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VAbstract
William Robertson Nicoll (1851-1923) founded the 
British Weekly in 1886 to exploit the need for a Liberal 
Nonconformist newspaper. Nicoll became the most important 
editor of a Free Church journal in the Edwardian period.
The British Weekly provided a regular focus for political 
Nonconformity and Nicoll was a primary raiser of the 
Nonconformist consciousness and shaper of the collective
conscience.
This thesis considers the role of newspapers as 
conduits of political thought. As distributors of 
information, newspapers had a definite role in setting the 
political agenda and this work considers the programme 
which Nicoll pressed at the British Weekly. The newspaper 
is also considered as a nexus of religious and financial
considerations.
The analysis provides an examination of the British 
Weekly from its foundation in 1886, placing it in political 
context and setting down the editorial agenda.
Nonconformist concerns were threatened both by the
political preponderance of Irish interests and by the 
extension of the franchise to working class voters more 
concerned with social than religious equality. This thesis 
therefore looks at Nicoll's alignment with the Liberal 
Imperialists because they would rid the party of its 
commitment to Home Rule and (less importantly) because they 
appeared to respond to the needs of the working class. In 
1902 the British Weekly misplaced its national efficiency
VI
agenda and became prominent in the Passive Resistance 
campaign against the Education Act. The thesis examines 
the way in which the protest was used to energise political 
Nonconformity. The campaign brought Nicoll into contact 
with Lloyd George and this work explores the mutual 
benefits of this relationship and also the way in which 
Nicoll was compromised as a lobbyist by the association.
This is the first comprehensive examination of the 
political nature of the British Weekly. It highlights the 
increasing complexity of reconciling religion and politics 
in the twentieth century as pressing social issues could 
not be repaired by Victorian moral crusades.
INTRODUCTION
VI1
Benedict Anderson describes the reading of newspapers 
as an "extraordinary mass ceremony". He illustrates the 
way in which print provides the substance of imaginings 
which create the sense of a shared consciousness 
fundamental to the concept of nation.1 Newspapers also 
function in the formation of minority "communities" within 
the nation. For religious groups the "simultaneous 
consumption" of newspapers provides a system of information 
which multiplies the experience of public worship and gives 
meaning to the idea of a national religious tradition. 
Formalised religious groups have a strong oral culture but 
they are dependent upon print to give them a cohesion 
across a wide geographical area.
This thesis will examine the role of the Free Church
editor Robertson Nicoll in the weekly creation of the idea 
of "British Nonconformity". It will consider the function 
of newspapers as raisers of consciousness .and more 
specifically the function of the British Weekly as creator 
of conscience. The thesis will also explore the world 
created through the filter of the British Weekly, a 
newspaper which provides a comprehensive chronicle of the 
issues which preoccupied the Free Churches, and chart the 
political development of the British Weekly from its 
inception in 1886 until Nicoll's death in 1923. The 
newspaper will be examined as a nexus of religious, 
political and economic factors. This work considers how
these elements influence the direction of the British
1 B.Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the 
Origin and Spread of Nationalism, (revised edition) London 1992, 
p. 35 .
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Weekly and whether they can be reconciled without the loss 
of editorial integrity.
Despite the significance of Nicoll and the British 
Weekly to the Nonconformist mind at the turn of the century 
there has been very little comprehensive research on the 
subject. T.H. Darlow wrote an official biography of Nicoll 
in 1925. This is an invaluable source of the editor's 
correspondence.2 In 1954 G.W. Lawrence wrote a doctoral * 
thesis on Nicoll and religious journalism in the nineteenth 
century. This is a widespread if uncritical survey of 
Nicoll's career but its main focus is on religious rather 
than political subjects.3 Stephen Koss is the only other 
historian who has consulted the Nicoll archive in Lumsden, 
Aberdeenshire (correspondence between Nicoll and Lloyd 
George is in the National Library of Scotland). He 
provides many insightful comments on Nicoll in his survey 
histories of political Nonconformity and the political 
press.4 However this thesis is the first systematic 
examination of Nicoll and the politics of the British 
Weekly. It provides the opportunity to put into historical 
context extracts plucked from the newspaper in an attempt 
to represent the Free Church viewpoint. J.E.B. Munson's
2 T.H.Dar1ow, William Robertson Nicoll: Life and Letters, 
London 1925. Many of the letters included in this volume can no 
longer be found at the Old Manse in Lumsden where the majority 
of Nicollzs correspondence is kept.
3 G.W.Lawrence, "William Robertson Nicoll (1851-1923) and 
Religious Journalism in the Nineteenth Century." Unpublished 
Ph.D, University of Edinburgh, 1954.
4 S.Koss, Nonconformity in Modern British Politics, London, 
1975 and The Rise and Fall of the Political Press in Britain, 
(paperback edition) London 1990.
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exhaustive study of Nonconformity as revealed through the 
passive resistance movement against the 1902 Education Act 
judges Nicoll imperfectly because the research is
concentrated on the British Weekly in the Edwardian 
period.5 This thesis will help to redress this type of 
imbalance.
As an editor Nicoll was self-consciously a raiser of 
consciousness. Stephen Koss has said of him and John 
Clifford (who also died in 1923) that they "believed 
passionately in the destiny of political Nonconformity, 
which they sometimes seemed almost to have willed into 
existence".6 This was exactly the purpose which the 
British Weekly served. The perpetuation of the view that 
Dissenters were defined by a different spiritual and 
cultural experience was important because it reinforced the 
sense of oneness within the disparate Free Church community 
and because it gave an impression of internal strength to 
those outside. The British Weekly, by its very nature, 
assisted this idea of separateness, and it used this sense 
of alienation to promote its own political agenda which was 
the struggle for religious equality. The British Weekly
did not want Nonconformists to assimilate until this had
been achieved.
Without newspapers there could have been no concept of
a "Nonconformist conscience" - indeed it was the editor of
the Methodist Times who coined the phrase. Church leaders,
5 J.E.B.Munson, "A Study of Nonconformity in Edwardian 
England as Revealed by the Passive Resistance Movement Against 
the 1902 Education Act." Unpublished D.Phil. Oxford 1973.
6 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.166.
Xthe National Free Church Council and Dissenting M.P.s all 
relied on the press to advertise their views nationally and 
invent the notion of a cohesive moral or political force.
As the most important Free Church journal of the Edwardian 
period the British Weekly became the main expresser of this 
conscience.
Paradoxically, the British Weekly was a hybrid born of 
political Nonconformity at its most confident and of the 
growing awareness that religion as a political force was 
declining. Nicoll's immediate purpose was to keep the 
debate alive while religious inequality continued to exist 
and in the longer term to ensure that Christianity remained 
vital to British national life. The British Weekly 
provided a platform for the agony of the Churches and the 
Liberal party as they sought to make themselves relevant to 
modern democracy without losing their essence. Both had to 
find a language which would be meaningful to the working 
classes without excluding their natural following. The 
British Weekly was aimed at a middle-class readership and 
therefore reflects its nervousness at the potential shift 
of power to the masses.7 Although newspapers were vital 
to the existence of political Nonconformity, so too was the 
presence of a Free Church electorate which was prepared to 
use its vote to lobby certain causes. The extension of the 
franchise to a less religious working class considerably 
diluted the political power of the Free Churches and forced 
their sectarian interests down the political agenda. This
7 It is very apparent from readers' letters, competitions 
and columns on etiquette that the British Weekly was aimed at and 
attracted a middle class audience.
analysis therefore takes into account the British Weekly's 
interest in the development of the Labour movement and the 
implications of Socialism for the Liberal party's claim to 
be the nation's main progressive force.
Newspapers are not simply narrative ephemerae. 
Editorial policy is directed by many practical social and 
economic factors. The elements which contributed to the 
overall character of the British Weekly are examined in 
this introduction together with the unique input of its 
editor. Nicoll provided the personality of the newspaper. 
His good friend J.M. Barrie, wrote: "Seldom, I suppose, has 
there been an editor who was his paper so peculiarly as 
Nicoll was. He made the British Weekly off his own bat - 
made it by himself out of himself; it was so full of his 
personality that he came stalking out of all the
pages..."8 Nicoll's assistant editor Jane Stoddart has 
recorded that the lowest number of leaders written by 
Nicoll in any year was 41.9 Consequently he was less an 
editorial spectre than a physical presence whose 
contributions defined the newspaper. As its founding 
editor and proprietor it was Nicoll who established the 
British Weekly as the main reference point of the Free 
Church mind after 1902, less than twenty years after the 
first issue. In this year the publishers Hodder and 
Stoughton recognised the "great value" of Nicoll's 
contributions which had "very largely brought... about" the
XI
3 Darlow, op.cit., p.326.
9 J.T.Stoddart, William Robertson Nicoll LLP: Editor and 
Preacher, London 1903, p.41.
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success of the newspaper and offered him an increased 
salary of £700 plus a fourth share of the profits.10 In 
1903 Nicoll reminded Hodder and Stoughton during a dispute 
over the production of the British Weekly: "I have written 
more of my paper than any editor in London. More and more 
as the years went on..."11 In the minds of contemporaries 
Nicoll and the British Weekly were inter-changeable.
Nicoll was born in Aberdeenshire in 1851 and was 
raised in a Free Church manse. He graduated from Aberdeen 
University at the age of 19 and was licensed to preach at 
21. He was prevented from pursuing this vocation by a 
weakness in his lungs which necessitated a move to London 
where journalism provided a surrogate pulpit. He was 
appointed editor of the religious journal the Expositor in 
1884 (a year before he gave up his ministry) by the 
publishers Hodder and Stoughton. Two years later Nicoll 
helped to found the British Weekly and was instrumental in 
the setting up of the Bookman (1891), Woman at Home (1893) 
the Christian Budget (1898) and the British Monthly 
(1900) ,12
Nicoll was also a recognised literary editor. He 
acted as a literary adviser to Hodder and Stoughton from
10 Hodder and Stoughton to Nicoll, 13th February 1902, 
Hodder and Stoughton Papers, Guildhall Library, MS.16,372.
11 Nicoll to Hodder-Williams, 29th November 1903, Hodder and 
Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
12 The Expositor ceased publication in 1910; the British 
Weekly was sold to the Christian World in 1946; the Bookman was 
sold to London Mercury in 1935; Woman at Home stopped publishing 
in 1909; the Christian Budget lasted only until 1902 when it was 
sold to the Christian Herald and the British Monthly was closed 
in 1905. Hodder and Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,355.
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1886 and was linked to the founding of the Kailyard school 
of Scottish writing. His passion for literature gave him a 
breadth of vision which freed him somewhat from a very 
narrow Nonconformist viewpoint. This was amply illustrated 
in 1916 when Nicoll joined a host of Radical writers in an 
attempt to save Roger Casement from execution.13 In H.G. 
Wells' Boon Nicoll is parodied as the "eminent litterateur" 
Dr. Tomlinson Keyhole who is murdered "in his villa at 
Hampstead". Keyhole writes four reviews of the same work 
under different names (a common practice of Nicoll's) and 
reveals an appetite for scandal:
Dr. Keyhole distinguished himself by the feverish 
eagerness of his curiosity about where Leslie 
slept and where was the boudoir of Mrs. Sinclair.
He insists that a very sad and painful scandal 
about these two underlies the New Republic, and 
professes a thirsty desire to draw a veil over it 
as conspicuously as possible.14
Nicoll had many critics. In his obituary the Times noted 
that "His personality was held in awe even when he was not 
always beloved".15 A.G. Gardiner recorded hearing Nicoll 
speak on literary criticism and thought him "as false & 
sleek as ever" although undeniably "very clever".16 Lloyd 
George opined that "Nicoll had enemies, due in a great 
measure to the fact that he was thorough.
13 S.Koss, Fleet Street Radical: A.G.Gardiner and the "Daily 
News", London 1973, p.196.
14 H.G.Wells, Boon, London 1915, p.79. Nicoll was known as 
Keyhole behind his back in the Reform Club. Koss, Nonconformity 
Politics, p.41.
15 Times, 5th May 192 3 .
16 28th January 1910, Gardiner's Diary, Gardiner Papers, In 
Koss, Fleet Street Radica1, p.173.
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When he went into the war, he went into it heart and 
soul..."17 While there was some truth in this assertion, 
criticism more often came because Nicoll appeared to be 
incredibly calculating and his journalistic style was very 
abrasive. George Riddell wrote that as "a controversialist 
he [Nicoll] was in the first rank. No writer of his time 
had a greater power of marshalling arguments in an 
arresting and convincing form...He excelled with all the 
weapons of controversy - persuasion, invective, satire and 
humour".18 The power which Nicoll enjoyed undoubtedly 
exposed him to many detractors.
The British Weekly was also the product of the work of 
a wider team. Jane Stoddart was a versatile assistant 
editor who spoke French and German and revealed a great 
breadth of reading in her journalism. She first met Nicoll 
when he took up his ministry in Kelso where she lived. 
Stoddart moved to London in 1887 to help Nicoll edit a 
planned series of homiletic volumes and joined the staff of 
the British Weekly in 1890.19 Ernest Hodder-Williams, 
grandson of the publisher, became an important contributor 
and along with Stoddart edited the British Weekly in the 
last years of Nicoll's life (although Nicoll remained 
nominal editor). Principal James Denney was also a 
significant contributor and in 1906 agreed to relieve 
Nicoll - probably with a leader article - at least once a
17 6th May 1923, Riddell Diaries, British Library, 
Add.MS.62990, ff.53-54.
18 British Weekly, 10th May 1923 .
19 J.T.Stoddart, My Harvest Years, London 1938, p.18, p.57,
p.65.
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month.20 Denney, who was born in Paisley, was appointed 
Professor of the Free Church College in Glasgow in 1897 and 
Principal of Glasgow College in 1915.21
Hodder and Stoughton provided the financial support 
for Nicoll's journalistic ventures and (according to 
Darlow) did not trouble Nicoll about the expense of the 
British Weekly, encouraging the editor in every way 
possible.22 However correspondence suggests that the 
publishers were very dependent upon Nicoll to generate 
ideas. When Nicoll wanted to introduce illustrations to 
the British Weekly supplement he was prepared to pay for 
the cost personally.23 In 1901 changes to the method of 
printing the British Weekly - to a new rotary printing 
machine24 - were a constant source of tension between 
Nicoll and the publishers. The editor threatened to 
refrain from writing anything for the journal if its 
production and distribution were not put on a more reliable 
basis.25 Nicoll appeared to feel that the contribution of 
the publishers to the finished product was negligible. He 
complained to Ernest Hodder-Williams about the response of
20 Denney to Nicoll, 2nd October 1906, W.R.Nicoll (edit.), 
Letters of Principal James Denney to William Robertson Nicoll
1893-1914, London 192 0, p.74.
21 W.R.Nicoll (edit.), Letters of Denney to Nicoll, p.xiii, 
pp.xvii-iii, pp.xxii-iii.
22 Darlow, op.cit., p.74.
23 Nicoll to Hodder and Stoughton, n.d., Hodder and 
Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,355.
24 British Weekly, 12th December 1901.
25 Nicoll to Hodder-Williams, 29th November 1903, Hodder and 
Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
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Hodder and Stoughton to a particular idea:
I do not think either of them in the least 
understood my real idea, and they did not put a 
single question or make a single remark. It is 
very disheartening to do business with people of 
that kind, but I suppose there is no help for it, 
although I have been thinking very seriously 
whether in your interest and in mine it would not 
be well to leave them without any proposals for 
one year, and just see how they would get on. I 
need not say that they have not a single idea 
themselves of doing anything nor do they appear 
to be in the slightest degree disturbed but 
rather complacent.26
This dearth of intellectual input from the publishers 
allowed Nicoll a free hand while the British Weekly 
continued to make a profit. This it did almost 
immediately; by the end of 1886 it was already clearing its 
expense.27 28In 1901 Nicoll reproached Hodder-Williams from 
Paris for announcing that the circulation of the British 
Weekly was 68,000 arguing that it was unprecedented to make 
this kind of statement unless the circulation was
remarkably large (as that of the Daily Mail), and it was 
even more unprecedented to announce it as less than it was: 
Nicoll's estimate was 70,000-72,000.29 This forces us to 
treat with caution the British Weekly's public estimate of 
its own circulation which it gauged to be 80,000 at the end 
of 1901, having increased from 54,071 in 1899, 62,419 in 
19 00 and 73,859 in November 1901.29
26 Nicoll to Hodder-Williams, 31st January n.d. [1900-01], 
Hodder and Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
27 Darlow, op . cit. , 'p . 74 .
28 Nicoll to Hodder-Williams, n.d., [1900s], Hodder and
Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
29 British Weekly, 12th December 1901.
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Before launching the British Weekly Nicoll wrote "We 
must have 20,000 subscribers [to survive], and there is not 
that number of intelligent people in the country - so we 
must condescend to weak minds".30 Nicoll took advantage 
of new trends in typography and journalistic content 
pioneered by W.T. Stead at the Pall Mall Gazette. Matthew 
Arnold is attributed with coining this departure "new 
journalism". He believed that it had "much to recommend 
it; it is full of ability, novelty, variety, sensation, 
sympathy, generous instincts; its one great fault is that 
it is feather-brained".31 Arnold's critique was inspired 
by an article in the Nineteenth Century by Stead in which 
he posited the view that sensational journalism was "solely 
a means to an end...never an end in itself. When it ceases 
to serve its turn, it must be exchanged for some other and 
more effective mood [sic] of rousing the sluggish mind of 
the general public into at least a momentary activity".32 
Although the British Weekly did not use the infamous 
methods of the Pall Mall Gazette to capture the national 
imagination, it did employ innovative devices like the 
London religious census of its first issue and the popular 
"Tempted London" series which outlined the various vices
30 Nicoll to Marcus Dods, 7th August 1886, Darlow, op.cit., 
p.70. Dods was a frequent correspondent of Nicoll. He was 
Minister of Renfield Free Church in Glasgow from 1864 to 1889 
when he became Professor of New Testament criticism and Exegesis 
at New College, Edinburgh, until his death in 1909.
31 M.Arnold, "Up to Easter," Nineteenth Century, 1887, xxi, 
pp.638-9, in A.Lee, The Origins of the Popular Press in England 
1855-1914, (reprint) London 1980, p.118.
32 W.T.Stead, "Government by Journalism," Contemporary 
Review, Vol.49, May 1886, p.672.
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waiting for young men and women in the capital.33 It must 
never be forgotten that the British Weekly was a commercial 
enterprise. No matter how important its political agenda 
it still had to sustain itself as a viable business.
In his article in the Nineteenth Century Stead 
described newspapers as the ultimate democratic expression, 
"the most immediate and most unmistakable exponents of the 
national mind".34 This was part of the broader notion 
that the repeal of the "taxes on knowledge" in 1855 had 
ushered in a period of press freedom; newspapers were no 
longer dependent upon political party funding and were 
sustained through advertising. However this market based 
system made it increasingly difficult for truly Radical 
newspapers to sustain their economic base. Advertisers 
became important arbiters of the politics of the press as 
the political slant of newspapers was assumed to indicate 
the social class of the readership. It did not make 
financial sense to advertise in journals purchased by 
people with low incomes.35 Contemporaries were not 
oblivious to the narrowing affect of advertisers on 
political debate. Hall Caine wrote in the British Weekly
33 "Tempted London: Young Men" began on 7th October 1887, 
and the "Young Women" series began on 27th April 1888.
34 W.T.Stead, op.cit., p.653.
35 J.Curran and J.Seaton, Power Without Responsibility: The 
Press and Broadcasting in Britain, London 1981, passim. 
J.Goodbody has concluded that although the Radical Star matched 
the circulation figures of its main rival, advertisers assumed 
that while the early editions were bought by the lower middle- 
classes added circulation came from those who were less well off. 
"The Star: Its Role in the Rise of Popular Newspapers, 1888­
1914," Journal of Newspaper and Periodical History, Vol.l, No.2, 
Spring 1985, p.23.
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in 1901:
Our newspapers are bigger and better than the 
newspapers of other countries but they live on 
their trade adverts - in other words they live on 
the capitalists. They are free from political 
censorship, but less free than newspapers abroad 
from class control. The English press is the 
reverse of a corrupt press, but it would be folly 
to pretend that it is an independent press. Its 
interest always lies on the side of the existing 
order, and it cannot be expected to play the part 
of a pioneer in a social and economic change.36
Stead outlined the three areas in which the press played 
out its role: accessible representative of the public; 
guardian of the general interest and Chamber of Initiative. 
It was the acceptance of the first of these which gave 
newspapers their mandate to act as watchdog for the nation 
and their political strength to act as a initiators of 
policy. Although access to the medium was not universal 
and advertising was an increasingly restrictive type of 
capital it was vital for the success of a newspaper that it 
was seen to be representative.
The British Weekly had to create the image that it 
spoke for Nonconformity. The fact that its circulation was 
substantial suggests that readers recognised its depiction 
of Free Church culture and accepted its role in the sharing 
of their common beliefs. Nicoll's parliamentary influence 
was dependent upon the notion that those who bought the 
British Weekly subscribed to its political viewpoint and 
that Nicoll had the ability to generate thought in his 
readership. However political comment made up no more than 
20% of the British Weekly, 70% of the content dealt with
3 6 British Weekly, 12th Dec ember 1901.
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religious issues. It is as likely that this type of 
journal was purchased as much for its religious and 
literary articles - for its value as a magazine - as for 
its political polemics. There is not necessarily a 
correlation between the influence the British Weekly was 
perceived to have over its readership and the reality.
Politicians allowed themselves to be influenced by the 
press because they were prey to this journalistic 
propaganda which portrayed newspapers as the great 
educators and representatives of the people. More 
importantly the press was seen to be a means of 
politicising the growing number of novitiate electors. No 
one could evaluate the extent to which newspapers 
influenced the politics of their readers. However, 
evidence suggests that they are instruments which confirm 
rather than convert political opinion. It was observed in
1902 :
If the voter does not take his party politics 
from the paper, it confirms him in his party 
preferences or prejudices, and by an action 
analogous to that of water dripping on a stone, 
keeps him loyal to the party; in any event the 
newspapers provided the- parties and their 
organisations with a highly effective means of 
publicity.37
This perceived influence allowed newspapers to be most 
constructive in the setting of the political agenda. This 
thesis is concerned with the agenda which was set by Nicoll 
and the British Weekly. It presents the newspaper as a 
conduit of political and social opinion and attempts to
37 Ostrogorski, Democracy and the Organisation of Political 
Parties, London 1902, p.410, in Lee, op.cit., p.187.
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gauge the impact of the British Weekly on the parliamentary- 
process. It does not claim to be able to assess the actual 
impact of the newspaper on its readership other than how 
this is refracted through the vision of the British Weekly 
itself and the private correspondence of journalists and 
politicians.
The main source for this thesis is the British Weekly 
which has been systematically consulted. Although it was 
not the only journal Nicoll edited, it was the most 
important and the only one with which he was connected 
throughout his journalistic life. I have also had access 
to Nicoll's private letters which remain in Aberdeenshire. 
Where possible I have examined the archives of those 
connected with the British Weekly but it has not been 
possible to locate any surviving letters pertaining to Jane
Stoddart.
This thesis opens with an examination of the founding 
of the British Weekly, placing it in political context and 
setting down its editorial agenda. It shows that the 
British Weekly had a specific sectarian aim: the
presentation of the case for Nonconformist Liberals who 
wanted to create a space within the Gladstonian liberal 
programme for disestablishment and nondenominational 
education, and who were not preoccupied with the debate 
over Irish Home Rule. The British Weekly's loyalty to the 
official Liberal party in 1886 did not signify a commitment 
to Gladstone, rather it began life as a Chamberlainite.
Chamberlain's move to the Unionists forced his 
erstwhile supporters to compensate for this loss to the
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Liberal party and the second chapter of the thesis looks at 
nature of this process. The British Weekly sought a modern 
Liberal agenda which would nonetheless be friendly to 
religious politics. The chapter examines the shift in 
traditional Evangelical thinking and in the Liberal party 
which provided the language for greater governmental 
intervention and looks at the British Weekly's response to 
this and its movement towards the Roseberian section of the 
party. Finally it shows that Nicoll's support for Liberal 
Imperialism was as much a rejection of Gladstonianism with 
its Home Rule agenda and anti-disestablishment basis as it 
was a positive embracing of national efficiency.
The third chapter concentrates solely on the debate 
over education. This issue was of fundamental importance 
to the Free Churches because it represented the first base 
of the power of the Established Church. It also receives 
prominence in this thesis because the controversy over the 
1902 Education Act established Nicoll as a leading voice of 
the Free Churches and propelled him into a political role. 
This chapter looks at the way in which the British Weekly 
interpreted the Nonconformist conscience and how it used 
the issue of education to energise the Dissenting 
tradition. It indicates that Nicoll did not simply use the 
Education Act to bolster support for the Liberal party but 
was primarily concerned with its implications for the 
future of the Free Churches. Therefore the passive 
resistance movement against the education rate did not 
represent the exploitation of the Nonconformist conscience 
but was an extension of Free Church culture in which
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sacrifice was used to heighten religious conviction.
Chapters 4 and 5 will deal with political 
Nonconformity within the framework of the Liberal 
Governments of 1906 to 1914. The British Weekly was at its 
strongest as a protest newspaper and these chapters will 
consider its position once its main political champions had 
achieved power. Balfour's Education Act brought together 
the political interests of Nicoll and David Lloyd George 
and these chapters examine this relationship and consider
its mutual benefit. The obstructive behaviour of the House
of Lords after 1906 helped Lloyd George to convince Nicoll 
that the Second Chamber was the real battleground for 
religious equality. Lloyd George recruited Nicoll as a 
publicist for official Liberal party policy and in return 
Nicoll expected Free Church interests to be given priority. 
This was the beginning of a process of change for the 
British Weekly as it became involved with the political 
future of Lloyd George and was instrumental in selling the 
Peoples' Budget and the Land Campaign to its middle class 
readership.
Chapter 6 will be a study of the major concerns of the 
British Weekly during the First World War. Initially 
opposed to British intervention, Nicoll became a fervent 
convert to the rightness of the war. He was an important 
proselytizer and helped to rally the Free Churches behind 
the Government. Nicoll came into conflict with Lloyd 
George over the handling of the drink traffic and 
amendments to the Welsh Disestablishment Bill, confirming 
his independent Free Church voice. However this thesis
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suggests that the way in which Free Church leaders like 
Nicoll interpreted the Nonconformist conscience during the 
war had long term damaging repercussions. For the first 
time, duty to the State was placed above the integrity of 
individual conscience in Free Church criticism of
conscientious objectors.
The final chapter of the thesis looks briefly at the 
years following the war in which Nicoll's infirmity forced 
him to make fewer journalistic contributions. It considers 
the British Weekly's position on the process of post-war 
reconstruction and looks at the implications for
Nonconformity and Liberalism.
CHAPTER ONE
"A JOURNAL OF SOCIAL AND CHRISTIAN PROGRESS”
1The British Weekly was launched into a gap created by 
the decamping of the Christian World to Liberal Unionism. 
Its avowed creed was one of "progress" and - while 
independent of any sect or party - "Advanced Liberalism".1 
Nicoll's more specific agenda was to consolidate the 
position of Nonconformists within the reduced Liberal party 
in the hope of pressing a sectarian programme. The British 
Weekly supported the Gladstonian Liberal party even though 
its editor was a self-confessed Chamberlainite. Indeed in 
the newspaper's opening months Nicoll commissioned two 
important unsigned leaders on Ireland from Henry Drummond 
which gave the impression that the British Weekly was 
sympathetic to Home Rule for the island. This chapter 
looks at the political background of the British Weekly and 
shows that Nicoll stayed with the official party because it 
was the traditional home of Nonconformists and because he 
had miscalculated the longevity of Gladstone's political 
life. It examines Nicoll's position once Chamberlain's 
self-banishment to the Unionists became permanent and the 
British Weekly's subsequent anger at the Irish Nationalists 
and Gladstone as they obstructed Nicoll's own agenda: 
disestablishment and disendowment of the Church and equal 
right of access in schools.
It was disestablishment of the Irish Church which 
encouraged Nonconformists to look to Gladstone as a 
supporter of religious equality.2 This precedent allowed
1 British Weekly, 5th November 1886.
2 Guinness Rogers recorded that, "it was probably Mr. 
Gladstone's action in this [Irish Disestablishment] which 
first raised him to the position he never afterwards lost in
2the British Weekly to exalt Gladstone as the leader of the 
battle despite the fact that he more often seemed its 
greatest obstacle.3 However for Gladstone the real 
significance of the legislation was in part that it 
incorporated principles which might protect the Church of 
England and English religious education from Parliamentary 
interference.4 The Midlothian campaign had again 
significantly strengthened Gladstone's relationship with 
the Nonconformist community, which understood the 
unequivocal nature of his reaction to Beaconsfieldism.5 
Faith in the integrity of the Liberal leader tied many 
Dissenters to Gladstone's coat tails and pre-empted the 
consolidation of Chamberlain's leadership of this group and 
its possible independence.6
The Bulgarian agitation erupted at the time when Dale 
and Guinness Rogers were completing their disestablishment
Nonconformist affection and esteem." J.Guinness Rogers, An 
Autobiography, London 1903, p.204.
3 British Weekly, 23rd December 1887. The British Weekly 
restated this in 1890 when it argued that Nonconformists had 
stayed with Gladstone because of his achievements, genius, 
religious conviction, and because he had practically served 
them when he passed Irish Disestablishment. British Weekly. 
30th October 1890. Gladstone did also make periodic hints 
that he had "crossed the Rubicon" and this helped to maintain 
Nonconformist support, eg. British Weekly, 21st June 1889.
4 J.P.Parry, Democracy and Religion: Gladstone and the 
Liberal Party 1867-1875, Cambridge 1986, p.177.
5 The eventual decline of Evangelicalism in the Free 
Churches in the last two decades of the nineteenth century 
meant that Gladstone's adamant, moral politics would soon be 
adrift from contemporary religious understanding. B.Hilton, 
"Gladstone's Theological Politics" in High and Low Politics 
in Modern Britain: Ten Studies, edit. M.Bentley and 
J.Stevenson, Oxford, 1983, p.53.
6 Kitson Clark, Introduction to Shannon, Gladstone and 
the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, London 1963, p.xxviii.
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campaign, and they had anticipated that the issue of 
religious equality would gain some prominence.7 The 
radical campaign in Scotland was so strongly committed to
land reform and disestablishment that the Liberal
leadership feared it would divide the party.8 But in 1879 
Gladstone wrote to the voluntary campaigner Principal Rainy 
that "in the present condition of imperial affairs" he 
could not profess that disestablishment occupied "the 
first, or nearly the first, place in my mind".9
Nevertheless Nonconformist support remained such that 
Gladstone was in a position to commend Free Church 
patriotism at the General Election one year later.10
Having relied upon the cooperation of various interest 
groups to obtain power the Liberal Government found itself 
again besieged by calls for disestablishment, temperance 
and social purity legislation.11 The 1880s saw a
resurgence of Scottish assertiveness which expressed itself 
in part through demands for disestablishment and in the 
formation of Land Leagues.12 Concentration on the 
extension of the suffrage and redistribution of seats
7 Guinness Rogers, op.cit, p.214. •
8 J.G.Kellas, "The Liberal Party in Scotland 1876-1895," 
The Scottish Historical Review Volume XLIV No.137, April 
1965, p.3.
9 Gladstone to Rainy, 24th May 1879, in P.C.Simpson, The 
Life of Principal Rainy, Volume II, London, 1909.
10 D.A. Hamer, The Politics of Electoral Pressure, 
Hassocks, 1977, p.21.
11 D.A.Hamer, Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone 
and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership and Policy, Oxford, 1972, 
p.89 .
12 Kellas, op.cit., p.5.
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temporarily united the party but the anticipation of a more 
democratic system led many sectional groups to believe that 
their position would be enhanced once reform had been 
secured.13 In September 1885 the radical National Liberal 
Federation of Scotland was formed to counter the more 
Whiggish Scottish Liberal Association. Unlike its
Chamberlainite English counterpart the Scottish Federation 
had as a main plank the call for religious equality.14 The 
threat of radical and moderate Liberals standing against 
each other became serious enough for Gladstone to intervene 
with an open letter appealing for the end of double 
candidatures.15 The Prime Minister also saw fit to quash 
debate on disestablishment in Scotland by placing it firmly 
"at the end of a long vista".16 In England Chamberlain 
continued to campaign for a broad programme of radical 
reform and began to suppose that democratic radicalism 
could survive without Gladstone and his more moderate 
supporters. It was within this context that Gladstone 
presented his Home Rule proposals.17
The subsequent schism grew out of the battle to secure
13 Supporters of disestablishment certainly believed that 
the negation of Whig power through the single-member 
constituency, the extension of the county franchise and the 
redistribution of seats would help their cause. G.I.T.Machin, 
Politics and the Churches in Great Britain, 1869-1921,
Oxford, 1987, pp.147-8.
14 Kellas, op.cit., pp.6-7.
15 Scotsman, 26th November 1885, in D.C.Savage, "Scottish 
Politics, 1885-6," Scottish Historical Review, Volume 40, 
1961, p.127.
16 Scotsman, 12 November 1885, in Kellas, op.cit., p.8.
17 Hamer, Gladstone and Rosebery, pp.100-1, p.110.
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the initiative within the Liberal party. Hamer supports 
the view that Gladstone's concentration on a single issue 
was designed to suppress the fragmentation of the party in 
the hands of sectional interests. Electoral reform brought 
with it a change in the relationship between Liberals and 
extra-parliamentary pressure groups. Groups like the 
Liberation Society, the United Kingdom Alliance and the 
National Education League - despite the rift in the 1870s - 
were more closely associated with the Liberals than the 
Conservative party. Interest groups contributed energy and 
moral certainty to the party but they also provided a 
target for those who depicted the Liberals as puppets of 
faddists.18 However it can be argued that Chamberlain's 
progressive agenda had already run out of steam by the 1885 
general election.19 Gladstone was determined to keep 
Ireland within the Empire and only adopted Home Rule once 
it was clear that the Conservatives would not use their 
influence to push it through the House of Lords.
In the autumn of 1885 the course of the British 
Liberal party was directed by two misconceived notions: 
that Gladstone's retirement was imminent and that Liberals 
would win handsomely at the next election. Despite 
tensions, neither the Whig nor Radical sections of the 
party wanted to break with Gladstone. Hartington and his 
followers aimed to present themselves as the heirs of
18 D.A.Hamer, Electoral Pressure, p.viii, pp.2-3.
19 T.A.Jenkins, Gladstone, Whicrcerv and the Liberal 
Party, 1874-1886, Oxford, 1988, pp.204-5, p.285.
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orthodox Liberalism once Gladstone had retired20 and 
although Gladstone's election manifesto represented a "slap 
in the face" to Radicals, Chamberlain judged, "his
[Gladstone's] reign cannot possibly be a long one and it is 
undesirable to have even the remains of his great influence 
cast against us".21
In anticipation of a convincing victory in the 
election Gladstone hoped to be given time to convince his 
party of the merits of Home Rule before introducing 
legislation. Hartington had accepted Gladstone's 
leadership with the understanding that Ireland would remain 
an open question and with the possibility that Gladstone 
would retire before submitting specific proposals.22 
Chamberlain expected a Liberal victory at the polls to 
provide his mandate for Radical reform. The party's 
failure to gain an overall majority scuppered all of these 
proj ections.
The internal politicking of the Liberal party had a 
dramatic effect on the party's traditional supporters in 
the press. Alan Lee saw the debate over Home Rule as the 
manifestation of much more complicated and long ranging 
grievances; "In the press, as in Liberalism generally, Home 
Rule probably served as an indicator of pre-existent 
political affiliations and attitudes, rather than as an
20 T.A.Jenkins, Gladstone, Whiggerv, p.218.
21 Chamberlain to Collings, 22nd September 1885, JCPP, 
in R.Jay, Joseph Chamberlain : A Political Study, Oxford, 
1981, p.115.
22 Jenkins, Gladstone, Whiggerv, p.246, p.256, pp.274-6.
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originator of them".23 Stephen Koss preferred a less 
fatalistic approach and instead saw the upset which Home 
Rule caused in the press - if not the Liberal party - as a 
much more spontaneous reaction to an unacceptable policy.
He argued that although it would be folly to view the Home 
Rule split in isolation, "the weight of newspaper 
opinion... abruptly shifted" in 1886 and 1887. The fact 
that the Unionists had overthrown the numerical superiority 
which the Liberal press had maintained since the abolition 
of the "taxes on knowledge" suggested to Koss that Home 
Rule itself was of paramount importance in the division.24 
Certainly in the Parliamentary sphere there was nothing 
inevitable about the split or the sides which were taken.25
The general decrease in Liberal influence in the press 
was in part due to financial considerations. This was more 
true of the Radical newspapers whose editors came under 
increasing pressure to tone down more extreme views.26 Sir 
Edward Hamilton confided to his diary in January 1888, 
"Several of the best Provincial papers have gone over 
wholly or in part [to the Unionists]; and others are at 
their wits' end for want of funds". This was primarily due 
to "the desertion of the bulk of the wealthy classes from 
the advanced liberal camp".27
In the first years of the Liberal split, the loss of
23 Lee, op.cit., p.161.
24 Koss, Political Press, p.287.
25 Jenkins, Gladstone, Whicrqerv, p. 291.
26 Lee, op.cit., p.159.
27 Koss, Political Press, p. 306 .
support for the party among the London press was greater 
than in other regions. The party was forced to rely on the 
Pall Mall Gazette for its metropolitan support as the Daily 
Chronicle had Unionist tendencies and the Daily News was a 
somewhat confused voice of Liberal party policy. Against 
this the Times had become anti-Home Rule along with the 
Spectator, the Observer and the Christian World. Among the 
English regional press the level of dissent was somewhat 
less dramatic. The Leeds Mercury and the Manchester 
Guardian continued support of Home Rule.28 Many areas 
maintained their Gladstonian press at least until the 
1890s.29
Scottish newspapers were much less predictable. The 
Scotsman, the Glasgow Herald and the Aberdeen Free Press 
joined an anti-Gladstonian bandwagon, leaving the Dundee 
Advertiser as the only substantial Liberal newspaper in a 
predominantly Liberal country.30 A possible rift with the 
right wing of the Liberal party in Scotland had been 
averted in 1885 by Gladstone's declaration on
disestablishment. However this temporary accommodation 
could not overcome the Home Rule Bill of the following 
year.31 In 1884 the Scotsman1s editor, Charles Cooper, had 
written warning Rosebery against a close association with 
the government:
I have never had much confidence in Mr.
8
28 Koss, Political Press, p. 281.
29 Lee, op.cit., p.161.
30 Koss, Political Press, p. 289 .
31 Savage, op. cit., p.129.
9Gladstone. If I had more I should have been 
disgusted with him because of certain matters 
with which you are fully acquainted. But it 
seems to me that further than this, he has got 
the party into serious discredit, and is getting 
it into more. He has disgusted me and I suppose 
many more like me by his open and disgraceful bid 
for the Parnellite vote in regard to the 
Franchise Bill...I had hoped that Lord Hartington 
would have had the courage of his convictions - 
if he had any - and would have stood out against 
much that has been done. I have been 
mistaken. . .32
Until its severance with Gladstone in April 1886, the 
Scotsman was used to gather force behind the Liberal leader 
despite its editor's private anxieties. It argued that - 
having given the Irish an extended franchise in an attempt 
to find out what they wanted - it would be wholesale 
hypocrisy to ignore the message of the last election in 
which out of a possible 103 seats the Home Rulers gained 
85. "Of course, if she [Ireland] asked for separation," it 
qualified, "the necessity of self preservation would 
override all other considerations and her demand would be
refused". Three months before the Home Rule Bill was 
outlined the Scotsman opined, "the man is not living who 
has done so much as Mr. Gladstone to make the Empire 
strong, prosperous and contented".33
However when the Scotsman published the details of the 
Home Rule Bill34, the reality of Gladstone's intentions
32 Cooper to Rosebery, 13th March 1884, Rosebery Papers, 
National Library of Scotland, MS 10011, f.l.
33 Scotsman, 25th December 1885.
34 The Irish Parliament was to have a degree of 
independence with the London Government maintaining control 
over the imperial, fiscal and foreign affairs.
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- which Cooper felt repealed the Act of Union - alongside 
public opinion, convinced Cooper that Liberal Unionism was 
his only possible course. He explained to Rosebery:
If a plan approaching Repeal were adopted I think 
you may count on most of Scotland going against 
Mr.G. Of course this does not mean that there is 
to be no Home Rule. Let us have a measure which 
Scotland would also be willing to accept for 
herself and the people will go for it, no matter 
what may be said in London.35
Cooper had been an advocate of Home Rule for Scotland as 
well as Ireland. However for him the crux lay in "the 
difference between a co-ordinate and a subordinate
Parliament in Dublin".36
In the more general experience Koss suggested there 
was, "reason to suspect that several of the 
newspapers...were responding more to popular taste than to 
conviction".37 But in Edinburgh and Glasgow the fact that 
the prevailing mood favoured Gladstone did not prevent the 
conversion of the major, dailies and in Manchester a 
substantial injection of money was administered to the 
Manchester Weekly Times and the daily Examiner by Liberal 
Unionists, making little impression on the sales of the 
dominant Manchester Guardian.38
In the traditionally loyal Nonconformist press the
35 Cooper to Rosebery, 4th April 1886, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS 10011, f.156.
36 Cooper to Rosebery, 24th May 1887, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS 10011, f.180.
37 Koss, Political Press, p.287.
38 Koss, Political Press, p . 290 .
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Christian World which had the largest circulation, had 
reportedly lost "some thousands of readers" through its 
opposition to Home Rule.39 This suggested the existence 
of a stubbornly Liberal readership which might provide the 
base for a Nonconformist journal for "Christian Radicals". 
It was into this opening that the British Weekly emerged.
i. The Founding of the "British Weekly":
In the autumn of 1886 the publishers Hodder and 
Stoughton had made an unsuccessful attempt to take over the 
ownership of the struggling British Quarterly Review (which 
they published); its sales having fallen from 2,500 to 
5 0 0.40 The previous May Hodder had informed Nicoll that 
the newspaper was in fact dead. In its place the publisher 
proposed a Monthly Review with Nicoll - who edited the 
theological journal the Expositor for Hodder and Stoughton 
- as editor. From the outset Nicoll was determined to 
assert his editorial rights. He refused to accept
suggestions from the British Quarterly trustees knowing 
"that suggestions are commands and I would have to put in 
articles by men whose names are a sentence of death in 
themselves to my periodical. There might be no control 
except the power of dismissal".41 Ultimately Nicoll
39 Darlow, op.cit., p.58, Koss, Political Press, p.289.
40 Lawrence, "William Robertson Nicoll", p.78.
41 Nicoll to Dods, 16th June 1886, Nicoll had written to 
Dods the previous week, "The only difficulty is the capital 
about £5 000. It cd be raised at once with a company but I
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disliked the idea of a monthly, arguing the impossibility 
of running a successful Nonconformist Contemporary Review. 
He proposed instead a weekly paper, "I have thought it out 
thoroughly and wd stake anything on its success," he wrote 
to Marcus Dods.42 In the end the Congregational owners of 
the British Quarterly refused to associate themselves with 
a successor, not wanting it to become a more general 
Nonconformist vehicle, but Nicoll and his publishers had 
already moved beyond their original proposals and a very 
different newspaper took shape.43
In June Nicoll wrote to Dods further elucidating his 
idea for a newspaper which was to be priced at a penny, "A 
penny [being] a democratic coin," and printed on a sheet 
similar in size to the Pall Mall Gazette. It was to be 
Nonconformist, democratic and advanced liberal, filling the 
same place as the Spectator among Whigs. Nicoll intended 
to offer "sane sympathy to such movements as Temperance 
Purity etc. wh: in spite of their leaders and extravagances 
are really democratic and wh: the Spect only sneers at".44 
The title, which presented the "chief trouble,", was finally 
settled as the British Weekly " - a la British Quarterly,"
would not work with a company. I do not need the money and a 
free hand is essential." Nicoll to Dods, 7th June 1886, 
Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
42 Nicoll to Dods, 5th May 1886, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
43 Allon, the British Quarterly editor, wrote to Nicoll 
on 3rd August expressing the wish of the Congregational 
Ministers that the title and good will of the British 
Quarterly would only be relinquished "in a way that would 
maintain the old lines of the Review in the service to 
[their] churches." Allon to Nicoll, 3rd August 1886, Nicoll 
Papers, Lumsden.
44 Nicoll to Dods, 7th June 1886, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
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an "intelligible and popular" option.45
The new journal was being conceived "above all [to] 
reflect the views of leaders and direct public opinion;" 
Nicoll wanted influence.46 He told Dods, "We want to teach 
and encourage the leaders of the new Democracy - Primitive 
Methodist ministers, elders and deacons people who talk 
about aspirations etc. Further we must make a special 
appeal to Scotland and Wales the new centres of
movement... and above all we must be in confidential and 
constant touch with the leaders in all parts". Nicoll 
concluded, "I have no doubt as to the perfect soundness of 
the scheme - if the leaders will help. But only a very few 
have yet been sounded - all I met very enthusiastic. I 
have good reason to know that Chamberlain and Dale will do 
their utmost". 47
The second half of the nineteenth century had seen a 
growth in Free Church newspapers; the Baptist, the British 
Friend, the Nonconformist and in 1885 the Methodist Times 
represented only a selection. A month before the
publication of the first British Weekly Nicoll wrote to 
Dods of the "frightful" mortality among newspapers in that 
year including the British Quarterly; the Clergyman1s
45 Nicoll to Dods, 7th August 1886, 18th August 1886. 
Dods suggested the subtitle which was adopted, "A Journal of 
Christian Progress," Nicoll to Dods, 7th August 1886, Nicoll 
Papers, Lumsden.
46 In the following decade Nicoll suggested that Hodder- 
Williams write a weekly column for the Morning Leader. He 
concluded, "The advantage is not in the money but in the 
power." Nicoll to Hodder Williams, 28th April n.d., Hodder 
and Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
47 Nicoll to Dods, 7th June 1886, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
Magazine and the Congregationalist. In the majority of 
cases he argued that death was "due simply to editorial 
carelessness and incapacity".48
In the summer before publication Nicoll wrote to Dods 
with a proposal that the first issues of the British Weekly 
contain the results of a religious census of London which 
would be sponsored by the newspaper. This would give 
substance to the many discussions on the religious
condition of the metropolis and would also generate 
publicity. Nicoll anticipated that other papers, meetings, 
conferences, even Parliament would be compelled to discuss 
the matter and "every Congregation in London wd at once get 
to know my name - a result after which otherwise we might 
strive many years in vain".49 The idea materialised and 
the religious census of London provided a novel boost to 
sales. Four days after publication of the first edition of 
the British Weekly, Nicoll wrote to J.Macnivan:
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The census is doing us enormous good, and I don't 
know how we should have got a hearing without it. 
I never expected it to reach the masses, as the
Christian Herald does. But I hoped to reach the 
vast number of educated Nonconformists in 
Scotland and England who take no Christian paper, 
and despise the Nonconformist religious papers 
for their want of culture. I hope especially to 
get the ministers.50
48 Nicoll to Dods, 5th October 1886. On 18th May Nicoll 
had written to Dods of how sad it was "to see Nonconformist 
journals ruined one after the other thro gross mismanagement 
and stupidity." Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
49 Nicoll to Dods, 7th August 1886, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
50 Nicoll to Macniven, 9th November 1886, Darlow, 
op.cit., p.73.
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Nicoll had embarked upon the task with a very strong 
sense of the constituency he wished to address.
G.W.Lawrence has written that Nicoll claimed he had no 
intention of setting up a newspaper to rival any other.51 
However preparation for the British Weekly revealed it to 
have a very definite political agenda. Retrospectively 
Nicoll wrote, "When I began to plan the British Weekly, I 
determined that under no circumstances should it represent 
any official party or take any official advice, but that it 
should be in every respect entirely independent".52 Yet 
this did not signal political objectivity. In the first 
leader Nicoll stated that while his journal would be 
"independent of any sect or party, [it would] aim at the 
ends of what is known as Advanced Liberalism".53 From the
outset Nicoll declared his hand as a Chamberlainite but his 
newspaper was not Liberal Unionist, 
ii. The "British Weekly" and Home Rule:
In April 1886 Chamberlain himself explained the 
support among Liberals for Home Rule as a combination of a 
feeling in favour of self-government, a desire to have done 
with the Irish question and loyalty to Mr. Gladstone whose 
judgement they trusted. The last of these Chamberlain saw
51 Lawrence, "William Robertson Nicoll", p.78. A letter 
to Ernest Hodder-Williams in 1904 suggests that Nicoll was 
being disingenuous in his claim. Discussing the possibility 
of setting up another weekly journal, Nicoll wrote, "I shall 
be attacking a paper already established. The attack on 
T.P.'s Weekly wd be an infinitely less serious thing than the 
attack on the Christian World nearly twenty years ago..." 
Hodder and Stoughton Papers, N.L.S., MS.16,370.
52 Darlow, op.cit., p.80.
53 British Weekly, 5th November 1886.
as the most significant.54 This contemporary reading has 
influenced more recent historical approaches to the 
relationship between Nonconformists and the Liberal party. 
Two main players in the drama, Herbert Gladstone and 
Chamberlain, made it very clear that Home Rule represented 
the older Gladstone's continued domination of the party.55 
Therefore it was not surprising that Chamberlain should 
interpret support for the policy as ultimately a vote of 
confidence in Gladstone's leadership. D.W. Bebbington has 
echoed this view, arguing that Nonconformists became 
advocates of Home Rule out of a traditional sense of 
loyalty to the Liberal party and more specifically to its 
leader. He has suggested that those who broke with the 
Liberal party fell into four categories: Chamberlain's 
Birmingham supporters, an "intellectual elite", anti­
catholics and conservatives.56
Bebbington refutes a more generally held contemporary 
view that Nonconformists backed Home Rule in order to gain 
support for disestablishment. He argues that
disestablishment had ceased to be an urgent issue for all 
but a few.57 Yet the evangelical Record wrote of rumours 
that an "informal agreement" existed between Gladstone and 
Liberationists, and the Liberal leader would give new
16
54 Chamberlain to Thomas Gee, 26th April 1886, National 
Library of Wales, MS. 8305 C, F.15a, in Hamer, Gladstone and 
Rosebery, p.118.
55 Ibid., pp.114-120.
56 D.W.Bebbington, The Nonconformist Conscience: Chapel 
in Politics 1870-1914, London 1982, pp.87-93.
57 Bebbington, Nonconformist Conscience, p.86.
consideration to disestablishment as a result of the 
political support he had been given by Nonconformists.58 
In Scotland, while the Home Rule Bill was opposed by the 
Liberal Association, Gladstone received the support of the 
Federation which had attacked him the previous year for his 
Church policy.
Nicoll is certainly an exception to Bebbington's rule. 
He was not bound to the Liberal party out of an attachment 
to Gladstone, but wrote to Dods in May 1886, "I am much 
taken up with the idea of Chamberlain making an end of 
Gladstone wh: is how things look..."59 Nicoll's
expectation that Gladstone would not remain leader for long 
makes sense of his political actions. For those extra­
parliamentary supporters of the Liberal party it was not 
immediately apparent in 1886 that they had to choose 
between Chamberlain and Gladstone. Nicoll informed Dods,
"I had a long conversation with Guinness Rogers yesterday 
and he is of the same mind. They [the Liberal party] will 
have to come back to Chamberlain ...Rogers thinks Gladstone 
is played out and he has excellent opportunities of knowing 
people's real mind."60 This was even more striking as 
Rogers was a loyal supporter of the Liberal leader. Hamer 
indicates that in the immediate wake of the Home Rule split 
many within the Liberal leadership were relieved that the
Record, 25th June 1886, in W. H .Mackintosh, 
Disestablishment and Liberation: The Movement for the
Separation of the Anglican Church from the State, London 
1972, p.304.
59 Nicoll to Dods, 18th May 1886, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
60 Nicoll to Dods, 5th October 1886, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
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chaos of "programme" politics had been replaced by the 
certainty and order of a "single issue" behind which the 
party was truly united.61 However others saw the Home Rule 
controversy as a division of the natural Liberal party 
which had been "rent in twain by an angry feud".62
The British Weekly grew out of a tactical trend 
already established by Edward Miall in the 1860s and 
Chamberlain and the National Education League in the 1870s 
which included in its agenda reform of broader Liberal 
policy as well as the aims associated with specific 
pressure groups. The Nonconformist had become an advocate 
of bringing pressure to bear upon the Liberal party from 
within, in a nondisruptive way.63 Similarly in 1886 
Nicoll's decision to remain within the Liberal party did 
not signal that he accepted every aspect of its programme. 
He stayed loyal to the Liberal party because to him it was 
an institution far from synonymous with Gladstonianism.
For Nicoll Liberalism was almost as inherent as 
Nonconformity because Toryism represented the Established 
Church. The Liberal party - which had abolished compulsory 
Church rates and disestablished the Irish Church - posed 
the most realistic vehicle for Nonconformist aspirations.
In 1889 the British Weekly recalled a speech Joseph 
Chamberlain had delivered at Bristol in 1877 in which he 
stated that "if ever he turned Tory...he thought he should
61 Hamer, Gladstone and Rosebery, pp.124-5 also 
D.A.Hamer, "The Irish Question and Liberal Politics 1886­
1894", Historical Journal XII, (1969), pp.520-1.
62 British Weekly, 51h November 1886.
63 Hamer, Electoral Pressure, pp. 38-39 .
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His belief was thatturn Churchman too, and also brewer, 
the Church and the public houses were the great supporters 
of the Conservative party".64
Nicoll was not convinced of the value of Gladstone's 
proposed Irish legislation. "Is there a Protestant in 
Ireland worth his weight in paving stones in favour of the 
Bills?" he wrote to Dods in June. Nevertheless the British 
Weekly editor did not want to become immersed in the 
debate. He explained, "As Spurgeon [who had joined the 
Liberal Unionists] expresses my ideas about the Bills, I do 
not discuss them except with people who like the Irish 
monks "follow in reploy on the same soide".65 In a letter 
to Professor Henry Drummond soliciting contributions for 
the impending British Weekly Nicoll wrote, "...as to the 
unfortunate Irish question I am an adherent of Mr. 
Chamberlain. But in the leading articles we should aim 
simply at the re-union of the Liberal party, avoiding 
everything that could irritate. In the signed articles we 
should allow free expression to both sides".66 * He 
confessed to Dods, "I wrote to Drummond as humbly as I 
could, but telling him frankly that I was a Chamberlainite. 
To tell you the truth, I feel great compunction in asking 
his help, for I cannot believe in him. All that 
evangelising, banqueting, reconciling and
19
64 British Weekly, 24th May 1889.
65 Nicoll to Dods, 7th June 1886, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
66 Nicoll to Drummond, 3rd August 1886, in Darlow,
op.cit., p.69.
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philandering. . . "b7
Drummond was something of an amateur authority on Home 
Rule and Nicoll specifically asked for two signed articles 
on "Impressions of Ireland".68 In the event Drummond 
contributed two unsigned leaders on the subject in November 
and December.69 In this way Drummond helped to set the 
tone of the British Weekly's response to Home Rule. It was
later recalled that Nicoll believed Drummond had the 
makings of a great journalist, "but he disliked committing 
himself, and was averse to controversy". Nicoll believed 
that Drummond was only in partial sympathy with the line 
taken by the paper as he was an ardent Home Ruler.70 
Nevertheless Nicoll had allowed Drummond considerable
influence in the British Weekly's Home Rule debate.
Drummond was a significant acquisition. The newly 
appointed Viceroy of Ireland, the Earl of Aberdeen, had 
asked him to join his staff in February 1886 and Gladstone 
was the most eminent of several Liberals who prevailed upon 
Drummond to stand for Parliament.71 Like Nicoll, Drummond 
appears to have remained with the Liberal party for reasons 
other than a blinding loyalty to Gladstone. His biographer 
and friend, George Adam Smith, recounted:
67 Nicoll to Dods, 7 th August 1886, Nicoll Papers,
Lumsden •
68 Nicoll to Drummond, 3rd August 1886, in Darlow,
op.cit. , p.69.
69 Darlow, op. cit., p.69.
70 Stoddart, William Robertson Nicoll, p.73.
71 Smith, G.A., The Life of Henry Drummond, London 1910, 
p.263, p.266 .
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He [Drummond] had not been converted by Mr. 
Gladstone's own judgement... But he had been 
impressed by the evidence of Lord Spencer, Sir 
Robert Hamilton, and other statesmen responsible 
for the government of Ireland who had declared 
for Home Rule; he recognised that the policy was 
in agreement with the Liberal principles he 
professed, and he was attracted by the moral 
possibilities which he felt it to contain.72
Drummond also considered that Gladstone had managed to 
create the climate in politics to facilitate his policy and 
this view was consolidated by the Professor's visit to 
Ireland in the spring of 1886.73 His natural distrust of 
the Irish party - due to their support for denominational 
education - was countered by his lack of sympathy for the 
position of Ulster protestants.74 In a private document 
Drummond outlined the "Reasons For and Against" standing 
for Parliament. It is clear that he saw the situation in 
Ireland as a "supreme crisis" to which Christians and 
patriots had a duty to respond. By actively supporting 
Gladstone's policy Drummond believed that he would be 
helping to prevent "...a time of terrible horror and
72 Smith, Drummond, pp.264-265.
73 Smith, Drummond, p.165.
74 Smith, Drummond, p.265, In the unpublished
Recollections of the Late Henry Drummond, his s tudent 
T.Hunter Boyd recalled that on his return from Belfast he had 
informed Drummond that "..great excitement had prevailed in 
Belfast and numerous prayer meetings had been held...to 
implore the defeat of [the Home Rule Bill]..The chief reason 
for this intense excitement appeared to be that if this bill 
passed, the Roman Catholics would in all probability drive 
the protestants into the sea, or that life would at any rate 
be made intolerable for Ulster folk. He [Drummond] had no 
sympathy with this attitude, indeed he thought they might 
deserve to be driven into the sea if they proved incompetent 
to maintain their footing on land..." Drummond Papers, 
National Library of Scotland, MS.Acc 5890(1).
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bloodshed in Ireland which may incite the Socialist leaders 
to attempt a social revolution here".75 76Despite a strong 
pull towards Parliament, Drummond decided that he could 
best serve the Liberal party and the "cause of truth and 
righteousness" by abstaining from a political career.75
Electoral defeat allowed "loyal" Liberals the luxury 
of uniting behind the principle of Home Rule without 
risking further schism over detail. The British Weekly - 
in its attempts to avoid exacerbating division - was 
equally vague in its support for reform in Ireland. It 
expressed some sympathy for the Plan of Campaign and 
reminded readers that, "Eviction was a mere pastime with 
many of our alien proprietors, or their agents. The 
refusal of the House of Lords to pass Mr. Gladstone's 
Suspensory Eviction Bill reflected the spirit that has 
ruled Ireland for weary generations".77 In a British 
Weekly leader Drummond proposed that unlike the 
Conservatives the Liberal party was more concerned with men 
than with institutions. Consequently, while the Tories 
could see Home Rule only in terms of Empire, the Liberals 
were able to look beyond such symbols to the grievances and 
the "underlying needs, wrongs and aspirations" of the 
people.78
Being an avowed "adherent of Mr. Chamberlain" did not
75 n.d. Drummond Papers, MS. Acc.5890(2)
76 Drummond Papers, MS. Acc 5890{2), Drummond to 
Gladstone, 15th June 1886, in Smith, Drummond, pp.266-267.
77 British Weekly, 24th December 1886, 5th November 1886.
78 British Weekly, 10th December 1886.
preclude Nicoll's support for Home Rule. Chamberlain had 
conceded the right of Ireland to govern itself on matters 
of domestic policy and had scorned that "absurd and 
irritating anachronism known as Dublin Castle",79 80but he 
felt snubbed by Parnell in the 1885 election and had been 
continually undervalued and undermined by Gladstone.30 
Chamberlain concentrated much of his attack on the Land
Bill during 1886 and condemned not only the estimated 
expense and lack of security surrounding the legislation 
but also the way in which it pandered to Irish
landlordism.81
For those like Nicoll who remained within the Liberal 
party, Chamberlain did not represent Unionism but 
Radicalism. Specifically he had been associated in his 
earlier career with campaigns for nondenominational 
education and disestablishment and this suggested that he
would be alert to the needs of his fellow Dissenters. It
seemed clear that if a Chamberlainite ascendancy was to be 
established within the Liberal party then his supporters 
would have to remain with Gladstone and exert their
increased influence. •
"The main body of the Liberal party must prepare a new
23
79 17th June 1885, in J.Morley, The Life of William Ewart 
Gladstone Vol.II, London, 1908, p.355.
80 Chamberlain had also been shocked by the antagonism 
provoked by his proposed visit to Ireland (with Charles 
Dilke) in the wake of the fall of the Government. 
F.S.L.Lyons, Charles Stewart Parnell, Suffolk 1978, pp.288­
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programme," Nicoll stated in the British Weekly's first 
leader: "Nothing could be more sterile and disheartening 
than the idea of going to the country with Home Rule and 
Mr. Gladstone's four points".82 Nevertheless the British 
Weekly endorsed Gladstone's leadership and conspicuously 
did not specify possible alternatives. It simply concluded 
with the weak hope that dissentient Liberals would show the 
slender nature of their alliance with the Tories and
"hasten the time when all true Liberals will band
themselves together for new campaigns against wrong".83 
The British Weekly argued that Chamberlain should not let 
his views on Home Rule force him to join hands with Whigs, 
believing that he had misconstrued the attitude of Parnell 
and the remaining Liberal party to Gladstone's Bill. On 
the pivotal issue of attendance of Irish Members at 
Westminster the British Weekly believed correctly that both 
Liberals and Irish Nationalists would be prepared to 
concede.84
The underlying contradiction remained that while 
Nicoll agreed with much of what Chamberlain had to say, the 
British Weekly would not champion the M.P. while he 
remained outwith the Liberal party. Even while he was 
offering what Garvin later called "the metallic imitation
82 British Weekly, 5th November 1886. These had been 
outlined in September 1885: representative local government; 
simplification of the electoral register; amendment of the 
land laws and reform of Parliamentary procedure.
83 British Weekly, 5th November 1886.
84 British Weekly, 31st December 1886.
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of an olive branch"85 at Birmingham, Chamberlain urged the 
Liberal party to concentrate on carrying out the vast 
reforms necessary in England, Scotland and Wales before 
considering the views of the Home Rulers.86 But his 
contention that Liberals were agreed on ninety-nine points 
of their programme, only disagreeing on one, brought from 
the British Weekly the response that it was the first and 
not the hundredth point which had caused the division and 
that in a personal sense Chamberlain had most to gain by 
making peace with the party.87 This was a warning to the 
Birmingham M.P. that he could not rely indefinitely on the 
support of Liberals as he perpetuated the party rift.
The British Weekly's admonishing of Chamberlain 
continued during the Liberal party's abortive attempts to 
mend its division. During the Round Table Conference in 
the opening months of 1887 Liberals, the British Weekly 
claimed, waited with "intense anxiety" for the result and 
believed that Chamberlain could be accommodated within the 
Liberal party with little real compromise on his part.88 
It warned that failure to reach agreement would represent a 
"fresh fracture" for the Liberal party.89 Both sides 
proved intractable. The Scotsman noted of Chamberlain's 
Birmingham speech that on certain vital principles of
85 J.L.Garvin, The Life of Joseph Chamberlain Vol.II 
1885-1895, London 1933, p.279.
86 Meeting of the Liberal Divisional Council at West 
Birmingham, 23rd December 1886, in Garvin, op.cit., p.278.
87 British Weekly, 31st December 1886.
88 British Weekly, 31st December 1886.
89 British Weekly, 14th January 1887.
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Gladstonian Home Rule Chamberlain had not yielded an 
inch.90 The Times argued that Chamberlain had no intention 
of surrendering the principles for which he had fought and 
concluded - in much the same vein as the British Weekly - 
that among Gladstonian followers there were signs of revolt 
against the Parnellite alliance. It observed the tendency 
in these circles to abandon and disavow Gladstone's Home 
Rule proposals.91
The British Weekly's position was further tested when 
the fitful progress of Round Table negotiations (which took 
place for a third time on 14th February) was halted 
completely by the publication of a letter from Chamberlain 
to the Baptist. It was a response to the accusation by 
Gladstone that the Liberal Unionists were responsible for 
the postponement of a Welsh Disestablishment Bill.92 
Chamberlain countered with the view that the great
advancement which the cause of Welsh Disestablishment had 
made in recent years had been:
...negated by the arrival on the political scene 
of a new subject, whose settlement may be long 
delayed, but to which we are told everything, 
including the just and pressing demands of "poor 
little Wales," must give way. Poor little Wales 
indeed if this be true and if its people accept 
this summary dismissal of their claims.
Chamberlain's letter was reprinted in the national 
dailies. Its criticisms reiterated many of his arguments
90 Garvin, op. cit., p.280.
91 Times 13th January 1887.
92 Garvin, op. cit., p.292.
during the general election of the previous year; putting 
forward the case of the "crofters of Scotland and the 
agricultural labourers of England".93 The statement in the 
Baptist outlined the differing priorities which had split 
the Liberal party. Its author claimed that Round Table 
negotiations would decide not only the future of the Irish 
question but the future of the Liberal party and its reform 
programme.94
Chamberlain asserted that the Welsh Nonconformists had 
supported Gladstone's Irish Bills in order to "arrive more 
quickly at the realms of their own hopes". The idea that 
the Liberal party was indebted to Nonconformists was one 
which the British Weekly returned to again and again in the 
years to follow. So too did it echo Chamberlain's 
arguments that the Liberal party had to be aware of 
problems beyond Ireland. Yet in February 1887 the British 
Weekly gave scant coverage to the publication of the letter 
in the Baptist. It noted that Chamberlain's actions had 
made the process of Liberal unity unnecessarily painful and 
was "straining very hard the faith of his friends". The 
British Weekly did not accept the letter's central thesis 
and countered that much time had been wasted at the Round
Table Conference due to Chamberlain's belief in the 
possibility of resolving issues such as disestablishment 
before some form of Irish settlement.95
Guinness Rogers shed some retrospective light on the
93 Times, 25th February 1887.
94 Times, 25th February 1887.
95 British Weekly, 4th March 1887.
27
28
position of Nonconformists as the split within the Liberal 
party hardened into permanency. He argued that, "Mr. 
Chamberlain's greatest mistake was his alliance with the 
Tories in order to force his views upon Liberals. The 
question - whether as to Mr. Gladstone's Irish policy 
itself or to the mode in which it was presented to the 
party - was one for the Liberals themselves to settle".96 
The British Weekly was certainly out of sympathy with 
Chamberlain's determination to dictate his terms to the 
Liberal party externally and saw this intransigence as the 
real obstacle to progress. This was more frustrating in 
view of the British Weekly's belief that Chamberlain could 
find support within the Liberal party if he would abandon 
his battle of strength with Gladstone.97 Rogers concluded:
In allying himself with the Tories in order to 
defeat his old chief Mr. Chamberlain sacrificed 
the interests of Liberalism and laid himself open 
to accusations of disloyalty,...No politician who 
pursued the extraordinary course which Mr. 
Chamberlain took in the Liberal Unionist split 
could expect to escape the severest censure from 
those whom he had deserted... It is not necessary 
to say there was betrayed trust, but there 
certainly was disappointed hope.98
Rogers was a more devoted follower of Gladstone than 
Nicoll but the frustration at chances lost was equally 
palpable.
96 J. Guinness Rogers, op.cit., p.258.
97 In 1894 the British Weekly claimed that it had never 
made any secret of the fact that Chamberlain had been badly 
treated by Gladstone, and that the Birmingham M.P.had acted 
in perfect conscientiousness in his revolt against the Home 
Rule Bill. 13th September 1894.
98 J. Guinness Rogers, op.cit., p.250.
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iii- Gladstone Blocks the Wav:
Only a week after it criticised Chamberlain's letter 
to the Baptist, the British Weekly argued that the 
political climate for disestablishment had changed because 
most Nonconformists had remained loyal to the party, while 
most Whigs (who had used their influence with Gladstone to 
oppose disestablishment) were now Unionists." By the end 
of 1887 the British Weekly still expressed optimism over 
the future of disestablishment because Gladstone's apparent 
endorsement of the cause suggested that it was no longer 
denominational but rather a question of principle.* 100 In 
fact it had never been an exclusively Nonconformist issue.
However the changing nature of British society had 
removed much of the intensity from the disestablishment 
debate. Proportionally Nonconformist numbers were 
declining and in the democratization of the political world 
social questions were overtaking old religious grievances 
in the discourse of justice and equality.101 In May 1888 a 
British Weekly reader expressed the concern that "at 
present nobody knows there is a question of
Disestablishment" and the newspaper conceded the Bishop of 
London's view that "a lull had come" in the debate. "The
" British Weekly, 11th March 1887. The leader was 
prompted by the Scotsman1s contention that Dissent was a 
spent political force due to its increasing support for 
Unionism.
100 British Weekly, 23rd December 1887.
101 Machin, op. cit., p.174.
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very peculiar political situation ha[d] for the time 
removed the question from the front", the British Weekly 
had concluded from its poll of Liberal and Liberal Unionist 
M.P.s. Generally the Liberal Unionists confessed to being 
so preoccupied with Home Rule that they had little time to 
write about anything else.102 Although the nominal 
support for disestablishment among Liberal politicians 
appeared to be significant it was in fact informal and not 
highly prioritized.103
The Liberation Society also suffered from lack of 
support. Impeded by financial constraints the Society 
found it difficult to find young men to fill positions of 
leadership. The disestablishment of the Irish Church had 
set a precedent which encouraged the Scottish and Welsh 
Churches to concentrate on their own separate
demands, thus fragmenting the Voluntary movement and 
removing support from the central Liberation Society. 
Although Welsh disestablishment became part of the Liberal 
party programme in October 1887, Gladstone did not commit 
the party to the disestablishment of the Scottish Church 
until 1889.104 In 1887 the Welsh voluntary campaign 
became riotous in opposition to the imposition of tithes. 
The British Weekly urged Liberal leaders to look at the
102 British Weekly, 4th May 1888.
103 Despite the fact that the number of Liberal M.P.s 
claiming to endorse disestablishment in 1885 was 171 out of 
333 and in 1895 was 162 out of 175, in 1897 only 86 of the 
162 made the effort to vote for the Bill. Bebbington, 
Nonconformist Conscience, p.24.
104 W.H. Mackintosh, Disestablishment and Liberation, 
pp.293-4, D.A.Hamer, Gladstone and Rosebery, pp.20-21, 
Machin, op.cit., pp.193, 197.
cause of the rebellion before advocating the repression of 
its symptoms.105
Henry Dunckley LL.D. argued in the British Weekly that 
disestablishment was a measure "pertaining to the general 
politics of the nation, though it is one in which 
Nonconformists naturally take a special interest, since the 
maintenance of a state Church is at variance with their 
principles and opposed to their interests in many 
ways'1.106 To Nicoll the elitism, which bestowed on the 
Church of England a sense of moral superiority, was a great 
anomaly in an increasingly democratic society. Yet it was 
the extending franchise which most threatened the political 
life of disestablishment. The British Weekly warned that 
female suffrage would help to "build round establishments 
an almost impregnable fortification". More importantly the 
1884 Reform Act, by bringing more working class voters into 
the system, had ensured the primacy of the social reform 
debate over disestablishment. The British Weekly chose to 
argue that increased democracy could result in the drive 
for disestablishment being removed from the hands of 
Christians. It warned that the dismantling of the Church 
would inevitably fall prey to the predatory instincts of 
the masses adding, "We should like [disestablishment] to 
come otherwise: as the work of Christian men, done in a 
Christian spirit, which means a just and even a generous 
regard to every possible claim, and an earnest desire to
31
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recognise the position and feelings of those affected".107
The politics of Home Rule had offered Nicoll his 
political baptism. Within two years of Chamberlain's 
letter to the Baptist, the British Weekly had come to 
understand that loyalty to the reduced Gladstonian Liberal 
party did not guarantee the leadership's commitment to 
religious equality. In October 1888 the British Weekly 
echoed Chamberlain in its demand that the Irish question 
should not be placed above all other issues, arguing that 
even if Home Rule were to be passed it would not lead to an 
immediate settlement. It reminded Liberal and Liberal 
Unionist Nonconformists that the great trust specially 
committed to them was the cause of religious freedom.108
By May 1889 the British Weekly stated plainly its 
belief that Gladstone was an old man with one cause who 
would bring about the further postponement of
disestablishment in Scotland and Wales.109 Lewis Dillwyn 
had moved a Welsh disestablishment motion in the Commons on 
the 14th and Gladstone had been absent.110 In October 1890 
the British Weekly expressed, "little doubt that Mr.
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Partington. She concluded that "Women who, on all other 
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Gladstone has consciously altered the natural course of 
events in order to avert disestablishment. He has plunged 
into the Irish question, and tried to make it the only one. 
But the disestablishment question will not down..."111 
Resentment was also expressed over the fact that although 
Gladstone appeared to be obliged to the Free Churches, his 
most faithful supporters, he had very little contact with 
their leaders and failed to recognise their special 
contentions and grievances.112 The lack of value placed 
upon Nonconformist loyalty was all the more galling beside 
the power of the Irish Nationalists. They lined up behind 
Parnell with the view that Irish interests could best be 
served by total independence from the main political 
parties . In reality the Irish Members had forfeited 
practical independence once the Liberals had accepted 
responsibility for the Home Rule Bill.113 But they could
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Rogers was later able to suggest the possibility that 
Gladstone had hampered the progress of Nonconformists: in 
1876 with the Bulgarian agitation and again in 1885 with the 
introduction of the Home Rule controversy. Guinness Rogers, 
op.cit. , p.214.
112 British Weekly, 30th October 1890. In July 1914 
Nicoll returned to this theme while writing some words on 
Chamberlain's career, "I cannot understand how anyone who has 
studied Gladstone's career can fail to see that he regarded 
Dissenters with something like loathing. He knew that he was
mainly indebted to them for his political victories.... Under
extreme circumstances he would even compliment them and 
address their meetings and tolerate their company. But he 
never made a real friend, so far as I know, of any 
Dissenter." British Weekly, 9th July 1914.
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never be seen as team players.114
iv. Revenge on the Irish:
The vigour with which certain Nonconformists attacked 
Parnell during the divorce scandal of 1890 was the result 
of an ongoing frustration with the degree of political 
influence exercised by the Irish. Ministers like Price 
Hughes of the Methodist Times were more concerned with the 
punishment of Parnell than they were with Irish politics. 
Parnell's downfall offered the opportunity for "respectable 
revenge" along with a chance to gain greater power in 
shaping the Liberal party and underlining its religious 
conviction. John Kent suggests convincingly that:
..the real, if concealed, issue in the Parnell 
case was political power...Home Rule could not be 
abandoned in Gladstone's lifetime but at least 
Parnell must go, and with him yet another 
obstacle in the way of bringing about the 
ascendancy of the Nonconformists in the Liberal 
party itself. Only an emotional involvement 
explains the bitterness with which Hughes 
denounced the Irish people as well as their
114 Parnell distinguished himself from his predecessor 
Isaac Butt by his insistence that the Irish members should 
not be bound by policy or parliamentary convention to the 
British parties. Lyons, "Political Ideas of Parnell," pp.753­
4. During Gladstone's second Ministry the Irish Nationalists 
commonly voted against the Government on free votes. The main 
bugbear however between Nationalists and Radicals remained 
religious education. Parnell's 1885 Manifesto urged his 
fellow-countrymen to vote against Liberals who, among other 
things, had "menaced religious liberty in the school," and 
Lyons has further suggested that the possible reason for the 
cancellation of the 1885 trip to Ireland by Chamberlain and 
Dilke was that the Irish clergy were aware that under 
Chamberlain's "central board" scheme education might have 
come under the control of secular Radicals. Lyons, Parnell, 
pp.2 6 8; 3 02 ; 289.
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leader.115
If on this occasion the Free Churches stood alone and won, 
it was because the struggle was political rather than 
moral: "Parnell did not really fall victim to British 
Puritanism: he fell on the cleaner field of British 
politics".116 Parnell certainly gave life to the view 
that he was the victim of a political conspiracy when he 
told the Freemanzs Journal that those who had plotted 
against him in the case of the Piggott forgeries were once 
again afoot.117 Contemporary wisdom also implicated 
Chamberlain in the timing of the scandal.118
Hughes was in part acting from a desire to engender 
unity among the Free Churches and to parade their moral and
115 J. Kent, "Hugh Price Hughes and the Nonconformist 
Conscience" in G.V.Bennett and J.D.Walsh (eds) Essays in 
Modern English Church History, London 1966, p.194.
116 Ibid., p.194. It was of course in the interests of 
the Nonconformist press to insist that it was a moral and not 
a political question. British Weekly, 27th November 1890.
117 Freeman's Journal, 30 December 1890, in Lyons, 
Parnell, p.453. .
118 Lyons, Parnell, p.455. On the event of Chamberlain's 
death the following interesting conversation took place 
between Lloyd George and George Riddell:
"Riddell: There is one side of his [Chamberlain's] character 
of which little is said. He was a political thug. He brought 
to bear upon Nineteenth Century politics the morals and 
conventions of the Middle Ages. If a man stood in his’ way he 
had to go down. I suppose there is no doubt that he 
engineered Parnell's downfall by advising O'Shea to bring the 
divorce case and possibly by assisting him with funds?
L.G.: Yes, I have always heard so. I wonder whether he 
was justified? I should not have done it but it is a nice 
question whether such a proceeding may not be justifiable in 
the interests of a great cause..." 9th July 1914, Riddell 
Diaries, British Library, Add MS.62974, f.112.
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political strength.119 Although the venom with which 
Nonconformists denounced Parnell was specific to this 
scandal the language was familiar to the campaign for 
social purity.120 The Free Churches had expressed the same 
moral censure in the divorce scandal involving Charles 
Dilke in 1886 and opposed his return to politics in 1891.121
While covering the exposure of Parnell's affair the 
British Weekly declared it "a result profoundly to be 
regretted from every point of view" and expressed a message 
of sympathy to the Irish nation whose leaders, by their own 
folly had removed Home Rule from the immediate Liberal 
party agenda.122 The newspaper's subliminal tone was one of 
restrained excitement. It seemed that the Irish members had 
delivered Nicoll from his campaign to relax Liberal 
concentration on self government for Ireland. The prospect 
that Parnell had a future in politics was not entertained 
in the weeks between the divorce case and the historic 
meeting of the Irish party in Committee Room 15.
Nicoll was not as notoriously anti-Irish as Hughes who 
told his audience at the St. James Hall, "We have 
sacrificed much for Ireland...But there is one thing we
119 J.Munson, The Nonconformists: In Search of a Lost 
Culture, London 1991, pp.215-6.
120 John Glaser has suggested that Parnell's failure to 
contest the divorce allowed him to be portrayed as deceitful 
and untrustworthy and this helps to explain the bitterness of 
the attack on him. J. F.Glaser, "Parnell's Fall and the 
Nonconformist Conscience," Irish Historical Studies, Volume 
XII, 1960-1, p.121.
121 Munson, Nonconformists, pp. 215-6 .
122 British Weekly, 2 0th November 1890.
will never sacrifice and that is our religion".123
Nevertheless the British Weekly asserted that the editor of 
the Methodist Times was speaking for thousands of liberal 
voters in (one of his more extreme statements) arguing that 
the Irish would prove themselves to be so obscene a race as 
to make them unfit for self government if they were 
deliberately to cleave to Parnell.124 The defence was 
compounded by the view that the zealous support of Price 
Hughes for Irish Home Rule previous to the divorce case 
gave particular weight to his protests in the crisis.125 
Nicoll, with fellow Nonconformists, enjoyed this licence to 
indulge both a long held resentment of Home Rule and a self 
righteousness made more glorious by the hesitation of the 
Romanists in Ireland.126
The British Weekly stated that the political future of 
Parnell was simply a question of limits, "the meanness, 
treachery, lust, and unblushing hardihood of Mr. Parnell 
remove him far beyond possibility". Nevertheless it took 
issue with the view that the cause of Home Rule was "buried 
in the cross-roads and a stake driven through its heart so
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123 Methodist Times, 27th November 1890, in Glaser, 
"Parnell's Fall" p.128.
124 This is referring to a piece by Hughes in the 
Methodist Times, 20th November 1890, in Lyons, Parnell, 
p.487. An endorsement appeared in the British Weekly, 11th 
December 1890.
125 British Weekly, 11th December 1890.
126 "The appalling and criminal silence of the Roman 
Catholic Bishops and priests is perhaps the most astounding 
fact of the situation, and will not readily be 
forgotten. . . .Meanwhile we are free to rejoice that the 
Nonconformists of this country have once more shown that 
there is that in them which may be trusted in the day of 
moral battle." British Weekly, 27th November 1890.
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that it [could] trouble men no more".127 But if Home Rule 
was not buried at the cross-roads it was certainly waylaid 
there, and the British Weekly took the opportunity in the 
weeks which followed to labour again the view that Home 
Rule was not the whole of Liberalism:
Home Rule is not the beginning and end of 
liberalism. There are questions of still greater 
moment, which bring all true Liberals instantly 
together, and give the party a prospect it has 
not had for long...Questions have ripened rapidly 
in these trying years. Liberals are longing to 
deal with social problems. The awful drink 
question is heavy on their consciences. No 
subject roused enthusiasm at Sheffield [1890 
N.L.F. Conference] like that of religious 
equality. Why should we not see an honest 
attempt to unite the party on the old great 
subjects, and leave the Irish question alone till 
this frenzy be overpast? Even in other
circumstances it was not enough by itself to 
generate a victorious enthusiasm.128
v. "Old Great Subjects": Disestablishment:
The "arrears of legislation" continued to accumulate 
and although Gladstone gave unenthusiastic support to the 
sectionalism famously encapsulated in the Newcastle 
Programme of the following year, Ireland continued to 
"block the way" in the mind of the Liberal leader.129 The 
British Weekly had warned of the weariness of those who had 
"ground in the Liberal mill these many years...and even yet
127 British Weekly 27th November 1890. The following week 
the British Weekly warned that, "The one chance Parnell has 
is that the Liberal party should now repudiate Home Rule. In 
that case he should soon be a greater power than before. But 
Home Rule is not the whole of Liberalism. . . " 4th December 
1890.
128 British Weekly, 27th November 1890.
129 R.Jenkins, Ascruith, London 1988, pp.56-7.
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have had almost no effectual redress".130 Yet it gave 
uncritical support to the litany of commitments in the 
party agenda which gave recognition to those "old great 
subjects" representing Nonconformist interests. The 
General Election of 1892 was underpinned by religious 
tension given the prominence of Home Rule and
disestablishment in the hustings and leaders such as 
Gladstone, Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith declared in 
favour of disestablishment.131 However the commitment was 
half-hearted and a British Weekly reader argued that 
Gladstone's reduced majority in Midlothian - which was 
attributed to his support for disestablishment - would not 
have been so far reduced had the leader educated the public 
in the justice of the cause.132
The new Liberal administration proved a disappointment 
to those impatient for religious equality. The British 
Weekly urged Wales to fight for a higher priority for 
disestablishment than it had been given in the Queen's 
Speech and promised that Liberalism as opposed to Mr. 
Gladstone was on their side.133 Inevitably Home Rule 
dominated the first session and the Welsh Church Suspensory 
Bill - which was intended as the first step to
disestablishment - was introduced in February 1893 and 
withdrawn seven months later due to lack of Parliamentary
time.
130 British Weekly, 16th April 1891.
131 Machin, op.cit., p.205.
132 British Weekly, 4th August 1892 .
133 British Weekly, 2nd February 18 93 .
The British Weekly continued to maintain that 
Gladstone was the real stumbling block to progress in the 
Liberal party programme. "My hopes of Gladstone being any 
good to Scotland, or Wales, or any place else, are very 
slight," Nicoll wrote to Rev. McRobbie in 1893, "He seems 
to me to be the greatest curse of the country, and how many 
are fallen while he lingers on plotting and scheming!"134 
Rumours that Gladstone was to resign in the early months of 
1894 elicited from Nicoll's newspaper the view that the 
Liberal leader was merely using the threat to force the 
party to accept an unadulterated policy of Home Rule. The 
British Weekly warned:
This, [move by Gladstone] it is calculated, will 
reduce the insistence of Welshmen and Temperance 
reformers to inarticulate grumblings which may 
well be disregarded, and allow for Irish 
legislation once more occupying the almost 
undivided attention of the House of Commons. If 
that is conceded we shall hear no more of Mr. 
Gladstone's retirement.135
Confirmation that Gladstone was to retire came as, "no 
surprise to those who, like ourselves, never believed that 
he would deal practically with disestablishment in 
Wales".136 The British Weekly responded to Lloyd George's 
threat of an independent Welsh party to press for
disestablishment by agreeing that the political honour of
40 .
134 Nicoll to McRobbie, n.d. [1893], in Darlow, op.cit., 
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Wales was now at stake.137 Asquith introduced a
Disestablishment Bill on 26th April which the British 
Weekly deemed "satisfactory".138 Countering the view that 
it was pointless to pass a Disestablishment Bill until the 
House of Lords had been reformed, the British Weekly argued 
that it was necessary to proceed with the legislation so 
that it could be put to the country, the democratic will 
being set against the will of the Upper House.139
Harcourt's Budget took up much Parliamentary time in 
this session but he promised that the party would deal 
fairly with the rest of its programme. The British Weekly 
hailed this revival of Newcastle as "a policy to awaken 
Liberal enthusiasm as nothing else could".140 It demanded a 
vigorous movement in the constituencies which would explain 
and promote the question of disestablishment. "There is no 
political subject which has received a place in political 
speeches so disproportionate to its importance..."141
The Welsh Bill did not reach its second reading. Talk 
of the dissolution of Parliament in November 1894 revealed 
the unwillingness of the Liberal administration to carry on 
trying to reconcile the backlog of demands being pressed by 
its loyal sectionalists. In December the British Weekly 
angrily attacked the Government for failing to approach the 
question of disestablishment with proper resolve and warned
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that it would rather vote for a Government which professed 
its support for the Established Church than one which 
claimed to be against it and did nothing to fulfil its 
promises.142
In the last session of the Liberal Ministry Scottish 
Disestablishment was not mentioned in the Queen's speech.143 
The British Weekly wrote an impassioned plea to Scottish 
Nonconformists to fight against this pecking order. It 
warned the Free Churches that disestablishment was more 
important than Church unity at this juncture and harangued 
the Government whose actions had been conspicuously 
pusillanimous, uncertain and unwise throughout.144 At a 
time when sections of the party were trying to re-invent 
the whole, sectarianism was more obviously outmoded.
Conclusion:
The British Weekly had been created to appeal to a 
very specific readership: middle class, Liberal, 
Nonconformist. Nicoll claimed later "I represent nobody 
but myself; my party is under my hat and will remain so".145 
But this type of aloofness was not the way to assure large 
circulation or exert political pressure. It was important 
for the success of the British Weekly that it was seen to 
represent not only the interests but also the views of the 
Free Churches. This position added strength to Nicoll's
142 British Weekly, 6th December 1894.
143 Machin, op.cit., pp. 213-4.
144 British Weekly, 14th March 1895.
145 Nicoll to Dods, n.d., Darlow, op.cit., p.80.
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voice within the Liberal party but did not guarantee 
success to his particular agenda.
The British Weekly had supported Gladstone and Home 
Rule not only with the understanding that disestablishers 
would have moral and numerical strength within the Liberal 
party after the flight of the Whigs but with the
expectation that Chamberlain would obtain the leadership. 
Nicoll had been deluded into believing that if 
Nonconformists played the party game they would consolidate 
their position and win some reward. But he was confronted 
by a Liberal leadership which did not relish the prospect 
of filling its cup with sectional interests.
The British Weekly argued that the emphasis in the 
disestablishment debate should rest with the rightness of 
the cause and not with the majority verdict of the people: 
otherwise the Irish could legitimately establish the 
Catholic Church.146 (This was also to compensate for the 
fact that only in Wales was there an overwhelming majority 
in favour of voluntaryism. ) This type of logic did not 
convert itself into practical politics. Equally the 
language for religious equality had become antiquated and 
disendowment became a greater concern than disestablishment 
in the 1890s. The British Weekly was left to harry the 
younger generation for their silence and asked young 
Scottish men, "Is the whole business indecent and 
contaminating, unfit to be touched by self-respecting men? 
Is the agitation for disestablishment in itself
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disreputable, that no young leader touches it...?"147
Nicoll's frustration at the general lack of 
determination in the cause of religious equality exposed 
the actual nature of his newspaper. It was very much a 
pressure paper with its own agenda. The British Weekly was 
never truly at home in the Liberal party because its 
constant point of reference was the advantage to be gained 
in the campaign for religious equality. Equally Nicoll did 
not always follow the majority line of the Free Churches.
As the British Weekly gained in stature it increasingly 
took its own view. There was some truth in Nicoll's boast, 
"With all my crimes I am conscious of never having written 
to please people - of very often the reverse".148 From the 
outset the British Weekly determined to lead not to follow 
public opinion.
Nicoll's uneasiness in the Liberal party left him to 
gravitate towards its outsiders. The British Weekly 
bemoaned the departure of Chamberlain, "No true Liberal 
should be ashamed to say that he vehemently desires Mr. 
Chamberlain in his day of the battle..."149 It remarked of 
the schism, "The whole business is sad; but there is 
nothing in it sadder than the thought of our lost 
leaders".150 However Chamberlain's inability to renegotiate 
his position within the Liberal party robbed him of Free
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Church support within a year of the split.151
Nicoll was therefore left to seek a new political
counterpart to champion his cause. The marginalisation of 
his agenda led him always to cleave to those who found the 
party political system restrictive. His most effective 
pairing would come with Lloyd George but in the interim the 
British Weekly went searching for an efficient, electable 
Radicalism and found Liberal Imperialism.
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CHAPTER TWO
EVANGELICAL NONCONFORMITY 
AND THE SEARCH FOR ADVANCED LIBERALISM
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Nicoll aimed to reinforce the religious faith of his 
readers and to present Liberalism as the true political 
manifestation of Christianity. Theologically he was wedded 
to a conservative Evangelical dogma. However in the later 
nineteenth century residual Evangelicalism had been . 
increasingly threatened by theological shifts which were 
the result of Biblical criticism and the rejection of 
concentration on sin and punishment. The Incarnational 
view, that Heavenly providence need not be undermined by 
attempts to eradicate social evil, called for a re­
examination of the social and political role of 
Christians.1 It allowed for a freer interpretation of an 
individual's responsibility to the community. Children of 
Evangelical clergy - like Wallas and the Hammonds - had 
begun to look to Socialism for an energetic pursuit of 
social justice.2 Nicoll conceded the need for social 
reform although holding on to the belief that salvation of 
the soul could not simply be achieved through the 
restoration of the body. This chapter explores the 
religious temper and changing political position of the 
British Weekly from the 1880s to the upheaval of Balfour's 
Education Act in 1902.
At a time when many Christians were accepting a more 
interventionist model, Gladstonian Liberalism looked 
increasingly obscurantist. Sidney Webb argued that in the
1 B.Hi11 on, The Age of Atonement: The Influence of 
Evangelicalism on Social and Economic Thought, 1795-1865, Oxford, 
1988, p.303.
2 P.Clark, Liberals and Social Democrats, Cambridge 1978, 
passim.
1880s and 1890s the aspirations and watchwords of
Liberalism had "become increasingly distasteful to the 
ordinary citizen".3 Socialism appeared to provide 
righteous language for and a pro-active response to 
industrial poverty but - like Gladstonianism - it failed to 
reply to the Imperial spirit of the Age. The Positivists 
provided a Liberal discourse for State intervention and 
Liberal Imperialists converted this into the language of 
national efficiency. This creed accepted the idea of a 
minimum standard in domestic life and embraced the Empire 
as a benign provider. Nicoll could accept more easily the 
idea of State intervention when it was couched within an 
Imperial framework: domestic reform in the name of 
efficiency was more palatable than the prospect of high- 
spending, old style Progressivism. But consistently it was 
Rosebery's position on the Free Church agenda and on Home 
Rule which were the main determinants in Nicoll's support 
for Liberal Imperialism.
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i. The Transition of Christian Docrma:
Nicoll believed that, "religious papers did not give
enough direct religious instruction, and that the leading 
articles should be devoted to this, not to ecclesiastical 
matters or politics or literature chiefly, but to
3 S.Webb, "Rosebery's Escape From Houndsditch" Nineteenth 
Century and After, Vol. L, September 1901, p.367.
religion".4 Nicoll's religious convictions helped to set 
the tone of the British Weekly. In December 1887 it 
stated, "In theology we maintain Evangelical principles. A 
man is evangelical in the true sense who glories in the 
Cross. We fight against the tendency to belittle the 
Redemption".5
Nicoll's theological conservatism had helped to earn 
for him the editorship of the Expositor in 1884. He 
replaced Samuel Cox whose views on future punishment and 
Biblical inspiration were at odds with those of the 
publishers Hodder and Stoughton.6 However Nicoll's 
theological conservatism did not prevent him overseeing the 
publication of more liberal views. While editor, he 
allowed the Expositor to become a platform of quite free 
discussion although writing little of the journal himself.7 
Equally despite undoubtedly having reservations about the 
intellectual departures of contributors to the British 
Weekly, Nicoll explained to Dods, "You must in a religious 
journal deal with men whom the religious public care for - 
just as the political papers do with Chamberlain".8
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M.R.Watts, "John Clifford and Radical Nonconformity, 1836-1923." 
Unpublished D.Phil., Oxford, 1967, p.82.
7 Chadwick highlights the Expositor as one of the journals 
which broke the silence (in 1887) on the dilemmas for Churches 
and theological colleges inherent in Biblical criticism. 
0.Chadwick, The Victorian Church, Part II, London, 1972, p.98.
8 Nicoll to Dods, n.d., Nicoll Papers, Lumsden. In 1887 
British Weekly readers chose Clifford, Spurgeon and Maclaren as 
the three most popular Baptist preachers in the country. British
Consequently the British Weekly charted a middle ground 
between Spurgeon's "other-worldly" Christianity (Nicoll did 
not become involved in the Down Grade witch-hunt9 ) and 
Clifford's Christian Socialism.10
Although science was no longer seen as a direct threat 
to religious belief in the 1880s, it had altered the nature 
of theological debate. Darwin's evolutionary theory - 
expanded in Origin of the Species (1859) and Descent of Man 
(1871) - had prompted scepticism of the traditional 
creation "story" which had no historical basis.11
Theologians began to treat the Bible as a historical text 
and in 1864 the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had 
established the right of clergymen to treat parts of the 
Bible as unhistorical. Twenty years later the mythical 
nature of much of the Old Testament had largely been 
conceded by educated laymen.12 Drummond declared:
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9 When Spurgeon withdrew from the Baptist Union the British 
Weekly argued that while it could understand Spurgeon, his point 
of view appeared, "a reductio ad absurdum of all organisation in 
creedless churches . " It urged orthodox men to remain in the Union 
and to take a more prominent part in order to protect evangelical 
nonconformity. British Weekly, 4th November 1887.
10 The first issue of the British Weekly carried a review of 
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work. British Weekly, 5th November 1886, in Watts, op.cit., 
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11 A.Vincent and R.Plant, Philosophy, Politics and 
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12 Chadwick, op.cit., p.95, p.58.
The contest is dying out. The new view of the 
Bible has rendered further apologetics almost 
superfluous...No one now expects science from the 
Bible. The literary form of Genesis precludes the 
idea that it is science...The more modern views 
of the Bible have destroyed the stock-in-trade of 
the platform infidel. Such men are constructing 
difficulties that do not exist.13
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The Free Churches were slower than Anglicans to accept 
the inherent benefits of Biblical scholarship, but by the 
end of the century it had ceased to be a contentious issue 
for almost all educated Nonconformists.14 Nicoll was 
always wary of undue theological scepticism. In 1886 he 
wrote to Dods concerning the reality that no story in the 
Book of Genesis had any traceable connection in fact, 
positing the view that, "they [were] true & that relation 
to fact is like 'whether it is best to wear a nightcap' no 
man knows and no man shall ever know".15
Nicoll became indebted to Henry Drummond for 
theological contributions to the British Weekly although he 
could not always find enthusiasm for the Professor's point 
of view.16 The success of Drummond's Natural Law in the 
Spiritual World in 1883 had highlighted the public's
13 Smith, Drummond, pp.131-2.
14 R.J.Helmstadter, "The Nonconformist Conscience" in The 
Conscience of the Victorian State, edited by P.Marsh, Hassocks, 
1979, p.161.
15 Nicoll to Dods, 20th September 1886, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
16 Nicoll wrote to Dods, "Drummond has been most kind. I feel 
crushed by a sense of obligation to him wh: I have no means of 
in any way discharging." 11th December, n.d. [1886]. After 
Drummond's death, Nicoll wrote thanking Marcus Dods for his kind 
words on Drummond and confessed that he did not feel that he "cd. 
write with sufficient sympathy for his ideas to do him justice." 
6th April 1897, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
appetite for natural science couched in the author's 
sincere evangelical beliefs. Matthew Arnold believed that 
the more serious portion of the anti-clerical world 
accepted the book as a "godsend," believing it to offer, 
"safety and scientific shelter for the orthodox
supernaturalism which seemed menaced with total defeat". He 
continued, "What is certain is, that the author of the book 
has a genuine love of religion and a genuine religious 
experience; this gives his book a certain value, though his 
readers, in general, imagine its value to be quite another 
kind".17 Nicoll disliked the confusion in Natural Law and 
in 1897 wrote to James Denney, "Probably what riled me...in 
his books was not anything that he said so much as what he 
did not say - the airy way in which he seemed to do without 
all that to common Christians was indispensable".18
In the mid century Essays and Reviews had publicly 
acknowledged that there existed a gap between the beliefs 
of scholars and ordinary believers.19 Nicoll was among 
those who continued to fear that the subtleties of academic 
argument would lead to confusion and unbelief when 
translated to a broader audience. In 1894 he wrote to 
Denney regarding a series of lectures the latter had given 
in Chicago. Nicoll believed that not enough emphasis had 
been placed on the fact that the Bible constituted the only
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18 Nicoll to Denney, 15th March 1897, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p.155.
19 Chadwick, op.cit., pp.76-7.
revelation given to humans of God. He was critical of 
scholarship which treated the Bible as a purely secular 
historical text, bereft of supernatural inspiration or 
mystery. Nicoll warned Denney that he "should take account 
of the arguments and thoughts about the Bible that are 
moving in ordinary minds," concluding, "I feel sure you 
cannot simply ignore the attitude of Christ to the Old 
Testament. If we could put people just there, all would be 
right - at that standpoint of freedom and fearlessness and 
yet reverence and love and trust, the difficulty would be 
over" .20
Concern for the future of Christianity permeated all 
Nicoll's political and social responses. In superseding 
Evangelicalism, the Nonconformist churches offered no 
equally unifying replacement. The introduction of a 
rational, less absolute dogma was not as emotionally 
rewarding for many churchgoers. Nicoll was fearful of the 
over-intellectualisation of religion. In 1889 the British 
Weekly conceded that a rationalistic view of religion 
recommended itself to many minds, but countered that 
Christianity was enthusiastic or nothing. Ultimately 
history had shown, the British Weekly believed, that reason 
would be overthrown by revival.21 In 1898 Nicoll wrote to 
the Primitive Methodist Professor Peake, "It is not that I 
am opposed to people getting educated and reading books: 
far from it. But the value of all that is being enormously
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exaggerated. I feel I would much rather have the
superstitions of the Roman Catholic Church than a great 
deal that passes for enlightened teaching among us".22
New Testament scholarship had potentially more 
repercussions than Old Testament study. Academics were 
wary of publishing findings which could unsettle the 
broader social fabric.23 In 1901 Nicoll wrote to Denney 
with the warning that, "Men ought to know what is at stake 
in these controversies". Recent academic contentions that 
Christ was not sinless; that he was fanatical; accused by 
his conscience and given to moods of despair, seemed to 
Nicoll to be extremely dangerous. He warned, "if 
you...think that Christianity will survive in any form 
after these admissions, you are entirely mistaken. The Old 
Testament business is different... The historical Jesus 
Christ is the article of a standing or falling
Christianity".24 Even the progressive John Clifford was 
awake to the vacuum left by the decline in evangelical 
certainty. In The Demands of the Twentieth Century he 
argued that the chief intellectual task of Christianity was 
"the reconstruction of our theology in the light" of recent 
Biblical research as men and women of intellect were 
leaving the churches, saturated as they were, "with the 
survivals of a partial, inconclusive, and ill-adapted
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theology" .25
The breakdown of Evangelical protestantism was largely 
the result of two theological shifts, both affecting the 
way in which Nonconformists perceived their role within 
society. The first was a reassessment of the merciful 
nature of God. The traditional belief in Hell and eternal 
damnation seemed incongruous with mercy and as a result the 
concept of everlasting punishment was gradually diluted.
In 1874 R.W. Dale suggested that the wicked were 
exterminated, not subjected to an eternity of suffering.26 
This represented, according to Hilton, a "failure of 
middle-class nerve.." But he adds, "In abolishing Hell, 
the middle and upper classes were also removing a 
justification for their own material advantages".27 This 
indefiniteness about the erstwhile certainties of damnation 
and therefore salvation encouraged a more merciful earthly 
judgement of those destined for destruction.28
Central to all Evangelical faiths was a belief in the 
primacy of the Cross. Atonement through the death of 
Christ lay at the heart of Nonconformists' confidence in 
their own salvation. Boyd Hilton's periodisation of 
nineteenth century religion dates the demise of the age of 
Atonement from 1850; this was followed by a period of 
Incarnational optimism and individualism which lasted until
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the early 1880s.29 Scientific treatment of the Bible 
undermined concentration on specific acts of God which 
could not be authenticated. It became important to see God 
in as well as above the world.30 In 1885 Drummond 
explained in the Expositor that:
The evidence for Christianity is a Christian.
The unit of physics is the atom, of biology the 
cell, of philosophy the man, of theology the 
Christian. The natural man, his regeneration by 
the Holy Spirit, the spiritual man and his 
relations to the world and to God, these are the 
modern facts for a scientific theology.31
In place of His death, Christ's birth became pivotal 
for many Free Churchmen. The singular significance of the 
Crucifixion and Resurrection was gradually undermined.
Many believers began to shrink from the idea that God had 
literally inflicted pain on his son.32 God's example had 
become more important than his sacrifice and this forced 
believers to emulate the life of Christ in their works and 
actions rather than contemplating it introspectively. 
Incarnationism weakened Evangelicalism, eroding solid 
directives on right and wrong and blurring the concept of 
wickedness. An espousal of mercy by Evangelicals played 
havoc with their traditional faith. Helmstadter has also 
suggested that it signalled the end of Nonconformist
29 B.HiIton, Atonement, passim.
30 Chadwick, op.cit., p.31.
31 Expositor, Third series, vol.i, in Smith, Drummond, 
p.228.
32 Hilton, in Bentley, op.cit., p.35.
confidence and a fascination with failure.33
Nicoll remained a firm believer in the primacy of the 
Cross.34 The British Weekly held that the Atonement had 
been "mightily confirmed by increased knowledge and riper 
thought". It conceded that there had been a move away from 
the doctrine but argued, "there will be, and there is 
already, a return to the deep and vital essence of 
Evangelicalism".35 *Nicoll did not welcome the apparent 
shift in Nonconformity to an acceptance of justification by 
works. In 1894 he wrote to Denney, "I am thinking a good 
deal about Justification by Faith. The doctrine is as good 
as ever, but it wants restating, for I think we are getting 
away from it".35 Nevertheless he was influenced by the 
effects of theological shifts and accepted an
interventionist interpretation of Christian behaviour. 
Nicoll wanted to find a middle path between spiritual and 
physical Christianity which would strengthen rather than 
shake the faith of the "ordinary" believer.
The unpredicted success of Mrs Humphry Ward's Robert 
Elsmere in 1888 was testimony to the fact that Christianity 
was in transition. The novel was an exploration of Mrs 
Ward's personal reservations about orthodox religions and
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a common and reasonable feeling among Nonconformists that they 
owed too much to the evangelical revival to tolerate any 
disloyalty to it." K.S.Inglis, "English Nonconformity and Social 
Reform, 1880-1900," Past and Present, Volume 13, 1958, p.84.
35 British Weekly, 1st February 1889.
35 Nicoll to Denney, 2nd March, 1894, in Darlow, op.cit., 
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offered a new theology, religious humanism which was a 
replacement for Christianity. Benjamin Jowett suggested 
that "its success is really due to its saying what 
everybody else is thinking".37 The British Weekly 
rejoined, "Plenty of people believe that the demolition of 
Christianity is merely an affair of books, and squires and 
German professors - in sufficient quantity".38 Robert 
Elsmere received favourable reviews in the Manchester 
Guardian and Pall Mall Gazette whereas the Times and London 
Quarterly Review attacked it for its abuse of revealed 
religion.39 Gladstone explained to Lord Acton that,
"Robert Elsmere, who has been a parish clergyman, is upset 
entirely, as it appears, by the difficulty of accepting 
miracles, and by the suggestion that the existing 
Christianity grew up in an age specially predisposed to 
them".40 Gladstone's reaction to the novel, published in 
the Nineteenth Century in May, inadvertently assured the 
book's international success - despite his contention that 
Robert Elsmere was an ill informed critique of contemporary 
Christianity. The British Weekly concluded:
The problem of constructing Christianity minus 
the miraculous is not new. It has occupied minds
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as wise and keen as Mrs. Ward's for many years. 
Mrs. Ward has done her best. She has invented a 
new benediction and - this is no doubt a very 
great stretch - a new sacrament... Catherine 
Elsmere chose the better part when she still 
looked to Jesus...Who for the joy that was set 
before Him endured the Cross...By this Christ, 
and no other, are souls ruled and saved.41
ii• T.H. Green and the Adaptation of Liberalism:
Mrs Ward's work in 1888 added notoriety to the
Idealist philosopher T.H. Green on whom she had based one 
of her characters. This, along with the publication of his 
collected works, brought Green's philosophy to a wider 
public.42 The Idealist concept of a shared moral value ‘ 
system was appealing to a middle class which had been left 
somewhat bewildered by the intellectual debates of
theologians in the second half of the nineteenth century.
In language and nature Green's message was easily 
recognised by middle class churchgoers. The missionary 
nature of Positivism helped to fill the void left by the 
lessening influence of theological Evangelicalism in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. It also provided a
41 British Weekly, 9th March 1888. In November 1889 the 
British Weekly also carried a piece by Sir Alfred Dale on Robert 
Elsmere which concluded, "The most ruinous, the most hopeless of 
all delusions, is to suppose that the soul's inner life can be 
sustained or strengthened on such fare as this; that doubts when 
they rise, can be laid by these short and easy methods. " This was 
reprinted in the British Weekly twenty-five year anniversary 
edition, 7th December 1911. In this year also Mrs Humphry Ward 
wrote to Nicoll remembering, "the fair and kindly review of 
Robert Elsmere." Darlow, op.cit., p.86. Darlow does not make any 
connection with the publication of that year.
42 M. Richter, the Politics of Conscience: T.H.Green and his 
Ace, London, 1964, p.294.
welcome intellectual response to secularism. Green offered 
the religious community a philosophy which was essentially 
Christian. In a time when this was increasingly
unfashionable, Idealism made "Christianity at once rational 
and defensible".43
Green had a captive audience among disillusioned 
Liberals and anxious Nonconformists. His message offered a 
plausible moral utopia. The conviction that the working 
classes and landed classes could be imbued with the virtues 
of their capitalist, Christian, middle class counterparts 
was in itself appealing. Green's philosophy coincided with 
the changes in Protestantism which laid less emphasis on 
the individual and on personal salvation and more on 
community work. Idealism also tapped many of the
inclinations of traditional radicalism with its advocacy of 
social reform. It was a rationalisation of the moral duty 
of each member of society to contribute to the whole.
Green provided the doorway into responsible,
interventionist government using the terms of reference of 
traditional Radicals and the language of morality. Much of 
Green's success was due to the fact that he was faced with 
a Liberal party and religious community which were in need 
of intellectual rejuvenation.
In the Contemporary Review in 1888 R.B. Haldane 
expressed his concern for the party's lack of leadership.
He did not blame commitment to Home Rule for the apparent 
Liberal decline since 1885, but was concerned with the long 
term ability of the Liberal party to maintain its middle
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class support. Haldane urged the Liberal party to define 
clearly its agenda fearing that the indefiniteness of the 
Liberal programme would lose crucial middle class support 
to the Unionists.44 He warned, "political leaders should 
lead and not follow, and...it should be made plain that 
programmes as that of Mr. Henry George form no part of the 
policy of the Liberal party".45 The problem was also 
apparent to those outwith the Liberal party. In 1889 
Charles Cooper challenged Lord Rosebery, "You say you have 
confidence in your party, which is your party? Is it Mr. 
Gladstone, or Mr. Labouchere? There is no Liberal party 
that would not go to pieces in a week if the shadow of Mr. 
Gladstone's umbrella were withdrawn from it".46
Idealist ethics had been instructing the values of
Oxford undergraduates for more than twenty years when they 
were popularized at the end of the 1880s. At this time 
Green's former students, such as H.H. Asquith, and 
adherents like R.B. Haldane were just beginning their 
parliamentary careers.47 Positivism helped the Liberal 
party to define the role of the state in a way which 
provided the party with a more persuasive and realistic
44 R.B.Haldane, "The Liberal Party and its Prospects,"
Contemporary Review, Volume III, January 1888, p.148.
45 R.B.Haldane, "The Liberal Party and its Prospects,"
pp.148-149.
46 Cooper to Rosebery, 24th May 1889, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10010, f.195.
4/ Asquith wrote in his autobiography, "Between 1870 and 
1880 Green was undoubtedly the greatest force in the real life 
of Oxford. For myself, though I owe more than I can say to 
Green's gymnastics, both intellectual and moral, I never 
"worshipped at the Temple's inner shrine." H.H.Asquith, Memoirs 
and Reflections, 1852-1927, Vol.I, London, 1928, p.19.
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agenda for the emerging democracy. For the immediate 
followers of T.H. Green individualism represented ultimate 
personal freedom. They saw their task as the creation of a 
social ethos which would make individualism moral and 
meaningful. Intrinsically freedom equalled the realization 
of potential. In theory the core aim of Idealist
philosophy was to bridge the gap between the actual and the 
potential self. Desirable citizens had a self respect 
which was bound to a respect for all people. In real terms 
the model for the fully realised citizen resembled a 
nonconformist, middle class ideal of the educated, diligent 
and thrifty teetotaller.48
The Positivist utopia was dependent upon individual 
freedom of choice. Ideally it was hoped that working class 
citizens, given the benefit of education and economic 
freedom would make choices in the spirit of Green's new 
morality. In order to begin this process it was necessary 
to free all citizens from the form of poverty which left 
them perpetually anxious about satisfying their basic need 
for food and shelter. Release from this rather primitive 
state would assist the elevation of the poor to an
intellectually and morally fulfilling level. This required 
a two pronged attack on the educational and financial 
standards of the working class. But it was difficult to 
clarify the minimum standard of living. Theoretically it 
was a level at which the population could be released from 
the insecurity of poverty. Green defined it as a state in 
which citizens could realize their true potential. He
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believed that:
It is the business of the state, not indeed 
directly to promote moral goodness for that, from 
the very nature of moral goodness, it cannot do, 
but to maintain the conditions without which a 
free exercise of the human faculties is
impossible.49
Haldane's aspiration for the Liberal party was a 
version of Green's Idealism. It was free of dogmatism and 
relied on the understanding that the state had far reaching 
responsibility for its citizens. He contended that:
...the Liberal party has accomplished the main 
part of what it has to do in the way of 
establishing mere freedom of interference for the 
individual. It has now to win for him the 
conditions of freedom in a more subtle and far 
reaching sense, of the freedom from that 
ignorance and the unnatural lowness of moral and 
social idea which are promoted by the bad 
surroundings amid which too many of our fellow- 
countrymen are born and grow up.50
iii. Nonconformity, the Labour Movement and Social Reform:
The moral obligations which Green had outlined for 
both state and citizen informed the Liberal conscience and
its Nonconformist extension. The social and economic
revelations of the late 1880s and 1890s in the form of 
labour unrest and studies by Mearns, Booth and Rowntree 
also prevented many ministers from remaining deaf to the
49 The Works of T.H.Green, Volume III, edited by 
R.L.Nettleship, p.372, in Richter, op.cit., pp.283-284.
50 Haldane, "Liberal Party and its Prospects," p.155.
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questions of economic inequality and deprivation. The 
Forward Movement, of which Huge Price Hughes was an 
important member was inspired by The Bitter Cry of Outcast 
London, and this work was also significant in the political 
awakening of John Clifford.51
Nonconformist bodies in the shape of the Wesleyan 
Conference and the Congregational Union had no official 
mechanisms to deal with the developing interest in social 
reform. In 1885 the Wesleyan Conference first addressed 
the problem of urban poverty, vaguely suggesting a more 
"practical interest" from Methodists in the "domestic and 
social well being" of the poor. This interest was 
developed and continued into the next century, albeit with 
occasional Conferences reviving the Evangelical notion that 
saving souls was the only way to exorcise the evils of 
society.
The Congregational Union was similarly timid in its 
acceptance of social reform. It was in fact concern about 
religious indifference which led Congregationalists to 
increase their involvement with the working class. The 
Social Questions Committee was formed in 1892 and it 
developed communications with Labour leaders. In this year 
Keir Hardie addressed the Congregational Union at Bradford 
and the ensuing debate prompted the setting up of a 
conference between Congregationalist and Labour M.P.s.
This in turn roused the Congregational Union to the need 
for a more practical and specific approach to working class
51 E.R.No rman, The Victorian Christian Socialists,
Cambridge, 1987, p.146, Watts, op.cit., p.102.
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hardship. The momentum which gathered allowed the assembly 
of the Congregational Union to pass a resolution in 1894 
which stated that "the rights of humanity must always take 
precedence over the rights of property".52 The following 
year however a conference of clergy and ministers was held 
to discuss the labour question during the coal strike. The 
British Weekly reported that, "the speakers were at sixes 
and sevens, and the Dean [of Westminster] declined to 
commit the meeting to any definite resolution. The 
proceedings were a sad fiasco".53
Political involvement was not straightforward for the 
Free Churches as it was often associated with
secularization. In 1894 Dr. Barrett the new minister of 
Clapton Park and chairman of the Congregational May 
Meetings warned against the preoccupation of the pulpit 
with material, temporal and intellectual issues in place of 
those "eternal verities which Christ [had] commissioned his 
ministers to proclaim". Dr. Barrett disagreed with the 
view that the main aim of religious groups should be to 
secure the basis for good wages, equal rights and temporal 
goods or to save the body from suffering. He wanted 
churches to remember that these things were only a means to 
an end. "It may be our duty," he argued, "to create the 
atmosphere, the sympathy, the public opinion, which will 
tend to bring these things about, but a changed environment 
will not make a changed man". Barrett voiced the 
widespread anxiety within the Nonconformist community that
52 K.S.Inglis, "English Nonconformity, pp.77-78.
53 British Weekly, 16th November 1893.
due to their interest in social and political issues 
ministers would forget that their first duty was saving the 
soul from sin. The British Weekly concurred with Barrett's 
position, concluding, "A secular pulpit means a pagan 
society" .54
Cooperation with the Labour movement added a new 
dimension to the social reform debate. Acceptance of 
extensive government intervention was the thin end of a 
dangerous wedge. The development of elements of the 
Idealist philosophy into a justification of Socialistic 
measures was in some ways a natural process.
Nonconformists did not come from a tradition of moderation. 
Their "conscience" politics of the nineteenth century had 
taught them that political rights were moral rights; 
immediate and absolute. The terms of the Nonconformist 
political debates over slavery, the Corn Laws and 
Disestablishment had indicated that they would not 
compromise their beliefs on a moral issue. Hughes' 
pronouncement on the Parnell affair exhibited the standard 
rhetoric of the Nonconformist conscience: what was morally 
wrong could never be politically right. Once the moral 
duty of governments to intervene in social and economic 
affairs had been conceded, Nonconformists had to decide
where the line should be drawn.
Many ministers who worked in inner city areas embraced 
the idea of Socialism. Some like Dr. Leach, a London 
Congregational minister, supported the Independent Labour 
Party and felt that this connection made no difference to
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his preaching, "except that it makes it more than ever 
evangelical, for Jesus Christ is more real to me as the 
Saviour of men than ever before".55 Others maintained a 
suspicion of government handouts. It has been suggested 
that Socialism was a more divisive issue for Nonconformists 
than either Home Rule or the Boer War.56 While this may 
exaggerate the impact of the Socialist debate, the 
Nonconformist community could certainly find no unity on 
the question.
Those who called themselves Christian Socialists often 
(like Hugh Price Hughes) drew a distinction between the 
secular Socialism of Europe and one which could be 
accommodated within the Liberal party. Hughes was a 
Gladstonian Liberal whose wife sat on the Executive 
Committee of the Women's Liberal Federation.57 In response 
to the formation of the Independent Labour Party, another 
Christian Socialist, John Clifford argued that there was, 
"no help for the country at large but in a purified and 
extended Liberalism, and to attack Liberalism was not only 
ungrateful, but impolitic".58 Although Christian Socialism 
was not revolutionary, its emphasis on materialistic reform 
did represent a danger to more traditional Nonconformists.
55 Leach believed that the I.L.P. should ally with which 
ever party was practical. He agreed with Home Rule and 
Disestablishment but wondered at their benefit for unemployed 
skilled artisans. British Weekly, 1st November 1894.
56 J.F.Glaser, "English Nonconformity and the Decline of 
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Clifford committed to his diary a deep impression of, 
"the need for more attention to the social problems of the 
day. Churches should have social missionaries attached to 
them...Workers should be trained who should not be 
theological. The Church has made too much of theology".59 
Clifford concurred with Stead that the supreme test of 
religious belief was the Biblical text, "By their fruits ye 
shall know them".60
Despite very conservative Evangelical beliefs Nicoll 
had not been unaffected by the debate surrounding the 
responsibility of the State. The British Weekly supported 
Clifford's view in The New City of God that, "Christians 
are sacredly bound to take a deep concern in the social 
problems of the time". Nevertheless it did not want to see 
God lost in the search for the new city.61 Clifford failed 
to resolve the central dilemma for Christian Socialists: if 
the state is made responsible for the implementation of the 
social gospel, the Church becomes redundant.62 The British 
Weekly was certainly aware of the danger and feared that 
Christianity might be lost in Price Hughes' Social 
Christianity. It praised the volume but would "have liked 
to read more about the Atonement".63
Nicoll's newspaper supported the need for social
59 J.Marchant, Dr. John Clifford C.H: life, letters and 
reminiscences, London, 1924, pp.81-82.
60 W.T.Stead, Centres of Spiritual Activity, London, 1886, 
p.iv, in Watts, op.cit., p.196.
61 British Weekly, 12th October 1888.
62 Watts, op.cit., p.180.
63 British Weekly, 15th March 1889.
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reform but ultimately it argued that only the
transformation of the soul could effect the transformation 
of the world.64 The British Weekly noted that leaders of 
the social reform movement had turned their backs on Christ 
although they taught doctrines which came directly from 
Him. But it continued:
We are persuaded that as social reformers go on 
they will perceive that their ideals are not 
worth pursuit if they transform conditions 
without transforming men - and that even the 
transformation of circumstances cannot be 
attained without civil war. Then it is for 
Christianity to step in. Through the power of 
Christ the miracle of moral renewal is still 
accomplished.65
Nevertheless the British Weekly was nervous of the 
increasing moral credibility of unbelievers. In 1888 it 
commented on the "ominous fact" that the champion of the 
match girls' struggle, Mrs. Besant, was a prominent anti­
Christian. It warned:
while these social reformers will work with us up 
to a certain point, let it be remembered that 
they will have nothing to do with
Christianity... In short, we cannot go far in co­
operating with them without becoming accomplices 
in the repudiation of the revealed will of Jesus 
Christ.66
Nicoll was concerned by the "heathenish manner in which 
certain Nonconformist "Settlements" [were] carried
64 British Weekly, 12th October 1888.
65 British Weekly, 1st February 1889.
66 British Weeklv, 12th October 1888.
on. There is..." he complained, "a certain pretence of 
Christian teaching, but what is taught is not Christianity. 
No heart is thrown into it and no interest is taken. On 
the other hand, people are got through socialism, waxworks, 
magic lanterns, and the like. But it is not the way that 
our Churches have lived or can possibly live".67 Even 
those who rejected the intrinsic link between religion and 
morality were confronted with a lack of interest. Mrs. 
Ward's social regenerationist instinct was disappointed in 
University Hall which revealed a greater interest among its 
clients for social work than new theology.68
In January 1894 Professor Marcus Dods opened a debate 
on Socialism in the British Weekly's "Young Men's Page". 
Dods introduced a tentative Nonconformist line, arguing 
that Socialism, despite its press, was not necessarily 
evil. Like all political labels Socialism is a 
multitudinous term and support or opposition was largely 
dependent on individual interpretation. Dods described 
Socialists as supporters of nationalisation of land and 
capital who believed that the "state shall pluck up the 
present industrial system by the roots, abolish the 
competitive system, and regulate labour in its hours, its 
renumeration, its relation to capital and in everything 
connected with it". In criticism, Dods contended that 
industry without competition was not viable. He argued 
that while both Christianity and Socialism preached gospels
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for the poor, the latter was a creed of coercion while 
Christianity involved the regeneration of society through 
the voluntary goodness of individuals. Dods concluded:
State regulation may play the part of a plaster- 
of-Paris jacket, and in our present shattered 
condition may serve to hold society together, 
till the body gains strength and the bond of life 
renews itself.69
The debate which followed involved commissioned 
articles and readers' letters. It revealed a great breadth 
of opinion and no uniform definition of Socialism. On 18th 
January Keir Hardie offered his response to the confusion. 
Hardie's language was familiar to British Weeklv readers. 
His Socialism was informed by his deep religious belief.70 
He claimed that Socialism offered the human heart love, 
brotherliness, sympathy and justice. However while 
Positivists tried to "moralise the competitive society of 
capitalism"71 Hardie contended that the intrinsic nature 
of capitalism was unethical and his aim was to overthrow 
it, not make it virtuous. The crux of Hardie's message to 
British Weeklv readers was that Socialism was the
embodiment of Christianity in the industrial system. "The 
underlying cause of every evil we suffer from to-day is 
that individuals gain by the sacrifices of the community. 
Socialism would make this impossible". This appealed to 
the Christian conscience and drew upon Idealist recognition
69 British Weeklv, 4th January 1894.
70 K.O.Morgan, Keir Hardie: Radical and Socialist, London, 
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of community rights and the danger of rampant and 
thoughtless individual aggrandizement. To those 
Nonconformists who avoided controversy by saying Socialism 
was an economic issue, Hardie replied; "I dispute 
altogether the statement that the question is one for the 
economists. Like everything else which concerns the human 
family, it is primarily a question of morals".72
By making Socialism a "question of morals" rather than 
economics or politics Hardie was forcing Nonconformists to 
take a side. His effectiveness was also dependent on 
Nonconformist awareness that their political and social 
influence would be diminished if they did not enter the 
debate. Still many Nonconformists found it difficult to 
reconcile the very material nature of the debate over 
social and economic reform with the spirituality of 
Christianity. They believed that concentration on these 
issues was anti- Christian, little more than "quarrels 
about the meat". Others felt that the debate itself was a 
vital part of the movement towards a Christian society.73
In June 1894 the British Weekly reviewed "The 
Incarnation and Common Life" by Dr. Westcott, the Bishop of 
Durham, and provided an editorial slant to the Socialist 
question. It accepted that Christianity and Socialism 
shared much common ground and concurred with Dr. Wescott's 
argument that Socialism was not only a theory of economics 
but also a theory of life and this made it part and parcel 
of Christianity: "that all men are "one man" in Christ,
72 British Weekly, 18th January 1894.
73 British Weekly, 1st March 1894.
sons of God and brethren suffering and rejoicing together, 
that each touches all and all touch each other with an
inevitable influence..." But the British Weekly would not
concede that a Christian must be a Socialist. The editor 
argued that Socialism was a theory of life which was also a 
theory of economics; and one which claimed to be the final 
and perfect theory:
72
And Christianity per se does not tell us whether 
this or that theory of economics will work out in 
the way we expect or desire. Christianity, for 
example, teaches us to pay our debts, but it does 
not teach us whether our bills are added up 
correctly. Christianity teaches us the
brotherhood of man; but it does not teach us 
whether the brotherhood of man can best be 
realized by nationalising all the instruments of 
production. That problem is surely one whose 
very terms cannot be grasped without some 
preliminary economic training; certainly it is a 
problem on which the holiest saints may hold 
quite opposite opinions.
In response to the frequent argument that the nature 
of Christianity dictated that Christians should be 
Socialists the British Weekly inverted the challenge and 
argued that Socialists should be Christians. The Leader 
stated that Socialism was totally dependent on the spirit 
of Christianity for the practical application of a 
cooperating brotherhood: "To gain and to keep any change 
worth having, you must kindle that unselfish passion which 
has never been energetic among masses of unchristian men". 
The British Weekly concluded:
We believe most firmly... that the social question 
of our day will finally receive not one answer, 
but many. But in one respect all the answers
73
will agree; all will be religious.74
A "religious" system was not necessarily Christian.
Theories such as Idealism and Socialism could provide an 
alternative belief system and as the British Weekly 
observed, they relied on the acceptance of an unselfishness 
which in Britain was associated with Christianity. If 
Socialism could be presented as neo Christian, then Robert 
Elsmere had shown there was room for an alternative to 
traditional Christian moralism. John Morley, George Eliot 
and Leslie Stephen were some of the more prominent 
unbelievers who attempted to prove that morality was not 
reliant on Christianity.75 In 1891 the British Weekly had 
taken the occasion of Charles Dilke' s threatened return to 
Parliament to note the signs that, "the party of religion 
without theology and morality without commandments [was] 
increasing among Liberals".76
In the last two decades of the nineteenth century the 
zeal which socialism excited in its followers was similar 
to that inspired in Christian disciples. Many converts 
described their experience in terms of a religious 
conversion and the language of the movement emphasised the 
sacrificial nature of commitment. Even those like William 
Morris, who were opposed to religion borrowed words like 
"evangelist," "disciple" and "gospel" from the Christian
74 British Weekly, 7th June 1894.
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tradition.77 Socialism offered its followers a meta­
narrative to rival theological explanations and gave them a 
sense of mission. Some like Graham Wallas came to dislike 
the word Socialist because it was identified with "a cut- 
and-dried formula held with theological fervour".78
Alternatively Hardie's Socialism was inextricably bound to 
his Christian faith. He told the Congregational Union 
that:
they in the Labour Movement had come to 
resuscitate the Christianity of Christ, to go 
back to the time when the poor should have good 
news preached to them, and the Gospel should be 
good news of joy and happiness in life.79
Political success was dependent on the capture of the 
middle ground. The adoption by Socialists of a high 
minded, religious tone (rather than one of class conflict) 
was the most effective way of gaining middle class 
confidence. However Nicoll was loathe to support a 
political system which was not necessarily underpinned by 
Christianity. The expansion of democracy was removing the 
strength of chapel in politics. Nonconformists did not 
have the leverage on the Socialist movement which they felt 
they had on Liberalism.
Nicoll's claim that he could not urge Christians to be
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Socialists because it was a matter for those with economic 
training was disingenuous. His involvement in the New 
Liberal debate and more specifically his support for Lloyd 
George's Land Campaign in 1913 indicated that Nicoll was 
prepared to be a polemicist without economic training when 
it suited his political instincts. Nicoll simply did not 
like the implications of Socialism. In 1886 the British 
Weekly took issue with the nature of Socialism because it 
did not differentiate between the deserving and non­
deserving poor; believing that, "when vice brings poverty, 
its sting is remedial". Nicoll did not want the Church to 
interfere with Providence. The British Weekly's solution 
was to have the Church instruct people in prudence, 
temperance and laws of life while guiding employers towards 
justice and righteousness.80
This position allowed the newspaper to have a degree 
of sympathy with those taking industrial action. It was 
always important to the British Weekly to attempt a degree 
of empathy with workers: it was part of the process of 
keeping Labour under Liberal/Free Church influence. Like 
the majority of Nonconformists, the British Weekly was 
initially asleep to the significance of the London Dock 
Strike of 1889. Price Hughes spoke of the fact that Free 
Church leaders had been shamed by Cardinal Manning and 
Roman Catholics who had assisted the poor in the strike 
from the outset.81 Once awake to the issue, the British 
Weekly defended the strikers against Socialist conspiracy
80 British Weekly, 7th December 1886.
81 Watts, op.cit., p.231.
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cries and in September 1889 it urged Christian ministers 
and philanthropists to become involved. "Their function 
is, " the newspaper argued, "in the first instance, 
mediatorial. But when they fail to make peace, and see on 
which side the blame lies, they ought to speak...What we 
deplore is the nerveless and cowardly apathy against which 
the stones are crying out".82 Throughout the 1890s the 
British Weeklv provided a forum for readers organizing aid 
for strikers. Letters asked for clothing or money for the 
"sober, decent, law-abiding men and women;" colliers, 
miners and industrial workers. It supported the right of 
workers to a "living wage" and concurred with the view of a 
speaker at Holborn Town Hall that, "Political economists 
will have to recognise and deal with the fact that the 
Christian, the religious, and the moral conscience, 
declines to allow men to be given a wage below that at 
which they can maintain a decent standard of living".83
Despite the recognition that strikes were a necessary 
evil, the British Weeklv did not want to see them become a 
commonplace evil. It agreed with John Morley's advice to 
the Dockers Union in 1891 to strike only when success was 
likely, and to restrict action to protests on definite 
grounds which would carry public sympathy. The British 
Weeklv wanted to see discipline in the Labour movement in 
order to alleviate strife and leave room for honourable
82 British Weekly, 6th September 1889 .
83 British Weeklv, 7th December 1893.
reconciliation.84 The prolonged Coal strike of 1893 
prompted the British Weekly to state that, '‘something must 
be done to prevent such a state of things recurring, 
whether it be by creating a coal trust or in some other 
manner...It is not the miners merely that need to be kept 
in order. The mineowners need control, perhaps even 
more" .85
Inherent in the concern for strikers was the fear that 
without the good sense of Liberal influence the Labour 
movement was a potentially anarchical organisation. The 
British Weekly was always concerned that the Liberal party 
should present itself as a credible representative of all 
classes. In this respect it was in tune with the 
Roseberian section of the Liberal party which saw the Trade 
Unions as a means of "encouraging the working classes to 
provide for their own necessities", in a way which saved 
the Liberal party from having to intervene on their 
behalf.86 The British Weekly prompted its middle class 
readership towards qualified sympathy for the Trades Unions 
and hoped to harness the Labour movement to the Liberal 
party. Fear of Socialism was presented as one reason for 
these aspirations. The British Weekly depicted the outcome 
of the 1893 coal strike as a victory for the new democracy. 
It warned, "To the new democracy Liberals and Conservatives 
are practically the same...The masses are beginning to know
84 British Weekly, 8th October 1891.
85 British Weekly, 28th September 1893.
86 Haldane in the Lothians, Scotsman, 12th October 1905, in 
C.G.Ma11hew, The Liberal Imperialists: the ideas and politics
a post-Gladstonian elite, Oxford 1973, p.245.
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that the power is with them. . . "87
In reality the debate over the moral rights and wrongs 
of Socialism remained an abstract conundrum for the 
majority of Nonconformist Liberals. Although it appeared 
as a potential threat in the 1880s, by the next decade the 
Labour movement was still largely dependent on the Liberal 
party as its political wing; prompting the view that the 
majority of New Liberals were non-Socialist rather than 
anti-Socialist.88 This absence of antagonism suggests they 
did not perceive the Left as an overt and immediate threat. 
Fear of Socialism was manufactured by the existing 
political parties for their own ends.
Haldane had used the possible adoption of Socialism by 
the working class to argue that the Liberal party should 
tighten its political programme and confront the battle 
between capital and labour.89 He saw the growth of a 
Socialist party as a sorry indictment of the failure of the 
Liberal party to deal with industrial friction.90 Nicoll 
also portrayed Socialism as a symptom of the failure of the 
Liberal party to appeal to the working class. He 
attributed Liberal impotence to the party's concentration 
on Home Rule with Gladstone as an oppressive weight who
87 British Weekly, 23rd November 1893.
88 Vincent and Plant, op.cit., p.46.
89 R.B.Haldane, "The Liberal Party and its Prospects," 
p.152 .
90 Haldane, "Liberal Party and its Prospects," p.153.
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maintained the old order.91 In practice however the 
British Weeklv itself remained insensitive to the issues 
which most concerned the working class. Its lack of 
interest over the Taff Vale ruling indicated that even by 
1901 the British Weekly did not fully understand the Labour 
movement.92
Nevertheless in these self-consciously transitional 
years Nicoll was anxious that both the Church and the 
Liberal party should not allow themselves to become 
alienated by democratic forces. He worried that in the 
post-Gladstonian era the Church would not be seen as a just 
and generous advocate of the poor. In 1890 the British 
Weeklv felt the Church stood, "arraigned by the poor of 
this country for not declaring the whole counsel of Christ 
upon wealth. And it is hard to see how she can escape a 
just condemnation".93 The problem for the Liberal party, 
from Nicoll' s point of view, was that it had failed both 
the poor and the Church. The British Weekly divided 
Liberal support into representatives of the propertied 
class, Nonconformists (whose ranks were sadly broken) and 
the masses. Of these the most important were Dissenters 
and democracy. The British Weekly felt that the leadership 
of the party had fallen into the hands of the least 
important group; "weakened hands" who as a rule had "no 
particle of sympathy either with Nonconformity or with 
Labour". In short the Liberal leadership consisted of:
91 British Weeklv, 12th September 1890.
92 British Weeklv, 5th September 1901.
93 British Weeklv, 12th September 1890.
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...capitalists, London clubmen, superior persons, 
and as a rule Churchmen or Agnostics. In not a 
few cases they are ex Dissenters. They pride 
themselves on their superiority to their allies, 
of whom they are just a trifle ashamed, and they 
consider that these allies should be very 
thankful that they have such representatives to 
direct their affairs. In consequence of this 
many sections of the Liberal party have become 
disheartened.94
The British Weekly wrote this Leader in support of the 
Liberal party's decision to meet with Labour 
representatives at Sheffield. It was strongly in favour of 
close cooperation between the two parties. It had accepted 
the results of the 1894 Leicester election as proof of the 
strength of the I.L.P. and challenged the view of the 
Speaker which maintained that the Labour party was still a 
negligible threat. The British Weekly claimed that the 
unofficial Liberal press was fully aware of the seriousness 
of the political situation. It argued that during 
Gladstone's lifetime there was no hope of Liberal / Liberal 
Unionist alliance, therefore the best way to defeat the 
Tories was an alliance between Liberals, Home Rulers and 
Labour. Nicoll no doubt felt that reliance on the Labour 
party would dilute the influence of the Irish and refocus 
concentration on domestic reform. He urged the Liberals to 
implement the Newcastle Programme along with some measures 
which would appease Labour.95 The British Weekly also 
wanted to see a firm commitment by the Liberal party to 
Disestablishment, in recognition of the importance of its
94 British Weekly, 20th September 1894.
95 British Weekly, 6th September 1894.
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Nonconformist support. It suggested that this might lure 
Nonconformist Unionists into returning to the Liberal party 
and underlined the necessity of the Liberal party adopting 
a "vigorous and intelligent policy" which would pre-empt 
Tory rule into the Twentieth century.96
iv. Nonconformity and the Roseberian Section:
Nicoll's preoccupation with the representation of
Nonconformity in the Liberal party made him less keen to 
overturn the old order completely but he was also a 
pragmatist, and in time recognised the redundant nature of 
Newcastle Radicalism. The Roseberian critique rooted the 
Liberal party's failure to present itself as the national 
party in the middle ground support lost in 1886 and in the 
subsequent domination of the party by faddists.97 Nicoll 
was a cautious supporter of the post-Gladstonian regime and 
the British Weekly supported Rosebery's leadership.98 Jane 
Stoddart was an avowed devotee of the Earl and wrote a 
flattering piece in the wake of Gladstone's resignation.
She contended that from 1886-1892 Rosebery "did more to 
help on the Liberal cause than all the other Cabinet 
ministers put together".99
96 British Weekly, 20th September 1894.
97 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, p. 130 .
98 British Weekly, 8th March 1894.
99 British Weekly, 8th March 1894. In her autobiography Jane 
Stoddart recorded, "All that Gladstone had been to the parents, 
Lord Rosebery was to the children. We saw in him, quite
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The British Weeklv was unable to match Stoddart's 
enthusiasm. In May it criticised Rosebery's threat of 
resignation as the threat of a pouting child, and at the 
end of the Parliamentary session highlighted Rosebery's 
failure to justify the expectations entertained of him. 
Specifically the British Weeklv referred to his lack of 
tact and ability.100 As always however the test was 
Rosebery's incomplete understanding of the Disestablishment 
question.101 The House of Lords threatened to become the 
issue of the hour as Rosebery and his followers hoped it 
would provide a post-Gladstonian focus on which the party 
could fight the next election.102 The British Weekly 
accepted the need for change but feared that, "the 
premature engagement in a battle with the House of Lords 
would postpone indefinitely those measures to which the 
Government stand committed".103
By the 1895 General Election Nicoll had become an 
established representative of the Liberal Free Churches.
He had a seat on the platform of the Albert Hall in July 
when Liberal leaders addressed the party.104 Later that 
month James Denney wrote, "I congratulate you, in spite of 
the result of the elections, on the place you have made for
literally, the hope of the future". Stoddart, Harvest Years, 
p.31. Stoddart also compiled The Earl of Rosebery K.G. An 
Illustrated Biography, London, 1900.
100 British Weeklv, 31st May 1894, 23rd August 1894.
101 British Weeklv, 17th January 1895, 24th January 1895.
102 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, p.13 8.
103 British Weeklv, 23rd August 1894.
104 Stoddart, Harvest Years, p.99.
the British Weekly in the political as well as the
religious world".105 In a plea to Liberal Unionists,
Nicoll used this influence to urge Nonconformists to put 
Church matters before Home Rule.106
The Liberal party itself faced the electorate in a 
state of disarray. Harcourt prioritised Local Veto, Morley 
Home Rule and Rosebery the House of Lords.107 The British 
Weekly interpreted the Liberal defeat as a resounding 
indictment of the prominence given to the divisive policy 
of Home Rule. It also pointed to the failure of the 
Liberal party to pick up on the working class vote and the 
alienation of Dissent. To those who blamed Local Option 
for the loss of votes, the British Weekly countered that if 
the complicated policy had been presented in a more 
positive way it need not have been a liability.108
The Roseberians within the party made a different 
diagnosis. They believed that Gladstone had left the party 
hampered by its association with sectional interests; "a 
Welsh-Irish, Dilke and Stanhope foundation," as it appeared 
to Perks.109 At Scarborough in the autumn Rosebery
asserted that if liberalism "could only appeal to one part
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nation...it must lose its qualification... for what...it has 
always been and must really be...the national party".110 
This was at odds with what the British Weekly wanted from 
the party. It criticised the speech because Rosebery 
"practically avoided reference to any particular measures," 
and blamed the Liberal party for taking Scottish and Welsh 
voters for granted.111 The British Weekly accepted that the 
Liberal party had been compelled to reduce its programme to 
a few items but argued that to reduce this any further 
would be "fatal" electorally.112 Conversely Roseberians 
hoped to unite the party behind a "general agreement about 
a common approach to politics" rather than a specific 
ideological programme.113
The introduction of the abortive Education Bill on 
31st March 1896 confirmed Nicoll's move to the Roseberian 
section. The failure of the Irish M.P.s to support the 
Nonconformists in their opposition to the Bill brought the 
warning from the British Weekly that, "Those who claim 
autonomy of themselves should be ready to grant it to 
others. The Irishmen in their present action are false not 
only to their friends, but to their principles".114 A month
110 Times, 19th October 1895, in Matthew, Liberal 
Imperialists, p.127.
111 British Weekly, 24th October 1895.
112 British Weekly, 24th October 1895.
113 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, p.139.
114 British Weekly, 23rd April 1896. In March Robert Perks 
had told the British Weekly, "English Nonconformists who have 
sacrificed so much, who have allowed their party to be rent in 
two, who have severed private friendships and almost forced Home 
Rule on many constituencies, will not forgive such treachery as 
this." 5th March 1896.
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later the Nonconformist community declared the Home Rule 
alliance dead, the Irish having proved themselves 
instruments of the Roman Catholic Church. The British
Weeklv concurred that the Free Churches' selfless 
commitment to Gladstonian Home Rule had expired.115 
Rosebery was presented as the politician who represented 
most accurately the position of Nonconformists.116 Whether 
or not Rosebery had a comprehensive understanding of the 
educational issues it was important that his brand of 
Liberalism represented a way of superseding Home Rule while 
remaining within the Liberal party.
Furthermore the close relationship between Rosebery 
and Perks suggested to Nonconformists that the former was 
amenable to their specific needs. It seemed that 
Dissenters finally had the ear of a Liberal leader and 
Perks was keen to promote this view. In November 1896 he 
wrote of his attempts to convince Price Hughes that 
Rosebery was not attempting to free the Liberal party from 
the "undue control of the religious communities," as John 
Morley had suggested.117 The following year Perks 
confessed, "Personally I don't care to see our party back 
in office unless we come in quite independent of the Irish 
vote". He reported that he was, "trying to do a little [to 
see the Liberals back into office] - by organising the
115 British Weeklv, 14th May 189 6.
116 Robert Perks in the British Weekly, 5th March 1896.
117 Perks told Hughes that he was being "innocently used as 
the Tool of a group of dissolute infidels". Hughes replied that 
Perks, Fowler and other weak minded people had come under the 
"glamour of [Rosebery's] personal influence". Perks to Rosebery, 
5th November 1896, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10050, f.8.
Eastern Counties Federation, by influencing certain 
journals, and by getting the Nonconformist Churches more 
closely into line".118
In a speech at Marshchapel in January 1898 Perks 
argued that the Liberal party should, "candidly recognise 
that they cannot hope to carry Home Rule," and end the 
"disastrous Liberal alliance" with Mr. Redmond. He urged 
the leadership to state that if re-elected they would not 
try to set up an independent Parliament or executive in 
Ireland or endow a Roman Catholic University. Perks 
reminded his audience that, "The Irish Party handed over 
the Nonconformist children in British elementary schools to 
the tender mercies of the Anglican clergy".119 He sent 
Rosebery a report of the speech enclosed with extracts from 
the British Weekly and Methodist Times, newspapers which he 
believed to be "true exponents of Nonconformist opinion".120
The British Weekly praised the "manly and 
statesmanlike speech," which put forward views familiar to 
its readers: that the Home Rule - Nonconformist alliance 
was over and that for every Irish vote forfeited by the 
Liberals, they would receive one from those torn between 
the Liberal and Unionist camps. The Methodist Times 
reiterated its view that when Dillon announced that the
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Irish would not vote against the Education Act, Home Rule 
was killed. It argued for local self-government for 
England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. The Irish had shown 
that they had no respect for the religious convictions of 
English Nonconformists and that their real aim was Irish 
Romanism throughout Britain.121 In March 1898 the British 
Weekly interpreted the Progressive victory in the L.C.C. 
elections as the London working man's acceptance that the 
Liberal party would never again put itself under the Irish 
yoke. Rosebery's conspicuous intervention on behalf of the 
Progressives appeared to indicate that he belonged to the 
reforming arm of the Liberal party and that he had, "most 
fully appreciated the state of things".122 In contrast, 
Campbell-Bannerman the following year, "astonished his 
hearers [at the National Liberal Federation] by the warmth 
of his defence of Home Rule, asking how they could abandon 
this Irish policy so long as they called themselves 
Liberals" .123
Rosebery's standing with the Free Churches was further 
consolidated in November 1899 when he presented a statue of 
Cromwell to the nation. Jane Stoddart told British Weekly 
readers that the long section of the address in which "Lord 
Rosebery vindicated Cromwell from the charge of hypocrisy 
was the most magnificent effort I have ever heard from
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him".124 Perks congratulated Rosebery and remarked, "I 
have always said that any statesman who can completely 
command the confidence and gain the ear of Nonconformity 
and Labour in this country would sweep the field".125 Two 
days later he warned Rosebery that it would be wiser not to 
meet a delegation of Nonconformists if he could not give 
them concrete assurances on religious freedom in elementary 
schools, temperance, the "crisis of the Churches"126 and 
Disestablishment. Perks was hesitant about Rosebery's 
ability to meet Dissenters without making some error. Yet 
he added that if Rosebery could speak with any confidence 
on Nonconformist issues he could rally the Free Churches, 
"the most powerful fighting force of Liberalism," to his 
side.127
v. Imperialism and National Efficiency;
By 1899 the grumblings of the young M.P.s who had
124 British Weekly, 16th November 189 9.
125 Perks to Rosebery, 2nd December 1899, Rosebery Papers, 
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formed the Articles Club had become known as Liberal 
Imperialism. Their purpose was to bring about a 
rejuvenation of domestic reform by alerting the nation to 
the needs of the imperial race. The Liberal Imperialists 
secularised the moral imperatives of the Idealist 
philosophy and gradually replaced the quasi- religious 
language of Green with the more materialistic language of 
efficiency. But a germ of Idealism remained and this 
appeased the sense of social responsibility within the 
Nonconformist conscience. However the Liberal Imperialists 
were associated in the public mind with imperialism rather 
than radicalism.128 Rosebery's own definition of his creed 
was the fusion of the old Liberal spirit from before 1886 
with "the new Imperial spirit". J.A. Spender 
retrospectively called it a revival of the Palmerstonian 
spirit.129
Nicoll was comfortable with a celebratory Imperialism. 
He later explained to James Denney, "I am an Imperialist 
for the reason that I think the Union between the Mother 
country and the dependencies is on the whole good for 
both".130 Nevertheless the British Weekly was alert to the 
problems of an aggressive British foreign policy. It took 
the occasion of the dispute with Venezuela over the
128 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, p.14.
129 P.D.Jacobson, "Rosebery and Liberal Imperialism, 1899­
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boundary of British Guiana to highlight Britain's moral 
isolation in the world noting, "it is proper to ask whether 
our spirit of aggression, and our consuming desire for 
commercial prosperity, may not have put us in the wrong".131
Naval Estimates had been a divisive issue for both 
parties since Stead had decided to rouse, "the sluggish 
mind of the general public" and awaken the government to 
the plight of Britain's beleaguered Navy.132 The press 
remained largely unaware of the extent to which Liberal 
Cabinets were disturbed by the question of increasing 
militarism. The fundamental reason for Gladstone's 
resignation was not immediately revealed to the public nor 
were the subsequent disagreements between Harcourt and 
Rosebery. But problems in the Near East in 1896 
highlighted the divisions within the party.133 When 
Rosebery resigned the leadership in 1896 over the Armenian 
controversy the British Weekly believed his speech in 
Edinburgh alienated many Liberal M.P.s and pleased Tory 
newspapers. Both Clifford and Hughes had condemned 
Rosebery's repudiation of the Cyprus Convention and the 
British Weekly presented Rosebery's speech as a great 
disappointment to every friend of Armenia.134 It had 
already joined in the call for the Government to realize 
that the time for action had come and British Weekly 
readers had responded promptly and generously to the
131 British Weekly, 9th January 189 6.
132 Pall Mall Gazette, 15th September 1884.
133 Matthew, Liberal Imperialists, pp. 24-25.
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Armenian Refugees Fund.135
Both Harcourt and Morley resigned their front bench 
positions in protest against the increasing jingoism, and 
that the "chosen people of the Liberal Press and Party had 
become addicted to strange gods".136 The British Weekly 
believed that in publishing his correspondence in the 
Times, Harcourt had "committed a great misdemeanour, and 
done what he could to injure the cause of Liberalism at 
this time". It held John Morley equally guilty and 
objected to his attacks at Brechin on Rosebery's stand on 
Fashoda arguing that "in common with almost everyone in the 
country," it believed that, "the policy actually pursued 
was a policy of peace".137 The British Weekly chose to 
"reiterate what [it had] said all along, that there is no 
schism in the Liberal party on these questions of Empire, 
and there is not one of us who does not oppose
extravagance, and bluster, and greed".138
The outbreak of the Boer war in October 1899 
exacerbated the differences within the Liberal party and 
the Imperialists saw it as their opportunity to take 
control.139 The Free Churches were also desperately 
divided. Bebbington records the bulk of Nonconformists who
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held, "that the war was honourable though lamentable were 
neither Jingoes nor pro-Boers, but their favourable 
disposition to Empire separated them far more sharply from 
the opponents of the war than from those who gloried in it 
outright".140 When the Parliament assembled for a war 
session in October 1899, the British Weekly reported that 
the best speech had been made by Campbell-Bannerman and 
acquiesced in his view that British diplomacy was 
reprehensible but that the tone of Kruger's ultimatum made 
it impossible for any Government to take it into 
consideration.141 In December the British Weekly addressed 
the relationship between Christianity and war. It posited 
the view that "Christianity does not forbid war in all 
circumstances," and with specific reference to the Boer war 
its position was "perfectly clear".
The demands made by Britain in the memorable 
dispatch of September 8th were acknowledged by 
all to be reasonable. In our view they were 
rejected in a manner which showed that the 
Transvaal meant to make no real concession, and 
the ultimatum made war inevitable.142
The readership of the British Weekly appeared to 
endorse the political and religious convictions of its 
editor. One correspondent wrote in support of the view 
that, "A speedy and intoxicating triumph would have been
140 Bebbington, Nonconformist Conscience, p.122.
141 British Weekly, 9th October 1899. At the outset of the 
war it did not appear to the British Weekly that Rosebery offered 
a credible alternative as leader. It pilloried him for shirking 
the battle. British Weekly, 26th October 1899.
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God's great curse on Britain...We are being tested as we 
never were before".143
The following month W.T.Stead set up the Stop the War 
Committee and John Clifford was enrolled as president.144 
However the mood of the country made it very difficult to 
maintain an anti-war stand. Silvester Horne, a 
Congregational minister, experienced the loneliness of 
standing on the opposite side of national sentiment.
"There is alienation where opinion on some great question 
is fiercely divided..," he wrote in January 1900, "My 
sympathies are all with my country; but my convictions are 
against her. The feeling that she is wrong, and is 
pursuing at appalling cost a wrong path, is agonizing".145
Wesleyan Methodists, traditionally more imperialist 
than other Nonconformists had among their number M.P.'s 
such as Perks and Fowler who were extremely supportive of 
the war effort. Hugh Price Hughes received a high level of 
attention for the severity of his attacks on pro-Boers. In 
Hughes' view, "the British Government acted not in a spirit 
of aggression...but out of a moral obligation to maintain 
its influence thereby to make the empire safe for 
Wesleyanism" .146 The Daily Chronicle suggested that 
Hughes denounced misrule by Boers because he was related to 
a Rand millionaire (his wife's second cousin). The
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Chronicle (before it also turned on the "pro-Boers") 
treated him to the ridicule, "Now they hint that lust for 
booty / Lures you from the path of duty, / Deaf to 
friendships Et Tu Brute, / Hugh Price Hughes".147
The formation of the Imperial Liberal Council in 
April before the 1900 General Election was testimony to 
Liberal Imperialist fear of attack from both the pro-Boers 
and the Unionists.148 Perks reported a "very
satisfactory" first meeting of about fifty members. The 
question of most moment was the name of the group and it 
was decided that the Liberal revolt against the Little 
England faction was too strong to warrant dropping the word 
"Imperial".149 Defeat in the election was inevitable and 
the Liberal Imperialist hope was to ride the debacle and 
build the party up from its foundations.150 In this task 
Perks assured Rosebery that he had the support of the 
leading Nonconformist journals, the Christian World, the 
British Weekly, the Methodist Recorder and the Methodist 
Times .151 Nicoll could now be looked upon by Roseberians 
as a "stalwart and accomplished friend".152
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The consensus among the Imperialist Free Churchmen was 
that annexation and conciliation were the only sound basis 
to end the war. The Methodist Times argued that it was 
always the mistake of the Liberal party to neglect the 
colonies and fail to appreciate the destiny of the race. 
Rosebery's, "sane Imperialism as distinguished from...wild­
cat Imperialism, ... a larger patriotism," appeared to be the 
only counter to the Little Englanders and Unionists.153 But 
the support of the press was fitful. On the same day 
Asquith wrote to Rosebery thanking him for a letter of 
support as, "Our press is a sight for gods and men: even 
Spender is making a poor show".154
The Khaki Election in October brought a predictable 
defeat for the Liberals. Perks assured Rosebery that the 
Little Englanders had been hopelessly beaten. Thereafter 
he proposed using the Imperial Liberal Council as a medium 
of friendly consultation and cooperation in the
reorganisation of the existing Liberal institutions. This 
was a somewhat magnanimous gesture in the wake of an 
election which had returned in Perks' view, 142 supporters 
of Lord Rosebery, 33 opponents and 7 doubtfuls, to sit on 
the Liberal benches. Perks also assured Rosebery that he 
had the support of the majority of Liberal dailies and the 
entire Nonconformist press.155 The British Weekly was in a
153 Methodist Times, 20th September 1900, Perks to Rosebery, 
Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10050, f.90.
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mood for reconciliation. "The rank and file of the party 
is sound," it argued, "and will be most grievously 
disappointed if there are fresh dissentions among the 
leaders on old and dead issues. We must agree to differ as 
to the origin of the war, and we must respect conscientious 
conviction wherever it is found".156
Despite Perks’ resolve to play down old differences 
the I.L.C. passed three resolutions which underlined the 
success of the Liberal Imperialists and looked to the 
Little Englanders to explain the Party's overall failure. 
The Council stated that it was time to distinguish clearly 
those in the Liberal party whose, "opinions naturally 
disqualify them from controlling the action of the Imperial 
Parliament of a world-wide community of nations".157 The 
British Weeklv found this "singularly unfortunate," viewing 
it as a call for an immediate split in the party: a split 
which would be made final by the stigmatising as 
unpatriotic those who did not want the war. It rallied to 
the defence of Campbell-Bannerman who had made "some very 
sensible remarks on Liberal unity," and warned:
No good will be done by forcing Lord Rosebery's 
claim to the general leadership, and no one would 
more abhor any such attempt than Lord Rosebery 
himself. The quarrel about Imperialism is very 
largely a quarrel about words, for the minority 
which thinks we can abandon our possessions is 
quite small.158
In December Perks told Campbell-Bannerman that the
156 British Weeklv, 18th October 1900.
157 British Weeklv, 25th October 1900.
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Imperial Council was a very powerful one and, "had much of 
the intellect, influence and wealth of young Liberalism; 
and that [they] did not mean to disband till [they] saw 
[the] party well established on sound Imperial lines".159 
A few months later Perks finally convinced Grey and Haldane 
to attend an I.L.C. dinner; the first public recognition 
from the Liberal front bench.160
The increasing association between Asquith, Grey and 
Haldane with Milner emphasised their distance from the 
Little England section of the party.161 In June Campbell- 
Bannerman countered with his denunciation of "methods of 
barbarism," an attempt to dictate the emphasis of the 
party's Imperial line. His speech was seen by Liberal 
Imperialists as an attack on the war itself.162 The 
British Weekly echoed Haldane that, "while the policy of 
concentration is most disagreeable, no alternative has been 
suggested". It warned that the inefficiency of the 
Government could only be corrected by an opposition eager 
to bring the war to an end and, "...in leaguing himself 
with the anti-war section, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman is 
on very dangerous ground".163 Nevertheless the balance 
was beginning to shift within the party. Beatrice Webb 
observed the '"retreat" of the Liberal Party within the old
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lines of Gladstonianism, under the leadership of Campbell- 
Bannerman nominally, but of the pro-Boers actually.'164 
In the summer and autumn the Daily News helped to gather 
signatures for a Free Church Ministers' Manifesto on the 
War; 5,245 of nearly 10,000 divines in England and Wales 
complied.165 In August the I.L.C. changed its name to the 
Liberal (Imperial) League, marking greater moderation.
Rosebery was still the only probable leader for the 
Imperialists but he remained elusive. In October the 
British Weekly had commented on the irony of his appeal to 
the people to press for the reorganisation of the Services, 
"The contrast between his advice and his political conduct 
would be ludicrous if it were not so melancholy" .166 
However notification that Rosebery was to make a speech at 
Chesterfield suggested that he was ready to come out of 
isolation.167
Chesterfield was presented as Rosebery's own 
"unmuzzling". He opened his address with the promise that 
he intended to "speak his mind" and declared that the 
Liberal party, now free from the Irish alliance, had to 
gain or regain unity and in turn regain the confidence of 
the country. To the delight of the crowd Rosebery implored 
the Liberal party to "beware of dissociating themselves, 
even indirectly or unconsciously, or by any careless word, 
from the new sentiment of Empire which has sprung up among
164 9th July, B.Webb, Our Partnership, London, 1948, p.217.
165 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.32.
166 British Weekly, 17th October 1901.
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US . "Efficiency" was the watchword. It began with 
parliamentary reform and was also to be extended to more 
efficient promotion of commerce and industry, extension of 
education, housing reform and an earnest effort to settle 
the temperance problem.168
As a manifesto it clung to generalisations. But for 
contemporaries Rosebery's address had excited great 
interest and was not reported as a disappointment. The 
possibility that the Liberal Imperialists would secede from 
the Liberal party if it proved incapable of reform hung 
over the event.169 In fact Rosebery delivered no ultimatums 
but instead excited his listeners and journalists with his 
go-home-and-prepare-for-government message. The Times 
confirmed that it had been a momentous speech from the 
Liberal point of view as Rosebery was "sketching in earnest 
the policy of an alternative Government, and it was not to 
be the policy foreshadowed by the National Liberal 
Federation" .170
Chesterfield showed signs of the influence of Sidney 
Webb who was at hand with a comprehensive plan if Rosebery 
cared to take it on board. In his September article "Lord 
Rosebery's Escape from Houndsditch", Webb encapsulated the 
arguments and language of the National Efficiency debate.
He argued that the Liberal party had been collapsing since 
1874 because it had lost its Progressive instinct. Webb
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derided the redundant individualism of Gladstonian
Liberalism, arguing that the opening of the twentieth 
century had found a new England "thinking in communities". 
The old beached Liberalism which was "inveterately 
negative" had aimed at "the abstract right of the 
individual to lead exactly the kind of life that he likes 
(and can pay for), unpenalised by any tax for purposes of 
which he individually disapproves". 171
The new language belonged to men like Asquith who 
asked "what is the use of talking about Empire if here, at 
its very centre, there is always to be found a mass of 
people,...huddled and congested beyond the possibility of 
realising in any true sense either social or domestic 
life?"172 For Liberal Imperialists the squalid conditions 
of the working class represented, not merely a disgrace, 
but a "positive danger" to civilisation.173 Here lay the 
full force of the argument behind the need for a national 
minimum.
Purging the party of Gladstonian soul also meant 
ridding it of its commitment to the atomization of the 
Empire in the form of Home Rule for Ireland. Webb argued 
that the maximum individual development of each member of 
the Empire would not be secured by "allowing each unit to 
pursue its own ends without reference to the welfare of the
171 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.371.
172 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.375.
173 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.376.
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whole".174 While Socialists understood the importance of 
collective rejuvenation at home, Webb harried them for 
their inability to understand the importance of the Empire. 
The Boer War had exposed their capacity to out-morley Mr. 
Morley.175 176
At Chesterfield, the countering influence of Robert 
Perks meant that Rosebery included references to education 
and temperance reform despite Webb's attacks on those who 
wanted to "revenge their outraged temperance principles on 
the publican and their outraged Nonconformists principles 
on the Church".175 But Rosebery's line on the ensuing war 
in South Africa was more conciliatory than the bellicose 
"Imperial Perks" would have liked. Rosebery emphasised the 
necessity of being ready to listen to overtures of peace, 
even from the exiled Transvaal Government, while tactfully 
distancing himself from Campbell-Bannerman's "methods of 
barbarism" viewpoint.177 The presence of Perks and the 
Webbs at Rosebery's ear personified the conflict within 
Rosebery's political creed, the confusion of radical and 
conservative doctrines. After the "Houndsditch" piece 
Perks suggested to Rosebery that one of the reasons the 
middle classes and artisans tended towards Toryism, "is 
that as these classes have prospered or acquired their 
houses they have inclined to the Conservative Party because
174 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.372.
175 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.374.
176 Webb, "Houndsditch," p.370.
177 Perks to Rosebery, 6th December 1901, Rosebery Papers, 
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they dread the doctrines which Sidney Webb thinks would be 
so popular".178
The problem for Rosebery's supporters was that he 
understood the importance of the new "good cry" but he 
could not provide a comprehensive programme to accompany 
"National Efficiency". The Webbs accepted that Rosebery's 
primary role was as an iconoclast of the Gladstonian 
ideals. Beatrice wrote that even if he failed to be 
constructive, "then he (Rosebery] leaves the field open to 
Asquith, Grey and Haldane with a good deal of the rubbish 
cleared away".179
For others this was not enough. Those like Lloyd 
George and Principal Rainy expressed doubts which might 
have come from Nicoll. Lloyd George recognised the 
problems of the clean slate: "Lord Rosebery seemed to think 
that because Liberals were beaten they should give up 
everything...No taxation of ground rents, no Welsh 
Disestablishment, no payment of Members, no Home Rule for 
Ireland - nothing but remounts and recantations".180 
Principal Rainy wrote to Haldane outlining his position:
I suppose Lord Rosebery and his friends go on 
the view that there is plenty of time to 
develope (sic) a positive programme and there 
may be reasons to recommend that course. But 
in the mean time people are very much 
influenced by the sound of it. They sayVhis 
will not work; there is nothing here to elicit
178 Perks to Rosebery, 8th September 1901, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10050, ff.174-175.
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or embody Liberal enthusiasms. You cannot go 
to the constituencies with a clean slate. 
Rosebery has mentioned Temperance and 
education, but on neither has he proclaimed a 
line of distinct action. These impressions 
operate [?] powerfully with many who would 
rather agree with Lord Rosebery in wishing to 
show themselves free of definite obligations in 
regard to Ireland.
...you must have emphatic Liberal labels and 
among these you must come in the end to 
religious equality. Imperialism and efficiency 
will not do, if only because the Tories as far 
as words go will overcrow you on both.181
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Haldane passed the letter on to Rosebery and his comments 
revealed the difficulties facing Dissenters in pressing 
their case upon the Liberal leadership:
The enclosed comes from Principal Rainy. He is 
genuinely with us, and knows too much to be 
pressing his Disestablishment cause. He is a 
very able man, but perhaps hardly conscious of 
the difficulties which attend what he 
recommends in the last half of his letter.182
Nicoll was prepared to support Rosebery after Chesterfield 
because unlike Lloyd George he could not cleave to the 
traditional Radicals in the Liberal party because of their 
adherence to the principle of Home Rule. His position was 
closer to Principal Rainy's: Nicoll saw in Rosebery a 
possible lever to a Free Church agenda and this was the 
price of public backing.
However the chief interest of Chesterfield as it was 
presented in the British Weekly was Rosebery's "disclosure 
or non disclosure of his relationship with the Liberal
181 Rainy to Haldane, 2 5th February 19 02, Haldane Papers, 
National Library of Scotland, MS.5905, f.162.
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N.L.S., MS.10030, ff.12-13.
party". He was presented as a politician who had long been 
aware of the mischief of the Irish question but who muffled 
his criticisms for the sake of the party. "Indeed," the 
Br.iti.ah-M.o.0.kly felt, "it [was] quite possible that Lord 
Rosebery sacrificed much of his reputation and influence on 
the altar of unity".183 Chesterfield allayed the fears of 
the British.Weekly. Rosebery was not going to provoke 
schism within the Liberal party as he did not appear to put 
himself forward as a candidate for the leadership; an act 
which would no doubt cause the party to split. This was in 
marked contrast to the view of newspapers such as the Daily 
Mail, the Speaker, and the Spectator. "Briefly we may 
say," wrote the Daily Mail, "that Lord Rosebery threw over 
both the Liberal and the Tory Parties and offered himself 
to a new party whose watchword will be efficiency".184
On the question of "national efficiency" the British 
Weekly endorsed Rosebery's view that a strong Opposition 
was essential to offer constructive criticisms of the 
Government. The newspaper extended the call for greater 
diligence in Parliament to a demand for greater efficiency 
in the country at large. "The truth is that," it warned, 
"during many years of peace and great prosperity, John Bull 
waxed fat and drowsy". The British Weekly was contentedly 
captivated by the essence of Rosebery's demands and 
declared, "Efficiency is the word of the nation today. It 
is a matter of life or death, and whether Lord Rosebery
104
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succeeds or fails, history will recognise that he has put 
his finger on the centre".185 This was enough for the 
British Weekly as explicit programmes might mean more Webb 
than Perks and an end to the Nonconformist agenda. Clean 
slates allowed all sections the opportunity of lobbying 
their causes.
For Nicoll however Rosebery's main achievement had 
been to bury Home Rule. Haldane's attempts to encourage 
the organisation of a Scottish National Liberal Association 
to promote the Chesterfield policy underlined its 
significance for the party. Haldane contended that the new 
organisation should, "explicitly exclude the Home Rule 
policy of 86 and 93 as having been madness".186 He wrote to 
Asquith on the 5th January arguing that Rosebery should 
move to an explicit anti-Horne Rule position.187 "It may 
take long - years perhaps - to get free from the evil 
traditions of the feeble counsels of the past eight 
years..." Haldane wrote to Rosebery of the commitment to 
Home Rule, "But as a member of a great historic party I 
feel that I have something to fight for that I can be proud 
of" .188
The Liberal Imperialist move towards Unionism 
intensified the divisions between Campbell-Bannerman and 
Rosebery. The controversy over Campbell-Bannerman's
185 British Weekly, 19th December 1901.
186 Haldane to Rosebery, 3rd January 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10030, f.2.
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188 Haldane to Rosebery, 16th February 1902, Rosebery Papers,
N.L.S., MS.10030, f.8.
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amendment to the Address in January 1902 revealed the 
contribution of Home Rule to the party's problems. Wemyss 
Reid wrote to Rosebery, "C.B.'s reference to Home Rule is 
generally resented. It was absolutely unnecessary, and has 
done us no good in any quarter".189 At the N.L.F.
conference the following month Campbell-Bannerman left no 
doubt that he was out of sympathy with the idea of the 
clean slate, "I am not prepared to erase from the tablets 
of my creed any principle or...ideal...of Liberalism". He 
added that to abandon Home Rule because it was not
expedient was not "a very creditable or even a decent view 
of the case".190
The defence of this shibboleth left Nicoll firmly 
ensconced in the Roseberian camp. On the 4th March Compton 
Rickett held a meeting of representative Free Church 
Ministers with Campbell-Bannerman and Herbert Gladstone. 
Nicoll wrote to Rosebery of the "practical unanimity" in 
favour of Rosebery's leadership with Campbell-Bannerman in 
the Commons. Nicoll claimed that although Campbell- 
Bannerman was agreeable to serve under Rosebery, no 
resolution could be passed because Compton-Rickett said 
that was not the purpose of the meeting.191 Silvester Horne 
who was also present recorded a less harmonious meeting:
[J.H.Shakespeare] practically said it must be
189-Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 22nd January 1902, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10058, f.5.
190 Times, 20th February 1902.
191 Nicoll to Rosebery, 5th March 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10168, f.
Lord Rosebery or a split. Robertson Nicoll 
said that the Irish Alliance had done us no 
good, and that he dissented from every word 
that Rickett had spoken. [Rickett having taken 
the side of Campbell-Bannerman against 
Rosebery] Herbert Gladstone, in a wise and fine 
spirited speech, tried to throw oil on the 
troubled waters. But the surges of Imperialism 
would not be allayed.192
In his report Nicoll ventured that there was sufficient 
information to suggest that in both England and Scotland 
Nonconformists were very largely with Rosebery. He 
therefore suggested that it would add to this feeling if in 
Rosebery's forthcoming speech he were to give some 
indication to Nonconformists. He added that Dissenters 
would be considerably disappointed if Rosebery did not say 
something about the impending education measures which 
would mean perhaps the extinction of Nonconformists in poor 
parishes.193 Revealing again that Nicoll was ever mindful 
of his own agenda.
The British Weekly was an immediate supporter of the 
Liberal League set up in the wake of Chesterfield. It 
explained that those who adhered to Rosebery’s policy had 
no intention of severing themselves from the Liberal party 
but instead intended to act with the rest of the Liberal 
Opposition in advancing that policy. Despite Nicoll's 
personal views, the British Weekly conceded that Rosebery 
had not enhanced his chances of regaining the leadership of 
the party by his long periods of non-involvement. It 
recognised that Campbell-Bannerman had gathered a lot of
192 Selbie, Silvester Horne, pp. 127-9.
193 Nicoll to Rosebery, 5th March 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10168,
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support to himself by "plodding diligently through the 
foulest of weather" although many of his supporters were 
not wholly in sympathy with his policies. However 
Rosebery's presidency of the Liberal League appeared as a 
sign that he was now ready to pay the cost of party 
leadership, and "will pay the upmost farthing without 
flinching, without complaint".194
The ending of the Boer war in June removed some of the 
contentious issues which stood between the Liberal League 
and the rest of the party. The eventual and hard won 
victory of the war left most Britons anxious about the 
future of the Imperial nation. Nicoll joined the General 
Council of the League in July 1902.195 R.J.Campbell, Joseph 
Parker and Guinness Rogers were among the other Free Church 
leaders who joined.196 Respect for Empire and domestic 
efficiency were appealing concepts to traditional Free
Church leaders.
108
vi. .Conclusion:
The purpose of the British Weekly had been to 
perpetuate a religious dialogue in an increasingly secular 
environment. But the language of the debate was changing 
and with it the nature of Protestantism itself. Increasing
concentration on the life of Christ as well as his
194 British. W-£.okly, 6th March 1902.
195 Perks to Rosebery, 16th July 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10050, f.278.
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Atonement converted itself into a responsibility to save 
the bodies as well as the souls of the nation's poor in 
order to give a physical meaning to Christianity.
Liberals too accepted that social ills could not be 
cured at one remove and that greater State intervention was 
required. Nicoll could partake of this discourse but he 
maintained a residual belief that spiritual salvation could 
not be achieved simply through social reform.
Theologically he was apart from progressives like John 
Clifford and politically his Radicalism stopped short of a 
Socialist solution. Nicoll belonged to that section of 
Liberal Radicals - like Samuel, Stapely and Murray McDonald 
of the Rainbow Circle - which believed that the future lay 
with "one great party of progress".197 * He wanted the 
Liberal party to accommodate the Labour movement without 
having the latter dictate the agenda; a common feature of 
the Lib-Labism of the 1890s. Alongside the fear that 
Labour would overpower Liberalism was the greater concern 
that Christianity would be removed completely from 
politics.
Gladstone had represented an assurance that political 
morality and Christianity would remain intertwined.
However he also stood as a bulwark of the Established 
Church and champion of Irish self government. In 1898 the 
British Weekly called again on the Liberal leadership to 
"give over flying kites, and say distinctly that they are 
not going to the country on this [Home Rule] issue". It
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now argued that many had voted for Home Rule out of loyalty 
to Gladstone and the Liberal party; if the two had been 
separate the outcome would have been different.198 But this 
was to rewrite the past. In 1887 the British Weeklv had 
argued that there was a moral case to be answered in 
Britain's handling of Ireland199 and the later revision was 
an attempt to circumvent the moral imperative because it 
was no longer politically congenial to the Free Churches. 
Again in 1902 the British Weekly attempted to undermine the 
leadership of Campbell-Bannerman when it ascribed his 
authority to personal loyalty rather than the force of his 
political principles.200
The commitment of the official Liberal leadership to 
Home Rule pushed Nicoll towards the party's Roseberian 
section. The Liberal Imperialists were increasingly averse 
to binding the party to Irish legislation and Perks worked 
hard to establish Rosebery as someone who would be 
responsive to Free Church influence. Rosebery's 
progressive past at the L.C.C. also allowed him to be 
presented as a social reformer. Some Radicals rationalised 
the relationship between Imperialism and domestic reform by 
arguing that "the Empire created the wealth that made 
domestic reform possible and uplifted indigenous population 
of the colonies".201 Through Liberal Imperialism Nicoll
198 British Weekly.
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could reconcile his recognition of the need for social 
reform with the appeal to his imperial inclinations and 
more importantly, cast off Irish Nationalist shackles. 
Social reform was never prioritised by Nicoll in the way 
that it was by Clifford and Hughes. He knew that it was 
necessary in order to maintain the relevance of the Liberal 
party and by association the Free Churches, but there was 
no real passion in the British Weekly's advocacy of change.
In 1904 Denney wrote to Nicoll, "I share strongly your 
opinion that it is a pity to see the Christian religion 
beaten out of the region in which people generally lead 
their intellectual life". 202 Here lay the real national 
crisis in Nicoll's eyes. In 1902 Balfour's Education Act 
offered a way of returning the intellectual and emotional 
energies of the nation to a religious cause. The radical 
language of Right wing Liberalism was abandoned as the 
phrases of the Free Church tradition were trawled. The 
British Weekly had campaigned against the system which made 
"the sole test of Liberal orthodoxy Home Rule, and 
allow[ed] a man to be as illiberal as he pleases about 
everything else". 203 But in 1902 it found its own single 
issue to transcend all others and argued that the Education 
Act should become a "test question" for all parties. It 
urged readers to "vote for anyone, Liberal, Unionist, or 
Labourist who opposed the Bill in preference to anyone who
Herbert Samuel, p.41.
202 Denney to Nicoll, 19th February 1904, in Letters of 
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supported it, by whatever name he chose to call himself".204 
The motivation was overtly sectarian and efficiency had 
been forgotten.
204 British Weekly, 9th October 1902.
CHAPTER THREE
THE QUESTION OF EDUCATION
The British Weekly was at the forefront of the 
campaign for religious equality in education. It argued 
that this could best be achieved through equal right of 
entry for all religions in schools; a position which placed 
it somewhere between the secularists and the
nondenominationalists. This difference was often lost in 
the more general battle with Anglicans and Unionists.
Nicoll was not a champion of the Board School system. He 
did not believe that nondenominational teaching of religion 
in these schools was adequate. Consequently he was less 
than hostile towards the 1896 Education Bill which gave 
Nonconformists the opportunity to provide religious 
teaching in Church schools where there was adequate 
parental demand. The subsequent Education Bills in 1901 
and 1902 provided neither public control nor right of entry 
in Voluntary schools and the British Weekly responded with 
a call for a campaign of nonpayment of the educational 
rate. In the course of the debate Nicoll established 
himself as an important player. He was referred to as a 
voice of Nonconformity even though his responses, having an 
internal consistency, were often a step removed from the 
general Free Church position.
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i. Nonconformists and Education: ■
The battle to control education had consumed 
much energy in the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Until the 1860s most Nonconformists had accepted the 
general view that the State had no direct responsibility to
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provide the nation's education. This attitude was part of 
a general suspicion of the State due to its intrinsic 
association with the Church. However in the last decades 
of the century Dissenters came to accept the view that the 
only efficient method of educating the population was under 
the auspices of the Government.1 It was part of the 
larger campaign for Disestablishment which had been 
gathering strength since the 1840s and the determination 
that the close association between Church and State should 
no longer prevent Dissenters from taking an active part in 
the future of the nation.
The haphazard nature of the English educational system 
compelled Gladstone's first ministry to take some steps 
towards reform. The debate over educational reform
revolved around the alternative choices of indirect state 
control by greater government assistance to existing 
Voluntary schools and more direct state involvement through 
the setting up of schools which would be run by elected 
boards and funded through the rates. As Anglicans, Roman 
Catholics and Wesleyans had much greater investment in the 
denominational Voluntary schools they favoured the first 
option. Conversely the Free Churches became associated 
with the campaign for free, secular, compulsory primary 
education. Support was crystallized in the formation of 
the National Education League in 1869.2 The major aim of 
Nonconformity at this time was, "not to preserve its
1 A.W.W.Dale, The Life of R.W.Dale of Birmingham, London, 
1898, p.268. ' ...
2 Machin, op.cit., pp.31-32.
interest against the state but to roll back the educational 
hegemony of the Church of England1'.3
The Education Act of 1870 was a compromise which 
failed to appease the Nonconformist community. The 
Government committed itself to giving financial assistance 
to Voluntary schools; although it was decided this money 
should not be raised through the rates. The Act also set 
up Board schools in areas where no Voluntary school 
existed. These were to be administered by publicly elected 
bodies which were funded by the rates. Although the 
Cowper-Temple Clause protected the nondenominational 
teaching of religion in State funded schools, the Act was 
seen as a way of propping up sectarian schools with State 
money and was therefore an affront to the Free Churches.
When Nonconformists had conceded the need for the State to 
become involved in education they made it their task to 
ensure that the Church was removed from the equation. In 
this respect they had largely failed. Disappointment with
the 1870 Act forced Nonconformists to examine their
political and social identity and provided some of the 
language and terms for future debate.
Support for denominational education was seen as a 
direct attack on Nonconformity. Arguments against the 1870 
Act were therefore a counter-attack on the apparent enemy 
forces. Diatribes against parsons and priests were used to 
underline the sinister nature of the Bill. Often fear of
the Established Church was combined with intrinsic anti-
Catholicism to suggest that Rome itself was the real enemy.
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3 Bebbington, Nonconformist Conscience, p.127.
The Church of England's tolerance of ritualism in some 
quarters fuelled these arguments. In his unsolicited 
attempt to bring the Scottish into the crusade, Rev. R.W. 
Dale of Birmingham warned an Aberdeen audience of the 
travesty of Imperial grants being voted "for the 
maintenance of schools intended to propagate the Romanish 
faith". He admitted that, "the deep antagonism between the 
traditional policy of this [Catholic] Church and its 
theological faith, and the free spirit of the Gospel, 
compel me to swear eternal hatred to Rome".4
Their experiences during the early 1870s heightened 
Nonconformists' sense of being deliberately excluded from 
certain aspects of national life. Forster's 1870 Act threw 
into question the relationship between the Liberal party 
and the Free Churches. Nonconformists believed they had 
played an important part in the election of the 1868 
Gladstonian Government and therefore deserved sympathetic 
handling in return.5 Anglican influences within the 
Liberal party - most notably in the shape of its leader - 
were clearly underlined by its handling of the 1870 Act. 
Activity over the question of education had brought many 
Free Churchmen into the political arena and Forster's Act 
taught them a hard political lesson.
Many Nonconformists determined that their support for
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4 Dale, op.cit., pp.294-295. The division of education by 
the end of the century was: Anglican: 11,777 schools, 1,885,802 
children; Wesleyan: 458 schools, 125,727 children; Roman 
Catholic: 1,045 schools, 255,036 children; other: 1,079 schools, 
220,032 children, in R.T.Shannon, Crisis of Imperialism 1865­
1915, London, 1986, p.495.
5 Dale, op.cit., pp.276-277.
the Liberal party would no longer be taken for granted.
Dale assured a Manchester audience that the Education Act, 
"relieves Nonconformists from their old allegiance to the 
Liberal party, and requires us so to organise our political 
power as to prevent the Liberal party from ever inflicting 
a similar injury again on the principles of religious 
equality".6 The most direct result of this was the 
withdrawal of Radical Nonconformist support in the 1874 
General Election from Liberals who did not oppose the 
Education Act. But Free Church retribution was wholly 
negative. It underlined Nonconformist influence within the 
Liberal party by undermining Gladstone's ministry. The 
unsatisfactory resolution of the controversy left the 
battle over education a running sore in the Nonconformist
memory.
Educational reform remained ad hoc for the remainder 
of the nineteenth century. In 1880 elementary school 
attendance became compulsory for children between the ages 
of five and ten. This was not a realistic provision until 
1891 when many nondenominational schools abolished the 
small fees charged to pupils and the cost was borne by the 
public. The heightening awareness that sporadic reform was 
insufficient spawned various educational Commissions and 
1895 brought two significant reports. A committee 
appointed by the Archbishop of Canterbury to examine the 
financing of Church schools concluded that greater 
Government aid was needed for Voluntary schools and 
proposed that the state should take responsibility for
117
6 Dale, op.cit., p.286.
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teachers' salaries. The more comprehensive Bryce
Commission on Secondary Education - appointed by the 
Liberal Government - reported to Salisbury's ministry in 
August. It recommended a more uniform approach to 
secondary education which was to be organised through 
county and county borough councils.7
ii. Gorst's 1896 Bill:
Neither Salisbury nor Balfour felt any real commitment 
to overhaul the inadequate educational framework. Indeed 
Salisbury had no desire to tamper with an issue which was 
potentially threatening to his Liberal Unionist Coalition 
and he did not commit his party to educational reform in 
his July Manifesto of 1895.8 Nevertheless it was widely 
accepted that Anglican support had been a significant 
factor in the Unionist General Election victory and 
consequently that the Government had a responsibility to 
provide aid for Voluntary Schools.9 It was within this 
context that the Unionists began to draw up their abortive 
Bill of 1896. In December 1895 Balfour wrote to Bernard 
Mallet, his private secretary:
7 J.E.B.Munson, "The Unionist Coalition and Education, 1895­
1902," The Historical Journal, 20, 3 (1977) p.613.
8 R.F.Mackay, Arthur James Balfour: intellectual statesman, 
Oxford, 1985, p.72, J.E.B.Munson, "Unionist Coalition", p.614. 
In December Chamberlain wrote to Devonshire explaining that 
although he had abandoned disestablishment he could not "hold up 
his head for a day" if he agreed to rate aid for voluntary 
schools without public control. Machin, op.cit., p.226.
9 Mackay, Balfour,p.73, Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.614.
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I shall be content if we succeed in saving the 
Voluntary Schools: I shall not be content if we 
fail in this object; and, in my opinion the whole 
question should be looked at from this point of 
view, and no extraneous provisions should be 
introduced into it except with the object of 
smoothing the passage of an effective measure 
through the House.10
Balfour's pre-election promise to his constituents 
that something would be done to help Church schools also 
belied his subsequent attempts to claim for Gorst's Bill an 
impartial commitment to efficient elementary education.11 
Consequently a large number of Nonconformists could see 
nothing more than a thinly hidden agenda. They opposed the 
Bill on the grounds that it was an a attack on
Nonconformity and ironically (in the light of 1870) Board 
schools.
The circumstances which had surrounded the Free Church 
attack on Forster's 1870 Bill were very different from 
those which influenced their response to its 1896 
successor. In 1896 the fact that Gorst's Bill was a 
Unionist measure meant that Nonconformists could rally 
their opposition to the proposed education reform without 
the complication of traditional allegiance. The Free 
Churches also had a collective representative body in 1896, 
the National Free Church Council.12 Although Koss claimed
10 Balfour Papers, 49781, ff.57-58, in Mackay, Balfour, 
pp.7 3-7 4 .
11 Mackay, Balfour, p.72.
12 Koss has argued that previous to the formation of this 
body "there had not existed the mechanism to canalise and 
mobilise Nonconformist opinion, or indeed the leadership to 
define goals and lay down strategy." However this does not 
take into account the pressure groups which opposed slavery and
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that the National Council "inaugurated a new era" and cited 
its foundation as the real "threshold" of his study of 
political Nonconformity, he did concede that, "From the 
start, the National Council found it easier to proclaim its 
intentions than to translate them into policy".13
The Education Bill of 1896 provided an early 
opportunity for the National Free Church Council to 
represent the general Nonconformist position. The first 
Council had drawn up a united Nonconformist Programme on 
the subject of education. This included a commitment to 
the provision of a nonsectarian school within the reach of 
every child, appropriate representation of ratepayers in 
Voluntary schools receiving government funds, universal 
School Boards over sufficient areas, no right of entry into 
Board schools and a sufficient number of nondenominational 
training colleges.14 In the wake of Gorst's Bill the Free 
Church Council drew up a manifesto denouncing the measure 
and urged local councils to make their position clear to 
M.P.s by writing letters and holding public meetings.15 
The will to unite the Free Churches into a political 
pressure group was easier to maintain than the reality. 
Underlying the negative response to the Education Bill was 
widespread disagreement over a positive Nonconformist
championed purity, nondenominational education and 
disestablishment. Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.29.
13 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.29.
14 Official Report... First National free Church Council 
1896, pp.147-154, in Munson, "Passive Resistance", p.66.
15 Christian World, 30th April 1896, in Bebbington, 
Nonconformist Conscience, p.73.
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alternative for the education system.
The third and most important difference between the 
position of Nonconformists in 1870 and in 1896 was that by 
the later date they had achieved an amount of success in 
"roll[ing] back the educational hegemony of the Church of 
England" and now had something to defend. In the twenty- 
six years which had elapsed many Nonconformists had become 
favourably disposed to the Board School system. However 
the struggle to maintain this familiar nondenominational 
structure was very problematic. It had been born of the 
hated 1870 Act and a significant number of Nonconformists 
had serious reservations about championing an educational 
framework which had been initiated with little
consideration for the Free Churches.
Liberal politicians in the majority underestimated the 
sense of betrayal which haunted the political consciousness 
of Dissenters. In the subsequent disputes over educational 
reform Liberal leaders such as Asquith and Harcourt 
defended the 1870 settlement without reference to the 
political difficulties it had incurred. In March 1896, in 
anticipation of the forthcoming Education Bill, Robert 
Perks gave a lengthy interview to Jane Stoddart. He 
outlined the weaknesses inherent in the post 1870
educational system and was highly critical of Anglican 
Voluntary schools, all of which were run with a large 
amount of public funds. Perks used his knowledge of 
Voluntary Methodist schools to show that 17 shillings out 
of every sovereign used by denominational schools came from 
public money. Unlike their Methodist counterparts the
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Anglican schools were under the complete control of the 
clergy. Perks also argued that the Conscience Clause had 
never been universally effective and was weakest where it was 
most needed; in rural, single school areas. He apparently 
spoke for a significant number of Nonconformists when he 
stated that Dissenters had never seen Forster's Act as a 
lasting settlement, but rather something which was forced on 
them by Liberal and Tory votes.16 The fact that the British 
Weekly also held this view explains its moderate opposition 
to the Unionists' educational proposals of 1896. The 
unsatisfactory nature of the 1870 settlement meant that it 
was less precious to some Nonconformists than it had 
apparently become to most Liberal Members of Parliament.
Perks (not surprisingly) promoted Rosebery as a 
Liberal who represented more accurately the position of 
Nonconformists. In Perks' view this position was: (1) that 
the standard of education should not be lowered; (2) there 
should be no interference with Board schools as at present 
constituted - the Cowper-Temple clause should be 
maintained; (3) If public funds were to be given to the 
Voluntary schools this should be accompanied by local 
control.17 This very general statement of aims was not at 
odds with the resolution passed a few weeks later by the 
National Liberal Federation in Huddersfield. Augustine 
Birrell spoke for the motion:
(1) that increased grants of public money to 
the Voluntary schools shall be accompanied by 
local representative control; (2) that any 
additional grant of public money shall go to
lb British, Mask lx z 5 th March 1896.
17 British Weekly, 5th March 1896.
increase the efficiency of the schools; (3) 
that nothing shall be done to impair the 
efficiency of the Board schools or to weaken in 
any way the existing guarantees for their 
unsectarian character. The Council is further 
of the opinion that the demand of the teachers 
in Voluntary schools for relief from compulsory 
duties and for reasonable security of tenure 
should be granted.18
This loose collection of aims was in keeping with the 
general atmosphere of the Conference. Rosebery spoke at a 
meeting earlier in the day and freely declared that he had 
neither policy nor programme to put forward.19 Birrell 
argued for his own vague statement of aims that it 
represented the "irreducible minimum" of Liberal demands. 
He warned his audience that education was under threat; 
"The great system of School Boards has afforded one of the 
noblest spheres of work to the citizens of this land, and 
this great achievement [is] now threatened by Lord 
Salisbury. Religious education! Why the education in the 
Board schools [is] a religious education".20 The British 
Weekly declared that the speech was "brilliant and 
statesmanlike" and "showed a true understanding of the 
whole subject". (This praise was probably more the result 
of Birrell's warning that the Irish were playing a very 
dangerous game in their stand on denominational
education.)21 In reality Birrell's statement was not
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Daily News, 28th March 1896.
19 Times. 28th March 1896.
20 Daily News, 28th March 1896.
21 British Weekly, 2nd April 1896.
above contention. Gorst's Bill, which was introduced to 
the Commons four days later, exposed some subtle but 
significant differences among the leaders of the 
Nonconformist community. Nicoll then began to argue that 
it was not an automatic truth that the School Boards were 
"great" and "noble" or that the "religious education" they 
offered was satisfactory.
The Education Bill which was introduced on 31st March 
1896 was viewed as "a measure even larger in its scope and 
more interesting in its specific proposals than had been 
generally anticipated".22 23It was hailed in some quarters 
as "a statesman-like and liberal-minded effort to solve an 
admittedly perplexing problem, and to improve and simplify 
the educational system. . . 1,23 The complexity of the Bill 
meant that initial reactions from the Liberal side were
cautious. In the House of Commons, the Liberal M.P. Arthur 
Acland placed on record his condemnation of the main 
principles of the Bill but could be no more specific.24 
To the press he simply stated that the measure signified a 
complete upheaval of the education system which would no 
doubt provoke great controversy.25
The Bill had indeed evolved into a more comprehensive 
measure than had originally been the intention of the 
Unionist Government. Nevertheless it clearly fulfilled 
Salisbury's and Balfour's earlier desire for a Bill, "to
22 Times, 1st April 1896.
23 Scotsman, 1st April 1896.
24 Times, 1st April 1896.
25 British Weekly, 2nd April 1896.
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protect denominational schools against the competition of 
Board schools through parliamentary assistance".26 Gorst 
reminded the Commons that 2,445,812 children were educated 
by Voluntary schools while 1,879,218 attended Board 
schools.27 He estimated that it would cost £20,000,000 to 
provide a Board school education for those presently in the 
Voluntary sector with an annual maintenance cost of 
£2,2 8 2,0 0 0.28 A Bill which bolstered the Voluntary 
schools was the most economically viable response to the 
education problem.
The central feature of the Bill fulfilled the 
Education Department's aim of decentralising educational 
authority. It was proposed that all county and county- 
borough councils would become Local Education Authorities. 
These would have responsibilities which included 
administering grants, the inspection of schools and the 
setting of an education rate. The democratic principle was 
to be maintained through the mechanism of a committee which 
was to be the active arm of the L.E.A. and it was proposed 
that the majority of committee members should be 
councillors. Gorst's Bill also allocated a new Exchequer 
grant of 4s per capita for all Voluntary schools and needy 
Board schools and permitted L.E.A.s to lend money to 
voluntary bodies to help them build new schools.29 The 
only comment by the British Weekly on the first reading of
26 Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.616.
27 Times, 1st April 1896.
28 British Weekly, 2nd April 1896.
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the Bill was that it would practically abolish the 
voluntary contribution.30 The jurisdiction of the new 
Local Authorities clearly jeopardized the long term future 
of the School Boards. The responsibility for all new state 
run schools would be undertaken by the L.E.A.s; the new 
authorities also had the power to take over the 
responsibilities of inadequate Boards.31
Nonconformists were most concerned with the 
implications of the Bill for religious instruction within 
schools and focused their attention on Clause 27, the 
provision which Gorst called "a kind of supplement to the 
conscience clause".32 It stated that elementary schools 
in receipt of government grants must provide separate 
religious instruction for children if this was requested by 
a "reasonable number" of parents. "We can hardly 
conceive", wrote the Times, "that there will be any great 
difficulty in carrying out this provision, though it is 
evident already that it will be unpalatable to extreme 
partisans on the one side and on the other".33 Sir 
William Hart Dyke even suggested in the Commons that the 
new provision would act to the advantage of Nonconformist 
families which had previously lived in single school 
regions and had been forced to send their children to 
"parson's schools".34 Indeed the Government saw Clause 27
30 British Weekly, 2nd April 1896.
31 Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.617
32 Times, 1st April 1896 .
33 Times, 1st April 1896 .
34 Times, 1st April 1896 .
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as a "sop to dissenters". The Parliamentary draftsman 
Courtney Ilbert revealed in a private memorandum that the 
measure, "was a surviving fragment of a much stronger 
clause...to abolish the Cowper-Temple clause but which was 
whittled down at the insistence of Chamberlain".35 
Despite the sop, virtually all Nonconformists denounced the 
Bill but agreement on a more exact response was
problematic. Leaders were divided on whether they should 
strenuously resist the Bill or put their energy into making 
it work as best they could.
The British Weekly adopted a pragmatic pose. Having 
had time to digest the Bill in written form it agreed with 
other Liberals that its tendency was to be "clerical, 
reactionary, and anti-democratic". But the British Weekly 
believed that it would be a very grave error to assume 
"that the country generally is in favour of the School 
Board system. Teachers hate it...[It is] oppressive to the 
teacher and injurious to the child. Neither can School 
Boards be said to be popular with parents".36 Indeed it 
often seemed that a system which pressurized Nicoll's purse 
was as offensive to him as one which assailed his
conscience. The British Weekly had little interest in the 
question of the Boards' future and remarked that if they, 
"continue to increase the rates they will themselves be
35 Ilbert MSS., Diary, n.d., in Munson, "Unionist 
Coalition," p.619.
36 British Weeklv, 9th April 1896.
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taking the most effective steps towards their ultimate 
extinction" .37
From this standpoint the British Weekly proffered 
several observations. In Gorst's favour it suggested that 
the Bill was not as partisan as it might have been and that 
it exhibited an attempt to be fair, "or at least to be seen 
to be fair". The newspaper also conceded that teachers 
generally favoured the Bill because it offered the 
possibility of higher salaries. (However it felt that the 
increased grant was more likely to be used to decrease the 
level of voluntary subscriptions.) The British Weekly also 
looked favourably on the implications of the Bill for the 
improvement of the chaotic nature of education in England 
and Wales. It saw in Gorst's measure the "germ of 
something better...the promise of universal School Boards 
under another name". In criticism, the British Weekly had 
reservations about the financial constraints which L.E.A.'s 
were empowered to enforce over School Boards. Although 
Nicoll had been very critical of the extravagance of the 
Progressives in London he believed that Boards were better 
equipped to judge the economic needs of their schools than
37 British Weekly, 30th April 1896. Again in 1902 the 
British Weekly's initial response was to comment, "The more we 
see of the Bill the less we like it. But the first point is that 
the education rate will be trebled." British Weekly, 27th March 
1902. The funding of education was always complex. Chamberlain 
had disturbed a hornet's nest in the 1870s with his sympathy for 
the idea that free education could be funded out of disendowment 
of the Church of England. M.Barker, Gladstone and Radicalism: the 
reconstruction of Liberal policy in Britain, 1885-94, Hassocks 
1975, p.33. The British Weekly accepted that if education was 
compulsory it ought to be free but was uncertain about 
Chamberlain's bid in 1888 to abolish fees in both Voluntary and 
Board schools. It conceded that a compromise would have to be 
reached but it was clearly complicated. British Weekly, 1st June 
1888.
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an independent body not specifically chosen for that 
purpose. He also called for a clearer definition of the 
powers of the Education Department over the new Local 
Authorities as a guard against the whims of "new and 
untrained rulers".38
The provision for sectarian teaching in schools 
encompassed in Clause 27 did not meet with outright 
criticism from Nicoll. Although he stressed that 
Nonconformists had never asked for the measure he urged 
them to gather their resources and to counteract the spread 
of clericalism in Board schools with their own Evangelical 
teaching.39 The central tenet of the British Weekly7s 
stand on Clause 27 was the belief that nonsectarian 
religious education was ultimately a spurious concept. It 
argued that it was not possible to teach the Bible in a 
truly objective way in schools: therefore it was in breach 
of the secular role of the State to make declarations on 
what should and should not be included in the religious 
lessons of the Board schools. Equally the British Weekly 
was of the opinion that reliance on weekly Sunday school 
classes for the furtherance of denominational learning was 
wholly insufficient. It argued that Nonconformists such as 
Spurgeon and Dale, as advocates of secular education, had 
never provided an effective alternative to the teaching of 
religion in schools.40 The first reading of the Education 
Bill prompted this comment:
38 British Weekly, 9th April 1896.
39 British Weekly, 9th April 1896.
40 British Weekly, 16th April 1896.
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What really lost us the battle in 1870 was that 
we had no plan for teaching the children 
religion. We clamoured for the committal of the 
churches, and when asked how the churches were to 
discharge it, we were perforce dumb. Now we are 
in no better case, but we admit that Sunday 
School teaching is not enough, and that it must 
be supplemented during the week. We shall be 
compelled to find out how it is to be 
supplemented...The emergency will discover our 
true strength. . .41
The British Weekly did not see Clause 27 as 
necessarily threatening to Nonconformity. It quoted the 
Church Times as saying that it was, "quite conceivable that 
the ultimate effect of Clause Twenty-Seven may be the 
extinction of the voluntary system".42 The British Weekly 
suspected that Roman Catholic schools might close down 
rather than have heresy taught within their walls. As the 
Bill could usher in the ultimate decline of the Voluntary 
sector, it was argued that Roman Catholics and Anglicans 
would both fight to have the Bill dropped. Although 
hopeful that the Bill would be abandoned because education 
would receive better handling by a Liberal Government, the 
British Weeklv showed no real fear of the new religious 
provisions within the Bill. Its view was stated simply:
"we are not particularly desirous that the clause should 
stand, but we have argued that it is not the business of 
Nonconformists to destroy the clause, and if the clause 
becomes law, it is their plain duty to make the very best
41 British Weeklv, 14th May 1896.
42 British Weeklv, 16th April 1896.
of it".43 This included the conviction that 
Nonconformists should take positive and unified action 
working through a Federation of Free Churches. Nicoll 
despaired of the capacity of Nonconformist bodies to pass 
resolutions at the expense of action. The British Weekly 
contended, "Our present political position is very much due 
to the fact that we have done so much make believe. We 
have been afraid to speak out frankly, and what have we 
gained by it all?"44
The British Weekly's arguments were more cerebral than 
those being offered for general consumption by more emotive 
orators and this gained Nicoll public criticism from both 
Clifford and Hughes. Clifford's remonstrance of the 
British Weekly in a letter to the Daily News elicited a 
short correspondence consisting of the British Weekly's 
leader article, "A Friendly Reply to Dr. Clifford and the 
Daily News11 and Clifford's response, printed on the letters 
page in the following issue.45 While welcoming the
chastisement from Clifford for remissness in the cause of 
Nonconformity and "kissing the rod with meekness," the 
British Weekly did not alter in any way its position on 
Gorst's proposals.
The point of departure between Clifford and Nicoll was 
the ability of the existing Board school system to provide 
an acceptable type of undenominational religious
instruction. Clifford believed that by concentrating on
43 British Weekly, 16th April 1896.
44 British Weekly, 30th April 1896.
45 British Weekly, 16th April 1896, 23rd April 1896.
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the Bible, experience had taught that it was possible to
"inspire in children attending state schools that religious 
faith which underlies all our theologies and 
ecclesiasticisms,...all that is actually fundamental to 
them, without violating the sacred rights of the human 
conscience". Having accepted that the Bible provided a 
basis for truly nonsectarian education, Clifford held that 
distinctive religious convictions should be left to the 
teaching in homes, churches and Christian Endeavour 
societies and therefore had no place in the Board schools. 
He saw Clause 27 as a way of bringing denominational 
teaching into these schools.46 Clifford's criticism of the 
Bill was therefore unrelenting;
For myself, forecasting the results of enacting 
Clause 27 as law, from what I know of the 
crushing tyranny of the sacerdotal clergy in the 
rural districts of this country, I cannot imagine 
anything more mischievous to religion, more fatal 
to education, or more disastrous to the country.47
Price Hughes preached the compromise of 
undenominational teaching, warning that Free Church 
commitment to a secular programme would drive Wesleyan 
Methodists from the Nonconformist camp. Hughes attacked 
the concept of the State as a wholly secular entity as 
characteristic of an atheistic value system. The British
46 Clifford's biographer shared his subject's views when 
writing, "...the Bill of 1896 practically repealed the Cowper- 
Temple clause, and opened the door of the nation's schools to the 
priests and a doubtful and deceptive advantage - the door of the 
Anglican schools to Free Churchmen." C.T.Bateman, John Clifford 
Free Church Leader and Preacher, London 1904.
47 British Weekly. 23rd April 1896.
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Weeklv believed that this was to make a fundamental 
mistake. It argued that, "The State is as divine as the 
Church, but it belongs to another order, and it is 
instituted for other ends. When it arrogates functions 
that pertain to the Church, it becomes in that measure 
undivine". The British Weekly assailed Hughes' standpoint 
on two levels: firstly that his proposed methods could not 
secure their ends - there was not sufficient common ground 
between Anglicans, Nonconformists and Catholics to 
facilitate nonsectarian religious instruction; secondly 
when the State began to teach children religion it 
abandoned its true sphere. Although Hughes did not agree 
with Nicoll on the falseness of undenominational Board 
school religion he did come to the view that if Gorst's 
Education Bill was passed Nonconformists should make every 
effort to send Evangelical teachers into the 8,000 Church 
schools in areas where no Board school existed.48
The most militant stand came from the Congregational 
Union which declared that it would not use Clause 27. Dr. 
Berry (the Congregational minister from Wolverhampton who 
was an important figure in the move for Free Church 
cooperation49) claimed an adherence to Congregational 
principles when he restated his belief that the religious 
instruction of children was the business of the Churches. 
The British Weeklv did not dispute this but felt that this 
type of statement did nothing to address the fact that 
existing religious teaching through Sunday schools was
48 British Weekly, 18th June 1896.
49 Bebbington, Nonconformist Conscience, p.70.
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inadequate. The British Weekly disagreed with Dr. Berry in 
his view that Clause 27 was a blatant but transitory attack 
on Nonconformity through the School Boards. It believed 
that the issues which had been raised for Dissenters would 
not disappear easily. The most important of these being, 
"the obligation of Nonconformists to face the
responsibility of giving their children religious education 
on weekdays".50 The British Weekly also believed that the 
Church had a valid argument with the view that those who 
wanted religious education in schools must make the effort 
to provide it and that ministers made better teachers of 
religion than Board school teachers.51
The British Weekly criticised those Nonconformist 
leaders who opposed the Bill with sentiments which were 
wholly negative as they appeared to lack confidence in the 
ability of Dissent to mobilise its forces in the 
educational arena. In its "Friendly Reply" to Dr. 
Clifford's criticisms of moderation in the Daily News, the 
British Weekly argued that, "Fervent denunciations are all 
right in their place, but much that is being said in 
criticism [of the Bill] is entirely unpractical".
Commenting on the Congregational Union's opposition to the 
Bill the British Weekly stated:
The Nonconformist opposition to the measure has 
been throughout on the whole singularly futile, 
because it has not been grounded on any true 
principle. It might have been hoped that the 
Congregationalists would in some measure recover 
lost ground, but both Dr. Berry and Mr. Hirst
50 British Weekly, 21st May 1896.
51 British Weekly, 30th April 1896.
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Hollowell completely lost their heads, as we have 
little doubt they will admit when they have had 
time to think over the matter.52
In his address to the Union James Hirst Hollowell, the 
long time advocate of unsectarian education, told his 
listeners that if priests were allowed to enter the Board 
schools Nonconformists should refuse to pay their rates.
The British Weekly argued that this was an extremely 
inappropriate tactic within the context of the 1896 Bill. 
While it could conceive of circumstances under which 
Nonconformists should refuse to pay rates, this was an 
action of the last resort, "Obedience to the law, save 
under the absolute compulsion of conscience, is our 
rule".53 If such a revolt could be deemed necessary, the 
British Weekly argued, it should be well organised and so 
clearly justified that it commended itself to all fair 
minded men. According to Nicoll and his newspaper these 
conditions would not be met by Gorst's Bill.
Nonconformists were not of one mind on the matter and the 
British Weekly felt that resistance to the law was a very 
serious and dangerous game which two could play. It 
warned:
Unless our consciences are outraged, we must 
submit, and wait for a better time. We shall be 
in a majority again, and then others, our 
opponents, will have to accept legislation they 
do not like.54
52 British Weekly,
53 British Weekly,
54 British Weekly,
21st May 1896. 
21st May 1896. 
21st May 1896.
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In one sense the British Weeklv may have been trying 
to second guess the Unionist Government and its Anglican 
and Roman Catholic supporters. In declaring his certainty 
that it was "those who have called for this clause most who 
will most regret that it ever... passed," Nicoll may have 
been protesting too much.55 Indeed the British Weeklv 
occasionally suggested such a tactical strategy. It warned 
its readers that Nonconformists' complaints about the Act 
would only serve to convince Anglicans that great 
advantages were to be gained from its passing.56 The 
British Weeklv also assured those who maintained they would 
not use Clause 27 that one thing which would pre-empt the 
measure was the fear that Nonconformists would use it.57 
It is only through comparison with the British Weekly's 
responses to the education proposals of 1901 and 1902 that 
a true understanding of Nicoll's position can be reached.
The 1896 Education Bill was withdrawn on 19th June due 
to both a lack of time and commitment on the part of the 
Government. Salisbury explained to the Queen that the Bill 
had been "exceptionally complicated" and had undergone 
"unexampled obstruction" but its abandonment was 
nevertheless a great embarrassment to an apparently strong 
Government.58 The memory of the climb down was still fresh 
in the minds of Unionists and Nonconformists when the
55 British Weeklv, 14th May 1896.
56 British Weeklv, 23rd April 1896.
57 British Weekly, 21st May 189 6.
58 Salisbury to Queen Victoria, 22nd June 1896, CAB 
41/23/59, in Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.620.
Government came to address education in 1901 and 1902, It 
encouraged a more inflexible attitude among both the more 
Radical Free Church leaders and High Church Conservative 
back benchers forcing Arthur Balfour to attempt to 
conciliate between two irreconcilables. By March 1902 both 
Balfour and the Duke of Devonshire thought the question of 
education would "wreck the Government".59
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iii. The Education Bill of 1901:
In July 1899 T.B. Cockerton, auditor of the Local
Government Board, ruled that it was illegal for Board 
schools to provide secondary education out of rates raised 
for elementary education. This focused attention on the 
formerly acceptable practice of State schools extending 
their educational facilities to incorporate the technical 
and secondary levels without official recognition. Once 
this legally dubious practice was challenged the Government 
was forced to look at the generally inadequate nature of 
the country's secondary education. An Appeal against the 
Cockerton judgement delayed the need for immediate action 
until April 1901 when Cockerton's case was upheld. The re­
elected Unionist Government could not escape another 
wrangle over education.
Gorst introduced the Government's hurried response on 
7th May 1901. He stated that its object was "to establish
59 1st March 1902, Fitzroy, Memoirs I, in Munson, " 
Resistance," p.105.
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in every part of England and Wales, a local education 
authority for the supervision of education of every kind". 
He hoped that this authority might eventually have control 
over all schools - elementary, secondary and technical.60 
The Bill was to some extent a regurgitation of the 1896 
measure stripped of its provisions for elementary 
schools.61 Gorst worked on the premise that a consensus 
existed in favour of the establishment of a local authority 
which, having control over both primary and secondary 
education, would be able to form a plan for the general 
public education of its district suitable to the needs of 
the population.62 It was proposed that the education 
authorities would exercise their duties through a 
committee. Each locality was given the freedom to 
determine the structure of its committee with only two 
Governmental stipulations: the majority should consist of 
members of the council or where relevant of the excised 
boroughs and in every case there should be members on the 
committee who were not members of the county council. The 
exact ratio was a matter for the individual local 
authorities and their proposed schemes were to be published 
before they could be approved.63 Funding for the committee 
was to be provided by the county council from local 
taxation money. The county council also had the power to
60 Times, 8th May 1901.
61 Munson, "Passive Resistance," pp.79-80.
62 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xcii, 29th April - 13th May 
1901, col.971.
63 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xciii, col.977.
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levy a rate which was to be restricted in the Bill for the 
initial period to 2d. The School Board rate was not to be 
touched by the Bill.64
Gorst claimed there was very little importance in the 
conscience clause as it related to secondary education and 
his references to religious freedom were stated simply. It 
was proposed that;
the following condition should be imposed upon 
all schools which are aided, established, or 
maintained out of this money [local income tax 
and possible rate levied by the county council]. 
First of all, there is to be no condition of 
making a grant, that any particular kind of 
religion is or is not taught in a school; and, 
secondly, the parents of every scholar are to 
have the power to withdraw him or her from any 
religious observance or religious instruction, 
and, the hours of religious teaching and 
religious observance are to be so arranged as to 
make the withdrawal as convenient as possible.65
This clause provided the county councils with the 
right to assist denominational schools with the proviso 
that no pupil would be under any obligation to attend 
religious classes. The operation of the Cowper-Temple 
Clause after 1870 had revealed that it was in fact rare for 
parents to take a stand, fearing the possible detrimental 
effect on children. An opting-in rather than opting-out 
clause would undoubtedly have been more effective from a 
Nonconformist point of view. However the muted response 
(inside and outwith the House of Commons) to the Bill's 
conscience clause suggests that many shared Gorst's view
64 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xciii, col.978.
65 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xciii, cols.1980-1.
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that the religious make up of secondary schools was not as 
vital an issue as it was in the elementary sector.
Although Munson has noted that contemporaries regarded the 
Bill as, "inconsequential and ill-timed attempting to do 
too little too late in the session" immediate reaction to 
the Bill was more encouraging.66
Dr. Macnamara M.P., former President of the N.U.T., 
was agreeably surprised that the Government had brought in 
the Bill so quickly but felt that it had failed in its 
primary task of unifying and consolidating the local 
authorities within suitable areas for educational purposes. 
Despite the Government1s good intentions he argued that in 
failing to deal with elementary education it had
essentially undermined its main aim.67 Gorst had of course 
explained that while the Bill did not attempt to transfer 
the power of the existing elementary education authority - 
the School Boards - it represented the first step towards a 
greater unity of authority, which could only be achieved 
through a structure like the L.E.A. Gorst's proposals 
assumed the later transfer of the Board Schools to the
control of the new local authorities.68
Bryce, in his reply to the Bill, stated that as it was 
desirable to remove the anomalies in the existing education 
system the Opposition would consider the proposals in a 
fair spirit so long as nothing was done to encourage the 
sectarian controversy which had done so much to retard
66 Munson, "Passive Resistance," p.79.
67 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xcii, cols.993-4.
68 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.xcii, col.989.
progress in the past.69 This will to support the 
Government was echoed in the Times which stated that the 
Bill, "if not in all respects adequate to the education 
opportunity and the expectations of those most interested 
in the question, appears to be an honest attempt, more 
welcome because too long deferred, to introduce something 
like harmony into chaos".70 The Times encapsulated 
widespread opinion in describing the Bill as no more than a 
"well-meant instalment in a matter of great national 
urgency" .71
On 9th May 1901 the British Weekly noted that the Bill 
had been introduced but confessed that "much of it was 
obscure, and criticism must be postponed" until the full 
text had been made available.72 The Bill was not again 
referred to in its columns until the 20th June when the 
British Weekly congratulated Price Hughes on his article in 
the Daily Chronicle in which he spoke "the convictions of 
the vast majority of Free Churchmen" on the new Education 
Bill. The British Weekly summarised Hughes' opposition to 
Gorst's proposal in three points: (1) it substituted a 
responsible and representative educational authority with a 
nonrepresentative and irresponsible educational authority; 
(2) it proposed to abolish representative School Boards 
even in the case of elementary education; (3) it proposed 
to sweep away existing safeguards against the use of rates
69 Times, 8th May 1901.
70 Times, 8th May 1901.
71 Times, 8th May 1901.
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72 British Weekly, 9th May 1901.
to endow sectarian and privately managed schools, day 
schools and boarding, primary and secondary.
The British Weekly's response was surprisingly 
vehement. It declared, "If this Bill were forced through 
Parliament Free Churchmen would be bound to resist it even 
to the extent of refusing to pay the rates. This is the 
position we have always taken, and we are fully persuaded 
that Free Churchmen if forced to it would not shrink from 
the conflict". The British Weekly agreed with Hughes that 
bitter sectarian conflict over education was unfortunate at 
a time when the Empire was in danger but argued that the 
battle had been provoked by clerical friends and supporters 
of the Cecil Government.73
This was the first time a "major force" in 
Nonconformity advocated passive resistance as part of the 
educational struggle.74 Munson has suggested that the 
important change in circumstances which forced Nicoll to 
revise his position in June 1901 was that his "1896 faith 
in the inevitable Liberal victory had been shattered by the 
divisions within the party over the [Boer] war and the 1900 
"Khaki" victory for the government".75 This reading of 
Nicoll reinforces Munson's argument that for some Free 
Church leaders mobilisation of the "Nonconformist 
conscience" through the passive resistance movement was 
influenced by political as well as religious imperatives.
However Nicoll's call for passive resistance in 1901
73 British Weeklv, 20th June 1901.
74 Munson, "Passive Resistance," p.82.
75 Munson, "Passive Resistance," p.82.
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came from the fear, which re-emerged in 1902, that secular 
education would be subsidised by rates. The 1896 Bill had 
proposed forcing all denominations to provide the money and 
ministers for their own religious instruction in all 
schools. The 1901 Bill did not allow for Nonconformist 
religious teaching in the Voluntary schools and it did not 
safeguard the rates from being used for denominational 
teaching. Therefore without altering the structure in a 
way which the British Weekly might conceivably see as 
advantageous to Nonconformists, the 1901 Bill upheld the 
denominational exclusiveness of Voluntary schools.
Alongside this was the double blow of depriving the Free 
Churches of possible democratic control over State funded 
schools and releasing rate aid to the autonomous Voluntary
sector.
Yet despite the tone of its response to Hughes' 
article in the Daily Chronicle, Nicoll's call to
Nonconformists to defend their educational interests was
not on the front page. It was placed in the "Notes of the 
Week" section, at the end of the relatively long piece on 
Hughes; Nicoll's call to arms was almost hidden.76 It 
seems likely that the British Weekly suspected that the 
Bill would not be processed due to the restrictions of time 
and this is why it gave no mention of the Bill until six 
weeks after it had been introduced. Indeed the day after 
the first reading of the Bill in Parliament the Times
76 The tone of the piece undoubtedly has a lot to do with 
Nicoll's habit of dictating much of the British Weekly to his 
secretary. The article reads like someone becoming increasingly 
agitated the more he pursued the implications of the Bill.
commented that due to the state of public business it had 
small chance of becoming law in the present session.77
Nicoll took the opportunity afforded by Hughes' 
publicity to record his dislike of the Bill and to leave 
the Government in no doubt that any further educational 
measures would have to consider very seriously
Nonconformist objections. Although the Bill did not alarm 
many observers because it did not tackle elementary 
education, the British Weekly would have been in no doubt 
that it made the gradual assumption of primary schools into 
the sphere of the L.E.A.'s inevitable.
Nicoll's criticism of the Congregational Union's 
opposition to the 1896 Bill that it "had not been grounded 
on any true principle" was reminiscent of the British 
Weekly1s advice to the labour movement in November 1891.
It warned, "don't strike unless your strike will be 
successful. When you do let it be a big thing, on such 
simple definite grounds as shall carry popular sympathy 
with you. If you fail, in great part the suffering 
entailed will be yours".78 As the editor of a national 
weekly Nicoll felt the full weight of his responsibility 
towards his readership. He knew that by encouraging his 
readers to break the law he would have to bear some 
responsibility for their subsequent suffering. He also 
knew that unless it was possible to focus the public's 
attention on a single, clear-cut issue (like Rome on the 
rates) it would be very difficult to initiate and sustain a
77 Times, 8th May 1901.
78 British Weekly, 21st May 1896, 5th November 1891.
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campaign which enjoyed widespread support.
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iv. The Education Act of 1902:
The Baptist M.P. George White was first to resurrect
the idea of non-payment of rates in the education debate of 
1902.79 His plea for passive resistance was carried in the 
March edition of the monthly magazine The Light of Home and 
was published before the first reading of the Education 
Bill on 24th of that month.80 This symbolised the rigidity 
of Radical Nonconformists who were predisposed to oppose 
the Bill before knowing its contents. The British Weekly's 
reaction to the limited Education Bill of 1901 had revealed 
a similar predetermined hostility to the 1902 Bill. It had 
warned, "Liberals will strenuously resist the short Bill 
this session, but the real storm will burst when another 
foolish, elaborate, and highly contentious measure is laid 
before the country this year".81
The National Free Church Council which met in Bradford
in March 1902, addressed the effects of the education
crisis. Perks outlined the two demands on which
Nonconformists and the Liberal party would agree: that all 
grades of education be under the control of one directly 
elected authority and that public money should not be
79 Darlow, op.cit., p.379.
80 Light of Home, March 1902, in Munson, Nonconformists, 
p.255.
81 British Weeklv, 4th July 1901.
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granted without popular control. Hirst Hollowell called on 
the Government to hold another General Election before 
bringing in an Education Bill. He asserted that the 
Unionists by their own admission had been elected with the 
single mandate of settling the problem in South Africa.
The British Weekly agreed with this view but reported that 
the effect of Hirst Hollowell's speech was marred by his 
cry that it was a terrible outrage that Nonconformists 
should be threatened with a clerical Education Bill in 
Coronation year. Clifford's words also foretold the 
emotive nature of his future debate. He declared it high 
time "that the process of turning little Nonconformists 
into Anglicans at the public expense should cease".82 
Nonconformists had drawn the battle lines before the Bill
had been read.
Balfour was aware of the peril of underestimating the 
wrath of the "Nonconformist conscience" and he reminded the 
Commons, "Nobody can be more impressed than I am with the 
difficulty of the task which the Government have
undertaken".83 The Bill's uneasy and often painful
gestation was the result of the need to satisfy Unionist 
backbenchers (impatient after the 1901 debacle) without 
unnecessarily upsetting Dissenting Liberals and Liberal 
Unionists. The Bill as it appeared in the Commons on 24th 
March was therefore a compromise which proposed to deal 
with "secondary and primary education in one measure with
82 British Weekly, 20th March 1902.
83 Parliamentary Debates, Volume CV, 14th March - 10th April 
1902, 24th March 1902, col.846.
the view to their better coordination".84
The 1902 Bill was not dissimilar to its 1901 
predecessor but had the advantage that the Government was 
determined to see it through the Commons. In place of the 
dual system of School Boards and County and Borough County 
Councils the Government proposed setting up a single 
authority (L.E.A's) for all levels of education which would 
be responsible for raising a limited educational rate. 
L.E.A.s were also to be given responsibility for the 
training of teachers. Balfour defended his intention to 
assist denominational institutions reminding the Commons of 
the absurdity of starving them of funds while they provided 
for the education of the majority of children in the 
country. Two final aims of the Education Bill were the 
eradication of denominational squabbles in local and 
municipal life; and that the education authority should 
have at its disposal all the educational skills of the 
district.85
The L.E.A.s - the County Councils in counties and 
Borough Councils in county boroughs - were to operate 
through committees. These committees were to have a 
majority of members nominated by the Council. The powers 
of the committees were far reaching. Balfour stated that 
whether schools were Voluntary or rate erected, "in future, 
if this Bill becomes law, the local education 
authority...will be absolute master of the whole scheme of 
secular education in every elementary school in its
84 Parliamentary Debates. Vol. CV, col.846.
85 Parliamentary Debates, Vol. CV, cols.850-7.
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district, voluntary or otherwise".86
The L.E.A.s were to inherit the powers of the School
Boards over all rate-erected schools. In Voluntary schools 
it was proposed that their new jurisdiction would include 
the power to appoint one third of the managers, the duty of 
inspection and the power to refuse on educational grounds 
the appointment of any teacher. Alongside these new 
powers, the L.E.A.s had to adopt responsibility for the 
maintenance of buildings.87 The Bill also proposed to 
abolish the legislation which in effect allowed schools - 
Voluntary or Board - which had a sufficient number of 
places for the district, to block the building of a new 
school in their area, taking no account of the will of 
parents and ratepayers. Balfour suggested that "common 
sense, the needs of the economy, and the difficulty of 
finding the necessary funds" would provide a check on the 
unnecessary building of new schools.88 The Bill in its 
original form had two limitations: it did not apply to 
London and it made optional the Local Council's new 
responsibility for elementary education. This local option 
clause was justified by the belief that authorities aware 
of the advantages of the Bill, would adopt its measures 
more effectively without duress.89
Balfour anticipated the camps which would find fault 
with his Bill: ardent believers in School Boards, militant
86 Parilamentarv Debates, Vol.. CV, cols.858-9
87 Parliamentarv Debates. Vol,. CV, col.859.
88 Parliamentarv Debates, Vol.. CV, col.861.
89 Par1i ament arv Debates. Vol..CV, cols.862-3.
denominationalists, and militant anti-denominationalists. 
The third group was clearly the most difficult to appease. 
Balfour recognised two unanswerable educational grievances 
in the position of Nonconformists. The first, the problem 
of single-school districts where Anglicans or Roman 
Catholics held the monopoly, was to be countered with the 
legislation allowing a new school to be built where there 
was enough demand from parents. The second problem was the 
difficulty of entering the teaching profession in areas 
where single Church schools existed. The Government 
proposed that by creating a Local Education Authority which 
would have the power to deal with the whole question of 
education (including the provision of teachers) the 
grievances if not removed would be largely mitigated. 
Therefore Balfour hoped that militant Nonconformists would 
"look with less malevolent eyes" on the proposed
educational reform.90 •
Balfour's call to his countrymen to enable him to,
"put aside for ever... barren controversies which for too 
long have occupied our time", temporarily wrong-footed the 
Liberal Opposition which had to be seen to consider the 
Bill with a bipartisan mind.91 Campbell-Bannerman promised 
a favourable reception for the Bill in the House if it was 
truly calculated to promote the interests of education. But 
he warned that if the Bill eroded the real popular control 
and management of schools and was simply an effort to 
improve the conditions of Voluntary schools then the
90 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.CV, Cols.866-7.
91 Parliamentary Debates, Vol.CV, col.868.
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Government would face difficulty in getting it through.92
The British Weekly took its cue from Campbell- 
Bannerman and noted the wisdom of reserving judgement until 
the Bill could be studied in detail. Despite suggesting to 
its readership that the more Balfour's speech was examined 
the more obscure were the Government's provisions and 
proposals, the British Weekly offered some observations.
The first consequence of the Bill was the inevitable rise 
in the rates. It calculated that the Government's
proposals would add a further £3,000,000 to the cost of 
education. The size of county districts would make it 
impossible for Councils to provide adequate supervision for 
all schools, resulting in the continued management of many 
Voluntary schools by parsons, given the fact that most 
County Councils were Tory-dominated. On a practical level 
the British Weekly thought impending extinction would make 
impossible the position of School Boards which were 
maintained through the local option clause.93
The British Weekly then addressed the Bill's provision 
for Nonconformists. It conceded that Balfour deserved 
credit for recognising the grievances of Dissenters but had 
doubts that his scheme would provide any remedies. It 
seemed unlikely that Nonconformists would accept partial 
provision for control of the Voluntary schools, having no 
guarantee that the quota of managers appointed by the 
Council would be sympathetic to the Free Church view. The 
British Weekly thought Balfour's legislation which allowed
92 Parliamentary Debates. Vol.CV, cols.869-871.
93 British Weekly, 27th March 1902.
parents to have a second school built in single school 
areas was less than satisfactory. Nonconformists would be 
forced to have extra schools erected in order to protect 
their children from sectarian attack and to give jobs to 
those Dissenters who were in the teaching profession. 
However Nonconformists would act reluctantly, never having 
advocated the separation of children in their early years.
Therefore the British Weekly argued that all 
Nonconformists must endeavour to secure a truly popular 
control of schools. If however the Government used its 
enormous power to drive the Bill through, Nonconformists 
could not avoid joint action. Despite claiming that all 
immediate criticism of the Bill was made with the utmost 
reserve, the British Weekly remarked that there was, "at 
least, an opportunity of manifesting the unity and strength 
of the Liberal party. Their first effort must be to see 
that no sectarian interest is served by the new 
proposals" .94
Nicoll's tentative response to the first reading of 
the Education Bill concentrated on a desire to see 
parliamentary opposition by the Liberal party. The salient 
points to which the British Weekly drew attention were 
increased rates and the lack of popular control implied in 
the Bill. No mention was made of "Rome on the rates". In 
part, this was due to Nicoll's desire to take the time to 
examine the Bill properly before committing the British 
Weekly to an attack which was only partly considered. It 
was also born of the desire to attract support from a
151
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broader area than radical Nonconformity. Nicoll examined 
the Bill, the Liberal party's response and the attitude of 
the Liberal press before making his emotional plea to Free 
Churchmen to resist the education reforms.
Nicoll has been criticised for his hesitant response 
to Balfour's proposed legislation. It has been suggested 
that Nicoll's deliberation over the Bill's contents is 
evidence that he was taking political, secular soundings 
rather than reacting to the voice of his conscience.95 He 
is further implicated by his support for Lloyd George. 
Initially Lloyd George was "not unfavourably impressed with 
the Bill, judging it from a purely Welsh point of view".
But he conceded, "I am assured by English members that the 
Bill will be a bad thing for England...There may be parts 
of the Bill which I cannot agree with, and, until I have 
seen it in print, I must reserve further opinion".96 Lloyd 
George then took his cue from more militant voices such as 
the Daily News and John Clifford rather than risk losing 
his position as a spokesman for the Free Churches.97 Given 
his Little England past, it was also "helpful to Lloyd 
George to be reconciled by a good sectarian issue with 
fellow-Liberals who supported the Boer War".98
Munson sees Nicoll's response in similar terms to that 
of the Welsh M.P. He has argued that to both the Bill
95 Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.538.
96 Western Mail, 25th March 1902, Lloyd George Papers, 
H.L.R.O., A/10/2/12.
97 J.Grigg, Lloyd George; the people's champion, 19 02-1911, 
London, 1978, p.25.
98 Grigg, People ' s Champion, p. 27 .
offered, "a golden opportunity for a joint Liberal- 
Nonconformist campaign against the government. (Both men 
had initially far less hostile view towards the bill.)"99 
This culpability by association is not a satisfactory 
judgement of Nicoll. It is true that Nicoll came 
relatively slowly to the furore in 1902 but he was not 
inconsistent.
As Nicoll was one of the central characters in the 
drive for passive resistance his motivation has 
significance. If Nicoll was not primarily driven by his 
religious beliefs this implicates the passive resistance 
movement as a victim of political opportunism. 
Contemporaries were well aware of the association between 
opposition to the Education Act and the political Liberal 
party. Indeed the Coventry Herald and Free Press stated in 
1903 that, "The organisation of conscience becomes in part 
at least an organisation of political forces".100 Munson's 
study reveals an often conscious link between the campaign 
for religious freedom in education and political opposition 
to the Government. He notes that many Leagues were called 
Citizens' Leagues, with the emphasis on political rather 
than religious aims.101
It would be simplistic to argue that clever 
manipulators in London - Nicoll, Lloyd George,
Thomas Law, and Sears - manipulated the simple 
faith of provincial Nonconformists for political
99 Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.638.
100 Coventry Herald and Free Press, 8th May 1903, in Munson, 
Nonconformists, p.266.
101 Munson, Nonconformists, p. 266 .
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ends because Registers were perfectly aware that 
in politics religious beliefs mattered, whether 
Nonconformist, Anglican or Roman Catholic. This 
was especially the case concerning education. In 
all honesty they argued that their aim was not so 
much political but parliamentary while their 
motives were religious because based in 
conscience.102
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Nevertheless Munson has referred to Nicoll's call for 
passive resistance in opposition to the Unionists' 1901 
education proposals as an action which served "merely to 
strengthen the Liberal opposition".103 He groups Nicoll 
with the band of "clever manipulators in London" without 
properly examining Nicoll's individual relationship with 
the Liberal party or indeed Nonconformity. Of passive 
resistance Munson says, "While it would prove an effective 
weapon against the Tories, it was not a truly conscientious 
movement unless we assume that men's consciences can be 
organized by a triumvirate of Nicoll, Clifford and 
Sears...While not discrediting those who felt they were 
acting from honourable motives, we must admit that they 
were to a degree manipulated by Nicoll and Sears if not by 
John Clifford.104
Nicoll did not address the paradox of putting pressure 
on Free Churchmen to look to their conscience while 
preaching that they had a duty to reach a certain 
conclusion. A.M. Fairbairn would not take part in the no­
rate campaign because he believed that external
102 Munson, Nonconformists, do.266-7
103 Munson, Nonconformists. p. 253.
104 Munson, Nonconformists, p.275.
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organisation negated the role of the individual
conscience.105 106But Munson's examination of the extent to 
which Nicoll's actions were tempered by political concerns 
is too obsessed with party politics. Nicoll saw the 
Liberal party as a vehicle for Nonconformists demands. If 
he hoped that the movement against the Education Bill would 
assist the Liberals in the short term it was so that they 
could serve Nonconformist interests in the longer term. 
Nicoll's consistent political aspiration was religious 
equality not simply the electoral success of the Liberals.
Nicoll's hesitancy over the Bill was not lengthy. On 
the 3rd April the British Weekly published its leader, "The 
Duty of Nonconformists," stating that:
The more closely the Education Bill is examined 
the clearer appears the duty of resisting it at 
all costs, and to the last extremity. It is a 
Bill avowedly introduced to save the Church 
schools. It hardly meets in any way the 
educational necessities of England. It will, if 
passed, involve the country in tremendous 
expenses... The extraordinary confusion of the 
arrangement is almost incredible.105
Initially, therefore, the British Weekly appealed as 
much to common sense as to conscience. Although the 
viewpoint that the Bill was ultimately an inefficient 
measure was questionable, it was a legitimate concern given 
the wide reaching effects of the Unionist legislation. As 
an alternative to Balfour's proposal, the British Weekly 
suggested that what the country needed was the enlargement
105 Munson, Nonconformists, p.259.
106 British Weekly, 3rd April 1902.
of local School Board areas, the development of higher 
grade schools as a bridge to a system of secular education, 
the elimination of inefficient schools and popular control 
at every point. The list was more vague than Balfour's 
"bird's eye view" of the Education Bill and showed no 
awareness of the difficulty of fulfilling these aims. 
Nevertheless the British Weekly reiterated that the present 
Bill would open up "the prospect of inextricable confusion, 
hopeless inefficiency, and enormous and unbearable 
expense" .107
Ultimately the British Weekly was primarily concerned 
with the Bill's effect on Nonconformists. It argued that 
Balfour's attempt to alleviate the educational grievances 
of the Free Churches would only serve to exacerbate them.
It was unrealistic to suppose that rural districts with 
declining populations would be able to bear the burden of 
two half-filled schools or that Nonconformists would incur 
the wrath'of their neighbours by compelling them to submit 
to additional tax for rate aided schools. The British 
Weekly also noted the unfairness of Nonconformists being 
taxed alike for Church schools and others and the fact that 
the Church party could divert money saved from
subscriptions to the building of new Voluntary schools 
which would then have to be maintained by the rates. 
Therefore while Church schools would thrive under the new 
Bill Nonconformists would find themselves taxed to support 
"a religious propagandism of which they conscientiously 
disapprove[d]". The British Weekly therefore declared the
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Bill "the very worst Education Bill ever proposed".108
Despite Nonconformist antagonism, there was little 
hope that the Bill would be rejected by the Commons; the 
Unionists had a majority and could rely on the support of 
Irish M.P.s. Therefore Nonconformists had to consider 
possible action once the Bill had become law. The British 
Weeklv readership was left in no doubt of the action they 
were being urged to follow: "If this Bill is passed in its 
present form, we as ratepayers must allow our property to 
be seized for the school rate, but we cannot
conscientiously pay it...There is no occasion for excited 
talk, but for serious deliberate warning. The 
responsibility for giving such warning is much less than 
the responsibility of withholding it".109
The British Weekly reiterated its condemnation of the 
link between Church and State and was opposed to the State 
funding the teaching of Christianity either in Church or 
school. It also restated the belief that it was a "great 
calamity" that the position of secular educationalists like 
R.W. Dale had been abandoned by the Free Churches in favour 
of undenominationalism. The British Weeklv still looked 
unfavourably on this brand of religious teaching, which 
operated in the Board schools but now accepted that it was 
preferable to the increased sectarianism being condoned by 
Balfour. As an alternative to the 1902 Unionist
legislation, the British Weekly advocated proposals not 
dissimilar to those floated by the Government in 1896. The
108 British Weekly, 3rd April 1902.
109 British Weeklv, 3rd April 1902.
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newspaper cited as a more favourable system one in which 
all schools were under popular control and clergy and 
ministers of all denominations had the right to give half 
an hour's religious instruction to pupils. Although the 
British Weekly did not offer this as a complete solution it 
noted that, "provided that representation goes with 
taxation, and that each has an equal opportunity, there is 
no outrage of justice. Besides, in this way the country 
would be saved from the hateful necessity of building 
useless schools".110
Opposition to the Bill was also agreed at a meeting of 
the Free Church leaders at the Memorial Hall on 27th March. 
Thomas Law stated that the Free Church leaders were against 
the Bill because it represented an attempt to "disturb and 
suppress" the School Boards, and it provided for the 
maintenance of Voluntary schools out of the rates,
unaccompanied by real popular control. As a precursor of 
the British Weekly's sentiment he called the Bill, "the 
most retrograde educational measure introduced into the 
House of Commons within living memory". Law saw the first 
duty of Nonconformists to be opposition to the Bill without 
compromise. If passed, they might have to work with it by 
forcing the building of nonsectarian schools but this was 
to be a last resort. Whatever the outcome, Law was certain
that the Bill would unite all the Free Churches in 
opposition.111
Within three weeks of the Bill being read the British
110 British Weekly, 3rd April 1902.
111 British Weekly, 3rd April 1902.
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Weekly became one of the leading passive resistance 
journals. A leader, "The Last Resort", combined a 
practical approach to organised opposition with an 
emotional appeal to Nonconformist loyalty. In contrast to 
previous coverage of the Bill which laid stress on 
inefficiency and expense, the article abandoned any attempt 
to outdo the educationalists. It stated, "We are 
Nonconformists first and Educationalists afterwards, and as 
Nonconformists our main business is to see that the 
elementary principles of religious freedom are respected". 
The British Weekly posed the question to its readers, "do 
proposals of the Bill touch our conscience?" - given that 
the Bill dealt the deadliest blow to the very existence and 
future of Nonconformity and would practically hand over the 
children of the nation to the Anglican and Roman Catholic 
clergy.112 The call for passive resistance quickly 
became referred to as the "line" of the British Weekly and 
Nicoll, as one of its primary apologists, felt bound to 
examine the implications.113 The British Weekly's 
rationalisation of the movement against the Education Act 
showed an awareness of the criticisms which might be 
levelled at its organisers. The explanation for the 
necessity of illegal action revealed a defensiveness which 
suggested that the British Weekly was aware that the appeal 
to the Nonconformist conscience was tenuous. It recognised
112 British Weekly, 10th April 19 02.
113 The Westminster Gazette referred to Dr. Parker's support 
for passive resistance as following the line of the British 
Weekly. At a Baptist Conference the members stated their 
agreement with the British Weekly in supporting the campaign 
against the Education Act. British Weekly, 10th April 1902.
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two possible objections to passive resistance; that it was 
unwise to make such extreme declarations before other 
measures had been tried, and that nonpayment of rates 
itself was a very strong step to take. In reply to the 
former the British Weekly stated that if consciences were 
invaded by these proposals Nonconformists must - in 
fairness to themselves and their opponents - make this 
known at the earliest opportunity. If this was not made 
clear, the British Weekly feared, the opposition would 
claim that conscience had nothing to do with the matter. 
Despite the dubious nature of a direct prompt from 
Protestant leaders to individuals, the British Weekly 
was unrelenting in its insistence that the issue was one of 
conscience. The call to conscience deliberately alienated 
those outside Radical Dissent. The British Weeklv 
underlined this;
There is a sharp distinction between those who 
look at the Bill as bad from an educational point 
of view, and those who look at it as outraging 
the principles of religious liberty. Bad from 
the educational point of view we believe it to 
be, but opposition on that ground is one thing, 
and opposition on the ground of conscience quite 
another thing, infinitely more serious, involving 
quite other necessities of resistance.114
Passive resistance was also very much in keeping with 
the tradition of middle class martyrdom inherent in 
Nonconformity and the ethos of suffering for religion.115 
There can be little doubt that Nicoll used the campaign
114 British Weeklv, 10th April 1902.
115 Munson, Nonconformists, pp. 267 , 2 65.
against the Education Act as a way of consolidating turn of 
the century Nonconformity. The British Weekly carried a 
report of a meeting of the London Congregational Union 
stating that although the Union was firmly opposed to the 
Education Bill, younger members were not behind the 
veterans in zeal.116 The fear that the campaign for 
religious equality was dying among young Nonconformists was 
a constant theme in the British Weekly. A worry which had 
nagged at Nicoll during the 1890s became a prominent 
concern during the Education controversy. The British 
Weekly feared the end of the old Nonconformist spirit, 
killed by "the growing indifference of the country, and the 
alienation of the masses from public worship". This 
apathy, the British Weekly believed, had prompted 
Nonconformists to "refrain from aggressive action against 
the Establishment, and concentrate their energies on a 
great work of evangelisation".117
Free Church leaders often referred to tradition in 
order to remind Nonconformists of their duty to oppose an 
attack on religious freedom and therefore keep the flame of 
radical Nonconformity alive. The M.P. A.E. Hutton stated 
that if Nonconformity quietly accepted the Education Bill 
then, "truly we must be a people ignorant of our
principles, careless of our duty, and unworthy of our 
heritage". Clifford also attempted to tap into the 
cultural memory of the Free Churches stating, "The older 
folk who remember the great struggles of our past are ready
116 British Weekly, 10th April 1902.
117 British Weekly, 8th May 1902.
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to repeat the sacrifices of our fathers".118
The end of the nineteenth century witnessed the 
paradox of growing secularism with an increase in Anglican 
assertiveness and Nonconformists pitted themselves against 
both forces. Clearly the campaign of passive resistance 
was a show of strength on the part of committed
Nonconformists. Once the battle against Anglican hegemony 
in schools had begun the absolute desire of the Free 
Churches to win led to extremism. Indeed as early as April 
1902 the Free Church Conference on Education agreed 
unanimously that the Bill should be ended, not amended.
The British Weekly was spurred on by the belief that in 
journals like the Times the possibility of Nonconformists 
effectively fighting the Education reforms was not taken 
seriously.119
The Bill received its second reading in mid May 1902 
and was passed by 402 votes to 165. Parliamentary 
opposition was apparently futile and the British Weekly had 
to maintain its efforts to gather the extra-Parliamentary 
forces of the Free Churches. In the face of political 
hopelessness it assured its readership that, "Enthusiasm is 
invariably stirred to vehemence whenever the refusal to pay 
rates if the Bill is passed is even so much as hinted at. 
The ancient spirit of zeal for freedom is rapidly reviving 
and will soon be at its height".120
Behind the emotive words was the realisation that
118 British Weekly, 14th April 1902.
119 British Weekly, 8th May 1902.
120 British Weekly, 15th May 1902.
effective political action is not accidental and the 
British Weeklv outlined the immediate duty of 
Nonconformists as three-fold: to fight the Bill inch by 
inch in Parliament; to keep up the movement in the country 
and to ensure that they were thoroughly prepared for the 
battle. Nicoll was determined that the mobilisation of the 
Nonconformist conscience was not spiritual and abstract.
His newspaper argued for the, "organisation of our forces. 
Very soon we shall have to mobilise them. Money will be 
needed as well as leadership".121
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v. The Response of the Liberal Party:
Liberal M.P.s had tentatively backed the Nonconformist
campaign against the Education Bill. The Liberal
leadership agreed to attack the reform on "the Rating 
question without popular control", and therefore stood 
somewhat apart from the Nonconformists and their religious 
objections. The Free Church reaction to Balfour's Bill was 
a "mixed blessing" to the Liberal party. The Education 
Bill served as a way of uniting Liberals around a 
traditional rallying point. It was a welcome source of 
unity in the light of the Boer War divisions but was also 
dangerously mixed up with Nonconformity and illegality.
The Liberal party did not want to be seen to be the tool of 
the Free Churches any more than it wanted to seem to
121 British Weekly, 15th May 190 2.
condone breaking the law.122
This equivocal response made it more difficult to
organize the opposition. In July Lloyd George wrote to 
Nicoll in an attempt to "coordinate" the fight against the 
Education Bill. He felt that there, "ought to be .a more 
complete understanding between those who conduct the 
campaign in the country and the Members who fight the Bill 
in the Commons". Lloyd George wanted Hughes, Nicoll and 
Clifford to meet with a few of the more active
Nonconformists in the House to discuss the situation. He 
warned that success or failure depended entirely on the 
events of the coming months, "The House of Commons is not 
yet convinced that the Nonconformists in any part of the 
country except Wales mean business".123
James Denney was also concerned about the lack of 
leadership among both the Free Churches and Liberals. He 
feared that the Liberal party was an ineffective instrument 
as it did not "naturally care for spiritual religion as the 
Tory party naturally cares for the Established Church, so 
that in the field of action the Nonconformists have all the 
advantages against them. I am afraid", he concluded, 
"unless it comes as you suggest to fines and imprisonments 
all over, they will be trampled on".124
122 Munson, Nonconformists, pp.256, 2 57.
123 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 19th July 1902, Nicoll Papers, 
National Library of Scotland, MS.15941, f.14.
124 Denney to Nicoll, 29th July 1902. Denney wrote again in 
the autumn, "If any man is entitled to the credit of the national 
movement [against the Education Bill] it is you, and one could 
only wish for Liberalism a leader with any principle or backbone 
to take the guidance of it. The other side are strong only 
because we are weak..." Denney to Nicoll, 16th October 1902, in
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The British Weeklv wasted little time in increasing 
its efforts to mobilise Nonconformist forces and on 31st 
July it published its famous leader, "Set Down My Name,
Sir," a quote taken from Pilgrim's Progress, which urged 
Free Churchmen to register as Resisters.125 In September 
Lloyd George followed his prompt to Nicoll that, "A hint 
from you will set all the machinery in motion," with an 
open letter to the editor in the British Weekly. He urged 
Nicoll to use his "great influence with the fighting forces 
of Nonconformity... for action in the forthcoming municipal 
contests in England and Wales".126 These elections 
represented an opportunity to demonstrate the unpopularity 
of the Education Bill and, Lloyd George argued, the chance 
to have opponents of the Bill represented in the County 
Councils.127
The Liberal League section of the party found 
opposition to the Bill more complicated. Haldane published 
Education and Empire, a collection of his speeches arguing 
for the greater organisation of education at all levels. 
R.L. Morant believed that Haldane had, "said what needed 
saying over and over again...I sympathise with your 
impatience at the smallness of vision which seems always to
October 1902, in Letters of Denney to Nicoll, p.27, p.28.
125 The same title was given to a pamphlet published by 
Nicoll some years later which called on men to volunteer for 
service in the First World War. Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
126 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 8th September 1902, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., British Weekly, 11th September 1902, Lloyd George 
Papers, H.L.R.O., A/10/2/29.
127 British Weeklv, 11th September 1902, Lloyd George Papers, 
H.L.R.O., A/10/2/29.
Sidney Webb hadlimit our education rulers. . . "128 
alienated the radical Nonconformists by helping to draft 
the Bill and then giving it his support and Rosebery was 
slow in his opposition. Wemyss Reid prompted, "There is no 
doubt that the Education Bill is the question of the day 
but you [Rosebery] will fight it in your own way. Still an 
early utterance on it would not do any harm".129 Even 
Asquith was judged to have "worked himself into an unreal 
opposition... not really convinced of the iniquity or 
unwisdom of the bill he [was] denouncing".130 Although 
Nicoll joined the League four months after the Education 
Bill had been introduced, he was unhappy that it included 
members who saw themselves as educationalists. Nicoll 
warned Perks that the Liberal League in Scotland had been 
11 seriously damaged" by Haldane and Munro Ferguson and urged 
that the General Council make "a clear expression of 
opinion" on the Education Bill when it next met.131
The expression given to the League's opinion owed more 
to Webb than to the Nonconformists. Reid told Rosebery of 
attempts to draft a resolution on the Bill which received 
the approval of Perks and Paulton.132 However a meeting 
three days later of the League's publications committee
128 Morant to Haldane, 2 5th May 1902, Haldane Papers, N.L.S., 
MS.5905, ff .175-6.
129 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 10th September 1902, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., Ms.10058, f.45.
130 28th November 1902, Webb, Diary Volume Two, p.263.
131 Nicoll to Perks, 14th October 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, f.22.
132 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 20th October 1902, Rosebery
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10058, f.56.
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"resolved itself... into a sitting of the other members at 
the feet of Sidney Webb, who gave...a great deal of good 
advice in very strong language". Webb's own resolution was 
accepted after he threatened to introduce an amendment if 
Reid's original proposal was moved at the meeting of the 
General Council the following day. "We all think that it 
would be a very good thing if we could ensure union 
tomorrow by adopting this resolution instead of the 
original one," Reid finished "It is not so strong of course 
but I think it contains everything that is essential".133
Reid recognised the potential of the education 
question as an effective jolt to the Liberal party 
fortunes, particularly if the sectarian element was not 
stressed. In November 1902 he urged Rosebery to take the 
chief role in opposing the Bill in the Lords. "My own 
feeling," he wrote, "is one of amazement that the official 
Liberals (both Parliament Street & the Federation) have not 
organized demonstrations in the great towns not upon the 
general question but upon the subject of the destruction of 
the School Boards in those particular towns".134 Perks was 
also keen to coordinate the campaign and suggested to 
Rosebery that he write a note asking Lloyd George his 
opinion on some points raised in the Bill adding, "I know 
Lloyd George is anxious to be friendly".135 The difficulty
133 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 23rd October 1902, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10058, ff.57-8.
134 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 20th November 1902, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10058, ff.81-3.
135 Perks to Rosebery, 29th November 1902, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, f.39. '
remained that the activists who opposed the Education Bill 
had committed themselves to a rigorous campaign on a 
sectarian level. Lloyd George had warned Nicoll earlier in
the month:
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It is now too late to reverse the policy of "no 
rate". The leaders of the Free Churches have 
committed themselves too deeply for
reconsideration & they must go through with their 
threats otherwise they will make Nonconformity 
contemptible in the eyes of the nation.
However, I have no doubt as to their organising 
first. The Bill is as obnoxious to day as it 
ever was.136
Nicoll had stated emphatically in the November 
Contemporary Review that Nonconformists must oppose the 
Bill, "by every endeavour... one of the great forms of 
resistance being the refusal of the school rate".137 
However the British Weeklv editor also suggested that the 
English Free Churches would be prepared to accept the 
Scottish educational system, "All they wish is to have 
public control, and they are not afraid of the results".138 
Rosebery responded publicly urging the Government to
136 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 4th November 1902, Nicoll Papers, 
N.L.S., in Munson, Nonconformists, p.261.
137 W.R.Nicoll, "The Education Bill and the Free Churches," 
Contemporary Review, November 1902, p.632.
138 W.R.Nicoll, Contemporary Review, November 1902, pp.642-3. 
Nicoll believed that at least the Scottish system would (1) 
secure the administration of education by popular bodies, elected 
for that end; (2) abolish all sectarian tests for teachers; (3) 
establish undenominational religious teaching over the whole 
country; (4) secure full and adequate protection of minorities 
everywhere. Stoddart, William Robertson Nicoll, p.157.
During a speech on 8thexamine Nicoll's suggestion.139 
December he became further involved in the campaign with 
his assertion that if the Nonconformists of England 
submitted tamely to the Education Bill, "I will not say 
that they will be weakened religiously, but I will say that 
in my judgement, politically they will have ceased to 
exist". Rosebery went further in the Scottish Liberal 
Club, arguing that if the country accepted the Bill without 
protest, Liberalism would be dead.140 Wemyss Reid noted 
that the battle over education could be used to energise 
the party. He wrote to Rosebery of the dullness in the 
political world after a long Parliamentary session, "but 
out of doors & in the country there is more than enough of 
spirit & if the Noncons. take your admonitions to heart we 
should have a lively winter".141
The Bill received its Royal assent on the 18th 
December and the King congratulated Balfour on "the skill, 
temper and patience," which he had shown, "in steering such 
a difficult and controversial Bill through the House".142 
Nicoll told Perks, "It is a good policy for the clergy to 
grumble that they have not got more, but in reality they 
are delighted as they well may be". He felt sure that if 
Nonconformists tried to work the Bill they would be lost 
and urged Perks to lead the Liberal Methodists, "They are
139 Stoddart, William Robertson Nicoll, p.157.
140 Stoddart, William Robertson Nicoll, p.158.
141 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 14th December 1902, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10058, ff.92-3.
142 Lord Knollys to Balfour, 5th December 1902, Balfour MSS. 
Add. MS.49683, f.114, in Munson, "Unionist Coalition," p.641.
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all right if they have a man of wisdom and standing to lead 
them, but otherwise they will not be able to stand up 
against the official ring".143
vi. Passive Resistance:
The first prosecution for nonpayment of rates took 
place in May 1903.144 Perks wrote to Rosebery, "There is 
every indication that the revolt of the Nonconformists 
against the Education Act will be extremely serious - far 
beyond anything that the Government or the Liberal Press 
supposed. I was perfectly right in my forecast".145 But 
the tone of the more general Nonconformist response was 
more dutiful than outraged. Wemyss Reid described the Free 
Church protestors as reluctant demonstrators:
Yesterday's Nonconformist demonstration was the 
largest I have ever seen...How touching to see 
how widely the procession of yesterday differed 
from the stuff of which ordinary demonstrations 
are composed. I think a good half of the people 
(respectable women, grey haired men in tall hats 
and good black coats & even smart people in fair 
horse (?) with coachmen and footmen on the box) 
did not like being there. But they had come at 
the call of duty & were very grave & very 
resolute. It was such a turn = out of the middle
143 Nicoll to Perks, 2nd January 1903, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, f.54.
144 Machin, op.cit., p.2 66.
145 Perks to Rosebery, 16th May 1903, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, ff.82-83.
classes as I never saw before.146
By June 1903 there were 206 Passive Resistance
Leagues; a number which was eventually swollen to 648.147
Alongside the British Weekly which published regular 
updates on passive resisters, the movement received 
constant support from the Light of Home and the Crusader - 
which was started for this purpose and became a weekly 
instead of a monthly in October 1903. Both were edited by 
J. Edward Sears.148 It was most common for resisters to 
return their payment for rates having deducted the amount 
calculated by the Leagues as being used to subsidize 
denominational education. Those who appeared before the 
magistrate and continued to refuse payment then had some 
goods seized in lieu of money. Often the same item was 
taken each time a rate demand was issued as it was common 
for friends of the Resister to purchase his goods at 
auction, returning them to the owner.149 As Nicoll lived in 
London and was exempt from paying the rate (as the 
Education Act did not extend to the capital) he proposed 
taking a house in the country.150
The farcical nature of nonpayment of rates meant that 
it was difficult for resisters to maintain credibility.
146 Wemyss Reid to Rosebery, 24th May 1903, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10058, ff.118-119.
147 Munson, Nonconformists, p.2 64.
148 Munson, Nonconformists, pp.2 64-5. The deaths of Hughes 
and Parker in 1902 meant that Sears became one of the most 
important members in the movement alongside Nicoll and Clifford.
149 Munson, Nonconformists, p.274.
150 Lawrence, "William Robertson Nicoll", p.180.
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But for its leaders the campaign of passive resistance was 
of much broader significance than playing cat and mouse 
with teapots and candlesticks. As pragmatic men they had 
to recognise the difficulties which faced them politically. 
The Liberal party was their most obvious vehicle yet it was 
ever cautious of alienating the Irish vote and was 
reluctant to advocate wholesale undenominational education. 
Perks reminded Rosebery in April 1903 that critics did not 
realize that the Education Act would not be reversed with 
Irish help. He believed that the Liberal party needed to 
draw to its side the multitudes who left over Home Rule.151
However Perks and his ilk were also faced with the fact 
that Nonconformist demands also stood in the way of a 
reconciliation with many Liberal Unionists.
It was not simply Liberal Unionists who were alienated 
by the stringent nature of Nonconformist action. In 
December 1903 R.B.Haldane threatened to retire from 
politics and leave the Liberal party if the Nonconformist 
call for the total repeal of the Education Act was not 
dropped. However Haldane did favour considerable amendment 
and proposed a Bill which encompassed two main principles; 
universal public schools with effective public control, and 
abolition of all sectarian tests. Perks, who did not want 
to see the fragmentation of the Liberal League any more 
than a split in the Liberal party, nonetheless believed 
that the solution lay in a measure which provided for the 
purchase or renting of Anglican schools by public
151 Perks to Rosebery, 4th April 1903, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS. 10051, f.73.
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authorities and permitted parents who desired additional 
religious instruction for their children to have ministers 
of religion in school during school hours.152 Perks wrote 
to Rosebery that he was beginning to feel very strongly 
that Nonconformists would have to try and come into line on 
education with their Free Food allies. However a meeting 
with the Free Church leaders revealed that they were not 
ready to compromise, opposing the idea of the clergy in 
schools during school hours. Perks met with Lloyd George 
on 23rd December and discovered that his fellow
Nonconformist took the same line as the Free Church 
leaders.153 On the same day Perks informed Asquith, "It is 
the bounden duty of the Nonconformists, thru every agency 
in their power, to oppose every candidate be he Unionist 
Free Trader or anything else who will not accept our 
Education policy".154
Illegality was also problematic for the Free Church 
Council. In October 1903 G.S.Hirst, Chief of Staff at the 
Memorial Hall published a pamphlet entitled, "Organising 
for the Elections: a manual for the secretaries of the Free 
Church Councils and others engaged in organising the Free 
Churches in connection with the forthcoming elections". 
Under the heading "What Free Churchmen Want" were two
152 Perks to Rosebery, 12th December 1903, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, ff.162-3.
153 Perks to Rosebery, 19th December 1903, 21st December 
1903, 23rd December 1903, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10051, 
f.168, f.171, ff.173-4.
154 Perks to Asquith, 23rd December 1903, Asquith Papers, 
Bodleian Library, X, f.118, in Koss, "1906: Revival and 
Revivalism," from A.J.A.Morris, Edwardian Radicalism 1900-14: 
some aspects of British radicalism. London, 1974, p.85.
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points of consensus; that the vital amendment of the 
Education Act was of primary importance both to the Free 
Churches and to the English nation, and education must be 
made the most imperative question in the next municipal and 
general elections. The Manual stressed the importance of 
getting candidates to make firm promises on the education 
question and not accepting the reply that the matter would 
be given "very careful consideration". In an introduction 
to the pamphlet Thomas Law noted that it dealt with work 
which usually lay outside the duties of the Free Church 
Council. Under normal circumstances both local and 
national politics were to be kept out of an organisation 
whose primary aim was the spiritual and moral uplifting of 
the people but, Law argued, the Government had forced on 
the nation two Acts which did grievous wrong to Free 
Churchmen.155 Despite Law's contention the National Free 
Church Council did not want to cause division among its 
members and left the organisation of the campaign against 
the Education Act to the Passive Resistance Committee 
organised by Clifford.156
Nicoll found the business of controlling the movement 
which he had helped to start extremely difficult. He was 
keen for Rosebery to take a more active role in the Liberal 
League and to deliver a speech on the Church crisis as the 
former Liberal leader seemed to be more sympathetic to the 
Nonconformist cause than Asquith or Haldane. However 
Rosebery was not inclined to jump into the fray without
155 Lloyd George Papers, H.L.R.O., A/2/3/9.
156 Machin, op.cit, p.266.
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hearing, as Perks put it, the imperative and resistless 
call of the country.157 Nicoll's relations with Lloyd 
George were also strained by the early refusal of 14 of the 
15 Welsh Local Authorities to enforce the Education Act. 
This had left English passive resisters isolated as 
Scotland had not been affected by Balfour's proposals.158 
Evan Davies wrote to Lloyd George from the Carnarvon 
Education Offices warning that a settlement for Wales might 
be achieved without much difficulty but Lloyd George must 
consider his duty to English Nonconformity.159 Lloyd George 
wrote to Nicoll asking for his support:
...it would strengthen [the Welsh County 
Councils] considerably if they knew that the 
leaders of English Nonconformity would be 
prepared to back them up when the blow is 
delivered, and I should very much like to be 
able to inform them when I go down next week 
that such support is forthcoming. We cannot do 
without your powerful influence and although I 
have no doubt that all of it will be on our 
side when trouble comes still I should like to 
hear from you with a word to that effect. I 
know it will have great weight with the Welsh 
Nonconformists .160
The Welsh revolt meant the closure of all state aided 
schools as the County Councils would issue no rate. Lloyd 
George proposed opening the chapels for the education of 
children until the dispute had passed. He wrote to Nicoll
157 Perks to Rosebery, 22nd June 1904, Nicoll to Perks, 2nd 
September 1904, Perks to Rosebery, 8th July 1904, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10051, f.231, f.250, ff.235-6.
158 Munson, Nonconformists. p.277.
159 Evan Davies to Lloyd George, 17th March 1904, Lloyd 
George Papers, H.L.R.O., A/l/3/1.
160 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 20th February 1904, Nicoll 
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requesting his "powerful aid" in carrying through the 
policy. It was hoped that the Free Church Council would 
assist Welsh Nonconformists not only by sending speakers 
but also funds for the ad hoc schools. Lloyd George asked 
Nicoll to address a meeting in Cardiff to be attended by 
the leaders of the Free Churches. Nicoll was to share the 
platform with Clifford and Perks.161 The meeting, which 
took place the following month, resolved that if the 
Default Act was enforced Nonconformist parents should 
withdraw their children from Church Schools. The Act 
empowered the Board of Education to support denominational 
schools without the approval of the local authority.162
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vii. Education under the Liberals:
The campaign of passive resistance found it difficult 
to maintain support over a period of years. "The real loss 
came in 1906 after January's landslide Liberal victory", 
Munson has written, "this would, of course, support the 
view that resisters' motives were essentially political for 
the political make up of the Government should make no 
difference to the alleged injustices which the Act
produced".163 But Resisters made no secret of the fact 
that their aim was to have the Education Act repealed. The
161 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 15th September 1904, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, f.24.
162 Machin, op.cit, pp.268-269.
163 Munson, Nonconformists, p.272.
campaign of civil disobedience had been an attempt to 
undermine the Act as well as a registering of discontent 
and therefore had a political motive. The Liberals had 
promised that they would do their best to appease 
Nonconformists and the Government had a large number of 
Free Churchmen in its ranks. Therefore it was more
difficult for the leaders of the resistance movement to 
hold the support of the general public. Lloyd George and 
Perks may have been more disposed to compromise once their 
party formed the Government but Nonconformist leaders were 
not so easily satisfied.
Political life, tasted by Nonconformists during the 
campaign of passive resistance, no doubt encouraged greater 
participation in the General Election campaign of 1906.
The desire to see the Education Act repealed and its 
authors turned out of office also drove the Free Churches 
to an active role in the electioneering process. Campbell- 
Bannerman was quoted in the Times as saying, "We have been 
put into office by the Nonconformists, "164 and 24 of the 
new M.P.s were passive resisters.165 Consequently the party 
decided to deal with education in its first major Bill. 
Augustine Birrell, as President of the Board of Education, 
had the task of drawing up the legislation. The Bill met 
some of the Nonconformists' grievances. It forced
denominational schools to have nondenominational teaching 
three days a week with sectarian variations on the two 
remaining days and stated that the majority of school
164 Koss, "Revival and Revivalism," p.93.
165 Munson, Nonconformists, p.2 82.
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managers should be from outside the denomination.155 56 
Certain schools could apply for "extended facilities" which 
would enable them to have denominational teaching every day 
of the week. This was outlined in Clause 4. Birrell 
argued that the Clause - which many Free Church leaders did 
not like - was the consequence of their opposition to 
secular education.157
Robert Perks judged the Bill unfavourably and wrote to 
Rosebery calling it a compromise which pleased no one. He 
claimed that Nonconformists did not like it because of the 
provisions inserted to appease Catholics and Anglicans; the 
absence of any attempt to nationalise teacher training 
colleges and the absence of any provision for small 
education training areas. The Free Church Federation had 
given the Bill its "qualified blessing"158 and Clifford 
moved in the Baptist Assembly that although the Bill should 
be welcomed it ought to be significantly amended.159 The 
British Weekly remarked that its hopes in Birrell had been 
largely fulfilled and its fears dissipated. Of the two 
main Nonconformist grievances, single school areas had been 
addressed but not the lack of opportunity for Nonconformist 
teachers.170
Birrell met with the Nonconformist Parliamentary
155 Munson, Nonconformists, p.2 84.
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to the Present Day. London 1963, p.93, p.95.
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Committee in an attempt to convince them that Clause 4, 
which gave rate aid to denominational schools, should not 
be struck out. He said that although he did not like the 
Clause he did not consider it an intrinsic part of the Bill 
but believed that it was necessary in order to appease the 
Catholics. Birrell contended that if the Liberal party had 
to go to the country over the Bill it would come back with 
greatly reduced numbers.171 Perks likened the situation to 
that of 1870 when Gladstone carried the Bill with the help 
of the Tories and was defeated in 1874.172 He believed that 
Chamberlain and Balfour hoped to drive a wedge through the 
Government majority by concentrating on Clause 4.173 
However the Government could not risk a General Election. 
James Denney wrote to Nicoll:
Have you any feeling that people are getting 
tired of the Education Bill, and that the 
Government will suffer neither for the goodness 
nor the badness but for the abhorred presence of 
the thing?" The only thing the "silent voter" 
wants is to hear no more about it, and if it were 
possible that it should lead to an election in 
the spring, I fear it would be all up with the 
Liberal Government.174
Chamberlain had prompted Balfour and Anglican 
supporters to accept modification of the 1902 Act into a
171 Perks to Rosebery, 14th May 1906, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10052, f.165.
172 Perks to Rosebery, 8th May 1906, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., 
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174 Denney to Nicoll, 6th June 1906, Letters of Denney to 
Nicoll, p.67.
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form of secular rate-aided education, with religious 
teaching undertaken by private arrangements after school 
hours.175 176This was in tune with the secular option Nicoll 
had indicated he could accept. In July Denney wrote, "What 
a jingle the Education Bill is becoming. If the House of 
Lords mangle it past recognition, do you suppose the 
present House of Commons would venture on the logical 
alternative supported by you and Chamberlain?"175 However 
Nicoll was not in the majority. In November Perks wrote to 
Rosebery urging him to speak in the Lords against Clause 4. 
He noted that hardly any Nonconformists were in favour of 
secular teaching but preferred Cowper Temple teaching under 
which the teacher could explain the Bible.177
The battle was essentially futile as the fate of the 
Bill lay in the hands of the Lords who passed an amendment 
unacceptable to Nonconformists. The British Weekly 
described the Bill substituted by the Lords as "a great 
deal worse than the Bill of 1902".178 Campbell-Bannerman 
and Lloyd George argued strongly in Cabinet for rejection 
en bloc. The Prime Minister reminded the Cabinet of the
lessons of the 1870 Education Act and the Bill was
175 Jay, Joseph Chamberlain, p. 3 0 .
176 Denney to Nicoll, 2nd July 1906, Letters from Denney to 
Nicoll, p.72.
177 Perks to Rosebery, 8th November 1906, Alienation of
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break the Free Church Parliamentary group. Perks to Rosebery, 
20th December 1906, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10052, f.213,
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temporarily abandoned.179 "The net result," Perks wrote to 
Rosebery, "is that the Chief Bill of the Session is lost; 
the Noncons. alienated: the Catholics won over: and (I 
think) the Lords strengthened".180
The following year McKenna introduced a one clause 
Bill which removed from the authority of the managers the 
responsibility for funding denominational religious 
instruction through the rates. The British Weekly urged 
Nonconformists to support the Bill as, although a limited 
measure which did not touch on the real grievance, "so far 
as it goes it is in the right direction". It appeared to 
the British Weekly that Nonconformists had little to lose 
from having the Bill introduced: "The House of Lords will 
probably throw it out, and then we shall have a great 
reinforcement and revival of passive resistance".181
The Liberals attempted to keep Nicoll onside. Shortly 
before he introduced his 1908 Bill Runciman wrote 
protesting against Nonconformist criticisms at the delay in 
settling the education question. The Minister for 
Education assured Nicoll that he was negotiating for a 
settlement and hoped to reach a successful conclusion. On 
seeing the letter George Riddell thought it "a very weak 
one for a Cabinet Minister to write to a newspaper editor
181
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who had criticised him. . . 1,182 The following day Nicoll 
showed Riddell a letter he had received from Birrell 
regarding the Education Bill. Riddell recorded: "He 
[Birrell] asked Nicoll to dine with him...to meet Runciman. 
Evidently the object of the letter was to appease Nicoll 
and gain his support...A curious thing for a Cabinet 
Minister to write such a letter".182 83
At the beginning of November Runciman was still wary 
of Nonconformist opposition and had a successful meeting 
with Free Church M.P.s during which they approved his 
proposed Bill.184 Two days later Nicoll lunched with 
Runciman who subsequently received support in the British 
Weekly for his cooperation with Nonconformist M.P.s and the 
indication that he would not continue in the face of Free 
Church opposition.185 Runciman introduced his Bill to the 
Commons on 20th November. It conceded 3 points to 
Nonconformists: public control in all rate-aided elementary 
schools; no religious tests in the appointment of teachers; 
no denominational teaching in any of those schools at the 
cost of the rates.186 The British Weekly rejoiced that 
there was a consensus for conciliation among moderates in
182 28th October 1908, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62969,
f .14.
183 29th October 1908, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62969,
f .18 .
184 Machin, op.cit, p.291.
185 11th November 1908, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62969, 
f.40, British Weekly, 12th November 1908.
186 British Weekly, 2 6th November 1908.
Cliffordthe Church of England and the Free Churches.187 
also gave support to the Bill once he had established that 
it was consistent with his position. A British Weekly 
journalist went to interview him and found him "busily 
engaged in looking through a book of newspaper cuttings to 
see if he had said anything that would prevent him 
supporting the suggested settlement".188
The Lords again represented an obstacle and the 
Liberals' weakening position in by-elections encouraged the 
Government to shelve the Bill.189 Runciman wrote to Nicoll 
at 12 o'clock the night before the Bill was withdrawn 
saying he still had hope but informed the editor the 
following day that the Bill was dead. Riddell observed 
that it was "Curious how a Cabinet Minister could find time 
during such a crisis to write such communications. They 
are evidently much afraid of Nicoll".190
The courting of Nicoll was effective. The British 
Weekly gave a sympathetic hearing to the withdrawal of the 
Education Bill and harried Nonconformists for the
impossibility of their demands, (seeking Biblical teaching 
with an opt-out concession which they then fought when ■ 
Birrell and McKenna attempted to draft a Bill). However 
the basis of the British Weekly position was consistent 
with Nicoll's line throughout the education debate:
187 British Weekly, 2 6th November 1908.
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if there is to be religion in the schools there 
must be religious equality... that in a measure 
providing a true equality the right of entry and 
the right of contracting out in some form or 
other...must be granted, and not granted as a 
compromise, but as a matter of common justice.191
Two general elections in 1910 eliminated the Liberal 
majority and left the government dependent on the Irish 
Nationalists. This made a solution to the education 
question appear less likely because the Irish were 
advocates of sectarian education. With this in mind Nicoll 
dissuaded the Master of Elibank from shaping a new 
Education Bill in 1911, arguing that the Government should 
concentrate on a Disestablishment Bill. Nicoll opined that 
if "a new Education Bill was brought in at the present time 
it would look as if the Government were singling out a 
class for vindictive treatment".192
The question would not go down and Nicoll, as ever, 
could not be relied upon to follow automatically the line 
of the Government or the majority of the Free Churches. In 
November 1913 he attended "a very influential meeting...[at 
which] those present were very bitter against the 
Government".193 Pease, now the Education Minister, had 
proposed to deal with single-school areas by conveying
191 British Weekly, 10th December 1908.
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Dissenting children to the nearest County Council schools 
in omnibuses. Nicoll compared the plan to "conveying 
little lepers in tumbrils". He warned Riddell that a 
Committee had been appointed to draw up a manifesto "which 
would be very damaging to the Government".194 Riddell wrote 
to Lloyd George, "He [Nicoll] has written to Pease who has 
replied asking Nicoll to go to see him which he will not do 
as he never goes to visit Cabinet Ministers!!"195 Nicoll 
claimed he had only written to Pease "as an act of 
friendship to the Government who, he said, had treated the 
Dissenters very badly".196
Riddell also informed Percy Illingworth, who "seemed 
much concerned" over what had taken place and arranged for 
himself, Lloyd George, Pease, Riddell and Nicoll to dine 
the following week. But Nicoll declined the offer, not 
wanting to meet Pease.197 Lloyd George supported the 
Nonconformist position and believed that "the time [was] 
ripe for a judicious article in the "British Weekly" in an 
effort to formulate a scheme".198
To this end Lloyd George and Riddell dined at Nicoll's 
house the following evening. Lloyd George attempted to
194 12th November 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 62973,
f .73 .
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cajole Nicoll into writing the sort of article "which while 
stating the Dissenters' point of view would not be 
unfriendly to the Government". Nicoll did not intend to 
write an article but agreed to write privately to Asquith 
"telling him of the necessity for prompt and definite 
action". Lloyd George assured Nicoll that Pease "was a 
stupid man and that he had no authority to pledge the 
Government to the proposals which had excited so much 
wrath" .199
Nonconformist pressure brought from the Prime Minister 
the assurance that he had "determined to abandon any 
attempt at compromise in regard to the single school areas 
and that he [would] go straight ahead and endeavour to 
carry out the Dissenters' policy". Haldane and Pease had 
been "beaten to a frazzle in the Cabinet".200
Nicoll remained the minder of educational reform 
throughout the period leading to the First World War. 
Despite the change in emphasis once the Liberals had taken 
power in 1906 the British Weekly continued to record the 
fate of those appearing before Magistrates and being jailed 
for nonpayment of rates.201 The outbreak of the War dealt a 
blow to the Free Church involvement in education. Most, 
like Nicoll, let their preoccupation wane somewhat in 
handing over loyalty to the Government. When Fisher
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introduced an abortive Education Bill in 1917 the British 
Weekly discussed it without reference to the repercussions 
for the Free Churches. 202 But the Government was keen to 
avoid a renewal of sectarian controversy and Fisher's 1918 
Act was concerned with raising the school leaving age, 
expanding secondary schools and establishing new central 
schools and day continuation schools. The Education 
(Scotland) Act of the same year also provoked little 
controversy as the Scottish system was unusual in having 
only 10% of children educated in Voluntary schools.203 
When Fisher did believe that a re-examination of religious 
education was unavoidable in 1920 he immediately
encountered the hostility of the Education Committee of the 
N.C.E.F.C.204 Nicoll warned that it would be a blunder to 
try to deal with education. Fisher's proposal to abolish 
the Cowper-Temple clause brought the caution that the Free 
Churches would "not on any account surrender what [they 
had] secured with such difficulty. 205 The old Free Church 
guard was ever awake. In 1921 Clifford wrote to Nicoll 
warning, "We must be ready to rally our forces for fresh 
attempts will be made on the rates for sectarianism" .206
202 British Weekly, 16th August 1917, 25th October 1917.
203 Cruickshank, Church and State, pp. 114-5, p.117.
204 Cruickshank, Church and State, p.118.
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viii. Conclusion:
Even in education Nicoll was a loose cannon in Liberal 
and Nonconformist circles. He maintained a degree of 
intellectual integrity, regarding each education bill on 
its own merits, while nurturing an instinctive desire to 
rejuvenate Nonconformity. Throughout the debate the 
British Weekly campaigned for equal right of entry in 
schools, although this placed it at odds with Clifford and 
Hughes in 1896. Nicoll could work alongside Free Church 
leaders in 1901 and 1902 because the bills in these years 
did nothing to redress the educational influence of 
Anglicans. He claimed that the Nonconformist conscience 
was being invaded by the proposal of the Church of England 
to be treated as Roman Catholic schools claimed to be 
treated, where a distinct spiritual aura would pervade the 
school and "the children become imbued with Catholicity".207 
As the Bills appeared to give State aid to religious 
schools without public control, basic anti-Catholicism 
could be combined with a "no taxation without 
representation" lament.
The affront to Dissent also represented an opportunity 
to revive the Free Church tradition. Nicoll believed that 
passive resistance would "create a renaissance of
Nonconformity...that one of the resultant effects must 
prove the uprising of a new race of Nonconformists tested 
by sacrifice, with convictions firm and purpose
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undaunted. . . " 208 A Free Church revival was seductive to 
Nicoll and allowed him to sidestep the challenge that as an 
expression of conscience, passive resistance was
compromised by being so well organised. Once
Nonconformists had declared their opposition in 1902 and 
the Bill was passed into legislation, the campaign gathered 
its own momentum. It was spurred on by the derision of 
those outwith Nonconformity and by the strong language of 
those within. In the Spring of 1903 Nicoll reminded a 
meeting of the National Free Church Council of Fairbairn's 
promise to Balfour that Nonconformists would never submit. 
Nicoll elaborated that these words should never have been 
used "unless used in the full integrity of their
meaning" .209
Dissent received much of its energy from its sense of 
alienation. Paradoxically the success of the Free Church 
struggle to secure a say in British national life had taken 
the edge off the Nonconformist identity. In looking for 
respect Dissenters had become eminently respectable.
Wemyss Reid's description of the Nonconformist
demonstration in May 1903 presented people who were 
reluctant, "very grave and very resolute" in answering the 
call of duty. The passive resistance movement showed Free 
Churchmen not so much manipulated by men like Nicoll and 
Sears as people at a crossroads trying to find a meaningful 
way to express their religion, and falling back on the 
tradition of public suffering for conscience's sake.
208 Bateman, John Clifford, p. 2 7 4 .
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Passive resistance was part of the broader campaign 
for religious equality and was therefore political in 
intent. Association with the Liberal party was necessary 
for practical political purposes. Catholics had an 
influential Irish lobby and Denney had recognised the 
advantage of Anglicans in having the Unionists as keeper of 
their educational interests. But political intrigue 
tainted a conscience movement. After the collapse of the 
1908 Education Bill the British Weekly urged its readers to 
carry on the cause of passive resistance and reminded them 
of the great work the movement had done in bringing the 
Liberals to power. It bemoaned the absence of passive 
resisters' agitation in by-elections but stressed that the 
by-product of this type of political activity was the 
rallying of Nonconformists and inducing many who were 
otherwise indifferent to investigate the education 
question.210 This lateral effect of political involvement 
was at the forefront of the political Nonconformist's
purpose.
Nicoll saw the Free Church relationship with the 
Liberal party as one of mutual benefit. M.P.s like 
Runciman, Birrell, Lloyd George and Perks attempted to 
appeal to Nicoll's vanity in order to compromise his 
position. Although Nicoll was noted by contemporaries for 
his vanity he was not a political ingenue. His anger with 
Lloyd George during the Welsh revolt of 1903 showed that 
his support could not be taken for granted as did the 
Liberal Government's attempts to keep him informed of their
210 British Weekly, 10th December 1908.
educational proposals.
Only in 1911 did Nicoll truly compromise himself in 
dissuading the Master of Elibank from drawing up a new 
Education Bill. Despite the calculation that any such move 
might jeopardise the cause of disestablishment (and the 
fact that the Liberals had been trying for five years to 
settle the education question), Nicoll was aware that 
prosecutions were still taking place for nonpayment of 
rates. This represented a breach of faith as well as a 
breach of conscience.
Lloyd George was said to have admitted frankly that 
the "real objective" in the Welsh revolt was 
Disestablishment.211 Nicoll was similarly motivated. The 
Free Churches again attempted to use parliamentary and 
extra-parliamentary means to secure their interests. Yet 
despite their efforts to get the Liberals into power in 
1906 their expectations were largely disappointed.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PRACTICAL LIBERALISM
The controversy over the 1902 Education Act served to 
underline for Joseph Chamberlain the limited ways in which 
revenue could be raised.1 His advocacy of preferential 
tariffs in 1903 rooted the politics of the Edwardian period 
in a debate over economics. The British Weekly was a free 
trade newspaper which supported low spending government, 
but at the beginning of this period it was still pressing 
primarily religious issues with little appetite for the 
intricacies of social reform. The Liberal election victory 
in 1906 altered the position of the British Weekly, 
theoretically giving it access to more power; it had to 
reconcile the need to exploit this without compromising its 
independence. This chapter charts the British Weekly7s 
development from a religious pressure paper to becoming one 
of the central newspapers in Lloyd George's political
weaponry.
The House of Lords' determination to thwart 
legislation on education, temperance reform and Welsh 
Disestablishment pushed the British Weekly into a battle to 
dismantle the Second Chamber. Lloyd George encouraged 
Nicoll to see a fight with the Lords as an extension of the 
campaign for disestablishment. He had resolutely wooed 
Nicoll after critical articles appeared in the British 
Weekly in 1907. Nicoll became a Free Church lobbyist 
within Lloyd George's inner circle and in return he 
provided the M.P. with access to his anxious middle class 
Nonconformist readership whose concerns Nicoll understood 
and expressed. This was particularly exploited during the
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controversy over the People's Budget when the British 
Weekly was part of the campaign to make Radical Liberalism 
friendly to middle-income earners. Nicoll's involvement in 
the 1909 Budget campaign was pivotal in redetermining his 
political motivation into a more secular form.
i• Prelude to 1906:
In May 1902 Joseph Chamberlain spoke the language of a 
nation and Empire under threat and voiced the concern that 
it was not simply Britain's naval supremacy which was in 
danger but also her economic strength. He attempted to 
impress upon his Birmingham audience the fact that "old and 
antiquated" methods of fiscal policy had no place in the 
new century. "At the present moment the Empire is being 
attacked on all sides and in our present isolation we must 
look to ourselves". Chamberlain implored a cheering crowd, 
"...if we do not take every chance in our power to keep 
British trade in British hands, I am certain that we shall 
deserve the disasters which will infallibly come upon 
us".2 The following year Chamberlain made a more
definitive statement on preferential tariffs, deriding the 
system of "free trade" which did not let Britain
differentiate between those who treated her well and those 
who treated her badly.3 The Times declared that friends 
of England everywhere would hail the speech with
2 Times, 17th May 1902.
3 Times, 16th May 1903.
“thankfulness for a man great enough to express Imperial 
aspirations and to formulate an Imperial policy1'.4 The 
British Weekly saw a fiscal revolution which would bring 
about the speedy and complete downfall of British power and 
warned of the consequences of retaliatory action by the 
United States. It saw in Chamberlain's developing theory 
the desire to displace the centre of the Empire by 
concentrating manufacturing in more geographically 
appropriate places such as Canada.
In agreement with the Liberal party view put forward 
by Edward Grey, the British Weekly believed that 
Chamberlain's scheme would result in the destruction of 
both the United Kingdom and the British Empire;5 and was 
certain that the working men of Britain would not consent 
“to be starved and pinched till they die in order that 
their grandchildren may have the advantage of trafficking 
with forty millions of British colonial subjects..."6 
Although later in the year Harold Harmsworth suggested to . 
Perks that Chamberlain may try to bid for the Nonconformist 
vote by repealing the Education Act, “if not more", the 
British Weekly damned Chamberlain as having one strong 
principle: that he should govern England. "Mr. Chamberlain 
loves his country", it warned "though he loves power 
more".7
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Tariff reform allowed the Liberal party to unite 
behind a traditional cause which was free from the 
sectarianism of the education campaign. The fact that Home 
Rule no longer played such a prominent part in the Liberal 
programme also encouraged former Whigs to reconsider their 
political position - although the perceived influence of 
Nonconformists was prohibitive to rejoining the Liberals. 
This shift in political emphasis threatened Free Church 
power.8 The British Weekly perceived the danger to the 
education campaign of an alternative rallying cry and 
cautioned the Liberal front bench that although Free Trade 
was one of the most important issues which could be put to 
the nation it did not rank alongside that of religious 
freedom. It reminded passive resisters that, "Just as life 
is more than meat, so does the one transcend the other",9 
underlying again the extent to which the British Weekly 
remained a journal for religious lobbying. Nicoll relied 
on his readers' understanding that even though tariff 
reform was presented as a direct threat to the United 
Kingdom and the Empire the specific task of the Free 
Churches was to protect their own freedom. The tradition 
of Dissent helped them to imbibe this paradox.
Politically Nicoll maintained his Rosberyite stance.
He had told Perks in July 1904 that although he was 
sometimes disappointed that Rosebery spoke as a political
8 B.B.Gilbert, David Lloyd George: a political life 
1863-1912, London 1987, pp.241-2.
9 British Weekly, 4th June 1903, 24th September 1903.
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advisor rather than a destined leader, he was prepared to 
wait patiently and would loyally support Rosebery whenever 
possible because he felt that Rosebery would “be called to 
guide the nation and...when the call" comes Rosebery would 
not “be found wanting". Nicoll was reported to have said 
that Campbell-Bannerman was an impossible leader, "men 
laugh at the bare idea".10 Nevertheless Nicoll continued 
to show no preoccupation with the social reform debate 
prior to 1909. Those speeches of Campbell-Bannerman (at 
Edinburgh and Limehouse) which promised to respond to 
demands for a statement of policy on issues such as the 
provision of school meals, the payment of M.P.s and 
election expenses, were of more interest to the British 
Weekly for what the Liberal leader had to say about the 
Church crisis and how effectively he opposed
Chamberlain.11
In 1904 the House of Lords' decision against the 
United Free Church of Scotland further occupied Nicoll's 
energy to the exclusion of other Liberal policy. The Lords 
upheld the protestations of a minority of the Free Church 
in Scotland which objected to the Union and gave it 
possession of the whole Church property. The day the 
judgement was delivered Nicoll wrote the leader for the 
Daily Chronicle which he claimed inspired the line of the 
Westminster Gazette and the Daily Mail. He also wrote a 
long leader for the British Weekly which he told his wife
10 Perks to Rosebery, 8th July 1904, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, ff.235-6.
11 British Weekly, 10th November 1904, 22nd December
1904 .
was "the hardest work I have ever done...It is the best 
that ever I could do, and I hope may never have such a job 
again".12 The following month Nicoll advised Perks of the 
"intense desire" in Scotland that Rosebery should deliver a 
speech on the Church crisis. He warned that although in 
England there was very little understanding of what the 
business meant, in Scotland there was no other subject.13
The controversy exposed certain tensions in Nicoll's 
relationship with the Liberal Leaguers. His correspondence 
underlined the political lessons Nicoll had gathered during 
the Education controversy. Perks had furnished him with 
some notes on the recently published list of the new 
Council of the Liberal League.14 Nicoll replied that it 
was unwise to publish an article on the League at that time 
because of the feelings in Scotland regarding the "great 
and unprecedented Church crisis". He argued that nothing 
should be done to disquiet the unity of the Liberal party 
in Scotland as the business could give a great impulse to 
liberalism there if it was properly handled. Nicoll 
believed that people were coming round to the idea that 
Rosebery was the only possible leader of the party, "If he 
would take off his coat and work he could unite the party 
very easily". Raising the profile of the League would 
provoke potential supporters and as animosity against it
197
12 Nicoll to Catherine Robertson Nicoll, 4th August 1904, 
in Darlow, op.cit., pp.185-6.
13 Nicoll to Perks, 2nd September 1904, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, f.260.
14 Perks to Rosebery, 5th September 1904, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10051, f.259.
had died down there was no need to reassert its claims. 
Nicoll warned Perks that leaders in England were anxious 
not to make the Church crisis a party issue unless or until 
they were forced to do so.15 The editor as always, was 
prepared to use injustice for longer term
religious/political gain. If the Unionists could be 
demonised by their association with the Lords then the 
Liberal momentum could continue. For a campaigner like 
Nicoll injustice was bitter-sweet because it was 
anticipated that edifices could fall when confronted with 
growing moral righteousness.
Throughout 1905 Nicoll consolidated his association 
with Rosebery. In April he dined in Rosebery's company 
with "only about half a dozen [others] there". The former 
leader spoke frankly about an anticipated Liberal majority, 
Labour's hatred of John Burns and his great fear that 
Liberals would not stick together.16 Although Nicoll 
claimed that he was "not much at home in political 
gatherings", he attended a Liberal League dinner on the 
13th April which "was very successful", and where 
"Rosebery, who was in good spirits, made an excellent 
speech" .17
The purpose of the League however, was increasingly 
unclear and in the Autumn Perks informed Rosebery that the
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15 Nicoll to Perks, 2nd September 1904, Rosebery Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.10051, f.260.
16 Nicoll to T.W.Stoughton, 5th April 1905, in Darlow, 
op.cit., pp.187-188.
17 Nicoll to T.W.Stoughton, 15th April 1905, in Darlow, 
op.cit., pp.188-9.
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League funds would only last over the Election whereupon 
they would possibly "have to sink to the dimensions of the 
Eighty Club".18 Rosebery remained politically
unpredictable and after the Election victory of 1906 the 
Liberal League appeared as a possible ally for disaffected 
Unionist Free Traders like Hugh Cecil and Strachey in the 
British Constitutional Association.19 For this reason as 
well as sincere regret the British Weekly confessed to "a 
bitter disappointment and chagrin, at the fact of Lord 
Rosebery's standing out" of Campbell-Bannerman's newly 
formed Cabinet in December 1905.20
ii ■ R.ep.r.e.sentation o,f Class a,ft,ex...1.9 0,6:
The British Weekly had its own agenda to press after
the transfer of power at the end of 1905. It aimed to play 
its part in giving "information and instruction to the 
utmost of [its] power, fighting as ever under the old flag 
of Christian freedom and progress". And while assuring its 
readership that once the Cabinet had been named it would 
render futile attempts to scare electors with the spectre
18 Perks to Rosebery, 26th October 1905, Rosebery Papers,
N.L.S., MS.10052, f.92. Nevertheless Perks disagreed with
Fowler that a reception to be held by Rosebery in December 
should not be confined to League members. Fowler did not want 
to antagonise other sections of the party and risk revival of 
the Irish question. Conversely Perks believed that the League 
should maintain its independence and keep its members united 
with a view to coming back to Westminster with perhaps 100 
M.P.s and therefore being a force to be reckoned with. Perks 
to Rosebery, 9th November 1905, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., 
MS.10052, ff.106-7.
19 Sykes, Tariff Reform, p.157.
20 British Weekly. 14th December 1905.
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of Home Rule, it wanted a plain declaration from the party. 
"The alliance of British Liberals with Irish partisans of 
priestly supremacy must be in its nature capricious and 
incidental," it continued, "and the first business... the 
new Government will have to take up - the business of 
Education - will in all probability disrupt what remains of 
it".21 While the Unionists were happy to emphasise the 
Liberal-Irish connection, the British Weekly determined to 
foreground religious freedom along with protection and 
Chinese slavery.22 It hailed the Liberal victory, 
declaring that "For the friends of freedom the dark hour of 
despondency is past, and it has been succeeded by a general 
feeling of hope for the future".23
The British Weekly remarked that "One of the greatest 
and most gratifying phenomena of the Election [had been] 
the revelation it [gave] of the mighty power of Labour. Or 
rather...the willingness of the working classes to use the 
power they [had] so long possessed".24 Responding to the 
election of 29 Labour Representative Committee Members, the 
British Weekly took an orthodox Liberal position:
"We are not afraid of socialism so long as
Liberals mean business...we do not believe that 
the working class are socialist, or that they 
will ever be, so long as they have fair treatment 
and a fair chance. It is the business of
21 British Weekly,
22 British Weekly,
23 British Weekly,
24 British Weekly,
7th December 1905.
4th January 1906, 11th January 1906.
18th January 1906.
18th January 1906.
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Liberals to give them both.25
Of Trades Unions the British Weekly stated, "We 
should like to see them guided, enlightened, reconciled 
with the claims of the community at large, but to put them 
down is impossible".26 At the beginning of March it judged 
the Labour parliamentary presence as a "force strong enough 
to prevent the Government lapsing into that Whiggery which 
is the abiding danger of Officialdom".27 The British 
Weekly took the view that there were endless issues on 
which the Progressive forces within Parliament could agree 
and it was futile to fret about the "far off days in which 
the practical policies of Liberals and Labourists [would] 
be irreconcilable".28
Although there was a general policy of cooperation, 
the British Weekly was vague on specific legislation. It 
supported the Government's Workmen's Compensation Bill, 
which although not a definitive answer, provided relief to 
a greater number of people.29 The Government's blunder 
over the Trades Disputes Bill - in which Campbell-Bannerman 
supported Labour demands - was criticised because it 
undermined the Liberals' credibility, rather than for
25 British Weekly,
26 British Weekly,
27 British Weekly,
28 British Weekly,
29 British Weekly,
1st February 1906. 
18th January 1906.
1st March 1906.
11th October 1906.
29th March 1906.
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reasons of particular principle.30 Early in 1908 the 
British Weekly remained cautious of the concept of the 
"right to work" and while conceding its abstract justice, 
argued that unemployment should be solved gradually, by 
many means cooperating to the one end.31 Later in the year 
the significance of the Osborne Judgement was not realized. 
The British Weekly did not see it as a "heavy blow," 
assured that if the Unions maintained their unity "the 
democracy of the country [would be] strong enough to secure 
what they ask for".32
The British Weekly remained a step away from 
understanding the Labour movement because of its ultimate 
faith in the power of Liberalism to mediate in industrial 
disputes. Although it frequently supported the cause of 
strikers it maintained the belief that negotiation and 
agreement were possible. Before the Railway strike in 1907 
the British Weekly was confident that deliberation and 
arbitration would pre-empt action and suggested that there 
was a "growing desire for an early settlement, as the 
present suspense [was] affecting trade, and causing anxiety 
to investors".33 Once the strike had been declared the 
British Weekly supported the idea that Campbell-Bannerman 
should call Parliament together and ask for powers to deal
1907 .
30 British Weekly, 5th April 1906.
31 British Weekly, 19th March 1908.
32 British Weekly, 3rd December 1908.
33 British Weekly, 19th September 1907, 26th September
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with the dispute.34 Essentially the British Weekly
believed that it was "in the interest of every patriot to 
avert deadly battles between capital and labour. The 
battle may come, but it should not come till both parties 
understand better than they do the issues of such a 
fight" .35 36
Nicoll represented the concerns of the middle classes. 
Fear of the democratic majority had encouraged an amount of 
soul-searching and the adoption of a sense of victimhood on 
their part. In 1906 George Sims' series of articles in the 
Tribune, "The Bitter Cry of the Middle Classes," struck a 
national chord.35 The British Weekly described them as 
"forceful, unanswerable articles," and used the issues 
raised to attack the high spending of the recently defeated 
Progressives in the London Borough Councils. In a
recurring theme, it called for a return to the old Liberal 
watchwords: Economy, Efficiency and Publicity; and the 
greatest of these was Economy. "In the judgement of all 
sound Liberals through the history of Liberalism economy 
has been a primary thing," the British Weekly recorded, and 
drew on Sims to reiterate the ruin which higher rates 
brought on the "brave men and women who only by incessant 
struggle have been able to keep their heads above water".37
When Masterman published The Condition of England
34 British Weekly. 7th November 1907.
35 British Weekly, 14th November 1907.
36 H.V.Emy, Liberals, Radicals and Social Politics, 1892­
1914, Cambridge 1973, pp.172-3.
37 British Weekly, 8th November 1906.
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three years later, the British Weekly noted his "somewhat 
belated wisdom" that the Progressive Party had ended its 
career in the metropolis because it had forgotten the 
middle classes. It restated its old view:
For ourselves, we believe that the Middle Classes 
are the most anxious of men. They are anxious 
because they can rarely obtain security for 
themselves and their children. It is the 
pecuniary future most of all that troubles them.
They do not expect much...We do not see any clear 
prospect of much alleviation. What they have 
learned to dread most is change, and they are 
easily frightened into Conservatism.38
In 1911 the British Weekly received many letters on a 
leading article, "The Church and Labour". Again these 
responses revealed that the sense of grievance among the 
middle class remained vivid. "I maintain it is the lower 
middle class who have the greatest struggle to live," one 
correspondent wrote, "with the ever increasing burden of 
local rates and income tax, which very few working men pay, 
although plenty are liable. It is time someone should 
plead their cause".39 Yet this was exactly the cause which 
the British Weekly aimed to plead. The common fear that if 
so much emphasis was placed on the plight of the worker it 
would drive the middle class into the arms of the 
Conservatives informed the British Weekly response to all 
economic changes.
Throughout the lives of the last Liberal Government 
the British Weekly was on hand to make radicalism safe for 
the middle classes. In 1907 Jane Stoddart interviewed Rev.
38 British Weekly, 3rd June 1909.
39 British Weekly, 12th October 1911.
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J. Ernest Rattenbury (Superintendent of the West London 
Mission) under the heading "Why do I call myself a 
Socialist?" Rattenbury had confirmed her view that despite 
the label, he was an advocate of gradual reform rather than 
revolution. He had explained, "The ideal is that all the 
sources of wealth and produce should be entirely committed 
into the hands of the community. But in practice we must 
content ourselves for the present with methods of 
amelioration".40 Stoddart used this inherent conservatism 
of many British Radicals to urge Socialists of the future 
to work with Liberal and Labour representatives to strip 
away the terrifying spectre of revolution and "to unveil 
the kindly features of a radical and comprehensive Social 
Reform".41 Again here was the desire to bring all 
progressive souls into the safe Liberal temple.
In January 1908 Stoddart began her series, "Socialism: 
An Impartial Inquiry". She set out the premise that all 
Christians were agreed that the present condition of 
society could not be perpetuated as there were many 
fundamental wrongs; that Christianity was not bound up with 
any social theory, but existed for the furtherance of the 
Kingdom of God; and that since there was no revelation as 
to the economic structure of society, it was by the path of 
patient inquiry that the hope of true advance lay.
Stoddart added:
The Christian attitude to this question is surely
40 British Weekly, 24th October 1907.
41 J . T. Stoddart, The New Socialism: an impartial inquiry, 
London 1909, p.180.
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that if the socialistic reconstruction of society 
can be shown to be for the material, moral, and 
spiritual progress of the masses, then it ought 
to be welcomed. It is on this point that the 
real controversy lies.42
The articles were published in book form the following 
year. Although Stoddart was wary of the illiberal nature 
of Socialism - in particular the impossibility of a free 
press if the state became the universal publisher43 - she 
presented the New Socialists as more friendly towards the 
family and religion (but in England Socialists like 
Blatchford and Quelch remained anti-Christian) .44 She 
exposed the English Christian Socialists as sober and 
gradual reformers, many of whom veiled "the objects of the 
average Liberal or Radical under the high-sounding phrases 
of Socialism".45 In drawing a clear line between 
"reformers" and "revolutionaries" Stoddart concluded that:
The day of Socialist victory, as Marx understood 
it, fades into an ever more distant future...Nor 
is there any sign that the working-men of the 
world are prepared to surrender patriotic 
interests and enter into a great cosmopolitan 
alliance for the overthrow of capitalistic rule 
and the establishment of the International 
Socialist State.
The real service rendered by Marx is that 
indirectly and unconsciously he quickened the 
zeal for social reform.46
16th January 1908.42 British Weekly,
p.152.
Chap.10, Chap.11.
p.135.
pp.179-80.
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In 1908 the British Weekly spoke with more envy than 
bitterness of Socialists' dedication. In a leader which 
examined their "art of persuasion," it noted that 
Socialists took their message to the people, were about 
their business all the time, aimed at conversions, spoke 
with a burning passion and were proud of their creed which 
they also practised. "Surely Christians have much to 
learn" the British Weekly concluded, "from the untiring 
energy and absolute simplicity and purpose of many who are 
giving their lives to bring in the kingdom of Socialism".47
Nevertheless New Liberalism appeared to offer a reply 
to Socialists. In February 1908 Churchill drew attention 
to the plight of the unemployed who had gained nothing from 
Britain's international position. The British Weekly noted 
the parallels between Churchill's words and those of a 
great many Socialist continental writers. It declared that 
so long as Liberal leaders adopted this tone the party had 
nothing to fear from Socialism.48 Less than three months 
later Churchill was defeated at Manchester in the by­
election caused by his promotion to the Cabinet
illustrating that Socialists were not the only or major 
threat to the New Liberals. The British Weekly used the 
defeat to underline the necessity of educating the public. 
It stressed that the Liberal party must keep to its course 
of protecting Free Trade and passing social reform but most 
importantly it must keep up Free Trade propaganda. As a
47 British Weekly, 161h January 1908.
48 British Weekly, 13th February 1908.
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newspaper the British Weekly was necessarily aware of the 
importance of broadcasting the Liberal programme. 
Tirelessly and repetitively the British Weekly presented 
its own agenda along with that of the Liberal party.
iii. Sectarian Concerns:
Free Church expectation of the new administration was 
understandably high. The Liberal victory brought with it 
an unprecedented number of Nonconformists - 157 - into the 
Commons.49 The Standard pinpointed the primary and 
fundamental fact that "the Ministerial victory is beyond 
all question a victory for the Nonconformists". The Bishop 
of Newcastle and Mrs. Humphry Ward also opined that the 
Education Act had been a major cause of the Unionist 
defeat.50 The religious issues which preoccupied the 
British Weekly after 1906 were an extension of earlier 
concerns. Education represented a constant thorn and there 
remained the concern that Christianity proceeded in an ever 
more material fashion. Dods confessed to Nicoll, "I do not 
envy those who have to fight the battle of Christianity in 
the twentieth century. Yes, perhaps I do, but it will be a 
stiff fight, and will require great concessions to be 
made".51 In this year also Nicoll took an opportunity to
49 Shannon, Crisis of Imperialism, p.378.
50 British Weekly, 1st February 1906.
51 Dods to Nicoll, 30th March 1906, in M.Dods, Later 
Letters of Marcus Dods, D.D. , 1895-1909, London 1911, pp.211- 
2 .
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acknowledge in the Expositor the broad acceptance of the 
critical view of the Old Testament.52 He conceded the need 
to appraise the New Testament but argued that the obvious 
fallibility of English Literature criticism was also 
applicable to Biblical scholarship. He wrote, "Christians 
are also entitled to ask for more agreement between critics 
of the Gospel history than has yet been reached. In the 
face of the differences that divide the extreme critics, 
one may doubt whether the problem of the composition of the 
Gospel is soluble".53 Nicoll explained to Hutton that he 
"had no sympathy with those who distil a residuum of 
meaning from the Bible and pretend that this is what was 
intended by the sacred writers".54
The Biblical debate was given another jolt in 1907 
with the publication of R.J. Campbell's ideas on the "New 
Theology" which prompted a high profiled debate on the 
viability of the old religious orthodoxies. It also 
challenged conservative believers to defend the inactivity 
which came from an "other worldly" view of Christ.
Nicoll's response to the controversy provides confirmation 
of how little his religious beliefs had been shaken.
At a Summer School held six months after the 
publication of Campbell's book, it was contended that the 
popularity of New Theology resulted from the fact that the 
"young cause [had] struck the imagination, [had] appealed
52 Darlow, pp.354-355.
53 W.R.Nicoll, "The Church's One Foundation," (1901) in 
Darlow, pp.359-360. Darlow suggests that Nicoll never 
substantially departed from this viewpoint.
54 Darlow, p. 356 .
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to the sympathies... of many thousands of people whose 
religious needs were left unsatisfied by orthodoxy..."55 
It was a very practical response to religion. At the 
inaugural meeting of the Summer School, one speaker 
declared that the "two great principles of religion were 
social service and personal character".56
Campbell described the Old Theology as having taken 
"for granted that man was a loathsome creature, a mere 
worm,...and, even at the best, a monument to God's 
forbearance and grace".57 A speaker on the Atonement 
argued that evolution proved there had been no Fall and no 
total depravity; and that the new ethical temper of the age 
had made the Atonement an unacceptable concept. "Our only 
wonder" he concluded, "is that such a doctrinal nightmare, 
so unsubstantial, yet so heavy, should have been allowed to 
rest upon human minds and hearts for so long".58 In the 
second of two unsigned leaders on the New Theology at the 
time of the publication of Campbell's book, Denney in the 
British Weekly criticised the narrowness of the author's 
description of orthodox New Testament belief and reasserted 
his faith in the death of Jesus as the "exclusive, 
adequate, and final efficacy in the doing away with sin".59 
Privately Denney's contempt for New Theology was even more
55 R. J.Campbell et al, New Theology and Applied Religion, 
Report of the Proceedings of the Summer School, held from
August 3rd - 9th 1907, London 1907, p.4.
56 Campbell, New Theology, p.7.
57 Campbe 11, New Theology, p. 11.
58 Campbe 11, New Theology, pp. 49-50 .
59 British Weekly, 28th March 1907.
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pronounced. He wrote to Nicoll that in one way it could be 
"represented as a systematic debasement of the Christian 
currency" .60
Denney described Campbell's book as "even more acutely 
at issue with historic Christianity" than expected and was 
alarmed by its apparent flirtation with Pantheism.61 
Campbell had told an audience that no doctrine of God could 
be framed which was "not at the same time a doctrine of 
man, for we know nothing of God except as we read him in 
man".62 The City Temple Minister's decision to join the 
I.L.P. - as the true Catholic Church - further ruffled 
Nicoll as Campbell had apparently "sneered at the idea that 
the business of the Church is to prepare souls for heaven;" 
arguing that it was "earth that is to be turned into 
heaven". Again Nicoll asserted that if the "aspiration of 
man were satisfied by the better food, better wages, better 
houses, better health, and less work, to what depths would 
man have sunk!"63 Denney wrote "I was glad to see you 
meant to discuss the practical situation created by The New 
Theology. For my own part, I cannot think it will be a 
serious situation very long".64
60 Denney to Nicoll, 23rd March 1907, in Letters of 
Denney to Nicoll, p.85.
61 British Weekly, 21st March 1907. Darlow has recorded 
that about this time Nicoll declared to a friend, "If I had 
my choice, I would rather my children were taught 
Sacerdotalism than Pantheism." Darlow, op.cit., p.195.
62 Campbe 11, New Theology, p . 15 .
63 British Weekly, 4th April 1907.
64 Denney to Nicoll, 1st April 1907, in Letters of Denney 
to Nicoll, pp.86-7.
In the political sphere the Government had failed to 
get an agreement on its 1906 Education Bill and the Royal 
Commission which had been set up to stall the Welsh 
Disestablishment debate was coming under criticism in the 
Welsh press. Early in March 1907 a motion in favour of 
disestablishment of the Church of England and Wales was 
passed in the House of Commons by a majority of 108. The 
British Weekly declared this "an event of no small 
importance," proving that the question was very much alive, 
although not yet practical politics.65 But the Government 
was not pro-active in the campaign and by the end of May 
the British Weekly was calling for a revolt of the 
Nonconformist M.P.s It warned the Government not to take 
for granted the support of the Free Churches when it paid 
no attention to Nonconformist politicians and failed to 
distribute honours to Nonconformist citizens.66
Having received no obvious response from the 
Government, the British Weekly directed its attack on Lloyd 
George for his abandonment of Welsh concerns.67 It was at 
this time the M.P. began his concerted attempts to secure 
British Weekly support which, his biographer claims,
"became such an important weapon in Lloyd George's arsenal 
in the years between 1907 and 1914 that one wonders how he
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65 British Weekly, 7th March 1907.
66 British Weekly, 30th May 1907. Lloyd George told 
Herbert Lewis that he suspected that the leader was the 
consequence of Nicoll feeling neglected. Nicoll had 
apparently invited Lloyd George to dinner and the Minister 
had either forgotten to reply or failed to appear. Gilbert, 
Lloyd George, 1863-1912, pp.306-7, p.309.
67 British Weekly, 6th June 1907.
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could have been so casual about it before".68 Lloyd George 
wrote to his wife in July telling her of Nicoll's opinion 
that he (Lloyd George), "was the only Minister who had made 
a reputation as a Minister and that everyone was talking of 
[him] as the next Liberal Prime Minister". The British 
Weekly editor also relayed the view of the Rev. H. Elvet 
Lewis that concerning the agitation over Welsh
Disestablishment, "the Welsh people won't give up on Lloyd 
George lightly - they are proud of him & besides they have 
no substitute".69 However Lloyd George told Herbert Lewis 
that Nicoll had also warned him of the many letters 
received by the British Weekly criticising the President of 
the Board of Trade. These letters were apparently unsigned 
and therefore were not published by the British Weekly.70 
Nicoll's private warning to Lloyd George was extended to 
the public rebuke in his newspaper the following September 
which accused Lloyd George of having lost his interest in 
Welsh Disestablishment and having "yielded to the breath of 
officialdom". It urged the Nonconformist Convention, 
meeting in Cardiff, to insist that the Fourth Session of 
Parliament bring in legislation for Disestablishment and 
Disendowment in Wales. Lloyd George was warned:
whatever he does, the Welsh Nonconformists have 
the power of bringing the Government to reason 
and obtaining the satisfaction of their religious
68 Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863-1914, p.308.
69 Lloyd George to Margaret, 31st July 1907, Lloyd George 
Papers, N.L.W., 20428c/1247, in Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863­
1912, p.309.
70 J.H.Lewis papers, N.L.W., 10/231, Diary Extract, 7th 
August 1907, in Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863-1912, p.309.
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claims. They will not forget that vague 
promises, patriotic tall talk, and good 
intentions are materials for the pavement of 
Hell.71
The article prompted Lloyd George to write to Nicoll 
suggesting an interview in the next issue of the British 
Weekly.72 In the piece which followed Lloyd George assured 
Welsh Nonconformists that he had not forgotten
Disestablishment and that if Parliament ran its normal 
course then Welsh claims would certainly be met. However 
he pressed his view that the House of Lords was the real 
enemy of Disestablishment. Without interference from the 
Second Chamber, he argued, such a strong Liberal Government 
would certainly have a commitment to religious equality.
In its introduction to the piece on Lloyd George the 
British Weekly added the warning that, "some opponents [of 
Lloyd George] have dared to hint that his personal 
prospects and position might influence him to the 
abandonment of the cause which has ever been nearest to his 
heart". The newspapers own view, it was implied, was 
closer to that of Welsh Nonconformity: "the deep affection 
which Wales feels for Mr. Lloyd George explains the 
jealousy with which she watches to see whether...he 'steers 
the most steady course.'"73 Lloyd George was pleased with 
the response to the interview having "received letters from
71 British Weekly, 26th September 1907.
72 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 27th September 1907, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.32-3.
73 British Weekly, 3rd October 1907.
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all parts of Wales expressing gratification".74 The 
British Weekly's rediscovered confidence in Lloyd George's 
integrity was not simply the result of his convincing 
argument. Nicoll's comment - in another part of the 
newspaper - that he would not be surprised if Lloyd George 
were to say that a Disestablishment Bill was being 
prepared, suggested he was privy to private information 
conveyed during the interview.75 The British Weekly was 
evidently prepared to support Lloyd George on the
understanding that the battle over the House of Lords was 
not simply another diversion from the central Free Church 
issue of religious equality. Despite his desire to 
disengage himself from the tangles of sectarian controversy 
Lloyd George told Robert Perks that if, by 1909, the 
Government had not passed on to the Lords a Welsh 
Disestablishment Bill he would leave the administration.76
iv. A Battle with the Lords and the Peoples' Budget:
The British Weekly continued to press for Welsh 
Disestablishment but the emphasis of the debate was now the 
House of Lords. In the 1890s the British Weekly had not 
been a campaigner for reform of the Lords, believing that
74 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 6th October 1907, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.34-36.
75 Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863-1912, p.310.
76 Perks to Rosebery, 26th November 1907, Rosebery 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.10053, f.60.
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other policies should be given priority.77 In a leader 
examining the need for reform within the Liberal party, in 
December 1898, the British Weekly was scathing of calls for 
the reform of the second chamber. It argued against the 
wisdom of putting such a policy before the country without 
an alternative which was necessarily better, and called 
"ridiculous" the Scottish M.P. John Lang's proposal that 
the Lords' veto be ineffective after the Third Reading of a 
Bill. The British Weekly argued that the veto was a 
necessary check on legislation - such as Home Rule - which 
was at odds with the will of the country. According to 
this view the Lords acted as a buffer against Bills passed 
by smaller and smaller minorities.78
In 1906 consistent with the British Weekly's 
determination to see the Liberals and Labour in a 
Progressive coalition, it depicted the Lords as the true 
opposition within a year of the Liberals taking office.79 
However it was the ability of the Lords to obstruct 
Nonconformist legislation which was the real force behind 
the British Weekly's campaign against the Second Chamber. 
The destruction of Birrell's Education Bill in December 
1906 underlined the full extent of the Lord's power and 
forced reform of the Second Chamber to the top of the Free 
Church agenda. By the beginning of 1907 the British Weekly 
was calling on the Government to lay before the country a
77 British Weekly,
78 British Weekly.
79 British Weekly.
30th August 1894.
29th December 1898.
11th October 1906.
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policy for dealing with the Lords.80 In December Lloyd 
George wrote to Nicoll in agreement with the editor's view 
that the Liberal party should take up the challenge of the 
Lords promptly and effectively or falter under torrents of 
ridicule. Lloyd George told Nicoll of his conviction that 
the Liberal party could win its fight with the Lords, but 
only if it adhered to a strategy: "Let us challenge the 
Lords on our finance and if they decline the challenge they 
are beaten and if they accept it they will be beaten. In 
either event we win".81
The following year the House of Lords threw out the 
Licensing Bill and the British Weekly heightened its attack 
and called on the Liberals to take on a conflict "which 
must be carried on till the House of Lords is deprived of 
all powers but the power of revision". It further warned, 
"If the Liberal party were in any way to shirk this battle, 
it need never ask to be returned to power again".82 Two 
weeks later the British Weekly led with the view that "The 
question of the House of Lords is in a particular manner a 
question for Nonconformists". It announced to
Nonconformists that:
The time has come when they must merge their 
special contentions with the great issue which 
swallows up all others,...Nonconformists are in a 
special way trustees for the protection and 
extension of civil and religious liberty. They 
are confronted and balked once again by the 
immemorial and inveterate enemies of freedom, and
80 British Weekly, 7th February 1907.
81 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 21st December 1907, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.44-47.
82 British Weekly, 3rd December 1908.
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they must defend their trust.
The power of the Second Chamber had become the most 
pressing political issue and the British Weekly declared, 
"We will vote for the candidate who is against the present 
veto of the House of Lords and we shall not trouble too 
much about the rest of his opinions".83 The following 
month the British Weekly agreed with other Liberal 
newspapers that the Government was not giving the party 
enough of a lead on the House of Lords.84 It also began a 
six week series by Stoddart, "Against the Referendum" which 
considered different plebiscite models and objected to the 
mechanism on the grounds of expense and the fact that it 
would present the opposition with another weapon.85
Lloyd George's "Peoples' Budget" brought the debate 
to a head. It was a bid to draw into the Exchequer the 
funds for both Dreadnoughts and Old Age Pensions, while 
maintaining the validity of Free Trade economics. Nicoll 
was also privy to the contingency plan which was, if 
necessary, to provoke the Lords into a battle over its 
moral right to hamper or dictate legislation in an evolving 
democracy. The British Weekly fully supported Lloyd 
George's radical economic proposals. It did what it could 
to assuage the anxieties of its middle class readership 
which might fear that the proposals represented the 
revolution foretold by Lord Rosebery in the House of Lords.
83 British Weekly, 17th December 1908.
84 British Weekly, 28th January 1909.
85 British Weekly, 21st January - 25th February 1909.
219
The possibility of an alliance between Liberal Leaguers and 
Free Trading Unionists also made it necessary to mobilise 
all support for the Budget because it created the threat of 
an anti- Budget alliance within the Liberal party.86
The British Weekly anticipated that the Budget would 
re-animate the Liberalism of the British people.87 88The 
prospect that the Lords would reject the Welsh 
Disestablishment Bill also meant that Welshmen would be 
"more firmly together in their resolution to give 
themselves no rest till the baneful power of the Upper 
Houses [was] taken away".85 Fearful that opponents of the 
Budget would appeal to the working class with the offer of 
cheap beer and tobacco, the British Weekly clarified the 
Liberal position that the working class should be freed 
from taxation on their necessities.89
However direct taxation is generally more beneficial 
to the working class; it was the middle classes which had 
to be made to feel safe within the Liberal party. The 
People's Budget was specifically designed to protect the 
majority of the middle class from increased taxation. The 
Licence duties and land value taxes were also an attempt to
86 Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863-1912, p.375.
87 British Weekly. 25th February 1909.
88 British Weekly. 29th April 1909. In June the lack of 
progress in the Disestablishment Bill prompted another call 
to Liberals to give their whole hearted support to the 
Government in its current battle with the Lords. British 
Weekly, 17th June 1909.
89 British Weekly, 6th May 1909.
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appeal to traditional middle class reformers.90 Nicoll's 
role was to interpret these benefits for his readership as 
the British Weekly peddled the party's official line.
Readers were reminded that the "real" issue of the 
Budget was between rich and poor; with the rich wanting to 
shift the burden of taxation to the people. The British 
Weekly made it plain that by rich it meant that band of 
"hardly a million people" who paid income tax and who 
therefore had an income of at least £163 a year. It was 
important to emphasise that Liberals were the friends of 
both the middle and working classes while Protectionists 
wanted to shift the burden of taxation to people like the 
"ordinary business man struggling with constant
difficulties".91 This theme was returned to continually:
"If the opponents of the Budget had their way," taxes would 
be laid on those who can least afford it and to the middle 
class "no mercy would be shown".92 *
Lloyd George wrote to encourage Nicoll and assured him 
that his article of the 27th May, which had appeared at 
"just the right moment," was, "a real battle cry & will 
help us enormously at this juncture...We are in for a long 
and critical fight and the fortunes of Liberalism hang in
90 B.K.Murray, The Peoples' Budget 1909/10: Lloyd George 
and Liberal Politics, Oxford 1980, pp.4-5.
91 British Weekly, 2 0th May 1909.
92 British Weekly, 1st July 1909. This piece was also
included in the pamphlet by Nicoll, "One Fight More: The Best 
and the Last," reprinted from the British Weekly, London 
1910.
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the balance".93 The Budget League was established with 
Haldane and Churchill at the helm. The British Weekly 
declared it to have "begun its operations in a very 
satisfactory and promising way...to win the struggle we 
need the spade work as well as the oratory".94 The 
newspaper wanted the Government to be seen to be in 
control. It recalled that before the Budget the Liberals 
were losing strength; this was partly due to the actions of 
the Upper House but also due to the tameness of the 
Government in accepting these rebuffs.95
At the beginning of August Lloyd George delivered his 
Limehouse address at which he presented the Budget as an 
unequivocal attack on the Peers and evaded a discussion on 
detailed taxation. The British Weekly described the speech 
as, "one of his most brilliant, weighty and telling," and 
endorsed the Chancellor's view that land ownership brought 
with it responsibility to villages and neighbourhoods which 
if abdicated would bring about a revaluation of the system. 
It reiterated that the Government was "not proposing a 
revolution. It [was] proposing, on the contrary, very mild 
and moderate measures with much forbearance, and in a 
pacific spirit," concluding, "The Budget is safe in Mr. 
Lloyd George's hands".96
On 30th July, Nicoll had summarised his position for
93 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 6th June 1909, Nicoll Papers, 
N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.50-51.
94 British Weekly,
95 British Weekly,
96 British Weekly,
8th July 1909. 
29th July 1909. 
5th August 1909.
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James Denney:
We are now in the thick of a fight about the 
Budget. The main point is the taxation of 
unearned increment on land, which is being fought 
by the moneyed classes with fury. On this point I 
am whole-heartedly with the Government, and have 
even found a kind of pleasure in writing 
political articles - a thing I almost always 
detest. The forces appear to be pretty equally 
matched. But the Liberals are getting into heart 
again, and they really have something to fight 
about. In all likelihood the House of Lords will 
throw out the Budget and risk everything. So we 
shall have lively times to look forward to. I am 
glad of it for I like a good hot controversy when 
I am sure of my side.97
On the 5th August Nicoll addressed the Free Churches 
directly in a piece entitled, "Nonconformists and the 
Budget". The British Weekly piece was written to refute in 
part the view, put forward later in the newspaper by the 
M.P. Compton Rickett, that the Government should go for an 
early dissolution. Compton Rickett referred to the 
position of Nonconformists who were bitterly disappointed 
that none of their hopes in the new Government had been 
realised. "If their hopes could not all be realised at the 
outset," he suggested, "at least they expected to see the 
passive resister delivered from the degradation of the 
police-court and the country schools redeemed from their 
denominational bias".98
The British Weekly set out its counter case with the 
primary belief that the Lords would throw out the Budget.
It reasoned that Nonconformists would not reject the
97 Nicoll to Denney, 30th July 1909, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p.208.
98 British Weekly, 5th August 1909.
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Government for one which would be an oppressive oligarchy 
of 600 which would do nothing for the Free Churches. 
Nonconformists, it continued, believed that the true 
antidote to revolution was to be found in timely and 
moderate measures of reform, and they knew that the Budget 
was a most moderate measure: "Not that Nonconformists would 
say that revolution can always be avoided". The British 
Weekly claimed that it did not believe there would be a
dissolution in 1909 and it concluded with the reassurance 
to its readership that a Government which was fighting the 
House of Lords would not fail in its duty to
Nonconformists, and to the principle of religious equality. 
The tone of the piece, which suggested that the editor was 
privy to some politician's thoughts, concluded with 
confirmation that Nicoll had important contacts. The 
British Weekly divulged that an Education Bill and a Welsh 
Disestablishment Bill were being discussed in a new way by 
a Government now confident that such legislation would not 
forever be blocked by the House of Lords."
Nicoll's efforts did not go unnoticed by Lloyd George 
nor did the significance of the part the editor had to 
play. In September Lloyd George wrote to Nicoll thanking 
him for his valuable work:.
I am. delighted to find that you are taking steps 
to organise the Free Churches for the coming 
conflict, the issue of which means so much to 
them. Without their zealous cooperation in every 
constituency, we cannot hope to win; at least the 
victory would be such a doubtful one as to leave 
us weak, embarrassed and impotent.
I believe the Budget has secured the enthusiasm *
99 British Weekly, 5th August 1909.
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of the vast majority of the working men of the 
kingdom; but it is Nonconformity alone that can 
bring the middle class to our aid. It is not 
enough to secure a majority: we must have such a 
majority as will convince the House of Lords, the 
Tory Party and even the Sovereign that there is 
nothing to hope for in manoeuvring for a further 
appeal to the people.100
The crux of the relationship between Nicoll and Lloyd 
George was that the editor represented a direct line to the 
Nonconformist middle classes. After the death of Price 
Hughes in 1902 Nicoll was the most important editor of a 
religious Free Church journal and he was trusted by 
Dissenters as an editor who gave their interests prime 
concern. An endorsement from Nicoll helped to give Lloyd 
George's policies a respectability in Free Church circles. 
The Passive Resistance campaign over the 1902 Education 
Act, although a debacle in the eyes of those outside the 
Free Churches, had established Nicoll as a man who
understood the political potential of Dissent. It was 
important to Lloyd George that Nicoll translate the 
economic and constitutional debate into terms which would 
directly relate to the Nonconformist experience.
Nicoll was not simply a mouth piece for Lloyd George. 
He had come to believe that the House of Lords was an enemy 
of religious equality. Although perhaps not fully
convinced that the Liberal party would deliver on
Nonconformist grievances, Nicoll wanted to render dead all 
of its excuses. Of significance again was Nicoll's 
determination that the Free Churches should maintain a high
100 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 9th September 1909, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.52-55.
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profile in their support for the Liberal party thus giving 
their demands greater weight. Lloyd George understood this 
well. He wrote to Nicoll:
The destruction of the veto of the Lords means so 
much to the Free Churches that I cannot help 
thinking that they will realize that it is their 
special business to make the greatest concerted 
effort they have ever yet put forth.
Everything is possible for them in the domain of 
Government with the Lords out of the way: nothing 
worth accomplishing will ever be done as long as 
that House remains with uncrippled strength to 
frustrate, to thwart and to destroy. It is not 
merely that you cannot get an Education Bill, or 
a Licensing Bill, or a Disestablishment Bill 
through the House of Lords, but the mere fact of 
their presence there and the knowledge of the 
powers which they possess influence Radical 
Ministers in the shaping of the Bills which they 
submit to the judgement of Parliament.101
Lloyd George also congratulated Nicoll on his decision 
to bring out a book on "Nonconformity and the House of 
Lords" noting, "We stand sadly in need of something of that 
kind, and a striking case would be of enormous value in the 
fight. That is the reason why I am delighted to find that 
you are taking it in hand".102 The pamphlet was in fact 
called, "One Fight More: the best and the last," and 
included British Weekly articles from the second half of 
1909. Learning from his experience with the Education Act, 
Lloyd George was keen to coordinate support for the party 
from the Free Church leaders. He warned Nicoll:
As to the organisation itself, the start is
101 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 9th September 1909, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.52-55.
102 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 9th September 1909, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.52-55.
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everything. Clifford is a first rate fighting 
man, and there could be no better General 
appointed to command the Nonconformist forces in 
this expedition against the House of Lords; but 
it is highly important that all the picked men of 
the Free Churches should be associated with him 
from the start. That will secure the success of 
the organisation from the outset.103
Through the Free Church leaders Lloyd George could mobilise 
the support of the middle class for his Budget without 
adopting the language of class politics. Nicoll was 
reluctant to accept that Church and Chapel had ceased to be 
the most important factor in determining political 
allegiance. He was encouraged by Lloyd George whose slogan 
"Peers vs. People" was a simplified representation of 
British society which did not take into account the many 
inequalities which divided "the people". The eventual 
defeat of the House of Lords; a bloodless coup in which the 
third Estate seized power from the First and Second, was a 
victory for the bourgeoisie. Whether this was Church or 
Chapel going middle class ceased to matter to all but a few 
stalwarts like Nicoll.104 And even Nicoll was becoming 
more secular. In the summer of 1909 Denney wrote a leader 
for the British Weekly, "The Church and Legislation", which
concluded that the Church's direct interest was not in 
framing Acts of Parliament, but "in regenerating men, who
103 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 9th September 1909, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.52-55.
104 In October the British Weekly ran an unsubtle leader, 
"Christ's attitude to Money" in which its readers were 
reminded of Jesus' advice to the rich young man, "One thing 
that thou lackest: go and sell all that thou hast and give to 
the poor, and come and follow me." British Weekly, 28th 
October 1909.
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will give expression, indeed, to their new life, in their 
laws as in all their activities".105 Nicoll opined that the 
article was too unqualified in its conclusions. He 
suggested that there were "occasions when the Christian 
Church is called upon to take a side in politics as a 
Church, and I think it is an omission that you do not 
sufficiently insist on Christians taking part in
politics" .106
v. Conclusion:
The concerns of the British Weekly remained largely 
consistent after 1906: education reform and Welsh
Disestablishment. However once Liberals had formed a 
government Nicoll's relationship with the political world 
necessarily changed. Following the general disillusionment 
of Nonconformists with the ineffectiveness of Liberals in 
office Nicoll did not remain on the margins but moved 
instead towards the centres of power. Parnell had preached 
of the dangers of an independent Irish party which remained
105 British Weekly, 19th August 1909.
106 Nicoll to Denney, 30th July 1909, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p.207. On 30th September 1909 Denney wrote: "I saw you had 
some letters about the article on the Church and 
Legislation.... I had quite a lot of letters about it too - 
more than about any casual thing I ever wrote. Most of them 
were evidently from evangelical old tory gentlemen, who adore 
your religion AND abhor your politics, and I felt bound in 
common honesty to point out to some of them that what I wrote 
about was not the B.W. and Legislation, but the Church and 
Legislation, and that in point of fact I was on your side in 
politics as well as in religion, and only meant that while 
politics had a place of their own the Church was not that 
place." Letters of Denney to Nicoll, p.144.
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indefinitely at Parliament and in 1890 wrote that their 
integrity and independence had been apparently "sapped and 
destroyed by the wirepullers of the English Liberal 
party".107 Similarly, eternal faddism was difficult for 
Nicoll to sustain and he gradually accepted a position in 
the political sphere where his influence was more palpable. 
The British Weekly continued to play down the significance 
of other sectional interests within the party. It wanted 
an end to Irish influence in the light of the Liberal 
majority and represented the Labourists as part of a large 
progressive presence in Parliament.
Lloyd George recognised the usefulness of a polemical 
Free Church journalist and this association allowed Nicoll 
to become more politically active while hiding behind Lloyd 
George's high profile as a Welsh Nonconformist. The 
relationship became more concentrated after the British 
Weekly1s attacks on Lloyd George in 1907 when the M.P. 
recognised the value of using the newspaper to appease his 
natural supporters. The intransigence of the House of 
Lords helped to broaden the immediate political debate for 
the Free Churches and Nicoll presented the curbing of the 
power of the Second Chamber as a specific duty of
Nonconformists. This brought him into the campaign for the 
People's Budget.
Nicoll had never been as interested in social reform 
as other Liberal Imperialists. He could accept the need 
for a degree of state intervention but as his position
107 Freeman's Journal, 29th November 1890, in Lyons, 
"Political Ideas of Parnell," p.751.
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during the debate in 1907 over the New Theology
illustrated, he maintained the type of literal
Evangelicalism which kept him emotionally detached from the 
social reform debate. The British Weekly "strongly 
approve[d]" of old age pensions, hailing the measure as "a 
great step towards justice"108 and accepted that society 
had a responsibility towards the deserving poor, but always 
there was the question of who was going to pay. For Nicoll 
the great advantage of the People's Budget (and later land 
campaign) was that it specifically attempted to fund social 
reform without injury to middle-income earners.
Support for the Budget represented a gradual shift on 
Nicoll's part away from primarily religious politics. His 
newspaper declared that if the National Free Church Council 
did not take a stand on the Budget "there are multitudes 
who will feel that the Council has served its day, and must 
be replaced by a new organisation".109 By 1909 the British 
Weekly was pressing overtly party political economic 
policies and for his efforts Nicoll was knighted in 
November of that year.110 This symbolised the editor's 
temporary embracement of the political world with a rather 
blunted Nonconformist critique which lasted until the First 
World War.
108 British Weekly, 16th July 1908.
109 British Weekly, 18th November 1909.
110 Darlow, op.cit., p.210.
CHAPTER FIVE
TROUBLE IN LIBERAL ENGLAND
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Two General Elections in 1910 gave the Liberals a slim 
mandate for their progressive tax proposals and for the 
curbing of the power of the House of Lords. For many 
Dissenters these issues seemed far removed from their 
traditional interests and by the end of 1910 there was a 
noted fragmentation in Nonconformist political support. 
Despite the efforts of the British Weekly many Dissenters 
no longer felt emotionally bound to the struggles of the 
Liberal party. Nicoll also recognised that the record of 
the party on Free Church issues was lacking but as in 1886 
he did not see abandonment of the Liberal party as a 
solution. The importance of the party to him was 
underlined by his reaction to the constitutional conference 
of 1910 when he deplored the idea of coalition. Nicoll saw 
the curbing of the House of Lords veto as vital to the 
Nonconformist interest. Consequently he consolidated his 
position with Lloyd George and the British Weekly became 
even more of a propagandiser for the Liberal party.
This chapter looks at the New Liberalism of the 
British Weekly as it is manifest in responses to the 
primary political issues which arose between 1910 and 1914. 
Industrial unrest forced Nicoll to take a definite stand on
the minimum wage and government intervention in trade 
disputes and the issue of female suffrage revealed the 
innate conservatism of the British Weekly and its editor. 
The National Insurance Bill and the Land Campaign confirmed 
the extent to which Nicoll moved in the Lloyd George 
political orbit and the editor's support for Catholics in 
Ireland further emphasised the importance of party loyalty
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in his thinking.
i. Two Elections and the Threat of Coalition:
Once the Lords had rejected the Budget the British
Weekly declared that the supreme battle for liberty had 
begun.1 In the run up to the consequent General Election 
it foretold of a country under Unionist rule which would be 
undemocratic, impoverished and at war with Germany. 
Conversely a Liberal victory signalled an end to the 
tyranny of the Lords which would in turn open the way for a 
programme of social reform and the redressing of
Nonconformist grievances.2 The Liberals were returned as 
the largest party, but with no overall majority. The 
British Weekly assured its readership, "The fact which 
matters is that we are back again. Our reverses have been 
many and severe, but our victories have been glorious".3 
Nicoll wrote to Denney revealing the strength of his 
involvement in the party:
Personally I am quite satisfied with the result 
of the elections. Lloyd George and Churchill 
calculated on a Coalition majority of 140-20 more 
than they have won; but the Cabinet was quite 
prepared for the Irish holding the balance, and I 
have great confidence that Asquith will conduct 
the negotiations with the King firmly and 
suavely. But we must re-organize the Liberal 
Press, and it can now be done far more easily
1 British Weekly, 9th December 1909.
2 British Weekly. 6th January 1910. This leader was 
reprinted in pamphlet form for free distribution.
3 British Weekly, 271h January 1910.
than ten years ago. I hope to have a hand in 
this.4
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Not all Free Church Liberals could be so sanguine. 
Robert Perks wrote to Wemyss Reid:
Politics is a strange and disappointing business - 
no loyalty, no sincerity, no moderation -
everyone fighting for his own hand - and lying 
everywhere! even in the "religious11 press.
Apart from Ireland, Scotland, and Wales - the 
verdict of England is against Lloyd George.
When the Irish Catholics demand, as they will, 
their pound of flesh I shall stand alongside the 
Irish Protestants : and not again make the 
mistake of 1886 and 1892.5
Where there was no anger there was often ennui.
Denney had written nothing about the election, "not because 
I am not on the Liberal side, but because I have no 
business to, nor anything particular to say".6 Neither was 
Nicoll's patience infinite. In February 1910 Nicoll wrote 
to Hodder-Williams, "We want to get the Government to take 
up the House of Lords Veto first and at the same time we do 
not want to be put in a position of seeming to antagonise 
them whatever they do. I fear they will take up the Budget 
and get into all sorts of trouble, and freeze up
4 Nicoll to Denney, 31st January 1910, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p. 212 .
5 Perks to Wemyss Reid, 22nd January 1910, Robert Perks 
Papers, John Rylands University Library, Manchester. This was not 
an altogether surprising admission. Perks had been considering 
setting up a middle group with Unionist Free Traders based on 
Free Trade and Anti-Socialism. Perks to Rosebery, 21st September 
1908, Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10053, f.63. It had also been 
clear that cooperation was not possible between Rosebery and his 
Vice Presidents in the Liberal League after the introduction of 
the Peoples' Budget. Asquith to Rosebery, 14th September 1909, 
Rosebery Papers, N.L.S., MS.10001, ff.134-5.
6 Denney to Nicoll, 5th January 1910, Letters of Denney to 
Nicoll, p.151.
233
enthusiasm, but we shall see..."7 In March the British 
Weekly warned that Progressive supporters of the Government 
had been "disappointed with the serious and conspicuous 
blunders of the start [of the Session]".8
Liberals had been calling for the reform of the House 
of Lords for decades. In 1910 they finally had it within 
their power to force the issue; but it emerged that behind 
the Liberal rhetoric there was little understanding or 
agreement on what form the onslaught on the Lords should 
take. Nicoll favoured limitation of the veto and was 
opposed to any other measures which would reform the Upper 
House without significantly reducing its power. Asquith 
announced in April 1910 that the Liberal Government would 
feel forced to dissolve Parliament or resign if the Lords 
failed to accept the veto policy: "in no case would we [the 
Government] recommend dissolution except in such
circumstances as will secure that in the new Parliament the 
judgement of the people as expressed in the general 
election will be carried into law".9 The British Weekly 
was greatly encouraged by the Prime Minister's firm stand. 
It declared, "The effect on Liberalism has been 
extraordinary. The cloud has lifted at the words of truth 
and earnestness, and the spell bound world has been 
disenchanted...The past is as if it had never been. Our 
leaders have been given back to us to receive a support
7 Nicoll to Hodder-Williams, 4th February 1910, Hodder and 
Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
8 British Weekly, 10th March 1910.
9 British Weekly, 21st April 1910.
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which for loyalty and enthusiasm can never be exceeded".10
The clouds gathered again two weeks later on the death 
on the King. Garvin called in the Observer for politicians 
to lay party passions aside and sign a truce of God over 
the King's grave.11 The British Weekly did not immediately 
respond to Garvin's plea but subsequently showed little 
enthusiasm for the Constitutional Conference which was 
formally proposed by Asquith in a letter to Balfour on 9th 
June 1910. The new King used his influence to encourage 
conciliation and therefore it was difficult for the British 
Weekly to oppose openly the inter-party negotiations.12
The Conference involved Asquith, Lloyd George, Crewe, 
Birrell, Balfour, Lansdowne, Austen Chamberlain and Cawdor. 
The British Weekly concluded that Liberals of all schools 
were satisfied with the representation: Birrell "fitly1 
stood for the Irish Nationalists and "Labourists [would] be 
pleased to leave their interests in the hands of Mr. Lloyd 
George".13 Nevertheless Nicoll found it difficult to bury 
his antagonism for the Opposition, warning against the 
continuing propaganda of the Protectionists. The British 
Weekly noted that the chief peril of such Conferences was 
that individual members of the Liberal party might commit 
themselves to concessions which the party could not 
endorse. Nicoll was an opponent of the referendum and was
10 British Weekly, 21st April 1910.
11 Observer, 8th May 1910, in J.Grigg, People's Champion, 
p.259.
12 Lloyd George to Margaret, 9th May 1910, in K.O.Morgan, 
Lloyd George Family Letters 1885-1936, London 1973, p.152.
13 British Weekly, 23rd June 1910.
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concerned that some sort of compromise might be reached 
which was based on a plebiscite. His great fear however 
was that a concession would be made on the Liberals' 
commitment to limit the power of veto in the House of 
Lords. The British Weekly warned the Liberal leadership 
that they would split the ranks and fall upon the sword if 
they agreed to a reform of the Upper House which did not 
curb its veto.14
The Constitutional Conference was abandoned at the end 
of July although there were a few more meetings in 
November. The germ of inter-party cooperation had been 
laid in the mind of Lloyd George and throughout August 1910 
the Chancellor concocted his own solution to the 
constitutional, social and economic problems which beset 
the ever wearier titan. Lloyd George's memorandum of 
August 17th was a call to the most competent men on both 
sides of the House (judged by him to be no more than half a 
dozen in each party) to sink their differences and re­
organise the national life of the country in all its 
branches. These branches were listed: Housing, Drink, 
Insurance, Unemployment, The Poor Law, National Re­
organisation, National Defence, Local Government, Trade, 
Land, Imperial Problems and Foreign Affairs. As the 
memorandum was a bid to convince Unionists that cooperation 
was possible, Lloyd George hinted at compromise over 
fiercely partisan subjects such as Home Rule and Tariff
14 British Weekly, 16th June 1910.
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Reform.15
Lloyd George implied that Nonconformists would not be 
allowed to use their influence within the Liberal party to 
thwart progress. He foresaw that no settlement would be 
possible:
without exciting a good many ill-formed
prejudices,’some of them with an historical 
basis. They cannot be argued with, they cannot 
be voted down; but they are extremely pernicious 
in their influence upon the settlement of a 
difficult and complex problem. Separate action 
means that a Party in opposition is driven into 
enlisting the support of these prejudices, 
whether it wishes to do so or not: the more 
extreme men amongst their own supporters on the 
platform and in the Press always take advantage 
of these elements, however enlightened a view the 
Party leaders may take. Joint action will enable 
a Government based on the strength of the two 
Parties to ignore these prejudices.16
Areas of compromise in the Chancellor's memorandum which 
would inevitably incur the wrath of Radical Nonconformists 
were temperance and education. He argued that if both 
parties cooperated they could arrive at a solution which, 
"whilst treating vested interest fairly, and even
generously, would advance the cause of national sobriety". 
The British Weekly had long been opposed to generous 
compensation for publicans. Lloyd George also suggested 
that the question of education could be dealt with more 
satisfactorily by a coalition because both parties were 
"committed to certain controversial solutions which may not 
be the very best".
15 Copy sent from Lloyd George to Austen Chamberlain, 29th 
January 1815, Lloyd George Papers, H.L.R.O., C/3/14/8, pp.1-9.
16 Ibid.
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Lloyd George proceeded cautiously with his plan for 
national rejuvenation. Having revealed his scheme to 
Churchill in October the Chancellor approached F.E. Smith 
from the Opposition; with Smith's support Balfour was 
informed of Lloyd George's proposals. The leader of the 
Unionists was encouraged and the privy circle was extended 
to a few M.P.s including Asquith, Haldane, Birrell, Grey, 
Austin Chamberlain, the Master of Elibank, Crewe and Bonar 
Law. The only journalist to be treated to information of 
the coalition talks was Garvin.17
Lloyd George gave an important speech to the non­
political Liberal Christian League in October. The speech, 
which concentrated on social waste, was well received on 
all sides. The British Weekly reported that Lloyd George 
"very boldly, and in an original way" had appropriated 
Joseph Chamberlain's main contentions: that Britain was in 
an evil plight which could only be healed by radical and 
revolutionary change. Lloyd George argued that this change 
could only take place without consideration for vested 
interests and through bold and comprehensive action on the 
part of the State. The Chancellor pinpointed the three 
areas of national waste as armaments, land and idle rich. 
"My counsel to the people would be this", Lloyd George 
concluded, "let them enlarge the purpose of their politics, 
and, having done so, let them adhere to that purpose with 
unswerving resolve through all difficulties and
17 Grigg, From Peace to War 1912-1916, London 1985, p.267.
discouragements until their redemption is accomplished".18 
Within the context of his memorandum and his discussions 
with Unionist leaders, Lloyd George was clearly calling on 
the nation to rise above party politics until Britain's 
troubled waters had been negotiated by its most able men.
The British Weekly misconstrued the Chancellor's 
meaning. This interpretation of Lloyd George's closing 
words was offered to the newspaper's readership: "He means 
that the working classes should return to Parliament those 
who will promote their interests. All that is done outside 
of Parliament amounts to very little. In Parliament, given 
a large and resolute majority, anything may be done".19 
The British Weekly did not understand the full implication 
of Lloyd George's recognition of the influence of Joseph 
Chamberlain. His predecessor had found it virtually 
impossible to be confined by the rigidity of party politics 
but in 1910 was well ensconced in the Unionist camp. Those 
who heard Lloyd George's address were free to connect his 
references to the spirit of Radical Liberalism or to 
reconstructed Unionism.
The official Constitutional Conference was resumed at 
the beginning of November. Asquith announced that those 
involved had come to an agreement which could not be made 
effective "unless and until it [had] approved itself to the 
opinion and judgement of the country". The British Weekly 
assumed this to mean that rumours of a federal agreement 
for Ireland were inaccurate and that if the Conference did
18 British Weekly, 20th October 1910.
19 British Weekly. 20th October 1910.
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agree to practical conclusions these would not become law 
until after a general election. The British Weekly 
believed that any consensus reached by the moderate members 
of the Conference which was put to the country might be 
opposed by extremists in Conservative, Radical and Labour 
circles. It was throughout very sceptical about the 
advantages of inter-party discussions and of the suggestion 
that the Conference be followed by another secret 
Convention of eighty persons to discuss Home Rule and the 
House of Lords. It remarked (not intentionally for Lloyd 
George's benefit), "These secret conferences are not after 
the British tradition, and so far as the Liberals are 
concerned excite no enthusiasm".20
Throughout the six months between the King's death and 
the breakdown of the Constitutional Conference in November 
the British Weekly was out of step with the thinking of the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer. Nicoll's attention was 
focused on the House of Lords while for Lloyd George the 
problems of the British Empire did not all rest with a 
stubborn Upper Chamber. "Liberals, we believe," the 
British Weekly commented on the anticipated collapse of the 
Constitutional Conference, "will cheerfully accept its 
failure, and will insist on a resolute return to the veto 
resolutions". British Weekly readers were given no hint of 
Lloyd George's flirtation with a coalition. In a
conversation with Harold Begbie, Lloyd George reaffirmed 
that Liberalism was the true force of evolution in 
politics. He spoke of "a live Liberalism. The old,
20 British Weekly, 3rd November 1910.
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sleepy and half-Conservative Liberalism is dead.
Liberalism to-day is young, wide-awake, alert, and
conscious of an ideal. It is capturing the imagination of 
the people". The Chancellor's definition of Liberalism 
was, "surely the drawing together of all the best elements 
in a nation for the moral and physical well-being of the 
whole State".21 But in the face of national insolvency 
Lloyd George decided to look beyond party political 
Liberalism and draw the best elements from Unionists and
Protectionists.
The failure of the leaders of the main political 
parties to reach agreement led to the collapse of Asquith's 
and Lloyd George's attempts at nonpartisan cooperation.
The result was a second election in 1910 on the question of 
the House of Lords. Nicoll's correspondence with Ernest 
Hodder-Williams reveals the extent of the disillusionment 
endemic among Liberal lobbyists at this point:
I think the Liberals will get in, but even if 
they don't they have a splendid chance, and 
perhaps a better chance than if they got in. 
Think of Balfour jettisoning Tariff Reform!
Think of the difficulties the Tories would have 
to face. Think of the chances the Opposition 
would have. We must fight the fight fair and 
stand by our colours. But if I were searched to 
the deeps of my heart, I should scarcely know on 
which side I should wish victory to fall. At any 
rate, you and I know very well that politicians 
on either side have done nothing for us, so keep 
quiet.22
Despite such private reservations about the Liberal
21 British Weekly. 24th November 1910.
22 Nicoll to Ernest Hodder-Williams, 30th November 1910, 
Hodder and Stoughton Papers, G.L., MS.16,370.
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party's commitment to the Free Churches his newspaper 
showed no signs of wavering in its support. This was 
particularly significant in view of the fact that 
Dissenting voices in the press and pulpit were not 
depicting Nonconformity as an issue at the election.23 The 
British Weekly recognised that it was an election in which 
every vote would count and its one hope was that 
Nonconformists would organise and send a large number of 
Dissenters back to Parliament so that there would be "a far 
more unanimous and enthusiastic Nonconformist party".24 It 
reminded Nonconformists of their duty, taking the view that 
with the election everything Dissenters had struggled for 
through weary centuries was now within their reach:
Let everyone rise to the occasion. Let everyone 
do his own duty, and also do his utmost to spread 
the light and bring others with him. A triumph at 
this critical hour will be a triumph for peace, 
reconciliation, and unity, as well as for 
justice.25
ii• The "British Weekly" as Propagandist for the
Government:
Privately Nicoll had revealed the extent of his 
disillusionment with the Liberal party but he also showed 
an enthusiasm for the game of politics which Denney did not 
share. Nicoll was in a difficult position. He was editor
23 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.119
24 British Weekly, 24th November 1910.
25 British Weekly, 1st December 1910.
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of Britain's most important Nonconformist newspaper and he 
could hardly afford to be silent. Again he was faced with 
the reality that the Liberal party represented the most 
realistic home for Dissenters and it was in the interests 
of the Free Churches to maintain a visible presence there. 
Nevertheless there was a marked decline in the British 
Weekly's interest in religious/political issues if not in 
theological issues.
Returning again to office at the end of 1910 without 
an overall majority the Liberals needed the support not 
only of Labour, but also the Irish and the Free Churches 
for political survival. Home Rule and Welsh
Disestablishment were again high on the agenda. Asquith 
promised that a Welsh Disestablishment Bill would be given 
a strong position once the Parliament Bill was passed. The 
British Weekly accepted that this issue now brought forth 
only "good humoured apathy" from politicians.26 When the 
Welsh Church Bill was introduced the following year the 
British Weekly gave it a very positive response27 but was 
generally more interested in the Irish Home Rule Bill.
The First World War revealed that Nicoll was ready to take 
up the Free Church cudgel once Welsh Disestablishment 
appeared to be threatened but in the interim the British 
Weekly involved itself in the broader business of the 
Liberal party. Its role as provider of Government 
information was notable in the People's Budget campaign and 
is further developed in the debates over the proposals for
26 British Weekly, 16th March 1911.
27 British Weekly, 2nd May 1912 .
the National Insurance Bill.
The first part of the Insurance scheme was introduced 
in May 1911 and the British Weekly applauded its 
essentially Christian basis; "the ideas of personal 
brotherhood, charity, hope for mankind, have the Gospel for 
their source".28 In the Commons Austen Chamberlain 
admitted that the Bill represented an occasion for 
cooperation.29 Riddell recalled that himself and Nicoll 
listened to Lloyd George's speech and were "aghast at the 
magnitude and complexity of the scheme, and left the House 
in a dejected condition". He reflected that the Tories 
would regret their enthusiasm before many weeks had passed: 
"They have given away the whole show and have acted like 
idiots. L.G. called Insurance Bill a non-party measure.
We shall see".30 The British Weekly had again misplaced 
its editor's cynicism, Lloyd George's appeal for 
cooperation on the Second Reading appeared to lift the 
Insurance Bill, "high above the muddy waters of party 
politics" .31
The Bill proved extremely difficult to sell as the 
real benefits were not to be felt until February 1913. The 
British Weekly was frustrated by the Government's inability 
to educate the public. In June 1911 it supported Chiozza
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28 British Weekly, 11th May 1911.
29 House of Commons Debates, XXV, (4th May 1911), cols.609- 
45, in Gilbert, Lloyd George, 1863-1912, p.438.
30 12th December 1911, Riddell Diaries, B.L., MS.62969, 
ff.136-137. Riddell's memory may be unreliable as this was 
recalled several months after the event.
31 British Weekly, 1st June 1911.
Money's criticism that the administration appeared vague 
and inaccurately briefed.32 In November the unfavourable 
outcome of by-elections in Oldham and Somerset further 
underlined the unpopularity of the legislation. The 
British Weekly, believing that ignorance was the real 
enemy, decided to publish a "plain statement" in question 
and answers on the effect of the Bill - specifically to 
counter opposition to the inclusion of domestic servants in 
the measure.33 The following month it expressed the hope 
that the "Liberal party [would] see that the Insurance Act 
[was] thoroughly understood by the country".34
The Medical profession put a considerable amount of 
money into opposing the Insurance Bill and events like the 
rally of mistresses and servants in the Albert Hall in 
December 1911 were very poor publicity for the Government. 
The British Weekly wanted to see the formation of an 
Insurance League similar to the Budget League which would 
coordinate meetings and leaflets to promote the scheme.35 
Impatience with the Chancellor's indulgence of critics who 
reduced the debate to a haggle over small sums brought the 
response from Lloyd George: "You are right in your 
Insurance Note...It must be fought out on broad lines".36 
The British Weekly's most comprehensive contribution to the
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32 British Weekly, 20th June 1911.
33 British Weekly, 30th November 1911.
34 British Weekly, 28th December 1911.
35 British Weekly, 7th March 1912.
36 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 24th February 1912, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.60-61.
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Insurance Campaign was a series in which "a most eminent 
expert" answered readers’ questions on the Act. The series 
began in June 1912 and ran until the Act was "fairly in 
working order" the following April.37
This series was replaced by a column by the Radical 
M.P. Chiozza Money which proposed to deal with those 
problems which had made their way into British political 
life and therefore "with the fight with poverty which has 
now begun in earnest".38 In the first month Money wrote on 
wages and prices, Dreadnoughts and houses, the nation's raw 
material and the extraordinary vagaries of the rural 
wage.39 It was through this column that the British Weekly 
expressed its original thinking on social reform.
Throughout the rest of the newspaper it increasingly 
peddled the official Liberal line.
iii. The Burgeoning Democracy:
The apparent breakdown of civil cohesion in the years
before the First World War forced the British Weekly to 
make concrete statements on labour policy. It maintained 
its view of Trade Unions as necessary arbitrators which 
should be encouraged towards a Liberal world view.
Industrial unrest had become critical in the latter
1913 .
37 British Weekly,
38 British Weekly,
39 British Weekly,
6th June 1912.
24th August 1913.
1st May, 8th May, 15th May, and 22nd May
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half of 1910. Disputes in the Great Northern Railway, S. 
Wales Collieries and the Lancashire Cotton Trade were among 
the most serious, and the Lockout following an unofficial 
strike of Northern Boilermakers underlined the difficulty 
of Trade Union compromises. The British Weekly accepted 
that such revolts arose out of a sense of grievance and 
hardship. However it held fast to the idea that
negotiation and accommodation were possible and wanted to 
see the Trade Union movement seek industrial emancipation 
through political as well as strike action.40 The British 
Weekly also noted how often it was staggered by the 
apparent triviality of industrial quarrels like those of 
the Welsh Colliery workers.41 Of the Cotton dispute in 
Lancashire it remarked that outsiders could not understand 
why the "differences now separating the two parties should 
be allowed to dislocate the whole cotton industry of 
Lancashire".42 The British Weekly used the unrest as a 
stick with which to beat the House of Lords. It ascribed 
the problem in part to the fact that working men looked to 
the resistance of many landowners working through the House 
of Lords:
When the rich, already so rich and growing richer 
every day, adopt a policy closely approaching 
rebellion rather than pay their share, legally 
enforced, of their burden of the State, what 
wonder it is that the thoughts of the masses
40 British Weekly,
41 British Weekly,
42 British Weekly,
15th September 1910 
22nd September 1910 
29th September 1910
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should stray to anarchy.43
In August 1911 the British Weekly carried a letter 
from a "well known publicist" which remarked that 
contemporary newspapers had devoted comparatively little 
space to the strikes which had been taking place in many 
large centres of industry: "the truth is that we are in the 
midst of a great industrial upheaval, far more important 
than the abolition of the House of Lords..."44 The 
Liberals had come no closer to creating a mechanism to 
arbitrate effectively in industrial disputes. In August 
the decision of Railway workers to abandon the Arbitration 
Treaty negotiated by the Board of Trade in 1907 brought 
criticism from the British Weekly and it refused to condemn 
the Government's employment of troops, arguing that those 
who opposed the use of force were "ill-informed 
sentimentalists".45
In September Nicoll delivered a speech to the 
Brotherhood Conference at Whitefield's Tabernacle. He 
urged the members to use their powers to the full and 
(significantly) chose to speak firstly of political power 
before moving to the importance of intellect and character:
It has long been my conviction that the people of 
this country are not to be pitied. They are to be 
challenged... I shall not regret but rather 
rejoice in the hour when the masses of the nation 
take its administration in hand...it must be 
allowed that they understand infinitely better 
than the privileged what their life is and what
43 British Weekly,
44 British Weekly,
45 British Weekly,
15th September 1910.
17th August 1911.
17th August 1911, 31st August 1911.
is needed to make that life wholesome and fair 
and human.46
In the same month the British Weekly called for the 
Church to become more involved in advocating practical 
demands like better pay. In a change of emphasis it 
suggested that people were tired of abstract argument and 
it was time for the Church to admit that in no trade should 
wages fall so low as to prevent the worker from living a 
human life.47
The question of a minimum wage became ever more 
pertinent in 1912 and the Liberals' oscillation on the 
point exacerbated the National Coal strike of that year. 
Riddell chronicled it "The biggest thing that has taken 
place for years - the beginning of an economic and 
industrial revolution".48 The miners' strike began on the 
1st March despite the Government's attempt to arbitrate, 
and because of the nation's dependency on the coal industry 
it was generally felt in the press that the Government had 
a responsibility to attempt to find a solution. In an 
article in the Daily Mail it was suggested that although 
the Government could not force miners to go down the pits 
it could ensure that the military handled the coal above 
ground. "Others argue that the coal owners have a right to 
do what they like with their own," the piece continued,
"but we venture to think that the manufacturers and private
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46 British Weekly, 28th September 1911.
47 British Weekly, 21st September 1911.
48 2nd March, 1912, J.McEwen, (edit.), The Riddell Diaries 
1908-1923, London 1986, p.34.
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individuals who depend upon coal for their business and 
comfort will disagree. At such a moment, coal is no more 
private property than air".49
In February 1912 Lloyd George wrote Nicoll a long 
letter outlining his view of the subject:
Rather than allow the whole of the industries of 
this country to be paralysed the Government ought 
to take strong action. They might even act on 
the analogy of the Court of Chancery when a 
dispute between partners threatens to stop a 
colliery. That court appoints a Receiver who 
controls and manages the mine for the
partnership, rendering an account of the profits. 
You will realize that the one insuperable 
difficulty to carrying out a policy of this kind 
would be refusal of the miners to work on 
reasonable terms. You can coerce the owners by 
the process I have indicated, but you cannot 
compel a million of men to go down a pit and hew 
coal...The situation is critical and needs to be 
handled with great tact and firmness. The 
majority of the owners are prepared to be 
reasonable. South Wales and Scotland give most 
trouble.50
The British Weekly reproduced the unattributed view of 
the Chancellor. In a piece which underlined the importance 
of finding an alternative to coercion, the British Weekly 
listed among the possible options, "an analogy of the Court 
of Chancery" and a minimum wage with safeguards. The 
latter became the favoured choice of Nicoll' s newspaper but 
Lloyd George's reading of the situation was otherwise
49British Weekly, 29th February 1912.
50 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 24th February 1912, Nicoll 
Papers, N. L.S., MS. 15941, ff.60-61.
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faithfully transcribed.51
The British Weekly portrayed its repugnance of
coercion - a blatant U turn - as in keeping with the 
principles of Liberalism. A week after the strike had 
begun it carried the view that the Government had done all 
in its powers to prevent the crisis and attacked the press 
for calling for heavy handed methods. "If the majority of 
the nation really wish measures of violence and coercion," 
the British Weekly challenged, "we are quite sure that Mr. 
Asquith and his Government will gladly lay their burden 
down and leave it to statesmen like Mr. Bonar Law and Lord 
Lansdowne to compose the struggle. Come what may they [the 
Government] will not abandon the true principles of 
Liberalism".52 Regarding this leader Denney argued against 
Nicoll's apparent endorsement of the Repeal of the Trades 
Disputes Act as in effect legalising all violence in 
strikes short of murder: "It simply suspends the law where 
there is a trade dispute,...Government by soldier is the 
worst government ever invented, but it is better than 
none,...But you may think I am turning Tory or timorous if 
I write like this, which I hope is not the case".53
Asquith's subsequent refusal to specify a figure - "5 
and 2" - in the emergency Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act has
51 British Weekly, 29th February 1912.
52 British Weekly, 7th March 1912.
53 Denney to Nicoll, 11th March 1912, Letters of Denney to 
Nicoll, p.195-6.
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also been portrayed as the product of Liberal principles.54 
But contemporary Liberals were critical of the nature of 
compromise contained in the Act. The Manchester Guardian 
berated the Government for failing to accept the "5 and 2" 
and thus stultifying their own Bill. The Liberal leaders 
had taken a very significant departure in legislating for a 
minimum wage but as the Manchester Guardian noted they had, 
"committed themselves to the principle of a statutory 
minimum wage for the sake of settling a great dispute 
without settling that dispute". The British Weekly was 
equally frustrated. It declared that no record had ever 
been read with greater disgust nor could any be more 
damaging to the Government. Disheartened it concluded,
"All might so easily have been well, and all is ill".55 A 
week before, Nicoll had written to Denney, "...I deeply 
regret that Asquith has not gone further to meet the 
miners. L.G. is on his back, which is a calamity for the 
nation at this time, for Asquith with all his merits is 
essentially a Balliol man, unimaginative and cold".56
54 Lloyd George's contention that, "Asquith's declaration 
for a minimum wage sounded the death knell of the Liberal party 
in its old form," (2nd March 1912, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.34) 
has helped to train the debate into a definition of what 
constitutes Liberalism. Indeed the Chancellor of the Exchequer 
claimed to be prepared to declare strike pay illegal and imprison 
leaders in the event that the miners did not accept the emergency 
Act. (19th March 1912, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.38) Actions 
much more Draconian than the imposition of the minimum wage.
55 British Weekly, 28th March 1912.
56 Nicoll to Denney, 22nd March 1912, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p.223. Denney responded on 25th March, "I am sorry to see you so 
severe on Asquith. . . .To have put figures into the Bill would have 
been to admit that Parliament can fix wages, and that it ought 
to do so; but it can no more fix wages than it can fix the amount 
of sunshine there is to be next year." Letters of Denney to 
Nicoll, pp.196-7.
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The first award under the Minimum Wages Act was given 
in May. The South Wales Miners received 4s 6.5d. The 
British Weekly shared the resulting exasperation and in its 
certainty that the Government had intended the 5 and 2 to 
be adopted repeated its regret that this had not been 
enacted: "We believe the country see more clearly that it 
will be cheapest in the end to grant the men all their 
reasonable demands,... It is no use saying that we can face 
another strike".57 In private Nicoll admitted to Riddell 
that Lloyd George would have to face a minimum wage for the 
workers in the big trades: "It may be a temporary expedient 
and it may be objectionable, but it is the only real 
palliative in sight at the moment".58 This encapsulated 
the British Weekly's position on industrial problems. It 
accepted the expediency of certain measures out of a desire 
to find accommodation for the Labour movement rather than 
through a vivid sense of social justice. The fact that 
Denney was a regular contributor to the British Weekly also 
told of its social conservatism. .-This was made more 
explicit during the campaign for the female franchise.
The British Weekly's apparent belief in the power of 
the masses did not extend to an endorsement of adult 
suffrage. In 1889 it had run a series "Should Women have 
the Vote" to which Nicoll contributed a piece. It was the 
editor's view that:
no system of government is sound that separates
57 British Weekly, 16th May 1912.
58 27th May 1912, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62970,
f .123 .
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legal authority and physical force; and female 
suffrage would do this. Representative 
government will simply go to pieces if the 
executive does not carry out the decree of the 
majority of male voters.59
Nicoll discounted the arguments of those who believed 
that women were not politically knowledgeable, that female 
enfranchisement would disrupt households or desexualize 
women. He argued that women should interest themselves in 
politics and exercise great influence, but contended "this 
influence will be best and most safely exercised away from 
the polling booth".60
In 1906 the British Weekly advocated leniency for 
imprisoned suffragettes; believing that they should be 
treated as first class misdemeanants rather than ordinary 
criminals.61 However within two years it was condemning 
the militancy of the suffrage movement and calling for 
severe measures in response: "The present state of affairs 
is intolerable, and now that the Suffragettes have leagued 
themselves with the hooligan class, the police may 
reasonably ask for further powers".62 In June Stoddart had 
attended a meeting of Suffragists in the Albert Hall and 
concluded that the movement was "largely an anti-Liberal 
and anti-Government movement" and that the extension of the 
vote to women on the present electoral basis "would be an 
undemocratic measure which might have the effect of placing
59 British Weekly,
60 British Weekly,
61 British Weekly,
62 British Weekly,
6th December 1889
6th December 1889
1st November 1906
15th October 1908
the Conservatives in power for many years to come".63
Two years later Denney - a vehement anti-suffragist -
wrote, "I see you are very non-committal about the Woman's 
Suffrage. This is one of the things on which I have a 
prejudice stronger than all reason..."64 By 1911 he was 
feeling increasingly threatened:
I am sorry you are going in for the woman's vote 
in politics. Manhood suffrage, on the basis of 
universal military training - a vote to every 
person of twenty-five who had put in his drills - 
is the panacea which commends itself to me. If 
we had any more demonstrations like Mrs P's last,
I should say, 'Do not hesitate to shoot!' I admit 
this is a subject on which I can get few to agree 
with me...65
If Nicoll was prepared to accept a form of female suffrage 
he still linked the right to vote u>rt-V\ physical
aptitude. The acceleration of violence in 1912 did nothing 
to convince the British Weekly of the justice of women's 
suffrage, rather it was "unseemly and hateful to every 
class of the population. To choose the hour of a nation's 
great agony to damage the property of unoffending 
individuals was an act of great crassitude".66 The 
concession the British Weekly made was to suggest that a 
referendum - odious but necessary - might solve the
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65 Denney to Nicoll, 25th November 1911, Letters of 
Denney to Nicoll, pp.186-7.
66 British Weekly, 7th March 1912 .
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question on which both parties were divided.67 However by 
1913 the position of Nicoll's newspaper had not changed 
significantly since the 1880s. The British Weekly still 
insisted that adult suffrage was not possible because the 
country was not ready to have women make up the majority of 
the electorate.68 This remained Nicoll's position until he 
accepted more sincerely the justice of female suffrage 
during the First World War.69 In July 1915 the British 
Weekly praised women's contribution in the war and 
conceded, "That women will obtain the vote is as certain as 
the rising of the sun. But let the vote be a grateful and 
reverent offering, and not the angry concession to a fierce 
and irresistible demand".70
The British Weekly's Radicalism was largely 
unreconstructed. Even Jane Stoddart had internalised the 
anti-emancipation language of her newspaper and defined 
herself more in terms of party loyalty than gender. She 
represents an interesting example of those women who spoke 
the liberal discourse but did not challenge their own 
political lives.
67 British Weekly, 11th January 1912.
68 British Weekly, 30th January 1913.
69 Nicoll wrote to a correspondent on 11th June 1915, 
"Women have come out extremely well during this war. We have 
received a great number of patriotic letters whenever we have 
written an article. So I am much reconciled to the Suffrage. 
The women see the thing in its true danger." in Darlow, 
op.cit., p.245.
70 British Weekly, 22nd July 1915. .
iv. The Third Home Rule Bill:
The threat of civic collapse also clang to the
debate over the future of Ireland. Protestants in Ulster
were threatening armed rebellion before the Third Home Rule 
Bill had been introduced. The British Weekly had no truck 
with the extremists. It was concerned that legislation 
would contain securities for religious liberty but was 
convinced by the fact that in the last General Election 
Ulster had voted by 42,991 to 41,693 in favour of Home Rule 
and therefore it was the Government's responsibility to 
call Carson's bluff.71 Once the contents of the Bill had 
been revealed the British Weekly declared them watertight, 
"a model of constructive statesmanship". It noted that 
even in the Conservative party there was a manifest 
shrinking from identification with the Orangemen: "This is 
not the day for the rekindling of religious passion. It is 
not the day for the threat of organised rebellion".72
The overwhelming democratic support in Ireland for 
Home Rule made it possible for the British Weekly to 
support the Catholic majority against militant Protestant 
opponents. On the Bill's Second Reading it considered that 
the opposition of certain parts of Ulster was no doubt real 
but that it was "not enough to warrant the refusal to the 
vast majority of the Irish people all their claim to self­
government" . 73 The British Weekly also held the view that 
the Orangemen represented a minority view of Protestant
71 British Weekly, 11th January 1912.
72 British Weekly, 18th April 1912.
73 British Weekly, 16th May 1912 .
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Ulster. In June the General Assembly of the Presbyterian 
Church of Ireland refused to pass a report containing an 
emphatic pronouncement on Home Rule, convincing the British 
Weekly "that the Irish Presbyterians by a great majority 
detest the threats of civil war which have been so freely 
used by their unwise champions in Parliament".74
The devices used by the Carsonites were also 
repellent. The British Weekly defended its position - 
despite involvement in the passive resistance campaign - by 
drawing a line between passive protest and talk of armed 
rebellion and civil war.75 When a draft of the Solemn 
League and Covenant had been laid down the British Weekly 
wondered at what Orangemen hoped to gain by this type of 
agitation. Even if they succeeded in turning out the 
Liberals, a Unionist Government would not be able to impose 
the will of the minority on the Irish nation:
The Home Rule legions cannot now be thrown back, 
and those who meddle with anarchy will find that 
they have set loose forces the strength of which 
they never understood...we do not believe that in 
the end of the day sober men will range
themselves with Sir Edward Carson.76
The duty of the Government was therefore plain: it
74 British Weekly, 13th June 1912. In the autumn Denney 
added a further dimension to the debate when he wrote to 
Nicoll, "There is a curious likeness between the Home Rule 
(sic) and the Church Union situation. It looks as if Ulster 
might defeat the one, and if a resolute group of voluntaries 
might defeat the other." 25th October 1912, Letters of Denney 
to Nicoll, p.209.
75 British Weekly, 11th July 1912.
76 British Weekly, 12th September 1912.
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must not yield to threats.77 The British Weekly predicted 
that Orangemen would have no support in the Dominions or 
America and in Britain it had become clear that the country 
was not to be roused on their behalf. The British people 
"desired that the long quarrel between themselves and 
Ireland should end".78 D.C. Lathbury79 also wrote two 
leaders for the British Weekly which put forward his case 
as an anti-Horne Ruler who now conceded that the spectacle 
of a Dublin Parliament could "hardly be so painful as the 
constant recourse to fresh expedients for enforcing law 
upon a people extraordinarily clever in devising ways of 
resisting it" .80
The British Weekly had never conceded that the fears 
of the Protestants in Ireland - although understandable - 
were justifiable. It accepted the Nationalists' assurances 
that the Bill would be "so drawn as to make anything in the 
nature of religious persecution absolutely impossible". 
Effectively the British Weekly supported a system of Home 
Rule within Home Rule without understanding the long term 
complications of this for Nationalists. It accepted as its 
basis for this the fact that Nationalists had again and 
again said they would yield to Protestant Ulster on all
77 British Weekly, 3rd October 1912.
78 British Weekly, 12th September 1912, 23rd January
1913.
79 Formerly of the ecclesiastical journal the Pilot.
80 British Weekly, 8th August 1912. The second leader 
appeared on 5th September 1912.
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that could be yielded.81 Furthermore, once Carson began to 
talk of a separate Ulster, the British Weekly was riled by 
the inconsistency of a movement which had begun by talking 
of marching from Belfast to Cork to protect Protestant 
minorities against the great tyrannies of the Church of 
Rome and then withdrew this protection from those areas 
which needed it most.82
Throughout, the British Weekly was looking to hold the 
centre ground; hoping for a consensus which would bring 
about a solution, removing Ireland from the political 
equation. The threatened violence of the Ulster 
Protestants made it much easier for a British Nonconformist 
newspaper to justify its support for Catholics. The 
allegiance of Orangemen appeared to be up for auction. It 
was reported that on the occasion of the grand review of 
the provisional forces of the provisional government of 
Ulster a central banner on the Donegal Road read, "Long 
Live the Empire of Germany. No King in England". In an 
interview in the Morning Post. Craig testified that there 
was "a spirit abroad, ... that Germany and the German Empire 
would be preferred to the rule of John Redmond, Patrick 
Ford, and the Molly Maguires". The British Weekly reported 
the event in the belief that the British public "should 
attentively ponder the facts".83 Ultimately the British 
Weekly took this view:
81 British Weekly, 18th September 1913, 25th September
1913 .
82 British Weekly, 2nd October 1913.
83 British Weekly, 2nd October 1913.
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We have characterised the policy of civil war in 
Ulster as Satanic madness, and to this 
characterisation we still hold. But there was a 
day in America when Abraham Lincoln had to choose 
civil war before any possible alternatives, and 
there is no one now who doubts that he was 
right.84
Despite all public bravado in his newspaper - which was no 
doubt genuine - Nicoll came to extend his hope that the 
Northern Protestants could be made to feel secure into 
support for giving them the right to take a second ballot 
after six years which would extend their separation for a 
further six years. When Riddell conveyed this change of 
approach to Lloyd George and T.P. O'Connor they "both 
seemed surprised and strongly expressed the hope that N. 
would not propound the plan in the 'British Weekly.'" When 
this concern was relayed to Nicoll he replied that he 
proposed to make the suggestion "in a guarded way".85 
Denney believed the Government should face down both the 
Lords and Ulster if necessary: "If they simply cave in to 
the tempest of bad passions that has disgraced Christianity 
in the north of Ireland for two years past, they will never 
be forgiven".86
It is striking that the British Weekly overcame any 
affinity with the Ulster Protestants despite that fact that 
their Covenant was imbued with the language of the Bible
84 British Weekly, 30th October 1913.
85 15th March 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L. Add MS.62974,
f .58.
86 Denney to Nicoll, 25th July 1914, Letters of Denney 
to Nicoll, pp.241-2 .
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and Presbyterian fundamentalism, beginning: "Being 
convinced in our consciences1'.37 The British Weekly's 
position revealed its determination to be loyal to the 
Government and to be done with the Irish.
v. The Defence of the Realm:
Ireland appeared to represent the most immediate 
threat to British security but it was in foreign affairs 
that the real menace would explode. The naval race between 
Britain and Germany caused domestic as well as
international tension. Fear of invasion was played out in 
the annual Naval Estimates. The British Weekly was a 
supporter of strengthening Britain's power over the seas 
but as ever was concerned about the cost. Throughout it 
had to reconcile its demand for lower rates with the 
instinct that spending on social reforms and the navy could 
not be reduced. In March 1889 it expressed concern that 
both the Conservative and Liberal parties had programmes 
which would increasingly cost the taxpayer:
The new County Councils will add to the rates, 
the Education rate is to be added to, money is to 
be spent on the Navy, it is proposed that we 
should put our hands in our pockets for the 
volunteers. [This is] all very well, but the 
British taxpayer has only limited means, and he 
will begin to ask whether he may not use national 
property not at present in possession of the 
nation, but enjoyed by a privileged fragment *
87 E.Longley, "The Rising, the Somme and Irish Memory," 
in M.Ni Dhonnchadha and T.Dorgan (edits.), Revising the 
Rising, Derry 1991, p.38.
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thereof.88
Fear of ballooning expenditure meant that the British 
Weekly initially attempted to police warmongering and arms 
races. In January 1902 Count Von Bulow's speech in the 
Reichstag criticising British involvement in the Boer War 
caused a furore in the British press. Chamberlain responded 
with a speech in Birmingham which the British Weekly 
accepted, "represented the nation - and the truth". But it 
was severely critical of the flamboyance of Chamberlain's 
speech noting that people could look back on "the terrible 
record of unfinished war," and, "look forward to the load 
of debt and hatred which it has cost them". It concluded
with a sentiment which was characteristic of the British 
Weekly up to the First World War:
We wish we were as sure that our Navy is as 
strong as the language of Mr. Chamberlain. If it 
were, there would be no need for apprehension, 
and none for recrimination...A plain and 
dignified statement of the real facts would have 
done good; but the heady interchanges of retort 
and counter-retort between prominent statesmen is 
greatly to be deprecated.89
Lloyd George's position on naval spending was always 
equivocal. Esher wrote of him in February 1909, "Ll.G. in 
his heart does not care a bit for economy, and is quite 
ready to face Parliament with any amount of deficit, and 
"go" for a big navy. He is...an Imperialist at heart, if he
88British Weekly, 1st March 1889.
89 British Weekly. 16th January 1902.
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is anything..."90 During the height of the 1909 naval 
panic, the British Weekly (although declaring erroneously 
that there had been no quarrel between the Prime Minister 
and the Chancellor) assured its readership that Lloyd 
George was no advocate of a little navy and indeed that he 
would be the last man to betray his country.91 John Grigg 
confirms this view, noting that, "Lloyd George had always 
believed in a strong Navy and even as Chancellor could be 
persuaded that higher spending on it was vital for the 
nation's security".92
The British Weekly along with the rest of the country, 
anticipated an increase in the 1909 Naval Estimates.93 
Three days after the Estimates had been announced the Prime 
Minister revealed to the Commons that he had been mistaken 
in believing that the German naval programme was incapable 
of being realised within the dates assigned and that by 
1911 Germany would have 13 Dreadnoughts afloat. It had 
previously been suggested that she could only possibly have 
nine by this date.94 The ensuing panic caused the 
Observer to suggest that the British fleet act at once to 
destroy the German navy. The British Weekly had no time 
for such scaremongering and indeed was convinced that it 
was the result of an attempt to undermine the Liberal 
Government in a bid to frustrate the Budget proposals
90 Morris, Edwardian Radicalism, p.140.
91 British Weekly, 25th march 1909.
32 Grigg, Peace to War, p.17 6.
93 British Weekly, 25th February 1909.
94 British Weekly, 18th March 1909.
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(which had not yet been revealed).95 The British Weekly 
attempted to place the naval controversy within the 
political context and suggested that Balfour encouraged 
panic because he was unsure of the strength of the 
protection platform and hoped to unite opposition to both 
Liberals and Socialists. The British Weekly was concerned 
lest the Government would assist the Unionists by lacking a 
sense of urgency in its handling of the naval scare. It 
wanted the Government to take out a naval loan in the event 
of the rejection of the Budget by the Lords, "We are 
convinced that they must allow no suspicion to rest on 
their ability and willingness to keep up the Navy..." the 
British Weekly declared, "and assure the safety and 
stability of the country" ,96
Radicals refused to accept that the tally of naval 
strength should only include Dreadnoughts and discount all 
other battleships and cruisers. In contrast the British 
Weekly believed that the need of the nation was summed up 
in one word, "Dreadnoughts",97 In April 1909 Churchill 
made a speech in Dundee which urged the nation to stop 
judging the strength of the navy in this way. The British 
Weekly dismissed this view as Britain's first line of 
defence was the Dreadnought. It argued that a margin of 
three was not sufficient.98
At the end of March the British Weekly suggested that
25th March 1909.
6th April 1909.
25th March 1909.
22nd April 1909.
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a delay in commissioning the second four Dreadnoughts 
provided an atmosphere for a friendly arrangement with 
Germany. Conversely the newspaper also conceded that by 
building eight Dreadnoughts the Government would allay the 
fears of the nation and prove to other countries that she 
was serious about maintaining her supremacy. The British 
Weekly concluded by admitting that it did not know which 
was the more desirable approach." By the 15th April it 
also claimed that there was not the smallest doubt that the 
Government would build eight rather than four Dreadnoughts 
it should state this clearly and stop playing into the 
Opposition's hands.100
"Iniquitous and insane as the vast expenditure so 
spent must appear to all sober-minded people, the facts 
have to be faced", the British Weekly assured its 
readership. The "facts" as they appeared portrayed the 
British Fleet as a vehicle for peace. Citing the United 
States' conflict with Spain, Fashoda and the South African 
war as instances when the threat of the British navy 
diffused the possibility of interference from other 
continental powers, the British Weekly argued that in the 
previous twelve years peace had been secured without the 
fleet firing a single shot.101 Peace was equated, not only 
with intimidation, but with British interests. Indeed the
British Weekly, 25th March 1909. 
British.Weekly,... , 15th April 1909.
British „We.s..kly.7th April, 1909.101
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British Weekly claimed that the term Dreadnought was in 
itself "a stroke of genius on the part of those responsible 
for naval nomenclature, representing as it does in one word 
the idea of defence, not defiance".102
This represented to the British Weekly a position of 
sober imperialism: one which simultaneously condemned 
inflammatory talk while taking on board the alarms 
scaremongerers raised. Nicoll was therefore a much more 
pliable ally when Lloyd George delivered his Mansion House 
speech in July 1911. It is well recorded that Lloyd George 
pre-empted criticism from C.P. Scott by asking him not to 
write anything "about the German business" until the two 
had talked.103 The shift in Lloyd George's approach to 
Germany made it necessary for him to provide some 
explanation to his Radical constituency. It can be 
reasonably assumed that the Chancellor met with Nicoll in 
an attempt to keep him onside. This can be further 
inferred from the fact that the British Weekly did not 
include any reference to the Mansion House speech in the 
next issue. On 3rd August however it noted:
A fortnight ago, at the Banker's dinner, Mr. 
Lloyd George startled his countrymen by using 
language of solemn warning, which could only
British Weekly. 15th April 1909.
103 Scott was unaware of the content of Lloyd George's 
speech but he was assured: "This is urgently requested as a 
personal matter. The Chancellor asks if you could come up to 
breakfast with him tomorrow at 9.15. He regrets very much 
having to suggest your returning to town, but he and the 
Master of Elibank feel it of the utmost importance that 
nothing should be written without your seeing him." 
R.H.Gretton (of the Manchester Guardian's London staff) to 
C.P.Scott, n.d. [21st July 1911], T.Wilson, (edit.) The 
Political .Diaries..o.f....C,.,E . £C-0t,t...,19Ll-1.9.2&, London 197 0, p.45.
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have been meant for Germany. It was
universally realized that one of the most 
peace-loving modern statesmen could not have 
spoken such words unless he had recognised that 
the claims of Germany might involve a menace to 
the peace of Europe. Behind the curtains some 
strange drama is proceeding.104
However Lloyd George was not to be given carte blanche and 
at the end of August the British Weekly carried a piece by 
"a well-known naval expert" which asserted that many did 
not share the views of the Chancellor "as to the increased 
danger to [British] trade routes caused by the presence of 
the German cruisers at Agadir".105
The British Weekly attempted to maintain a selective 
approach to the increasing tension with Germany. In 
February 1912 Churchill circulated a memorandum to Cabinet 
which argued that the new German Navy Law allowed for an 
increase in the navy which should make Britain take serious 
note.106 The following day he spoke in Glasgow on the need 
to maintain British naval supremacy. The speech had .
displeased Lloyd George who believed it, "most imprudent 
and calculated to ruin Haldane's mission to Germany, which 
was on a fair way to success".107 The British Weekly 
described the speech as "a screaming, bellicose, jingo 
deliverance, calculated to irritate Germany in the highest 
degree". The most objectionable part of the speech, in the
104 Brit.i.sh, Weekly/ 3rd August 1911.
105 Sr i.t.i.sh..., Weekly, 31st August 1911.
106 Cabinet Memorandum circulated by Churchill, 14 
February 1912, Lloyd George Papers, H.L.R.O. C/24/3/17.
107 Lloyd George to Churchill, 10th February 1912, 
recorded in McEwen, Riddell Diaries., p.32.
268
newspaper's opinion, was Churchill's contention that while 
the British fleet was a necessity Germany's was a luxury.
In a change of tack from its stand three years earlier the 
British Weekly described as "notoriously untrue"
Churchill's declaration that the British navy could not 
"menace the peace of a single Continental hamlet".108
Disagreement with Churchill's provocative language did 
not stop the British Weekly from giving reluctant support 
to the First Lord's high Naval Estimates of March 1912 
which attempted to build a 60% margin of superiority into 
the British Fleet. Although the British Weekly did not 
think this an unreasonable target it did express profound 
regret that such large sums should be diverted from the 
needs of the people".109 Indeed Churchill was aware that he 
could not rely on unqualified support from the public or 
the Cabinet. In April 1913 he suggested that the Dominions 
should supply an Imperial squadron of battle cruisers, and 
called for a Naval holiday in Britain and Germany.110 The 
proposal was repeated in October when it was suggested that 
Germany postpone laying down its annual two ships for a 
year and Britain would delay laying down its four. In 
January the following year Lloyd George spoke of the need 
to abate the ever growing expenditure on arms and called 
for cooperation among nations. The British Weekly was at 
one with Lloyd George in his assertion that British 
superiority should be maintained but not so feverishly
British Weekly.
B£i.t.i.s..h.. Weekly,
British Weekly.
15th February 1912.
21st March 1912.
3rd April 1913.
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increased. It concluded:
There are many of us who do not like Mr.
Winston Churchill's talks through the 
megaphone. They would prefer a quiet and secure 
and unboastful efficiency. But every man must 
be allowed his own manner, and in all Mr.
Churchill's actions at least he is backed by a 
Cabinet we can trust.111
The British Weekly's response to the Naval race reflected 
the confusion in the country. If officials could not agree 
it was impossible for amateurs to gauge the danger
properly. Typically the Bxi.t.iaJ^..Wje.e.kly fell somewhere 
between the pacifist and the bellicose camps, as in the 
Boer war; falling closer to the latter than the former.
However debates over naval strength revealed that the 
British Weekly was susceptible to the fear of invasion and 
this contextualises both its support for social reform 
(national efficiency) and the extension of the nation's tax 
base in the People's Budget and the Land Campaign.
vi. The,Land. Campaign:
The battle over the Naval Estimates was played out 
against the background of domestic politics. Lloyd 
George's initial silence over Churchill's 1914 Estimates 
was an attempt to gain support for the Land Campaign. He 
told Riddell, "I have made a bargain with Winston - he has 
agreed to support my land policy with which he is not in 
sympathy and I have agreed to give him more money for the
in British Weekly.8th January 1914.
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Navy...I am only endeavouring to carry out my scheme of 
social reform...I am not at all sure that the bargain will 
meet with the approval of some members of our party...1'112
Balfour calculated that Lloyd George's later public 
opposition to Churchill was the result of purely political 
motives:
I do not mean that as Chancellor of the Exchequer 
and a taxpayer, he is not seriously alarmed at 
the growth of expenditure. I have no doubt he 
is...What I do suppose is that he wants an 
election cry which will rally what remains of the 
old Radical Nonconformist Party, the new semi­
Socialist-Radical, and the Labour party. A 
campaign against armaments is admirably suited 
for the purpose".113
Lloyd George had been trying to rally the old 
Nonconformist radicals with proposals for comprehensive 
land reform. The Land Campaign was a concerted attack in 
an area which had been a long standing grievance of Lloyd 
George and represented a natural progression in Liberal 
reforms but it was fragmented and difficult to sell to the 
public. The Campaign - which was anticipated throughout 
1912 and officially launched in October 1913 - provided 
veteran Liberal supporters with a focus which combined the 
language of social justice with economic pragmatism. In 
May 1912 Lloyd George told Riddell:
I am convinced that the land question is the 
real issue. You must break down the remnants of 
the feudal system. I have a scheme. I propose
112 1st November 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add 
MS.62973, in B.B.Gilbert, David Lloyd George A Political 
Life: the organiser of victory, 1912-16, London 1992, p.70.
113 Balfour to Selbourne, 7th January 1914, in Gilbert, 
Lloyd George, 1912-1916, p.74.
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that a land court should be established to fix 
fair rents and tenures...
...there are times when Radicalism needs a great 
stimulus - when the Radical cause has fallen into 
the abyss of respectability and conventionality. 
Something must be done to put fresh life into the 
dry bones. I feel that the land and the
agricultural labourer are at the root of the 
whole social evil.114
The following month Lloyd George breakfasted with a 
group of Radicals which included Rowntree, Scott, Buxton 
and Masterman. The unofficial Enquiry Committee which aimed 
to look at urban and rural conditions developed at this 
meeting. On 19th June the Chancellor had Nicoll, Riddell 
and Masterman to dinner and outlined his policy which 
included breaking down "the relics of feudalism," creating 
land courts to fix fair rents and tribunals to fix 
agricultural wages in certain districts.115 In October 
Asquith made public his support for a re-evaluation of the 
ownership of land; in part a bid to quell rumours of a 
split in Cabinet. The Prime Minister was also anxious to 
set the boundaries of reform. Despite pinpointing the land 
question as at the root of the evils of national life, 
Asquith declared that the Government's solution would "not 
impair the stability of property, and...[would] not 
confiscate the rights or the interests of any individual or 
class..."116 But the meeting arranged as a platform for the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer's launch of the Land Campaign
114 Lloyd George to Riddell, 27th May 1912, McEwen, 
Riddell Diaries, p.43.
115 19th June 1912, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add 
MS.62970, ff.145-8.
116 British Weekly, 10th October 1912.
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was officially postponed from the 26th October 1912 as a 
result of the situation in the Near East117 and in order to 
build up support in Cabinet.
The British Weekly saw in the Land Campaign a way to 
rejuvenate the party and from the outset had portrayed the 
advocacy of the land scheme as the beginning of a new 
order. In December 1912 it described Lloyd George's speech 
in Aberdeen as containing, "the note of the new era". "Mr. 
Lloyd George spoke as one whose heart was set on the 
solution of the social problems by which we are
confronted," the piece continued, "and which we can no 
longer ignore...There must be a new order. Mr. Lloyd 
George has a vision of the new order in the new day, and it 
is this which gives him his power".118 Lloyd George 
responded, "Robertson Nicoll is the greatest living 
journalist from a polemical standpoint. It is a pity he is 
too old to edit a daily paper. He would make it an 
enormous power".119
The Land Campaign was dealt a serious blow by the 
Marconi affair and Nicoll's value to Lloyd George became 
even more pronounced. The Chancellor's involvement in the 
purchase of U.S. Marconi stock had the lateral effect of 
exposing his movement from the democracy to the
117 British Weekly, 17th October 1912.
118 British Weekly, 5th December 1912 .
119 Lloyd George to Riddell, 29th December 1912, 
MeEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.52.
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plutocracy.120 Northcliffe commented that the whole 
business would "draw LG's teeth. He cannot attack the rich 
as he has done in the past".121 Lloyd George was ever 
concerned lest he alienate his natural constituency and 
therefore courted Nicoll who again acted as the
Chancellor's apologist. Lloyd George, "was anxious to 
know Robertson Nicoll's views" concerning Marconi. Riddell 
assured him that the editor was very favourable, "which 
seemed to please L.G".122 The British Weekly throughout 
championed Lloyd George's innocence and Nicoll was
apparently "all for L.G. and Rufus Isaacs". He even asked 
Riddell to prepare some notes for his British Weekly leader 
on the Marconi case, "dealing with the legal position of 
the 2 companies".123
At the end of March Nicoll dined with Riddell, Lloyd 
George, Rufus Isaacs and Masterman. Riddell recorded:
We spoke much of the Marconi case...Both L.G. and 
R.I. spoke very bitterly of their critics. It 
was curious to observe that none of my guests 
showed any appreciation of the view that was 
taken by the general public, viz, that such 
dealings were indiscreet and unsuitable for 
members of the Government. The party fight 
enters so strongly into their minds that all 
other considerations are overshadowed. L.G. and 
R.I. were very attentive to Nicoll and evidently 
very anxious regarding the line he would take in
120 B.B.Gilbert, "David LLoyd George and the Great 
Marconi Scandal," Historical Research, Vol.LXII, No.149, 
October 1989, p.317.
121 1st May 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 
62972, in Gilbert, "Marconi Scandal," p.317.
122 20th March 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., 
Add.MS.62972, ff.60-61.
123 26th March 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 
62972, f.83.
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the "B.W." on Wednesday.124
The British Weekly accepted Lloyd George's official 
defence that he had made a modest provision for a rainy day 
recognising the transitory nature of political office; the 
explanation was "so simple, so frank, so human, [that it] 
blew the whole fabric of scandal into the air". It 
condemned the whole "discreditable and sickening" business 
as an attack on Lloyd George who had to bear the penalty of 
being a great and victorious reformer.125 Lloyd George 
wrote that he was deeply indebted to Nicoll for this 
powerful article, of which he was having a marked copy sent 
to every Member of Parliament. He added, "Your paper is 
read by those who form opinions on our side & that is why 
the article is so useful at this juncture".126
The Marconi controversy diverted much of Lloyd 
George's time and energy away from the Land campaign. 
Riddell warned him that the Marconi business would knock 
the party endwise if they were not careful. He suggested 
that what Lloyd George's people wanted were "some good 
tonicy articles in the press and suggested he should write 
to Robertson Nicoll which he said he would do..."127 Nicoll 
appears to have been particularly concerned that he should
124 30th March 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 
62972, ff.92-93.
125 British Weekly, 3rd April 1913.
126 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 3rd April 1913, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.65-66.
127 7th and 8th June 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., 
Add.MS. 62972, f.212.
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reproduce the official Lloyd George line during the whole 
Marconi episode. In June Riddell recorded: "He [Nicoll] 
asked me to prepare an article for him on the Marconi 
debate which commenced today. I promised to see L.G. and 
Rufus & get some points from them".128
The Land Campaign was not only hindered by Marconi.
It proved extremely difficult to give practical detail to 
Lloyd George's reforming rhetoric. The Government's poor 
showing in the by-elections in the summer made more urgent 
the need for a comprehensive policy. Defeats at Newmarket 
and Altrincham prompted the Solicitor General to declare in 
a speech in Oxford that the Liberals would reply with an 
advance in the Land Campaign. The British Weekly supported 
the announcement but wanted to see a proper declaration 
before it was anticipated in October. Again, the following 
month in the report of Lloyd George's speech at the 
National Liberal Club in the wake of the Marconi affair, 
the British Weekly stated plainly that, "What the people 
are hungering for is a bold and articulated land policy", 
and hoped that this would not be delayed until the 
Autumn.129 Having received a good reception at the 
National Liberal Club, Lloyd George was ready to put 
Marconi behind him and told Riddell:
I must get on with my Land Campaign. I shall give 
them hell. I think it will be well devised to 
meet the grievances, the terrible grievances 
which undoubtedly exist. Fix up that dinner with
128 19th June 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 
62972, £.236.
129 British Weekly, 6th June 1913, 3rd July 1913.
Robertson Nicoll so that we may have a good 
talk.130
Riddell had urged Lloyd George to issue a shilling 
book on the Land Campaign and the two were to meet with 
Nicoll to discuss it.131 At the beginning of July Lloyd 
George, Riddell, Masterman and Nicoll had dinner and 
considered the best method of presenting the Land 
Commission. It was agreed that ideally two books would be 
published: one at 5/- containing the report and evidence 
and the other at 1/- containing a summary and statement of 
cause. No doubt Nicoll was recalling the problems with the 
Insurance Bill when he strongly urged that the facts must 
be "absolutely accurate". Lloyd George stressed his 
determination to keep the Cabinet with him: "I shall not 
make the mistake wh Joe (Chamberlain) made of stating my 
scheme to the country before stating it to my colleagues. 
Had he acted otherwise, he might have avoided such 
opposition" .132
Lloyd George used the occasion of a garden party at 
Dulwich to criticise the Land Purchase scheme which had 
been put forward by Lord Lansdowne as a possible solution 
to the accepted land problem. The British Weekly could not 
so easily dismiss the Unionist's proposals. John Grigg has 
pointed to Lloyd George's evasion of the fact that the
276
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landowners were themselves prepared to seek reform as a 
central weakness of the Chancellor's polemics during the 
Land Campaign.133 In contrast the British Weekly feared 
that the Unionists would outflank Liberals by offering more 
comprehensive reform than the Government. "Rather than 
forfeit the labourers' vote [Unionists] will offer much 
more," it warned, "and we shall not be at all surprised if 
they formulate a scheme for a minimum wage". The British 
Weekly accepted that the Government was on firm ground when 
it attacked the riches of the landed class but feared that 
this in itself was not enough. It urged the Government to 
announce the details of its own land scheme along with 
support for a minimum wage.134 The British Weekly, although 
it claimed that it had long been an advocate of the minimum 
wage,135 was more emphatic about the political than the 
social advantages.
From 21st August until 11th September George Riddell 
(as "X") contributed a series of articles to the British 
Weekly under the heading "The New Campaign". In October 
Riddell wrote: "Dined with Robertson Nicoll who kindly 
complimented me on my 4 recent articles in the "British 
Weekly" on the land campaign. He asked me to continue to 
help him as the campaign developed which I agreed to do".136 
The articles dealt with issues such as minimum wages for
133
Add.MS
Grigg, Peace to War,
134 British Weekly,
135 British Weekly,
136 8th October 1913 
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agricultural workers, rating anomalies, land courts and 
rural housing. This laid some foundation for the Land 
Campaign which was officially launched by the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer with two speeches to predominantly Liberal 
crowds at Bedford on 11th October 1913.
The British Weekly informed its readers that Lloyd 
George had addressed "perfervid audiences" which exhibited 
unparalleled enthusiasm.137 In contrast the Times reported 
that, "Disappointment was undoubtedly the feeling of many, 
even of the selected Liberal delegates, who were present". 
Worse still was the account sent to Walter Runciman, 
Minister for Agriculture, which recorded that during Lloyd 
George's long speech, "the audience was almost bored; there 
was applause certainly but never very hearty,...There was 
no wild enthusiasm".138
It is therefore not surprising that George Riddell 
wrote to Nicoll (at the Chancellor's bidding) conveying 
Lloyd George's view that the British Weekly leader was the 
only one in which the true inwardness of the situation had 
been indicated and that it had been the best written of the 
speech.139 It is also not surprising as Riddell wrote the 
leader.140 He outlined briefly the Chancellor's proposals 
to deal with:
137 British Weekly, 16th October 1913.
138 Times, 13 October 1913, Arthur Gage to Walter 
Runciman, 12 October 1913, Runciman Papers, in Grigg, Peace 
to War, pp.94-95.
139 Riddell to Nicoll, 17th October 1913, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.66-67.
140 Riddell to Nicoll, 27th October 1913, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S. MS.15941, ff.68-69.
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(1) The wages of the agricultural labourer; (2)
The relations between landlord and tenant; (3)
Housing; (4) The holding up of land required for 
the adequate development of a district; (5) The 
anomalies of the rating system; (6) The 
improvement of land not now under cultivation; 
and (7) The revision of the railway rates as 
affecting the conveyance of agricultural produce.
One of the problems faced by the Land Campaign in its 
initial stages was the fact that the Government had not 
come to a comprehensive statement of policy. Riddell was 
somewhat hampered when it came to filling in the details of 
Lloyd George's Bedford speech and reduced it to the words: 
"His Majesty's Government beg to announce that they have 
determined to abolish the system of absolute and unfettered 
ownership of land".141
Nicoll was kept informed of the Land Campaign 
throughout October. On the 17th he was informed by Riddell 
that Lloyd George's forthcoming speech at Swindon would 
explain in detail the plan which had been determined upon 
by the Cabinet the previous day. It was suggested that 
Nicoll might like to mention this in the next issue of the 
British Weekly.142 On the 27th October Riddell wrote to 
Nicoll to say that all topics had been dealt with
exhaustively in the British Weekly with the exception of
141 British Weekly, 16th October 1913.
142 Riddell to Nicoll, 17th October 1913, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff.66-67. The British Weekly duly 
carried the information: "We believe - though we write in 
ignorance of Mr. Lloyd George's Wednesday speeches [due to be 
made in Swindon] - that the plans for ushering in the new 
conditions have been definitely settled by the Cabinet, and 
that the suggestions of the Land report will be carried in 
the main." British Weekly 23th October 1913.
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the system of settled estates.143 Three days later the 
newspaper carried a note on the subject which had been 
"ignored in the press".144
By the end of October the British Weekly could 
announce that the Government had decided to set up a 
Ministry of Land which would possess judicial powers and 
would control the relationship between landlord and 
tenant.145 The campaign limped along, supported by the 
British Weekly until February 1914 when the Chancellor was 
able to announce that the Government would use the system 
of rating site values. This announcement marked the point 
at which the Land Campaign was subsumed into the struggle 
over the 1914 Budget.146
Editorially the British Weekly had never been a 
vehicle for original economic thought. However the extent 
to which it accepted the official line of the Land Campaign 
showed a marked difference. Lloyd George through Riddell 
fed the British Weekly his official line which was relayed 
without much amendment to its readership.
The chronic lack of preparation in Lloyd George's last 
peace-time Budget once again left him open to criticism 
that his Finance and Revenue packages were littered with 
inconsistencies. Despite this and the lack-lustre way in 
which the Chancellor introduced his scantily considered
143 Riddell to Nicoll, 27th October 1913, Nicoll
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff .68-69.
144 British Weekly, 30th October 1913
145 British Weekly, 30th October 1913
146 Grigcr, Peace to War, p.100 .
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proposals, the British Weekly rallied to Lloyd George's 
side. It announced that the most effective evangelists of 
Socialism were luxurious motorcars: "they proclaim to the 
toiling multitudes the luxurious lives of the rich". This 
picked up the thread of Lloyd George's warning that the 
murmurs of insurrection were to be heard not just in Ulster 
but among millions of men in Britain who would revolt 
against their conditions unless those who led rich, opulent 
lives were prepared to make sacrifices to lift their fellow 
citizens out of their wretchedness.147 But the catalyst 
to social upheaval was to come from elsewhere.
vii. Conclusion:
Increasingly the British Weekly shared its long 
standing characteristics of the pulpit with those of the 
stump. The editor's disillusionment with the Liberal party 
was not conveyed through the pages of his newspaper. 
Warnings were given that the history of the party should 
not be one of single issue obstructionism but as before the 
British Weekly had no other realistic political home.
Nicoll remained a very conventional Free Churchman and 
while the Conservatives had too long been the enemy, the 
Labour party did not appeal because it did not have the 
moral correctiveness of middle class Liberalism.
Nicoll's social Radicalism was always of a practical 
political rather than emotional type. He accepted the 
minimum wage as expedient and even came to accept a limited 
form of female suffrage although he was instinctively
147 British Weekly, 14th May 1914.
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opposed to it. The People1s Budget had shown how
effectively and efficiently the British Weekly was capable 
of bringing the Government's message to the middle class.
In the years which followed its line was more and more 
directed by official Liberal policy.
The campaign to promote the Insurance Bill of 1911 
revealed how Nicoll - who had always seen the role of a 
newspaper as that of educator as well as entertainer - 
used his skills to propagandise for the Liberal party, 
having dropped the codicil that it would help the political 
cause of the Free Churches. The position of the British 
Weekly was even more prominent in the Land Campaign which 
followed. By this point Nicoll had become so far ensconced 
in the Lloyd George orbit that he had no criticism of the 
M.P. despite revelations of impropriety during the Marconi 
affair. In fact Nicoll had been compromised to such a 
degree that George Riddell did not differentiate between 
the editor, Lloyd George, Rufus Isaacs and Masterman when 
he observed of his guests, the "party fight enters so 
strongly into their minds that all other considerations are 
overshadowed" .148
The British Weekly was still working hard to 
strengthen Christianity in Britain and three quarters of 
the newspaper continued to address religious issues. But 
the content of its political material had changed 
considerably. Nicoll1s tolerance of the Catholic majority 
in Ireland also told of a change. In 1886 the British
148 26th March 1913, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add.MS. 
62972, f.83.
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Weekly had supported Home Rule out of a sense of loyalty to 
a Liberal party which provided a political vehicle for Free 
Churches. It then denounced the Irish alliance once it 
appeared as a long term obstacle to domestic reform. By 
1912 the British Weekly had moved full circle and was used 
as an advocate of official Liberal policy with no implicit 
promise of reward for Nonconformists. The outbreak of the 
First World War would put new pressures on the relationship 
between Nicoll and Lloyd George. It was a period when the 
editor's Nonconformity, Liberalism and patriotism were in 
heightened relief and were not always reconcilable.
CHAPTER SIX
THE FIRST WORLD WAR
2 83-A
The First World War created specific problems for 
Christian leaders. In order to abate the pacifist tendency 
in Church groups, leaders were called upon to justify the 
nation's cause and rally their flocks behind the
Government. However the subsequent horror of the conflict 
appeared to fly in the face of the very existence of God 
and ministers were then confronted with the task of proving 
that Christianity still had meaning amid the bloodshed and 
uncertainty. Nicoll accepted the importance of his role as 
a prominent Free Churchman and threw his weight behind the 
Government; but as an editor he had to combine this loyalty 
with a responsibility to ask questions about the State's 
handling of the war. This chapter examines the issues 
which were most important to Nicoll from 1914 to 1918. 
Therefore it gives more time to the Welsh Disestablishment 
Bill of 1915 and the battle over State Purchase of the 
drink traffic than to the ideological battles of party 
politics between Asquith and Lloyd George or the 
introduction of War Socialism.
i. A Just War:
At the end of July 1914 the British Weekly in line 
with other Liberal newspapers - led by the Manchester
Guardian and the Daily News - urged a policy of neutrality
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in the face of the apparent demand for war in the
Northcliffe press1:
No one understands better than Sir Edward Grey 
that under hardly any conceivable circumstances 
would public opinion allow this country to be 
dragged into an Austro-Servian war. The quarrel 
in no way concerns us and we are fortunately 
unbound by any engagements that would require us 
to intervene.2
His newspaper's position won for Nicoll the support of 
Ramsay MacDonald who complained of Grey's "diabolical and 
wicked speech" in the House on the 3rd August. "Up to last 
Thursday he [Grey] stood magnificent for peace," MacDonald 
wrote, "and then suddenly he seemed to lose his nerve and 
his temper and swung round, outdoing Churchill in his 
demands that the Cabinet should agree to war".3 On 29th 
July Nicoll had warned George Riddell of his intention to 
get the Free Churches to prepare a Memorial to the 
Government against intervention and supporting Russia. 
Within a week Riddell had another meeting with Nicoll in an 
attempt to explain "fully" the situation. Riddell 
recorded:
1 In fact the Westminster Gazette was the only Liberal 
newspaper not to promote a policy of non-intervention. M. & 
E.Brock, (edits.) H.H.Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley, 
Oxford 1985, p.142.
2 British Weekly. 30th July 1914.
3 MacDonald to Nicoll, 4th August 1914, in Koss, 
Nonconformity in Politics, p.128. Koss has written that 
MacDonald offered his support to a leading article which 
appeared on 31st July 1914. The piece, which was not a 
leader, appeared on the 30th July 1914.
285
Before I left he [Nicoll] told me that he thought 
that we had no alternative but to support France, 
and that we must all stand together and sink 
differences of opinion. I wrote a note to 
Masterman saying what Nicoll had told me and 
suggested that he show it to Lloyd George which 
he did to considerable effect..4
In the following issue of the British Weekly Nicoll 
himself represented, "the amazing change which took place 
in public opinion between Friday 1st July and Friday August 
7th".5 Once it had been made clear to him that the 
Government was committing itself to intervention Nicoll 
prepared for the battle. The editor explained his position 
to the British Weekly readership in a leader "United We
Stand":
To say "My country; right or wrong" is to 
renounce humanity and to defy God. Only one must 
be very certain of his ground if he sets himself 
to weaken and worry and discredit a Government 
that has been forced to arms in a deadly
struggle.6
Dr. John Clifford experienced a similar change of 
heart and revealed that he had, "actually drafted a letter 
to the Press in favour of...British neutrality..." on his
4 3rd August, McEwen, The Riddell Diaries, pp.87-88.
5 Riddell to Nicoll, 13th August 1914, Nicoll Papers, in 
Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.128. Riddell was reporting 
the view of Lloyd George.
6 British Weekly. 6th August 1914. In a letter to his 
wife Nicoll revealed few signs of ambivalence concerning the 
leader. He wrote; "I have never had a more busy and anxious 
week. I have sent you the first two copies of the B.W. and I 
think you will like the leader. We are in for it and must 
tighten our belts." Nicoll to Catherine Robertson Nicoll 5th 
August 1914, in C. Robertson Nicoll, Under the Bay Tree, 
London 1935.
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way home from a trip abroad, "...But when, arriving in 
England, he had become acquainted with Germany's proposals 
and actions, he had [decided] to keep the letter back". 
Clifford was fortified by the knowledge that the British 
had been forced into war.7
It was important that Nonconformist leaders explain 
their conversion from a traditional position of peace and 
disarmament. They had to find a tone which would excite 
Free Churchmen into loyalty to the Government without 
alienating those who found it difficult to countenance war. 
In her "Woman's World" column on 6th August Jane Stoddart 
reflected the editor's message elsewhere in the British 
Weekly. She recognised that most women wanted peace but 
given that the decision had been taken Stoddart urged women 
to echo the words of the captain in a great storm, all the 
night crying to the man at the helm, "steady, steady, 
steady".
Throughout this issue the British Weekly carried the 
residual language of neutrality. It reported the sermon of 
the London Congregationalist Dr. Campbell Morgan which had 
been delivered the Sunday before war had been declared. He 
spoke of those who wanted war as the "accursed of the human 
kind". A letter to the editor - dated 3rd August - from a 
Manse in Gunnersbury moved that people everywhere should
7 Christian World, 20th August 1914, in Koss, 
Nonconformity in Politics, p.129.
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demand that England keep herself isolated from the war 
movements.8
In the controlled medium of the British Weekly Nicoll 
affected the wrestling of the collective Nonconformist 
conscience over the question of the rightness of the war.
A series of leaders appeared throughout the autumn of 1914 
which confronted the problem of reconciling the Biblical 
message of peace with a European war waged against fellow 
Christians. In his leaders, "The Christian Community and 
the War" and "The Churches and the War" Nicoll attempted to 
convey the message that those who partook in war could 
still be witnesses of Christ while reminding readers that 
Germans too had been created in God's image.9
At the end of August the War Office asked Nicoll to 
write the appeal to Free Churchmen.10 This "Appeal to 
Young Nonconformists" appeared in a large number of daily 
newspapers and was later printed in the pamphlet "Set Down 
My Name Sir".11 The reuse of the reference to "Pilgrim's 
Progress" echoed Nicoll's campaign for recruits in the 
cause of passive resistance and suggested that once again 
the Free Church conscience was being outraged: religious 
men must fight the enemy of liberty and democracy. Nicoll
8 British Weekly. 6th August 1914.
9 British Weekly, 13th August 1914. By 28th January 1915 
however the British Weekly endorsed the view that the "War 
Book" issued by the German General Staff - which taught the 
German army that the ends justified any means - embodied the 
very essence of Antichrist.
10 Nicoll to Catherine Robertson Nicoll, 2nd September 
1914, C.R.Nicoll, Under the Bay Tree, p.250.
11 Darlow, op.cit., p.240.
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called for Nonconformist support - in the name of the Free 
Church fathers of the past and the children of the future - 
in the war against the German Emperor revealed "as a tyrant 
whose whole life [had] been a lie".12 In this first year 
of the war the British Weekly campaigned hard for voluntary 
recruits arguing that the war was not a time for
stupefaction or depression but a time calling men to their 
posts. "If the voluntary effort fails," Nicoll warned, 
"then there must be a need for conscription, but that we 
hope and believe is needless".13 In mid October the writer 
Coulson Kernahan wrote thanking Nicoll for his war and 
recruiting articles which rendered a great service to the 
nation.14 The following month the British Weekly leader 
"More Men and Still More Men" reasserted its belief that 
conscription was alien to the genius of the people but 
feared that it would be necessary: "We hate Conscription. 
But we hate defeat infinitely more".15 Tentative 
apologetics for conscription were carried alongside calls 
for the reorganisation of the Recruiting Department.16 
Nicoll (through Riddell) attempted to ascertain Lloyd 
George's views as to a further article criticising the War
12 Set Down My Name Sir, London 1914, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
13 British Weekly, 3rd September 1914.
14 Coulson Kernahan to Nicoll, 13th October 1914, Nicoll 
Papers, Lumsden.
15 British Weekly, 12th November 1914.
16 British Weekly, 12 November 1914, 19th November 1914.
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Office's arrangements for recruiting but received little 
information.17
The British Weekly disparaged Church leaders who felt 
unable to join in the war effort and offered words of 
comfort and understanding to those whose ministers appeared 
to shy away from the real world.18 This hostility 
attempted to defeat even silent opposition to the fighting. 
Biblical justification of pacifism had to be rationalised 
away. The British Weekly dismissed literal interpretations 
of the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill" or the Sermon on 
the Mount's message that, "whosoever smite thee on the 
right cheek turn to him the other also".19 Denney and D.C. 
Lathbury added their weight to the side of the 
righteousness of the war. In leaders written for the 
British Weekly both attempted to depict the face of Christ 
in the midst of the conflict. According to Denney it was 
the nation's immediate duty to stake everything in defence 
of its own freedom and of the very elements of justice and 
international relations. He accepted that patriotism had a 
place so long as it was subordinated to the Kingdom of 
God.20 Lathbury argued that Christianity - which had 
always recognised the case for a righteous war - existed in 
a variety of nations and cultures and therefore accepted 
within its pale the process of national settlement; which
17 22nd November 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add 
MS.62974, ff.254-5.
18 British Weekly, 22nd October 1914.
19 British Weekly, 22nd October 1914.
20 "The War and the National Conscience" by James Denney, 
in the British Weekly, 20th August 1914.
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is war: "Christianity took the world as it found it and did 
its best to make it better. But it did so in its own 
way,...by transforming individuals, not communities".21
At the "great dissenting recruiting meeting" at the 
City Temple on 10th November, Nicoll asserted that, "if we 
had not been Christians we should not have been in this 
war. It is Christ who has taught us to fight for liberty, 
righteousness and Peace".22 Nicoll was echoing an address 
he had delivered just over a week before in which he
declared that:
The love of Liberty, the abhorrence of tyranny, 
the care for the rights of other nations, the 
sacred obligations of honour, would have had no 
power to move us to battle had it not been for 
the spirit of Christ within us.23
The meeting which Nicoll chaired on 10th November was an 
important bid to rally the Free Churches behind the war 
effort. It had been arranged that Clifford chair the 
proceedings but Lloyd George opposed this in favour of 
Nicoll with the argument that the Baptist element would be 
too strong. Riddell construed this to mean that Lloyd 
George did not want to speak after Clifford who would start 
the meeting on too high a key. "Nicoll on the contrary 
would say something striking and appropriate but in a low 
tone which would not spoil the effect for L.G...," Riddell
21 D.C.Lathbury, "Christianity and the War," British 
Weekly, 15th October 1914.
22 British Weekly, 12th November 1914.
23 From an address delivered at the City Temple, 30th 
October 1914, in the British Weekly, 5th November 1914.
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pondered, "he [Lloyd George] is very clever in managing 
these things. He has thought out all the tricks of the 
oratorical trade even down to the setting in which the 
chief performer should appear".24
Nonconformist opinion on the war was not monolithic 
despite the efforts of Lloyd George and Free Church 
leaders. In December Riddell recorded that Nicoll was, 
"very broken about the war and too excited...he [Nicoll] 
said that he had been at a Free Church meeting...and 
that... some of the dissenting ministers [were] still peace- 
at-any-price people. 'Varmits' he [Nicoll] called them". 
Nicoll's sympathy was with militant Free Churchmen; but for 
the intervention of Stoddart and Riddell the editor was 
willing to insert in the British Weekly a story which urged 
the nation to pray for the destruction of Germany. It was 
left to the more secular Riddell to reinforce Stoddart's 
protestations with the observation that, "a religious 
newspaper should not accentuate the asperities of the 
situation" .25
Lloyd George's posthumous tribute that, "had it not 
been for Nicoll's attitude, the Free Churches might have 
taken a different line, and the whole course of the war 
might have been altered,"26 greatly exaggerates Nicoll's 
influence, but the remark is a reminder that the Free
24 28th October 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L. , Add MS.
62974, ff.213-214.
25 1st December 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L. , Add MS.
62974, f .-263.
26 6th Mav 1923, G.Riddell, An Intimate Diarv of the
Peace Conference and After, 1918-1923, London 1933, p.406.
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Churches were very vulnerable to schism. In December 1914 
Riddell wrote:
It is obvious that there is a peace party on the 
move in the Liberal camp. I told L.G. that many 
of the dissenting ministers were pacifists. This 
had been ascertained by sending copies of L.G.'s 
City Temple speech to various chapels for 
distribution. Some of the dissenting parsons, 
mostly Baptists, had replied that they could not 
distribute the copies. L.G. asked me to obtain 
these replies so that he might read them and 
consider what steps should be taken to alter the 
opinion of the writers.27
Despite the flimsy nature of the research, the 
suggestion that certain community leaders were ambivalent 
about the war had to be taken seriously. The following 
March the National Free Church Council supported a motion 
which was an attempt to alienate the smallest number; "Our 
duty is to render such service to the nation as the war 
demands; to maintain the Christian attitude in the national 
life; to combat the tendency to militarism".28 In 1916 
Nicoll felt able to admit to his readership the danger at 
the war's outset that the Free Churches would not stand 
united. The editor congratulated Nonconformity on its rock 
like stand, "Her resistance to the interpretations and the 
arguments of Pacifism has been absolute".29
Christianity may have been mobilised behind the war 
effort but the carnage posed a deeper problem for religious 
faith. In 1915 the Principal of the Yorkshire United
27 5th December 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 
62974, f.267.
28 British Weekly, 11th March 1915.
29 British Weekly. 2nd November 1916.
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Independent College recognised that the "outlook on the 
Universe and on God [had] suddenly darkened;... the pillars 
of faith for many of us lie prone and shattered on the 
ground". The challenge to the Church was to make itself 
relevant at a time when it appeared that the war "had 
suddenly confronted Man with himself, not as the child of 
God, but as the offspring of the Devil".30
This was a common theme in religious writing during 
the war. The British Weekly wrote:
The war is searching our religion and testing our 
faith to its core...We no longer treat this as 
the best of all possible worlds,...We have left 
debating whether the devil exists, now that we 
are faced with an apocalypse of naked devilry.31
This awareness on the part of religious leaders that 
the war would have a devastating effect on Christianity did 
not protect them from the confusion of its aftermath. The 
militarism of the British Weekly left it implicated in the 
destructiveness of the war effort and left much of its 
Christian stoicism sounding hollow. The Liberal party also 
had to convert itself to cope with the conflict and it too 
discovered that much of its pre-war essence had been eroded 
by the emergency. The British Weekly supported fully an 
interventionist approach on behalf of the Government and 
became dislocated from the debate over the true nature of 
liberalism. When it did attempt to recreate its liberal 
persona in the post-war world much of the language sounded
30 E. Griffith-Jones, The Challenge of Christianity to 
a World at War, London 1915, p.xii, p.xv.
31 British Weekly, 2nd September 1915.
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more convenient than passionate. Lloyd George had lost 
credibility as a Liberal and the British Weekly was heavily 
defined by its association with him.
ii• The Quest for Information:
Nicoll was determined to bury party politics 
underneath the war effort. In 1915 he wrote:
I have no politics now. I am concerned only with 
ending the War. I can see that when the War is 
over parties will arrange themselves on a new 
basis. For example I should be in strong favour 
of a heavy tariff on German Goods.32
Unlike Radical editors such as Gardiner who 
interpreted the national good in terms of defence of 
liberal democratic values, Nicoll generally saw victory as 
an end in itself. Nevertheless there were issues raised by 
the war on which the British Weekly felt bound to take a 
stand opposite to that of the Government. Almost 
immediately tension developed over the availability of 
information and the freedom of the press. On 20th November 
1914 George Riddell recorded in his diary:
32 Nicoll to Professor A.E.Taylor of St.Andrews, [3rd] 
May 1915, Darlow, op.cit., p.244. Therefore Nicoll was 
comfortable with the Paris Resolutions of the following year 
which, among other things, agreed upon trade discrimination 
against Germany after the war: a policy pushed through by the 
business element within the Conservative party. J.Turner, 
British Politics and the Great War: conflict and coalition
1915-1918, New Haven, 1992, p.86.
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The Defence of the Realm Acts are being
consolidated. The drastic and unique provisions 
of this legislation have not attracted the 
attention they deserve. The legislation has 
taken place so rapidly that the measures have not 
been properly discussed. The press have been 
singularly ill-informed and lacking in criticism 
regarding a law which wipes out Magna Carta, the 
Bill of Rights, etc, in a few lines. [..]33
Before the second reading of the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Bill, Lord Robert Cecil raised similar 
concerns in Parliament. He drew attention particularly to 
paragraph (c) of Clause 1 which gave the Government power 
to "prevent the spread of reports likely to cause 
disaffection, or alarm". Cecil suggested that 
interpretation of these words was extremely wide and 
therefore open to abuse.34
Bonar Law expressed concern that the Act could be used 
to prosecute critics of the Government. He asserted that 
it was the right of every Member of Parliament and every 
newspaper in the country to expose the incompetence of any 
Minister even though this may cause a weakening in the 
confidence of the Government.35 In this he highlighted a 
problem which confronted all patriotic editors.
33 20th November 1914, McEwen, The Riddell Diaries, p.95.
34 23rd November 1914, in The Parliamentary Debates 
(Official Report) Fifth Series - Vol.LXVIII, col.910. In the 
final Act the wording was altered so that the Government had 
power, "to prevent the spread of false reports or reports 
likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere 
with the success of His Majesty's forces by land or sea or to 
prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers." In 
The Public and General Acts, Chapter 8, London 1916.
35 23rd November 1914, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.LVIII, 
col.919.
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The Second Reading of the Defence of the Realm 
Consolidation Bill also underlined the extent to which the 
war put pressure on Liberal supporters as well as the 
Opposition. In Parliament Bonar Law voiced a general
concern:
that the Government should not ask for greater 
powers than are necessary, and that they should 
be most careful to show by their speeches, as 
well as by their acts, that they recognise the 
limitation of the powers which are given to them, 
and that they do not intend to interfere in any 
shape or form with legitimate criticism.35 6
On the eve of the Bill's Royal Assent the British 
Weekly was heavily critical of the Government's decision to 
suppress criticism and certain information which included 
recruiting figures. The British Weekly declared that the 
Fourth Estate would not "cower beneath the pretensions of 
censorship" and reminded the Government that people wanted 
to be governed by honesty and truth.37 Even Lloyd George 
admitted to reservations about the power incorporated in 
D.O.R.A. Riddell recorded the Chancellor's feeling that 
this type of legislation was, "very dangerous and
subversive of the best British traditions..."38
Control of information was an integral part of the 
broader struggle and the Press Bureau and Foreign Office 
News Department were set up in the early stages of the war. 
From the outset Nicoll was accepted as belonging to that
35 23rd November 1914, Parliamentary Debates, Vol.LXVIII,
col.920.
37 British Weekly, 26th November 1914.
38 28th November 1914, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.96.
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group of London editors which wielded most influence. A 
month after the war began he was among fifteen such editors 
invited to meet with Masterman to discuss the "doings of 
the Press Bureau".39
In general the British government found it easier to 
be a censor than a propagandist. Dissatisfaction with 
official handling of war news was compounded both by 
journalists' resentment of governmental restrictions and by 
their belief that newspapermen better understood the 
communication media.40 Individual members of the Cabinet - 
most notably Lloyd George - had experience of cooperation 
with the Fourth Estate but the War Office machinery proved 
cumbersome when it came to the administration of 
information. In January 1915 both Riddell and Northcliffe 
supported the idea of inviting a party of French 
journalists to England. It was agreed that the assistance 
of the War Office was essential.41 Northcliffe wrote:
I am quite sure you will not be able to overcome 
the War Office. Judging from what I have seen 
during my second visit to the war, they do not 
know what they are up against. They certainly 
have no knowledge of diplomacy, either in the 
handling of the French or the Americans...
The people who did not see the war coming have 
apparently only just realized that trouble with 
America is coming, and, eventually trouble with 
France.42
39 8th September 1914, C.R.Nicoll, Under the Bay Tree, 
p.251.
40 Koss, Political Press, p.679.
41 Riddell to Northcliffe, 8th January 1915, Northcliffe 
Papers, British Library, Add MS.62173, f.42.
42 Northcliffe to Riddell, 14th January 1915, Northcliffe 
Papers, B.L., Add MS.62173, f.43.
298
Conversely the Government held the view that the Press 
was unaware of the gravity of the situation. Asquith 
described an assembly of 25 editors of London's leading 
newspapers as "a cohort of possible mischief-makers".43 
Lloyd George reportedly considered that, "the papers [were] 
either badly informed or that wilfully they [misled] the 
public in order to keep up their courage... and that...it 
[was] harmful to present things in an unduly optimistic 
way". He met with Riddell and Nicoll to discuss the matter 
at the end of February 1915.44 In March Riddell laid 
before Sir Reginald Brade his view that the authorities had 
a responsibility to represent both sides of Britain's 
performance in the war otherwise the country would fail to 
pull together with a sufficient sense of emergency.45 A 
meeting of the politicians and the Press took place on 1st 
April and it was decided that closer, official links should 
be established between the Press and the War Office and 
that the former should guard against engendering false 
optimism.46 *
43 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 1st April 1915, Brock, 
Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.526.
44 20th February 1915, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 
62975, f.83.
45 17th March 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.102. The 
British Weekly appeared to support the view that the Press 
Bureau - and not the Press - was responsible for the 
concealment of grave facts, the disclosure of which would 
have done much to strengthen public determination. British 
weekly, 8th April 1915.
46 1st April 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.104. Also 
Asquith Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.526 . Ridde11 was 
appointed the representative of the Newspaper Proprietors' 
Association on the 9th April 1915.
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Northcliffe wrote to Riddell on 20th April with the 
view that the Government needed to get, "really 
distinguished writers to make the war what it is - a matter 
of life or death to the nation". He suggested that Britain 
should follow the example of Germany and that,
"responsible, fully accredited writers, artists, 
photographers and cinematograph operators, under the 
guidance of some officer and proper censorship" should be 
allowed to spend time with Britain's various armies.47 The 
problem remained however as to what constituted "proper 
censorship". In October 1914 Arnold White had warned in 
the conservative Daily Express, "If we emerge successfully 
fhom this war, but under the yoke of a vigorous censorship 
of opinion, we shall only have exchanged the haunting 
menace of Potsdam for the very tyranny against which Milton 
protested in 1644".48
Nicoll used the discourse of freedom but had no 
tolerance for those who would not support the war. Within 
the framework of the "war effort" was the duty of
politicians and journalists to divulge information which 
might lead to alarm or criticism of the Government. The 
British Weekly was a firm advocate of the notion that, "if 
a democracy is to act promptly and wisely it must know the 
truth".49 In September 1915, frustrated by a Government 
which seemed to lack decisive, forward action, the British
47 Northcliffe to Riddell, 20th April 1915, Northcliffe 
Papers, B.L., Add MS.62173, ff.44-45.
48 Daily Express, 13th October 1914, in Koss, Political 
Press, p.680.
49 British Weekly, 8th July 1915.
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Weekly declared, "We want to know the facts, and we want it 
so much that the craving must be granted".50
The following month the question of press freedom 
adopted greater urgency. The two week suppression of the 
Globe (for reporting that Kitchener had resigned due to a 
conflict with his nonmilitary colleagues) was roundly 
condemned with the British Weekly echoing the general view 
that there were other newspapers more ripe for punishment. 
Nicoll1s journal defended the press's handling of the war 
but contended that journalistic criticism of the Press 
Bureau was universal. The British Weekly's warning that 
the liberties of the press had been won "very hardly" and 
if taken away would have very serious consequences, had 
gained new significance by the following issue when the 
Lord Chancellor hinted at further restrictive measures.
The British Weekly declared the moment hardly less critical 
than the fateful hour in 1852 when the French press was 
placed under the servitude of Napoleon III.51 Nicoll 
defended journalists' right to criticise the Government but 
wanted to see this done in a constructive way. The British 
Weekly was a strong critic of newspapers which issued
50 British Weekly, 23rd September 1915. The week before 
Denney had written to Nicoll, "I fancy the Germans know quite 
well all that the Government does not tell us, and the one 
thing which commands my unequivocal sympathy in the confusion 
is the demand for more information. Things that are not told 
will always be thought of outside as things too bad to tell, 
or things that it is someone's interest to hide." Letters of 
Denney to Nicoll, p.251.
51 British Weekly, 11th November 1915, 18th November
1915.
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personal attacks on politicians or journalists.52 It drew 
attention to the fact that every journal had criticised the 
Coalition Government at certain points and much of the 
criticism had done good. Nevertheless the British Weekly 
warned that criticism must be fair and patriotic and all 
should be underlined with the knowledge that there was no 
alternative to the existing Government.53
In March 1917 the cost of the British Weekly was 
increased to 2d due to the increase in the price of paper. 
The readership was also warned that further increases were 
almost certain and that supplies of paper may cease 
altogether.54 The following week Nicoll wrote of the 
groundless rumours in Fleet Street that the Government 
intended to put a complete arrest on the manufacture of 
paper thus destroying the whole fabric of journalism.55 
Nevertheless the problem of paper supply persisted and a 
year later Nicoll floated the idea that newspapers agree to 
suspend printing one day a week to save paper.56
In March 1917 Riddell had written to Walter Runciman 
pointing to the fact that the paper makers were entitled to 
no sympathy. "During the war they have made larger profits 
than they have made for years," he concluded, "whereas the 
newspapers have been badly hit and are likely to suffer
52 British Weekly,
53 British Weekly,
54 British Weekly,
55 British Weekly,
56 British Weekly,
4th November 1915.
18th November 1915.
8th March 1917.
15th March 1917.
14th March 1918.
302
more as the war progresses".57 The following year a 
statement sent to the War Cabinet on behalf of the 
Newspaper Confederation warned that the trade faced a 
serious crisis in the year commencing March 1918. Paper 
making materials had been reduced by 30% of pre war imports 
to 350,000 tons, of this 145,000 were required by the 
Government. The Cabinet was reminded that it relied on the 
Press Bureau to print an enormous amount of material 
concerning Naval and Military operations, official 
communiques, correspondents' dispatches and special 
articles as well as notices concerning recruiting, food 
supplies, Government loans and a host of other subjects.58 *
This sense of sacrifice compounded the self image of 
journalists as public servants. It also underlined the 
extent to which newspapers saw themselves as central to the 
war effort, not only as the channel of information between 
the Government and the nation but also as the custodian of
the national interest.
iii. Munitions and Men:
It was important that newspapers make their readership 
feel secure in their views during the war. This was a 
further limit on the ability of editors to criticise the
57 Copy of letter from Riddell to Runciman, 24th March 
1917, Northcliffe Papers, B.L., Add MS.62173, ff.73-74.
58 Statement submitted for the consideration of the War
Cabinet by the Newspaper Confederation representing the 
London and Provincial Press. Northcliffe Papers, B.L., Add 
Ms.62173, ff.93-96.
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Government without appearing to be unpatriotic.
Nevertheless by 1915 there was a growing concern that 
Asquith's administration was not handling the war 
efficiently: specifically with regard to munitions and army 
recruits. The Prime Minister's position had been 
compromised by his declaration at Newcastle in April 1915 
that there was no truth in reports that the Allies were 
being crippled by munitions shortages. Nicoll, who was 
"much annoyed" by the speech, was "disgusted with his 
[Asquith's] management of affairs."59 The British Weekly 
suggested that Asquith's assurances did not seem, "quite in 
harmony with Lord Kitchener's recent statement, that the 
lack of munitions of war was causing him the gravest 
anxiety" .60
The creation of the Coalition Government in May - 
which followed on Fisher's resignation and grew out of 
Unionist discontent - appeared to offer some hope to those 
who had been "furiously impatient with whatever retards or 
deflects the onward march of the fight".61 The British 
Weekly called for drastic and decided action regarding the 
registration of all those medically fit, the supply of 
munitions, liquor interests and press censorship which 
should be strong and impartial.62 Nicoll later defended
59 21st April, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.108. Nicoll was 
also angry with Asquith's stand on the Drink question as 
revealed at Newcastle, Darlow, op.cit., p.250.
60 British Weekly,
61 British Weekly,
62 British Weekly,
22nd April 1915. 
27th May 1915. 
27th May 1915.
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Lloyd George to a correspondent arguing that he had no 
intention of taking Asquith's place:
What he [Lloyd George] has thought, and what I 
have thought, almost from the beginning is that 
the War is not carried out with foresight and 
with push. Asquith seems to have no control over 
the varied departments and to seek no control.63
Lloyd George's appointment as Minister of Munitions 
pleased his supporters but the structure of the new 
Government remained inhibitive to dramatic change. 
Lathbury had a typical view:
I don't altogether like the Coalition Cabinet, 
but, as we must all put up with it, liking does 
not much matter. What I wanted was a small 
Cabinet - The half dozen men on each side. Now,
I suppose, the "Inner Cabinet" system will be 
more in vogue than ever. But this must, I fear, 
lead to a waste of Cabinet time, for I suppose 
the humbled member must have the decisions of the 
Inner Cabinet explained to him...64
The sinking of the Lusitania in May further fuelled calls 
for a form of compulsory service. The Morning Post, the 
Daily Express, the Globe, the Daily Mail and the Times all 
demanded conscription.65 The British Weekly recognised 
that the decisive attack on the Lusitania added to reports 
of the use of poison gas and the treatment of British 
prisoners had led to a change of mood in the country which 
demanded that the whole strength of the nation be given
63 Nicoll to J.D.Jones, 22nd October 1915, Darlow, 
op.cit., p.250.
64 Lathbury to Nicoll, 3rd June 1915, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
65 Koss , Political Press, p . 714 .
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over to the war.66 The political crisis prompted Garvin - 
whose newspaper broke the story of the coalition - and 
Northcliffe to attempt to push the newly formed Government 
into relieving Kitchener of power. Northcliffe' s unsubtle 
denunciation of Kitchener in the Daily Mail on 21st May had 
the perverse effect of rallying the nation to the side of 
the latter and discrediting Northcliffe.67
The British Weekly joined in the general affirmation 
of support for Kitchener, refuting critics who claimed that 
he had failed to supply enough high explosives.68
Correspondence between Nicoll and Northcliffe revealed that 
the former agreed with much that had been said in the Daily 
Mail but believed that personal attacks on war leaders were 
apt to produce sympathy for those attacked. Northcliffe 
defended his position revealing that he had taken personal 
responsibility for the campaign against Kitchener, "knowing 
that I should incur great unpopularity and be placing 
myself in a most difficult position. On 7th June Nicoll 
replied in concessionary spirit, "I have had much
conversation with Mr Lloyd George. He said that every word 
you wrote was absolutely correct. Also that you had 
performed and are performing an eminent service to the 
country. He told me a number of stories about the War 
Office which made my blood run cold".69
66 British Weekly, 20th May 1915.
67 Koss, Political Press, p . 716 .
68 British Weekly, 27th May 1915.
69 R.Pound and G.Harmsworth, Northcliffe, London 1959, 
p.481.
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In a meeting with Nicoll Lloyd George had given a 
"most depressing account,...including a statement by the PM 
to the effect that [British] trenches were inadequate and 
not to be compared with those of the French Army". He also 
suggested to Nicoll that his new position as Minister of 
Munitions would not automatically lead the way to more 
efficient handling of the crisis. "Before accepting the 
position of Munitions Minister he [Lloyd George] had 
stipulated certain conditions which had not been
performed," Riddell recorded, "and...he asked [Nicoll's] 
advice whether he should resign if they were not 
fulfilled". Nicoll's affirmative reply seemed to Riddell 
unwise.70
In response to Lloyd George's dissatisfaction 
regarding his authority and the inadequate nature of the 
British trenches, the British Weekly carried a strongly 
worded leader on 10th June. In "The Next Three Months"
Nicoll stressed the short supply of munitions and warned 
that, "whatever may be imagined about the ferocity of their 
[Germany's] attack will in all probability come true". The 
British Weekly supported Lloyd George's view that
production could only be increased if industry was
subjected to militaristic organisation and urged that the 
Minister of Munitions should be given a free hand to carry 
out the necessary changes. "If Mr. Lloyd George finds he 
is hopelessly hampered by conditions imposed upon him by 
the Government, or more likely by the House of Commons,"
70 9th June 1915, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62976, 
ff.17-18.
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the British Weekly declared, "he will and should refuse to 
go on".71 Riddell judged the article "injudicious" and 
suspected that Lloyd George had encouraged Nicoll to write 
a piece which "would strengthen his [Lloyd George's] hands 
with his colleagues and which would be quoted in other 
papers".72 Lloyd George declined to accept responsibility 
for inspiring the article but "coloured slightly" when 
confronted by Riddell.73 The British Weekly remained 
unrepentant in the following weeks. Indeed it stated that 
many letters had assured the editor that his leader had 
done something to clear the air.74
The most critical issue for the Coalition 
remained army recruits. The urgency with which the 
Government campaigned for volunteers carried with it the 
need to defend the voluntary principle. Conscription 
appeared to represent the ultimate betrayal of Liberalism. 
Nicoll's selective broadmindedness allowed him to approach 
the question of national service without attendant Liberal 
angst. By the end of the summer it seemed clear to Lord 
Milner that certain elements in the press, "like the Daily
71 British Weekly, 10th June 1915.
72 9th June 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.122.
73 10th June 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.122.
74 British Weekly, 17th June 1915. On 19th June Riddell 
wrote: "McKenna spoke of Nicoll's article, wh he said had 
done L.G. much injury amongst his friends in the 
Cabinet....The Chief thinks Nicoll's article most unfortunate 
and prejudicial to L.G. Nicoll says he has received hundreds 
of letters and telegrams approving his action. The writers 
are mostly Bishops and persons of that type, whose view is 
now the true one, so Nicoll says! He who has been treating 
them with contempt all his life. Now they agree with him, 
their opinion is of value and importance!" 19th June 1915, 
Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62976, f.34.
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News, the Daily Chronicle, the Nation, & the Star have 
thrown themselves furiously into the anti-Northcliffe 
agitation with the obvious intention of using the 
unpopularity of Northcliffe to damage the cause of national 
service".75 Nicoll's position was ambiguous. Despite the 
editor's apparent agreement with Northcliffe the British 
Weekly would not condemn Kitchener.76 It occupied the 
middle ground with Garvin and Strachey on the question of a 
national register - compiled by the heads of each community 
- of men who were medically fit.77
Correspondence between Nicoll and D.C.Lathbury 
throughout June revealed that both accepted the need for 
national service, with the view that legislation bringing 
in universal service - military and industrial - was 
absolutely necessary.78 Lathbury however complained that 
Northcliffe was "enough to bring any nation to
ruin...[running] all his scares for his own ends".
Lathbury expressed a view similar to the line of the 
British Weekly:
...a good few Liberals seem to me insane on 
compulsory service. I am not on the whole fond,
75 Memorandum by Milner, 29th August 1915, Milner Papers, 
in Koss, Political Press, p.722.
76 In November rumours of Kitchener's resignation led the 
British Weekly to restate its support for the war leader. It 
contended that popular respect for Kitchener had grown from 
his unceasing labours; prescience; love for the Army; and 
brotherly friendship with France. British Weekly, 11th 
November 1915.
77 British Weekly, 27th May 1915.
78 Lathbury to Nicoll, 3rd June 1915, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
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in the midst of a war, unless recruiting 
evidently fails, which I still hope it will not.
But the objection about liberty is like a sick 
man objecting to an operation after it has been 
proved necessary.79
The following month Nicoll was prompted into 
reiterating his position on conscription by the 
correspondence of the Secretary of the Association of 
Lancashire and Cheshire Baptist Churches. The Rev. Hector 
V. Thomas wrote to refute the (mistaken) impression that 
the British Weekly, as an advocate of conscription 
represented the view of Nonconformists. Nicoll replied 
that he had over and over again deprecated conscription, 
but with the view that "in the last peril of the nation's 
life, recourse to it might be a necessity... I have 
steadfastly opposed conscription as contrary to the genius 
of the British people and unneeded at this time".80 The 
British Weekly applauded the Government's "very wise and 
popular step" in deciding to enrol all persons between the 
ages of fifteen and sixty-five and supported the 
appointment of Lord Derby as Director-General of 
Recruiting. Both represented the last bid of the voluntary 
principle.81
The failure of a significant number of single men to 
attest to the Government forced Asquith to honour his 
pledge and introduce a degree of compulsion. The British
79 Lathbury to Nicoll, 20th June 1915, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
80 British Weekly, 8th July 1915.
81 British Weekly, 1st July 1915, 7th October 1915.
Weekly responded with Christian stoicism by reminding those 
soldiers called at such a glorious hour that they were 
helping to carry the cross of Jesus Christ.82 In the same 
issue Jane Stoddart attacked Dr. Clifford's New Year's 
Address at Westbourne Park which repeated his aversion to 
increased militarism. In an very uncharacteristically 
harsh report she accused those, like Clifford and Campbell 
Morgan who opposed conscription, of fastening Germany's 
rule upon Britain. Clifford's contention that English 
factories were supplying shells for several other allied 
countries was derided as "dangerous nonsense".83
The following month the British Weekly railed even 
further against its radical past with its controversial 
leader, "Work for Lord Northcliffe". The premise of 
Nicoll's argument was that the owner of the Times and Daily 
Mail should be harnessed to the side of the Government, 
giving him a vested interest in offering only constructive 
criticism. The British Weekly suggested that Northcliffe 
become Air Minister but concluded, "we do not much care 
what service Lord Northcliffe undertakes. What we are sure 
of is that, for his sake and for the sake of the country, 
he ought to be in service".84
Despite a high proportion of readers writing to 
support the proposition, Nicoll's kite was "generally 
regarded with ridicule". Lloyd George feared that the 
British Weekly editor had made "a grave error in starting
82 British Weekly, 6th January 1916.
83 British Weekly, 61 h J anuary 1916.
84 British Weekly, 10th February 1916.
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the idea that N[orthcliffe] should be bought off with a 
seat in the Cabinet".85 Riddell's derision belied the fact 
that in many circles Northcliffe was seen as a possible 
Cabinet member.86 By the end of 1916 the Star led with an 
article which argued that "The fatal mistake made by Mr. 
Asquith was that he neither fought Lord Northcliffe nor 
used him. He ignored him".87 Indeed Lloyd George offered 
the newspaper baron the position of Air Minister in 
November 1917 and Northcliffe finally agreed to join the 
Government the following year as Director of the Ministry 
of Propaganda.88 Nevertheless its claim, at the end of 
1916, that the British Weekly had always been on the 
Radical side and continued to be so89, seemed hollow 
alongside a defence of Northcliffe's campaigns against 
Governmental bungling and its attack on the Daily News as
85 11th February 1916, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, pp.lie-
ill.
86 Pound and Harmsworth, Northcliffe, p.498.
87 British Weekly, 14th December 1916.
88 Clarke, T., Mv Northcliffe Diary, London 1931, p.115. 
Nicoll was not deterred from his view and on 14th September 
1916 wrote to a correspondent, "...if Lord Northcliffe had 
been appointed to the Air Ministry we should have had no fear 
of Zeppelins." Darlow, op.cit., p.257.
Nicoll's publisher Ernest Hodder-Williams sided with 
Northcliffe in May 1918 over the Press Bureau's decision to 
stop the publication of Desperate Germany - a compilation of 
Daily Mail articles. The ban prompted Hodder Williams to 
write to Northcliffe offering support for publication without 
the Press Bureau's permission. This support was readily 
agreed and it was left to Nicoll to advise against issuing 
the book, "in face of such a strong appeal from Lord Newton." 
Hodder Williams to Northcliffe, 8th May 1918, Add MS.62174, 
f.175, Northcliffe to Hodder-Williams, 8th May 1918, Add 
MS.62174, f.177, Hodder-Williams to Northcliffe, 14th May
1918, Northcliffe Papers, B.L., Add MS. 62174, f.180.
89 British Weekly. 14th December 1916.
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the worst offender against all the laws of decent
j ournalism.
Despite his unpredictable responses Nicoll was much 
courted by M.Ps. April 1916 presented one of several 
occasions when Lloyd George consulted Nicoll about the 
possibility of resignation. Riddell and C.P. Scott were 
also present and the consensus emerged that Lloyd George 
should resign if he felt the war was being inefficiently 
conducted and resignation was a possible remedy. Nicoll 
and Scott reportedly advised, "You [Lloyd George] must 
remain in the House of Commons and form, not an opposition, 
but a party of criticism".90 In the same month Riddell 
wrote that Fisher was evidently "doing his utmost to 
capture Nicoll, and I doubt whether he has not succeeded in 
weakening Nicoll7s strong partisanship for Lloyd 
George".91 Montagu had also been attempting to 
"cultivate" Nicoll without much success. This was in part 
due to Nicoll's anti-Semitism. Nicoll described Montagu 
as a "cynical self-seeking Jew, devoid of personal charm". 
He also "made some caustic observations" on Venetia 
Stanley, calling her a female Judas.92
In June 1916 Lloyd George was offered the position of 
Secretary of State for War and he called Nicoll, Addison 
and Riddell to discuss whether he should accept the
90 13th April 1916, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, 0.151.
91 13th April 1916, Riddell Diaries, B.L. , Add MS.62977,
f .104.
92 2nd August 1916, Riddell Diaries, B.L. , Add MS.62978,
f.46. In August 1915 Churchill had also expressed interest 
in meeting Nicoll to try to generate some effective 
criticism. McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.128.
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position or resign and form an opposition with Carson. 
Nicoll was absolutely certain that Lloyd George should 
accept the office: "Do not haggle about powers. You will 
later get all the powers you want. Your appointment to the 
War Office will hearten the country and the Allies...If you 
refuse you will occasion consternation and dismay. I 
implore you to accept the P.M.'s offer".93
By the end of December 1916 it was Asquith's position 
which had become untenable and under pressure from Lloyd 
George, Bonar Law and Carson he was effectively usurped.
The broader concern over the failure to open up a 
successful Eastern Front was transferred onto the 
determination to reform the specific and real
administrative problem of the War Committee.94 The
British Weekly welcomed the new Government and, while 
conceding the greatest respect for Asquith, admitted that 
it had long remarked his fatal want of decision: "In short, 
our policy needed a bold, resolute and powerful hand, and 
we believe that that hand has been found and set to
work" .95
iv. Laissez-faire in War Time:
The lack of sentimentality which the British Weekly
showed over the Liberal principle of voluntary recruitment
93 15th June 1916, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62977, 
f.184.
94 A.Marwick, The Deluge: British society and the First 
World War, London 1989, (1st published 1965), p.182.
95 British Weekly, 14th December 1916.
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was extended to other areas of state intervention during 
the war. Free Trade was an early casualty and was not 
mourned in the columns of Nicoll’s newspaper. In February
1915 it wrote:
The Government, by prohibiting new investments 
of capital in foreign countries, and only 
allowing them on conditions even in the King’s 
dominions, has made everyone see that there is 
one thing in the world at least which is beyond 
price, and to which all savings if need be must 
be sacrificed - the life and independence of 
the State.96
In September McKenna’s supplementary War Budget made the 
first real intrusion on laissez-faire, imposing duties on 
imported cars, motor-cycles, films, clocks, watches and 
musical instruments. The British Weekly was only 
disappointed that it did not go further by putting a tax on 
spirits and declared it "The greatest Budget in the history 
of the British Empire".97 More typically of the British 
Weekly's editorial line was W.R.N.’s "War Note" of 1916 
which recognised that the Free Trade policy must be 
modified by the war experience, but which did not put 
forward its own specific proposals for how this should be 
accomplished.98 As in peace time, Chiozza Money (who wrote 
his column "Social Questions" until Dec.1916) was left to
do much of the social soul-searching on the British
96 British Weekly, 4th February 1915.
97 British Weekly. 23rd September 1915.
90 British Weeklyr 5th October 1916.
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behalf. Through his column, Money pilloried land-lords for 
raising the rents of poor people during the war and called 
on the Government to maintain its support of the peace-time 
infrastructures: specifically education." In general he 
was not saying anything which was not being echoed in the 
Radical press.
Chiozza Money's main campaign was on behalf of greater 
governmental intervention: control of production, 
distribution and exchange. By February 1915 it was 
accepted that in the previous twelve months the price of 
flour had risen by 75%, home meat by 6%, imported meat by 
12% and sugar by 72%.99 100 In May Money wrote urging the 
Government to end its attachment to laissez-faire:
If the war lasts for three years, and the policy 
of "laissez-faire" is continued, then we may 
expect to see bread at more than a shilling. It 
is the duty of the Government to consider all 
these things on a very large scale... There is 
only one way for the Government to end these 
misfortunes, and that is to take things in hand 
and to control trading interests in the public 
interest.101
The following year fear of famine became more acute in 
Britain and caught the imagination of the British Weekly. 
Consequently the newspaper as a whole threw its support 
behind the greater control of food. The threat of 
starvation was also used to encourage support for stricter 
liquor legislation. Money expressed his dissatisfaction at 
the Food Report which was published in October 1916 and
99 British Weekly, 13th May 1915, 29th July 1915.
100 Marwick, The Deluge, p . 42 .
101 British Weekly, 2 0th May 1915.
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supported the Minority view that the Government should take 
control of the purchasing of meat and bacon.102 When the 
Government finally took control of the supply of wheat, 
Money (in the only reference in the British Weekly) pressed 
Runciman at the Board of Trade to take control of meat, 
dairy produce, margarine, feeding stuffs and manure for 
farmers, tea and shipping, warning: "The supplies of these 
islands have lost their old safety, and our statesmen have 
a grave responsibility in these matters".103
The British Weekly expressed great satisfaction at the 
appointment of Lord Devonport as Food Controller in 
November 1916. It had no reservations about the extensive 
powers of the "most essential man in the Empire" who was 
empowered to take actions against anyone wasting food; 
proscribe the purpose for which any article may or may not 
be used; introduce a standard bread; deal with the mode of 
sale and distribution of articles and fix prices where 
possible. In his signed "War Notes" Nicoll gave his 
complete support to these changes and indeed urged Runciman 
to go further by bringing in State control of shipping and 
appointing a "Food Dictator" who would look into control of 
agricultural produce.104 Therefore the British Weekly was 
not surprisingly supportive of rationing and indeed in 1917 
Nicoll wanted the Government to extend voluntary rationing 
schemes to all food-stuffs rather than simply bread, in
102 British Weekly,
103 British Weekly,
12th October 1916.
19th October 1916.
104 British Weekly, 2 3rd November, 3 0th November 1916.
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order to be fair to the poor.105 Nicoll was not as 
radical as Chiozza Money in his support for State control 
and as late as July 1917 he wrote:
We have not the smallest faith in the proposal to 
call in the State to sell bread at a lower price 
than it can be manufactured at. The end we are 
aiming at should be reached by the suppression of 
profiteering, and that must be tried first.106
The British Weekly took little interest in the battle 
between workers and government during the war and reported 
dispassionately on the talks between Lloyd George and the 
workers on the Clyde in March 1915.107 It supported the 
Munitions Bill of that year which suspended trade union 
rules and gave the Munitions Department the power to 
declare any munitions factory a "controlled establishment" 
In a runaway piece which owed as much to Nicoll's habit of 
dictating large sections of the newspaper as to his 
distance from the working class, the British Weekly warned 
that if Germany won the war the British working classes 
would be "reduced to the position of slaves, toiling under 
conditions far more terrible than those of the negroes 
described in Uncle Tom's Cabin".108
Alongside this warning to the British worker was the 
realization that the capitalists must also give up their
105 British Weekly,
106 British Weekly,
107 British Weekly,
108 British Weekly
3rd May 1917. 
12th July 1917.
4th March 1915.
1st July 1915.
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rights of profit to the State.109 Chiozza Money was much 
more vocal on this matter than Nicoll and warned of the 
dangers of the worker perceiving the war as a capitalist 
conspiracy. However Money did over emphasise the extent to 
which industrialists had been disadvantaged by government 
legislation, writing that the liberty of the capitalist had 
been far more restricted by the Munitions Act than the 
liberty of the worker.110
In general however the British Weekly was not 
preoccupied with the issues of distribution and exchange 
unless they involved the drink traffic. The remarkable 
aspect of the British Weekly's war was the extent to which 
it maintained its Free Church agenda.
v. The Welsh Church Postponement Bill:
There were perceptible differences between Nicoll and
the main body of Free Church leaders. In 1914 Riddell had
observed:
L.G. Nicoll and Illingworth are the dissenters' 
heros, but they are not really as in sympathy 
with them as they are with me...Nicoll is a dear, 
kind creature, a lover of freedom and democracy, 
but he is too broadminded and the same applies to 
L.G. The Campbells and Cliffords have a kind of 
inkling of the differences between themselves and
109 British Weekly, 1st July 1915.
110 British Weekly. 20th January 1916.
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Illingworth & Co. but they don't like to probe 
too deep.111
However Nicoll was always easily roused when 
Nonconformists appeared to be ignored or threatened. So it 
was, in the midst of war, Nicoll battled fiercely with the 
Government over its Bill in 1915 to postpone any attempt to 
disendow the Church in Wales until six months after the war 
had ended. The Bill was to be passed with bipartisan 
support on the understanding that should the Opposition be 
in power at this time they would not prevent the Bill 
coming into effect. McKenna failed to consult the Welsh 
Nonconformist M.P.s and was therefore charged with
colluding with the enemy and once again riding rough shod 
over traditional Liberal supporters.112 Nicoll dined with 
Riddell on 10th March and was recorded as:
furious at what he describes as the Government 
betrayal of the Dissenters over the Welsh Church 
Bill - the operation of which it is proposed to 
postpone by agreement. Nicoll vows that the 
Dissenters will not rest under this injustice.
He begged me to convey this to Lloyd George.113
111 10th November 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add 
MS.62974, ff.237-9.
112 Even Asquith conceded the Nonconformists' grievance.
He wrote to Venetia Stanley, " ...As you know, I have never 
loved them [Welsh Free Churchmen] but there is no doubt that 
they have a real grievance in the way they have been 
mishandled. They believe (not altogether without reason) that 
they have been both flouted and hoodwinked by McK. . . " 12
March 1915, Brock, Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, 
p.474.
113 10th March 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.102.
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The following day the British Weekly announced that it 
was the duty of Welsh representatives and Welsh people to 
promote unrelenting opposition to the Disestablishment 
Bill. It challenged the Government to bring in such a 
measure with the help of Tory votes at the price of moral 
defeat with far reaching consequences.114
Asquith and Lloyd George had to employ their powers 
of diplomacy to appease both the Established and Free 
Church sections in the Commons. When the Welsh Church Act 
was being debated in Cabinet in August 1914, Asquith 
recorded that "not for the first (or perhaps the last) time 
I was able to devise a form of face-saving words wh. 
pleased everybody..."115 On 12th March 1915 Asquith was 
visited by Robert Cecil who tried to restrict the actions 
of the Government with the claim of "breach of faith". 
Asquith pondered that if "he [Cecil] makes more of his foul 
attacks it will have the incidental effect of angering the 
Welsh & perhaps making them more tractable".116 It had 
become, as Lloyd George observed, "a horrible mess".117
On 15th March, in Asquith's view, the Government had 
manoeuvred its way through the Welsh Church impasse in the 
Commons. Lloyd George made a powerful speech in the House 
in an attempt to appease his fellow Welshmen who later met
114 British Weekly, 11th March 1915.
115 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 10th August 1914, Brock, 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.163.
116 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 12 March 1915, Brock, 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.477.
117 Lloyd George to Riddell, 13 March 1915, McEwen, 
Riddell Diaries, p.102.
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with the Prime Minister, his Chancellor and Home Secretary. 
Asquith wrote sardonically to Venetia Stanley, "I hope & 
believe they have gone back to their mountains & vales with 
the fear of God in their consciences: and a certain 
apprehension of fiery vengeance, if they don't 'toe the 
line'...of reason and common sense".118
Lloyd George knew Welsh Nonconformity better than to 
believe it could be so easily intimidated. He wrote a 
lengthy letter to Nicoll on 16th in a bid to win the editor 
over with reason, veiled threats and flattery, "know[ing] 
what an influence [Nicoll1s] articles exert upon 
Nonconformist opinion". Lloyd George recognised that non­
consultation with Nonconformists had been, "an unpardonable 
offence as well as a blunder" and asserted that both he and 
the Prime Minister had been under the impression that the 
Free Churches had actually assented to the principle of the 
Bill before the Government entered into an arrangement with 
the Opposition. The Chancellor also argued that the Bill 
would in fact make repeal impossible and therefore it 
marked the end of religious inequality in Wales.
Lloyd George laid stress on the fact that the 
controversy was taking place during war time and urged 
Nicoll to avoid a struggle which would weaken the power of 
the Ministry at a most critical moment. He also warned 
that the war may dismantle support for religious 
controversies:
118 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 15 March 1915, Brock, 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.481.
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For the first time there is an atmosphere of 
settlement about the question, and it is a 
settlement on exceedingly cheap terms for 
Nonconformity. It would be a cardinal mistake 
for Welsh Nonconformity to destroy this hopeful 
position. One never knows what a general- 
election will bring forth, but at the post-bellum 
election the country will be concerned with 
reconstruction, and they will be impatient of the 
obtrusion of stale issues. Therefore Party 
leaders would be anxious to rule out questions 
which the public will view with distaste.
Whatever anyone may say the people of England 
will regard this as a closing of the controversy, 
and they will be angry with anyone that (sic) 
opens it.119
McKenna also began a correspondence with Nicoll 
concerning the Bill. The editor declined an invitation by 
the Home Secretary, saying to Riddell, "I am not going to 
run after Ministers. I want nothing from them. If they 
want to see me let them come to me".120 Despite attempts at 
conciliation the British Weekly carried a leader two days 
later which relied on out-dated rhetoric. It declared that 
no settlement was possible without radical changes to the 
Bill and once again reminded the Liberal party that they 
owed their power to Nonconformist support. The British 
Weekly warned Liberals that they could not present 
themselves as the lesser of two evils indefinitely and 
hinted that the patience which the Free Churches had shown
119 Lloyd George to Nicoll, 16th March 1915, Nicoll 
Papers, N.L.S., MS.15941, ff76-78.
120 17th March 1915, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62975, 
f .110.
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over the Government's failure to pass an Education Bill was 
not inexhaustible.121
This indignation lasted only a week and in the 
following issue the British weekly announced its decision 
to withhold further comment on the Disestablishment 
"compromise" following McKenna's letter to the North 
Monmouthshire Liberal Association. The Home Secretary 
stated categorically that, "As a condition of the 
postponement [the Government] has a binding agreement that 
the ecclesiastical corporations shall be dissolved and
national endowments transferred to the Welsh
Commissioners".122 Equally significant in altering the 
viewpoint of the British Weekly were the letters to its 
editor from McKenna. On 31st March Riddell wrote:
Dined with Robertson Nicoll who said he had 
altogether some six letters from McKenna 
regarding the Welsh Disestablishment Postponement 
Bill in which he said he had received guarantees 
from the Tories that no attempt would be made to 
upset the Disestablishment Bill and that any 
change would be limited to a comparatively small 
100,000. He also said that he, McKenna, could 
assure him on his word of honour that he had not 
been responsible for the neglect to consult the 
Welsh members.123
At the beginning of April J. Hugh Edwards contributed a 
piece to the British Weekly on the Disestablishment Bill 
which was an attempt to pull the strings of the debate
121 British Weekly, 18th March 1915.
122 British Weekly, 25th March 1915.
123 3 1st March 1915, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62975,
f.121.
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together. Despite Nicoll's private assurances that the 
Welsh Free Churches would not again be overlooked, he had 
been "bombarded with letters" from Dissenters furious at 
the Welsh Bill.124 Edwards noted that Nonconformists had 
spoken with striking unanimity but was tardy in his 
continued assertion that the Government's arrangement with 
the Opposition exposed the Welsh Church Act to the gravest 
of risks.125 Both Nicoll and Edwards negotiated the fine 
line between hostility towards the Government and a desire 
to absolve individuals from blame. Despite the boast of 
political Nonconformists that the Government relied upon 
their support it would have extremely foolish to alienate 
McKenna or Lloyd George - men who traditionally championed 
the cause of the Free Churches.126 On announcing its 
moratorium, the British Weekly made it clear that McKenna 
was not responsible for the misunderstanding which led to 
the Welsh Members not being consulted.127 Furthermore 
Edwards stated that no one believed that Lloyd George had
124 7th April 1915, Riddell Diaries, B. L., Add MS.62975, 
f .139.
125 British Weekly, 8th April 1915.
126 On 10th August 1914, Asquith wrote to Venetia 
Stanley; "We had a long & rather critical Cabinet this 
morning: the main question being (as I told you) what I was 
to say on the Adjournment about the Home Rule & Welsh Church
Bills.... McKenna & LI.George (quite properly & with good
temper) took up the Nationalist & Welsh cudgels..." in 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, op.cit., p.163.
127 British Weekly, 2 5 th March 1915. In private however 
Nicoll called him "McKenna the mis-manager." 7th April 1915, 
Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62975, f.139.
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bartered away the interests of his Nonconformist
countrymen.128
Nicoll was very good at making a lot of noise about 
Free Church issues. It was a way of reminding the 
Government that Nonconformists still represented a cohesive 
force and warning that their consciences could not be 
ignored. However the illusion of political homogeneity had 
become increasingly slender as class became a more 
important definer of cultural background than religion. 
Nicoll had no real response to Lloyd George's pragmatism. 
Although conscience was not whimsical the Free Churches 
could not be seen to undermine the Government at such a 
moment. Furthermore, as Lloyd George had stated, Welsh 
Disestablishment was now guaranteed.
vi. The Liquor Trade:
Lloyd George came into more bitter conflict with the 
Free Churches over his plans to purchase the liquor trade 
on behalf of the state. Four months before the outbreak of 
war the Times had published a letter from the secretary of 
the U.K. Alliance which revealed that in 1913 the British 
population had spent as much on spirits as they had on the
128 British Weekly, 8th April 1915, Edwards did qualify 
this statement with the fear that in his desire to 
subordinate sectarian interests to the supreme need of the 
country in the time of war, Lloyd George had forgotten that 
he was dealing with the astutest of ecclesiastical diplomats.
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Navy.129 Once the war was underway this indulgence was 
attacked more severely. The British Weekly protested that 
wartime supporters of temperance reform were not all 
peacetime puritans but it remained true that traditionally 
the Free Churches had moral and political interests in 
curbing alcohol consumption.130
Within the context of the war the "Drink Problem" 
became part of the broader question of munitions supply. 
Once Lloyd George had decided that excessive alcohol 
consumption was no less than a "peril to [Britain's] 
armies" he began the process of "stir[ring] up public 
opinion on the subject...with a view to making strong 
action possible".131 In February 1915 the Chancellor told 
an audience at Bangor in Wales that Drink was doing more 
damage in the War than all the German submarines put 
together.132 On 8th March Denney wrote to Nicoll of 
Scotland's support for drastic action on the use of liquor 
during the war, prompting: "If you can do anything - as I 
am sure you can do much - to promote so good an object, you 
will earn the gratitude of everyone who loves his
129 British Weekly, 16th April 1914.
130 At the end of November Lloyd George intended to send 
Kitchener a British Weekly leader regarding drink in the 
camps. But he thought it would be best to send the leader 
only, "as if Kitchener saw that the British Weekly was a 
religious paper, perhaps he would take no notice of it." 22nd 
November 1914, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS.62974, ff.254-5.
131 D. Lloyd George, War Memoirs Vol.I, London 193 8, 
p.193 .
132 Ibid. , p. 194 .
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country".133 Three days later the British Weekly carried a 
leader which pointed to Russia's example of sobriety and 
urged the Government to pass similar measures which could 
be repealed when the war ended.134 But the British Weekly's 
hopes for prohibitionist legislation were far removed from 
the scheme of State Purchase being concocted by Lloyd 
George.
On 25th March Asquith revealed to Venetia Stanley that 
Lloyd George was:
for the moment red-hot with a plan, or rather an 
idea, for nationalising the drink trade!...I 
warned him to go warily: a State monopoly in 
drink would I think be a most dangerous thing 
politically. But I am for surveying the ground, 
particularly on the lines of compensation and 
public control. The professional temperance lot -
Leif Jones & Co - wd. be aghast if they knew 
that anything of the kind was on the stocks.135
At the end of March both the King and Kitchener 
pledged to abstain from alcohol during the course of the 
war but self denial was not generally infectious. On the 
29th Lloyd George met a deputation from the Shipbuilding 
Employers' Federation which put forward the case for total 
prohibition during the course of the war. It was argued 
that days lost in vital industries due to the effects of
133 Denney to Nicoll, 8th March 1915, Letters of Denney 
to Nicoll, p.246.
134 British Weekly. 11th March 1915. The following day 
Denney wrote to Nicoll: "I was delighted to read your 
pronouncement on drinking... it could not have been more 
effectively done, nor put on a more unimpeachable ground, and 
I am sure all right-minded people are grateful to you..." 
Letters of Denney to Nicoll, pp.246-7.
135 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 25th March 1915, 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, pp.508-509.
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alcohol were helping to undermine the war effort. In reply 
Lloyd George asserted that success in the war had become 
purely a question of munitions.136 This type of language 
did more than stir up public opinion, it rendered 
indefensible Governmental inactivity on the drink question. 
Indeed when the National Government was formed at the end 
of May the British Weekly remarked characteristically that 
the Liberal Ministry had worked well up to a point but it 
had incorporated certain weaknesses - and it was its 
failure to deal with the Drink question which had first 
awakened the public's profound misgivings.137
Asquith's correspondence with Venetia Stanley revealed 
his concern that Lloyd George had "completely lost his 
head" over the question of drink: "His mind apparently 
oscillates from hour to hour between the two poles of 
absurdity: cutting off all drink from the working man, wh. 
wd. lead to something like a universal strike; and buying 
out (at this moment of all others) the whole liquor trade 
of the country, and replacing it by a huge State 
monopoly..."138 Lloyd George maintained in private his view 
that drink was responsible for munitions shortages.
Although he did not favour prohibition he thought the 
threat would make the trade a lot easier to deal with.139
136 Lloyd George, War Memoirs, pp. 194-195.
137 British Weekly, 27th May 1915.
138 Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 31st March 1915, Brock, 
Asquith's Letters to Venetia Stanley, p.525.
139 2nd April 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.104.
329
The public declaration of Lloyd George's proposed 
scheme of State Purchase prompted the British Weekly to 
declare its support for total prohibition, revising its 
former acceptance of a ban only on spirits. The 
Chancellor's plan of obtaining the drink traffic for the 
nation was viewed as not least a cumbersome response to an 
immediate problem. Nicoll's readership was reminded that 
Kitchener reportedly needed nine times as many munitions as 
were being supplied.140 The point had been conceded by 
Lloyd George before the British Weekly went to print. 
Conversation with the Chancellor prompted Riddell to 
conclude that the "wild cat scheme" was dead.141
The verdict was premature. At the beginning of 1917 
State Purchase was resuscitated and the threat was greater 
because its advocate was now Prime Minister. Denney had 
written to Nicoll on Christmas day 1916 of his conviction 
that a Government which did not have the moral courage to 
end the evil of alcohol consumption would not have the 
strength to win the war.142 The Prohibitionists threw 
themselves into the battle against State Purchase with 
Clifford setting the tone at his New Year's Address, "We 
drink one battleship and one aeroplane a week. Is the 
brewer actually going to keep us from winning this war?"143 
The British Weekly became a platform for those who would
140 British Weekly, 22nd April 1915.
141 18th April 1915, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.107.
142 Denney to Nicoll, 25th December 1916, Letters of 
Denney to Nicoll, pp.259-60.
143 British Weekly, 4th January 1917.
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not concede State Purchase as a temporary compromise for 
total prohibition. Denney contributed two leaders shortly 
before his death.144 He wrote to Nicoll:
This is a thing about which I feel very 
strongly, and I have written as I feel. The 
lapse of the Spectator and the Westminster 
fills me with dismay, and I am truly glad you 
are sticking to your guns. The need for 
prohibition is as urgent as ever...145
Throughout March and April articles in the British 
Weekly by Rev. J.H. Shakespeare, J. Duncan Millar, M.P. and 
Henry Randall used crusading language to prepare support 
for the meetings of the London campaign in May which 
culminated on the 19th at the Albert Hall.146
At the end of February Lloyd George wrote to the 
President of the National Free Church Council, Rev. J.H. 
Shakespeare, asking, "help in securing the fullest possible 
co-operation of all members of the Free Churches in 
carrying forward the great national campaign for economy 
and increased production".147 The following week the 
British Weekly further dramatised the food crisis by ,
declaring that Lloyd George had hinted in the Commons at 
the possibility of an approaching famine. While noting 
that Lloyd George had to keep the Government together, the 
British Weekly felt persuaded that the moment the Prime
144 British Weekly, 18th January and 15th February 1917.
145 Denney to Nicol, 14th January 1917, Letters of, .Denney 
to Nigel1/ p.26o.
146 British Weekly, 18th January, 15th February, 22nd 
February, 29th March, 26th April, 10th May 1917.
147 British,.Weekly, 22nd February 1917.
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Minister saw, "the Violent Spectre of famine...he will take 
his courage in both hands, and, acting in the name of the 
nation, prohibit all traffic in strong drink till the end 
of the war".148
The strength of Nicoll's coverage encouraged the 
Liberal M.P.s Duncan Millar and Hugh Edwards to approach 
the editor in a bid to co-operate in the battle. Millar 
contacted Nicoll on 10th March with congratulations and a 
suggestion that they meet.149 By the end of the month he 
had contributed a leader to the British Weekly on "The
Government and State Purchase".150 Millar also
contributed articles on the solid temperance campaign in 
Scotland which was manifest in a "huge demonstration in the 
Usher Hall...[at which] the new Principal of the Edinburgh 
University was nearly hissed down when he advocated State 
Purchase".151 Towards the end of July Millar also began 
his weekly "Temperance Notes" which derived their style 
from W.R.N.'s "War Notes".152
In February Nicoll had written to James Moffatt:
As to the Liquor Traffic there is no doubt that 
the Prime Minister is with the State Purchase 
people. But I still think that when the demands 
of the Trade become articulate they will be 
rejected...I believe that when the English-and 
Scottish voters realize that they are to spend
148 British Weekly, 1st March 1917 .
149 Millar to Nicoll, 10th March 1917, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
150 British Weekly, 2 9th March 1917.
151 Millar to Nicoll, 7th April, 4th April 1917, Nicoll 
Papers, Lumsden.
152 British Weekly, 19th July 1917.
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£150,000,000 in purchasing the existing stock of 
whisky, besides all other charges, they will 
shrink back. But there is no question that the 
Trade have complete power over the present 
Government. In fact, the Administration reeks of 
alcohol...It ought in fairness to L.G. to be 
remembered that he has always been in favour of 
some liquor scheme, but as he sketched it out it 
was very different from the scheme before the 
Cabinet today.153
These sentiments were echoed very clearly in the 
British Weekly "War Notes'* in the following edition.154 
Stephen Koss observed that Nicoll was torn between his 
devotion to Lloyd George and his natural aversion to State 
Purchase. "His distress was intensified," Koss wrote, "by 
the extent to which others banked on him to press their 
cause".155 156But despite attempts to temper criticism of 
Lloyd George in the British Weekly, in private Nicoll 
showed no ambivalence. On 1st April Riddell told Lloyd 
George of Nonconformist bitterness over the proposed State 
Purchase of the liquor trade. "Robertson Nicoll, Dr. 
Clifford and others are vowing vengeance", he warned, 
"Nicoll compared you on Wednesday to Judas Iscariot!"155 
Lloyd George was nevertheless convinced that Prohibition 
was impossible because it would irritate the working 
classes. Riddell, who admitted that he did not like Lloyd 
George's State Purchase scheme, consoled the Minister with
153 Nicoll to Moffatt, 31 March 1917, in Darlow, op.cit. 
p.262 .
154 British Weekly, 5th April 1917.
155 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.137.
156 1st April 1917, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.187.
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the view that many Prohibitionists were "very fond of their 
champagne. They want prohibition for other people".157
Lloyd George's meeting with advocates of Prohibition 
and State Purchase in April 1917 did nothing to appease 
traditional Nonconformist opinion. Nicoll conceded regret 
that the Prime Minister should appear such an enemy of a 
total ban and a representative at the meeting described 
surprise at Lloyd George's "imperfectly concealed contempt 
of Prohibition". The British Weekly offered lamely the 
belief that the Prime Minister was acting from the highest 
motives.158
Lloyd George met with Nicoll on 17th April to discuss 
the issue which appeared to consume the editor. Mrs Nicoll 
has recorded that her husband returned from lunch with the 
Prime Minister, Lord Milner and Lord St. Davids "very 
silent and tired and serious". Lloyd George told his 
guests that, "W.R.N. was among his greatest friends. He 
had pledged himself to nothing yet. He thought that State 
Control would be a better management than the present 
control... Finally, he said he would decide nothing without 
first consulting W.R.N. again".159
157 1st April 1917, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62978, 
ff.61. This was no doubt a reference to Nicoll as the editor 
was no abstainer. Riddell had recorded in his diary a story 
told of Nicoll going to address a big meeting: "Afterwards 
the Committee had high tea but Nicoll was discovered at his 
hotel with a small bottle of champagne and a biscuit. No 
high tea for him." 10th November 1914, Riddell Diaries, 
B.L., Add MS. 62974, ff.238-9.
158 British Weekly, 12th Apri 1 1917.
159 Darlow, op.cit., p.264.
The following week Nicoll received communications from 
the Liberal M.P. Hugh Edwards who regarded it "as a 
pleasure and a privilege to be of service". He enclosed 
extracts from Lloyd George's speeches on the Licensing Bill 
with specific references to fundamental principles.160 
Edwards had written to Nicoll three days before with the 
testimony:
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Every week I am addressing meetings in various 
parts of the country and on every hand I hear 
expressions of warm gratitude for the splendid 
stand which the "British Weekly" is making 
against State Purchase. If the project is 
defeated, it will be a great personal thing for 
you.161
Millar also kept Nicoll informed as to the proceedings in
the House. He sent the editor an article on Bread versus
Beer which might be published, "at a time when the food 
question has assumed the most serious character". Millar 
volunteered that it was intended to raise the matter in the
House at the earliest possible date and promised to let 
Nicoll know the result of the Scottish Members' meeting to 
discuss the Liquor Traffic.162
When Riddell dined with Lloyd George at the beginning 
of June the Prime Minister spoke much of Nicoll's attitude 
in the British Weekly. Riddell wrote:
160
Lumsden,
Edwards to Nicoll, 24th April 1917, Nicoll Papers,
161
Lumsden.
Edwards to Nicoll, 21st April 1917, Nicoll Papers,
162 Millar to Nicoll, 24th April 1917 , Nicoll Papers,
Lumsden
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L.G. will not bring himself to believe that 
Nicoll is strongly opposed to this scheme [State 
Purchase] for logical and business reasons. He 
ascribes N's attitude to war strain and a desire 
to take a course which will be popular with his 
readers. The latter consideration no doubt 
weighs strongly with Nicoll. The old boy is 
however very determined and very angry with 
L.G.163
The British Weekly warned Lloyd George before a visit 
to Scotland that some of his former supporters would feel 
forced to stay away because of his commitment to State 
Purchase.164 On 19th July Riddell recorded:
Robertson Nicoll is vehement against LG on state 
purchase of the liquor trade. He prophesies that 
this scheme will alienate many of LG's oldest and 
best friends and perhaps bring the Government 
down. He says that LG has reached his zenith and 
that he will now decline. He charges LG with 
treachery in regard to the drink business.165
Alienation from traditional Radical and Nonconformist 
support left Lloyd George politically isolated. He 
accepted Riddell's summation, "You have no party, no 
organisation, and no coterie of supporters. You stand 
almost alone".166 Nicoll was also struck by the hostility 
of "the McKenna-Runciman faction who forgather[ed] in the 
Reform Club". The editor's dislike of Runciman far 
outreached his anger at Lloyd George and nudged him to 
reconsider his antagonism towards his old champion. No 
doubt Nicoll was also aware of the increased opportunity
163 9th June 1917, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62979, 
ff.101-2.
164 British Weekly, 2 8th June 1917.
165 19th July 1917, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.192.
166 21st October 1917, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.202.
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for influence if the Free Churches joined the ever
decreasing band of Lloyd George supporters. Agreement over 
the control of liquor traffic presented itself as a 
possible means of Lloyd George showing his good faith. 
Nicoll remarked to Riddell upon the desirability of the 
reunion of Lloyd George with Dissenters which could be 
facilitated by the dropping of State Purchase. On hearing 
this the Prime Minister "avowed that he was now paying no 
attention to [State Purchase], as he had other things to 
attend to . . . "167
Nicoll's reading of Lloyd George's political situation 
was reaffirmed in other correspondence. To Canon Deane he
wrote:
I have moved down to the Reform Club since the 
year began and have had a dreadful time. Many of 
the important politicians are there, and are very 
communicative. They belong exclusively, so far 
as I can find, either to the Asquithians or the 
Pacifists. What unites them is a common hatred 
of Lloyd George, which is simply maniacal and for 
which it is not easy to account, especially when 
taken with the fact that his friends are very 
lukewarm.168
In April he wrote to Lathbury of his alarm about Lloyd 
George, "Everybody is bashing his head, regardless of the 
fact that they have no substitute for him...I have moved to 
the Reform Club. . .The air is filled with hatred".169
167 2 7th January 1918, McEwen, Riddell Diaries, p.214.
158 Nicoll to Deane, 23rd February 1918, in Darlow, 
op.cit., p.271.
169 Nicoll to Lathbury, April 1918, Darlow, op.cit., 
p.272.
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Nicoll's reassociation with Lloyd George was 
facilitated by the recognition, at the beginning of March, 
that State Purchase was no longer being considered by the 
Government. The British Weekly revealed the news with
"solemn thankfulness" and admitted that "few controversies 
we have ever engaged in have cost us so much pain".170 In 
the same month Nicoll told a correspondent that the Prime 
Minister had sent for him and told him that "State Purchase 
was dead".171 Lloyd George asked Riddell's advice regarding 
an invitation to speak at a Free Church meeting. Riddell 
was strongly in favour: "The Dissenters are your strongest 
supporters. Some of them suspect you just now. If you 
were to speak at this meeting it would revive the old 
alliance". It was resolved that Nicoll's advice should be 
sought.172 The rehabilitation of the Prime Minister's 
reputation had already begun through Nicoll's private and 
public efforts. Norman Maclean, from St.Cuthbert's Parish 
Church in Edinburgh wrote to express his deepest gratitude 
at Nicoll's tireless battle for prohibition:
I must confess I was getting sadly depressed 
about Lloyd George. I was terrified that he 
would go the way of all the rest. But your 
leader has reassured one. He [will] go on to 
deliver the nation from its greatest curse - that 
is what I gather from you.173
170 British Weekly, 14th March 1918.
171 Nicoll to Guthrie, 26th March 1918, Darlow, op.cit., 
p.272 .
172 2nd March 1918, Riddell Diaries, B.L., Add MS. 62981, 
ff.63-4.
173 Maclean to Nicoll, 11th March 1918, Nicoll Papers, 
Lumsden.
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Nicoll was left to rebuild his association with Lloyd 
George even though it was now clear the Prime Minister did 
not hold Free Church issues as paramount. Nicoll's 
political options were limited by the fact that Lloyd 
George's Conservative enemies were even more hostile to 
Nonconformist demands. Therefore the British Weekly 
continued to champion the Prime Minister and provided a 
means for Lloyd George to turn to his Free Church
constituency whenever he felt politically isolated.
Nicoll was with Lloyd George when the Prime Minister 
received the news in September 1918 that Bulgaria had 
submitted, leading him to anticipate the submission of 
Austria and Turkey.174 The war ended less than six weeks
later and the British..Weekly trumpeted the "end of the
mighty and evil system which Germany [had] built up with 
blood and tears".175
ii. C,Q.n,c.l.u,s.i-Qn:
The conviction during the war that the Government 
should use all means in its power to ensure victory allowed 
Nicoll to strip the layers of his Radical past; accepting 
the need for conscription and cooperating with Northcliffe. 
He was now heavily implicated in the shift to the right of
174 Nicoll to James Moffatt, 29th October 1918, Darlow, 
op.cit., p.277.
175 British Weekly, 14th November 1918.
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the whole Lloyd George camp.176 Gardiner's open letter in 
1916 warned Lloyd George:
Your friends have been silent long...They have 
refused to see your figure flitting about behind 
the scenes, touching the strings, prompting the 
actors, directing the game, and have agreed to 
talk of Lord Northcliffe, Sir Henry Dalziel, and 
the Reverend Dr Sir William Robertson Nicoll when 
the name that has been on their minds has been 
the name of David Lloyd George.177
Where there was disharmony between Lloyd George and 
Nicoll, it occurred because the editor remained in closer 
touch with his Free Church constituency. He knew that they 
would be outraged by Lloyd George's scheme for State 
Purchase - as was Nicoll - while the M.P. was more 
sensitive to the opposition of the working class to 
prohibition. Pressure from readers and Free Church friends 
pushed Nicoll towards extreme reactions and as always
176 In September 1915 Nicoll had further proved his value 
to Lloyd George by being instrumental in seeing off a 
vendetta by Henry Le Bas. Robert Donald sent Nicoll's 
biographer the following letter of explanation: "The letters 
which you send refer to a threatened action by Le Bas against 
Lloyd George, which would have been a very awkward thing 
during the War.
"L.G. had, before the War, threatened an injunction in 
connection with his life which Le Bas' company had published. 
Le Bas alleged that L.G. had accepted £1,000 to stop an 
injunction, and that his share of the payment, £500, had been 
obtained from him by false pretences. He wanted his money 
back. Riddell who had paid L.G. the other £500 paid Le Bas. 
The case developed into a matter of political and personal 
spite and has no public interest whatsoever, so you need not 
refer to it." Donald to Darlow, 30th January 1925, Nicoll 
Papers, Lumsden.
Nicoll received extreme gratitude for his part in the 
affair - which has not been recorded - from Stuart Paton and 
Donald, Paton to Nicoll, 15th September 1915, Donald to 
Nicoll, 14th September 1915, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden.
177 Daily News, 22nd April 1916, in Koss, S., Fleet 
Street Radical, p.189.
removed some of his room for manoeuvre. Nevertheless 
throughout the period that Nicoll was battling over the 
drink traffic he accepted the value of Lloyd George's 
leadership. He wrote to James Moffatt in March 1917,
"There is not the slightest doubt that L.G. had put a great 
deal more energy into everything, and that we are in a much 
better position than we were a year ago".178 But through 
this process the nature of British Liberalism had changed 
utterly.
The process of reconstructing the Free Churches post- 
bellum was equally difficult. In 1915 Nicoll remonstrated 
with Dr. J.D. Jones that Nonconformity needed to be told 
very plainly that its place in English life would be lost 
if it failed to play its part in the war179 but the ability 
of liberalism and religion to survive the war would only be 
known after a period of reconstruction. Griffith-Jones had 
warned that if Christianity could not be restated so as to 
meet the fundamental conditions of the new time "the only 
prospect for the future of civilisation is to face the 
Universe minus any religion at all".180 But what leaders 
like Griffith-Jones and Nicoll advocated was a spiritual 
innocence which was not possible after the war. Moreover 
the British Weekly had abandoned itself to militarism 
despite Riddell's warning that religious newspapers should 
not accentuate the asperities of the war. These journals
178 Nicoll to Moffatt, 31st March 1917, Darlow, op.cit., 
p.2 61.
179 Nicoll to Jones, 22nd October 1915, Darlow, op.cit., 
p.251.
180 Griff ith-Jones, The Challenge of Christianity, p. 219 .
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could not pretend to transcend the violence in its
aftermath. At the beginning of the war Denney judged:
The war presents to every creature whose country 
is involved in it the one great moral issue of 
our time; and for a man to say he can do nothing 
in it is to vote himself out of the moral 
world.181
However when some people judged how the Churches had 
responded to the one great moral issue of the time it 
appeared that Christian leaders were not beyond reproach. 
In July 1916 the British Weekly approached the question of 
conscientious objectors.. It accepted that the individual 
had the right - which had been exercised by saints and 
martyrs - to disobey the law when it conflicted with his 
conscience. However in the specific case of military 
service the British Weekly argued that allowing men to opt 
out on the grounds of conscience was "asking the law to
annul itself" because it would leave the nation with 
nothing but voluntary recruits. The newspaper further 
suggested that even those "who place the authority of 
conscience highest must admit that it is not
infallible".182 This type of argument did irreparable 
damage to the position of religious leaders because it put
the needs of the State above the individual conscience and
contradicted the tradition of the Free Churches. The
British Weekly had been hopelessly compromised by the war 
and as a consequence it lost the moral weight it had
achieved in British life. ■
181 This was recalled in the British Weekly, 2nd November
1922.
182 British Weekly, 13th July 1916.
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Nicoll was sixty-seven when the war ended. In 1921 he 
wrote to Sir John Clarke, "I feel that we are both of us 
victims of the War. I know I have been on the edge of a 
severe breakdown. I go on with my work, but at my age it 
is a strain".1 From the armistice until his death in 1923 
Nicoll's contributions to the British Weekly steadily 
decreased. Darlow records that Nicoll virtually retired 
after his seventieth birthday in September 1921.2 Extant 
correspondence from Jane Stoddart suggests that at least a 
year before this Nicoll was an absentee editor. He 
contributed some articles but the majority of the newspaper 
was now being written by his staff.3 Nicoll's signed 
column "Things in General" which replaced "War Notes" 
became increasingly a space for political and literary 
reminiscences rather than topical debate.
The content of leader articles also changed as 
Nicoll's grip lessened; they dealt overwhelmingly with 
religious rather than political issues. This was 
symptomatic of the position of the Free Churches in the 
post-War period. The internecine battle in the Liberal 
party exacerbated the existing trend in Nonconformist 
groups to move away from political partisanship.
1 Nicoll to John Clark, June 1921, in Darlow, op.cit., 
p.300 .
2 Darlow, op.cit., p.429.
3 Stoddart to Nicoll, 28th November 1920, 28th February 
1921, 24th July 1921, 28th August 1921, 3rd September 1921, 
7th October 1921, 12th November 1921, Nicoll Papers, Lumsden. 
This would further suggest that Stoddart's claim that Nicoll 
never wrote less than 41 leaders was a reference to his work 
preceding this period of nominal editorship. (Stoddart, 
William Robertson Nicoll, p.41.
Uncritical support for the First World War had discredited 
a very close association between religion and politics and 
drew further doubt over the Church's ability to provide 
society with a guiding moral light.4 The extension of the 
franchise to greater numbers of the unbelieving working 
class also lessened the political influence of Free Church 
leaders. Chapel was no longer seen to be the premier 
social signifier and the very real diversity of
Nonconformity was reflected in its voting patterns. The 
paralysing of the Liberal party by the Coalition made this 
appear less remarkable.
This chapter looks briefly at those political issues 
which ran through the life of the British Weekly until 
Nicoll's death, pulling together certain themes: the 
development of Lloyd George Liberalism, low-spending 
government and social reform, the Labour party, Socialism 
and Home Rule for Ireland.
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i. Accepting a Conservative Coalition:
The British Weekly and the Baptist Times were the only 
two Nonconformist newspapers to give strong support to the 
post-War Coalition.5 In May 1918 Nicoll had joined the 
cause of the newly formed Coalitionist Liberal Group and in 
November he attended a mass meeting of Liberal M.P.s and 
activists which passed a motion endorsing the Coalition
4 P.Catterall, "Morality and Politics: The Free Churches 
and the Labour Party between the Wars" Historical Journal, 
36,3 (1993) p.680. . .... .
5 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.153.
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manifesto.6 Nicoll wrote to a friend at the beginning of 
1919, "somehow the experience of the War has given me a 
great assurance of the general sense, stability and loyalty 
of the nation,"7 and the Coalition appeared to represent 
to him a practical manifestation of national unity. 
Nevertheless the Coupon Election was problematical. It had 
not been successful for Nonconformists, only one third 
having carried Lloyd George's endorsement.8 The Christian 
World saw in the election the "truth" that Lloyd George had 
been "completely captured and we had better recognise the 
fact at once".9 J.D.Jones wrote to Nicoll concerned by the 
"wholesale proscription of Independent Liberals," adding:
Frankly, I have no faith in the reforming zeal of 
a Government which has so preponderating a Tory 
element...My suspicions are confirmed when I read 
that the Welsh Church Act is to be amended &
Protection is to be introduced... The P.M. could 
have squared the Reactionaries & swept the 
country without this miserable "coupon" business 
& he himself would have been a free man.10
Nicoll did share some of these concerns but political/ 
religious issues were not given great prominence in the 
post-war British Weekly. The Welsh Church Act was given 
little coverage and there was a very muted announcement
6 K.O.Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, The Lloyd George 
Coalition Government, 1918-22, Oxford 1986, p.28, p.36.
7 Darlow, op.cit., p.284.
8 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, p.152.
9 Christian World, 7th November 1918, in Koss, 
Nonconformity in Politics, p.145.
10 Jones to Nicoll, 6th December 1918, Koss, 
Nonconformity in Politics, pp.153-4.
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that Welsh Disestablishment had been achieved on 31st March 
1920. This was remarkable given the long years Nicoll had 
battled for this cause. The British Weekly simply said 
that the "spirit in which the Welsh Church [had] been 
disestablished, and the language held by the new
Archbishops [were] full of good promise".11 It was not 
until Asquith's re-election to Parliament in 1920 that the 
British Weekly admitted its unease about the Coupon 
Election, noting the danger of a weak opposition. Even 
then it claimed that support for the Coalition was 
necessary because the country was not ready for the revival 
of party politics.12
Nicoll justified supporting the Coalition Government 
because he saw in its election a victory for Lloyd George - 
who embodied non-Socialist reconstruction - not the 
Conservative party. The British Weekly noted that the 
salient points of the Coupon Election were the triumphant 
return of Lloyd George and his colleagues; the defeat of 
Asquith and his following; the routing of the pacifists and 
the brilliant result for patriotic Labour.13 It appeared 
to believe that Lloyd George's strength in the country 
would enable him to pressurise his Coalition cohorts into 
accepting his agenda:
We hope no one is foolish enough to suppose that 
the results of the election are a vote for 
Conservatism. Conservatism was probably never so 
weak in the country as it is now. A generous,
11 British Weekly, 8th April 1920.
12 British Weekly, 13th May 192 0.
13 British Weekly, 2nd January 1919.
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far-seeing, kindly Conservatism which will work 
with Mr. Lloyd George, which will substantially 
benefit working people, will continue to have an 
honoured place and a very competent portion of 
the good things to come.14 .
Nicoll supported the type of reform which would be a 
bridge between Conservatism, Liberalism and the more 
conservative elements within the Labour party and he had 
enough confidence in Lloyd George to believe that he could 
deliver a reconstructive programme. The British Weekly 
identified the two rocks ahead as land and liquor. It 
wanted to see "compulsory expropriation [of land] on pre­
war terms, and nothing else or less will be satisfactory". 
It warned the Coalitionists of their certain fate if they 
succumbed to the landlords and the brewers.15 The 
following month in his "War Notes" Nicoll wrote that the 
desire on both sides for Liberal reunion was unmistakable 
and that the opportunity might arise from bringing forward 
an amendment appointing a committee to investigate 
profiteering.16 Yet at this stage Nicoll wanted to heal 
wounds rather than recreate the old party structure.
The British Weekly kept sustained pressure on the 
Government to deliver the social reconstruction which was 
necessary to sustain its credibility with Liberals and 
workers. Within the first months of the new administration 
it took the opportunity of a by-election defeat in 
Liverpool to remind the Government that what the electors
14 British Weekly, 2nd January 1919.
15 British Weekly, 16th January 1919.
16 British Weekly, 13th February 1919.
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had wanted was great and decisive beneficial changes which 
would be introduced immediately: "in particular they 
desired strong measures of social reform. The Government, 
it is tolerably plain, failed to be ready". The British 
Weekly had no doubts that the problem was "whether a Tory 
majority can work with a Radical Prime Minister. In order 
to do so they must be prepared to submit with good grace to 
drastic legislation...All that we read about the 
acquisition of land is profoundly unsatisfactory".17
The British Weekly continued its interest in low- 
spending Government and this was manifest in its campaign 
for cutbacks in the huge bureaucracy which had developed 
around war and reconstruction. However it did distinguish 
between this type of expenditure and that which was to be 
spent on social reform. In September 1919 it accepted that 
much stricter governmental controls were necessary in 
Government Departments but warned of the danger of running 
the business from the counting-house. Accusations of 
extravagance were all transferred onto the running of the 
government and it was now seen to be essential to the 
welfare of the country that the head of spending in 
Departments should have direct access to a supreme 
authority "in the event of his being convinced of the 
necessity of spending over and above the budgeted figure"18 
in order to provide more flexibility for social reform. In 
his own column Nicoll called for an increased building of 
houses and supported the Daily Mail's view that wooden
17 British Weekly, 20th March 1919.
18 British Weekly, 4th September 1919..
houses were the solution to the shortage.19
At the end of September the British Weekly addressed 
the fact that support for the Coalition was decreasing. It 
believed that the most important issue for the public was 
its disappointment that profiteering had been allowed to 
carry on to such an extent and that the economy had been 
allowed to linger. It argued that the public could see the 
future of the Government was ruled by men whose own 
fortunes were deeply implicated in any drastic measures 
that may be taken. The article also drew attention to the 
2,267 increase in the staff of Government Departments since 
July 1918. The British Weekly concluded:
Now if the Prime Minister will take these things 
in hand - profiteering and waste of money - he 
will not be successfully dislodged, but will 
obtain the confidence and gratitude of the 
people. But if the squandering of money is to go 
on practically unchecked, if the drink sellers 
are to have it all their own way about the sales 
of drink, if profiteering is but lightly 
diminished, the prospects of the Government are 
very dark - and dark for the best reasons.20
After Coalition by-election losses at the beginning of 
1920 Lloyd George discussed three possible options with 
Riddell: retirement, resigning in order to organise the 
Coalition Liberals or fusion between the two wings of the 
Coalition to give the Government a more positive 
identity.21 Lloyd George sought Nicoll's opinion on the 
political situation. The response provides the most
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19 British Weekly, 27th November 1919.
20 British Weekly, 25th September 1919.
21 February 1920, Riddell, Peace Conference, pp.164-6.
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comprehensive extant statement of Nicoll's private
political opinion.
While the editor believed that Lloyd George's position 
in the country was never stronger he accepted that members 
of the Government (which Nicoll referred to as "our
Government") were unpopular and that their inaction was 
severely criticised. Consistent with the line of the 
British Weekly Nicoll believed that profiteering and 
housing were the main causes of unpopularity and that 
Geddes and Churchill were liabilities. Regarding the 
possibility of Lloyd George retiring, Nicoll believed that 
it was out of the question as it would be interpreted as a 
triumph for Northcliffe and could never be justified given 
the immense majority commanded by the Prime Minister. Nor 
did Nicoll think Lloyd George should secede from the 
Coalition and form a Liberal party. He believed that the 
Wee Frees would come to very little if they were boldly 
faced, but in the meantime there would be a struggle on 
their part.
Nicoll concluded that Lloyd George should form a 
Democratic party to fight the foe of direct action: strikes 
of a murderous kind. In fighting these and insisting on 
all matters being settled in Parliament Lloyd George would 
have behind him Conservative, Liberals and a large portion 
of the Labour party. This would allow understanding with 
the Labour party on various points. The only loss would be 
that of some Tory extremists which would be bound to happen
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under any circumstances.22 This advice was followed by a 
piece in Nicoll7s signed column in March. The editor drew 
attention to speculation about "new parties" and agreed 
that by-election defeats made it necessary for the Liberal 
Coalitionists to talk about organisation. Nicoll concluded 
that perhaps too "a few who have done lip homage to the 
Coalition leader will be compelled to make a final and 
definite choice of service" .23
The following week the British Weekly led with an 
article on the "Prime Minister's Outlook". In it Lloyd 
George was again warned that his first duty was to show his 
independence and his Liberalism. The article argued that 
the Government was in danger because it appeared to be 
safeguarding the rich by every possible means and urged 
Lloyd George to "make it clear that he [was] not standing 
out as the champion of property and the opponent of 
progress". It concluded: "there is no future for Mr. Lloyd 
George as the alien leader of a selfish Toryism. We cannot 
do without him. He alone has the incommunicable fire".24 
Although much of the article made it very clear that the 
British Weekly was not in Lloyd George's pocket, it also 
helped the Prime Minister to outline for his Conservative 
Coalitionists the absolute minimum which even his most 
loyal supporters were prepared to accept.
The issue of Government expenditure was highlighted by
22 Nicoll to Lloyd George, 4th February 1920, L.G.P.,
F/43/7/15.
23 British Weekly, 18th March 1920.
24 British Weekly, 25th March 1920.
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the success of an Anti-Waste candidate in the Dover by­
election at the beginning of 1921. The British Weekly was 
"convinced" that if Lloyd George used his "unrivalled 
authority" and insisted in deeds not words in the spending 
Ministries, "the coming year may bring that relief from 
crushing taxation without which the trade of the country 
and the prosperity of its citizens cannot possibly 
revive".25 By-election defeats to Labour in Clayton and 
North Camberwell a year later prompted Nicoll to write in 
his signed column that the "security of the Coalition [was] 
seriously threatened by alienation of public confidence". 
The editor warned that the electorate did not believe that 
the Government intended to carry out the reforms suggested 
in the Geddes Report (which had recommended a reduction of 
over £75,000,000 on present outgoings). Nicoll argued that 
if the Government did not take up the theme with passion, 
disappointed electors would resolve that "whatever 
Government they give their votes to, it will not be the 
present Coalition Government. This we take to be certain. 
The whole immediate future of politics depends on the 
handling of the problem of economy".26 Again therefore 
Nicoll appeared to follow rather than lead general economic 
opinion.
Nicoll had followed Lloyd George towards the Right 
during the First World War and the British Weekly's support 
for the Coalition consolidated this position. Nevertheless 
loyalty was tempered by a great deal of criticism
25 British Weekly, 20th January 1921.
26 British Weekly, 23rd February 1922.
352
concerning the inactivity of the Government and Nicoll's 
new association with vested interests was not an altogether 
comfortable one. The editor was however sustained by a 
belief in Lloyd George's ability to build a shelter for all 
earnest reformers for the duration of reconstruction.
The British Weekly drew a clear distinction between 
expenditure on social reform which was necessary to cement 
post-war society and the wasteful expenditure of
bureaucracy. Nevertheless it did not have its own pro­
active programme of reconstruction and merely responded to 
topical debate. Despite the British Weekly's self-image as 
a Radical newspaper it did not recognise the significance 
of Addison's resignation and this exposed its limited 
understanding of the real social reform issues.
ii. Accommodating Labour:
The Coalition has been depicted as an anti-Labour, 
anti-Socialist union although the Government did attempt to 
be flexible when dealing with Trade Unions in order to 
avert the need for military action.27 The British Weekly 
largely maintained its pre-War line on the Labour Movement. 
It wanted to see cooperation between Liberal and Labour in 
order to offset the extreme Left; this was given heightened 
urgency by the impact of Bolshevism in Europe and more 
immediately by the militancy of British Trade Unions. This 
was consistent with the general aim of Lloyd George
27 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p.6, pp.55-56.
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supporters in the Coalition.28 29The British Weekly accepted 
the link between poor social conditions and support for 
radical solutions. In March 1919 it reported evidence 
given of the living conditions of Scottish miners and asked 
"Can we wonder if Bolshevism breeds and broods in darkest
Scotland? 1,29
However alongside a limited understanding of workers' 
discontent, the British Weekly was determined that vital 
industries should not be allowed to hold the country to 
ransom. In the face of the "Labour menace" it warned that 
if coal and transport were taken from the nation there was 
"no measure for the suffering that [would] result". The 
British Weekly argued that the country had awakened to the 
shame of the situation of miners and that capitalists were 
working hard to make amends. The apparent injustice of the 
situation was summed up in the lament, "We are being 
punished for the sins of our fathers even more than for our 
own" .30
The strike called by the London Police in the summer 
of 1919 prompted the British Weekly to reiterate its old 
line, that workers should not strike unless absolutely 
necessary (and could only be successful with the backing of 
public opinion) and that it was the business of the 
employer to "search out and probe into causes of even minor 
discontent among his employees and to apply the remedy
28 Turner, op.cit., p.369.
29 British Weekly, 20th March 1919.
30 British Weekly, 27th March 1919.
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before the dangerous feverish stage sets in".31 The 
British Weekly suggested that the reason why workers were 
so restless was that they were not being given a proper 
explanation for the fact that despite their wages being 
twice their pre-War level they felt no better off.32 The 
following week Lloyd George addressed the nation to explain 
that the world cost of the War had been £40,000 million and 
warned that time would be needed for the return of industry 
to peace conditions.33
The British Weekly wanted both Capital and Labour to 
accept that national unity was still essential to Britain's 
survival. It was not until the end of 1919 that Nicoll 
dropped his "War Notes" column. In September the British 
Weekly warned against the tendency in certain quarters "to 
struggle back into the ancient ruts, to imagine that a 
social scheme which is dead can be revived...Disaster must 
inevitably come of our failure to recognise that no such 
unworthy retrogression is possible". This was very much in 
line with the message of Lloyd George who described the 
sublime duty of all, "without thought or partisanship, to 
help in building up the new world, where labour shall have 
its just reward and indolence alone shall suffer want".34 
He told Riddell, "I shall not be for the 'haves' or the 
'have-nots'. My policy is to endeavour to hold an even
14th August 1919. 
14th August 1919. 
21st August 1919. 
18th September 1919
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balance between the two".35 But this was a very simplistic 
reading of post-War politics.36
The British Weekly continued to attempt to distinguish 
between militant Labour and moderate Labour leaders.
During the short lived Railway strike of October 1919 the 
British Weekly argued that what was at stake was the "right 
of one essential service to throttle the life of the 
nation, to enforce its demands by starvation of men, women 
and children, to ruin the trade of the country..." The 
spectre of Bolshevism was raised as the alternative if 
Britain abandoned constitutional government.37 The ending 
of the dispute, and the agreement of the Railway Unions not 
to strike again until after September 1920, prompted the 
British Weekly to argue that the strike had shown the good 
sense of the British people, their engrained respect for 
law and also that neutral Labour leaders had succeeded in 
their determination to make a bridge. It offered all 
credit to the leaders of the railway men.38
In the last weeks of 1919 Lloyd George delivered a 
speech at Manchester which included an attack on Socialism 
linking it to the maniac shriek of the Bolsheviks. He 
called on those who believed that society was essentially
35 20th September 1919, Riddell, Peace Conference, p.128.
36 Riddell had reminded Churchill that he and Lloyd 
George had to share the responsibility for the new order 
whether good or bad: "You have been busy for years past 
stirring up the people. Now they are stirred up and 
demanding the things you told them to demand" . 22nd July 
1919, Riddell, Peace Conference, p.105.
37 British Weekly, 2nd October 1919.
38 British Weekly, 9th October 1919.
356
working to meet those who thought it was essentially evil. 
The British Weekly's response revealed that it was not yet 
ready to adopt this tone. Although no campaigner for 
Socialism or indeed the Labour movement, the British Weekly 
held on to the view that the Left could be accommodated 
within the Lloyd George supra-party Coalition. It 
described the Prime Minister's attack as the most debatable 
part of Lloyd George's speech:
It is, in our judgement, far too soon to declare 
unrelenting war against Labour. It is also an 
error to declare that Labour is unanimous. It is 
true that Mr. Henderson has declared that a 
Labour Government would begin by a capital levy, 
a demand for the restriction of war fortunes, and 
a steeply graded income tax. But these claims 
are not irreconcilably different from the aims of 
Liberalism. The prospect before the Premier 
seems to be that of a war between Liberals and 
Conservatives in union and the Labour party. It 
is possible to conceive of other alternatives.39
In the spring of the following year the British Weekly 
criticised Lloyd George's view that all Labourists were 
Communists and Socialists who must be fought to the death. 
It stated plainly its desire "to make our protest against 
this wholesale identification of Socialism with the last 
word of the extremists", and argued that there were many 
points of cardinal importance on which Socialists, Liberals 
and Conservatives agreed; chiefly the need to raise the
39 British Weekly, 11th December 1919. In this the 
British Weekly was going against the view of both Lloyd 
George and Riddell. The latter recorded: "R: 'The Labour 
party are making excellent progress. Gay, the Labour party 
candidate at Plymouth, increased his votes by several 
thousand. It is obvious that there are going to be two 
parties - a Democratic Party with a forward programme and a 
Labour Party.' L.G.: 'Yes, that is becoming quite obvious'. 
2nd December 1919, Riddell, Peace Conference, p.148.
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condition of the worker.40
The British Weekly therefore continued its traditional 
policy of lambasting militant Labour while trying to reach 
an understanding with its more moderate members to the end 
that the country needed "industrial peace, and the highest 
standard of output in every trade".41 In August the 
formation of a Council of Action to organise a general 
strike if any British naval or military forces intervened 
against the Soviet Union was condemned by the British 
Weekly: "Threats of a general strike, mischievous at any 
time, are intolerable amidst a dangerous foreign crisis".
In the same week renewed threats of a miners' strike 
appeared as "such an appalling calamity" that the
Government was expected "to explore every avenue of 
possible settlement".42
The Coal strike was not circumvented and industrial 
action began in October 1920. The British Weekly responded 
with the Leader, "The Need for Sober Words". It agreed 
with the Government's main contention that it could not 
suffer one of the great necessities of life being in the 
hands of any section of the community: "If the miners were 
allowed to succeed in their claims, then the way is open 
for other trades, hardly of less importance, to do the 
same". Nevertheless the main message of the British Weekly 
was a call for conciliation:
40 British Weekly, 25th March 1920.
41 British Weekly, 22nd January 1920.
42 British Weekly, 19th August 1920.
Let the peacemakers do their utmost...Let every 
proposal be explored. Let all this be done in a 
spirit of calmness and of charity. The miners 
did great things during the war. There is no 
reason to credit them with a double dose of 
original sin. If they are fairly and gently 
used, we may come sooner than we think to a 
settlement which will more than reward our 
hopes.43
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The following year the British Weekly again returned 
to the question of industrial strife in an article by Jane 
Stoddart, "Need there be a Class War?" The assistant 
editor replied with a resounding "No". She presented three 
ways in which the Government could counter the "perilous 
doctrine of class warfare": by proving the falsity of 
syndicalism; counter-acting the plotters by showing the 
immense gains already won by labour thanks to Lloyd George 
and Asquith; and by fostering a new comradeship:
The business of statesmen in the future will be 
to see that no descendant of the war-winners 
shall be compelled to bear on his shield the sad 
word desdichado - disinherited.44
In 1919 Stoddart had written a piece on the debt of 
Labour to the Churches which was an attempt to show that 
"organised Christianity [was] awake, as never before, to 
the just claims of Labour". She claimed that during the 
Railway strike of that year "not a word was spoken 
from...leading pulpits which could prejudice the cause of 
the men. The Church and the people have sealed a new
43 British Weekly, 21st October 1920.
44 British Weekly, 14th April 1921.
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alliance".45 Stoddart was correct in noting this increased 
cooperation46 and on many occasions the same could have 
been said of the position of her newspaper. But Stoddart 
and the British Weekly failed to recognise that implicit 
support was not enough for the Radicalised Labour of post­
war Britain. Industrial relations involved coercion as 
well as mediation and the British Weekly's belief in the 
possibility of balanced arbitration was a luxury which 
those involved on both sides of disputes could not afford. 
In not coming out strongly in favour of Labour, the British 
Weekly effectively aligned itself with the status quo and 
the employers as did Lloyd George and the Coalition.
iii. Foreign Affairs:
Lloyd George lost what remained of his traditional 
Radical support more through his attitudes to Germany and 
Ireland than he did through his attitude to Labour.
Clifford was so opposed to the Prime Minister's anti-German 
position and the nature of the General Election that he 
took the Chair of a Free Church demonstration in support of 
the Labour party in December 1918.47 Indeed Lloyd George 
was criticised by Radicals and reactionaries during the 
Peace Conference of 1919. Much of the anger of the British 
press was a result of the secretive nature of the
45 British Weekly, 11th December 1919.
46 Catterall, "Morality and Politics" pp.667-685.
47 Koss, Nonconformity in Politics, pp.146-7.
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negotiations.48 However the British Weekly remained a 
steadfast supporter of the Prime Minister. This was no 
doubt in part due to the fact that George Riddell, as the 
official representative of the British press, corresponded 
with Nicoll throughout. Lloyd George had asked the British 
Weekly editor to join him in Paris but Nicoll declined, 
feeling too old for the task.49 In April the British 
Weekly declared that the "country had not withdrawn its 
support from the great leader who won the war," and nor 
would it "easily pardon those who [sought] to discredit him 
in a faithful hour".50
The draft terms of the Treaty revealed the following 
month prompted A.G. Gardiner to write "If the Peace Terms 
are the last word we have to say to Germany...Let us bury 
the Covenant and prepare for war in whatever quarter it may 
break out".51 In contrast the British Weekly decided that 
the Prime Minister had put the whole force of his own 
genius into the Treaty and that Europe would benefit from 
his "reconciling, healing efforts". It saw as the best 
hope for the future a democratic government in Germany 
which could become a member of the League of Nations and 
obtain some modification of the Peace terms.52 Reporting 
the joy in Britain as Germany signed the Treaty, the
48 March 1919, Riddell, Peace Conference, p.41.
49 Darlow, op.cit., pp. 287-8. This was told to the author 
by Nicoll's daughter, Mildred Kirkcaldy.
•50 British Weekly, 17th April 1919.
51 Koss, Political Press, p. 799 .
52 British Weekly, 15th May 1919 .
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British Weekly saw the League as the most important
element:
A peace on paper, even though ratified by-
Germany, and enforced by sternest guarantees, 
will not satisfy the British democracy. The 
League of Nations must rule, or civilisation is 
destined to go down in unimaginable horrors.53
Nicoll's militaristic past allowed him to be more 
amenable to the severity of the Peace Terms than other 
Radicals. But the flow of communication from Riddell also 
helped to include Nicoll in the process and impressed upon 
him a sense of the narrowness of Lloyd George's room for 
manoeuvre and the difficulty of the task.
Lloyd George's other foreign policy preoccupation was 
Russia and it also proved divisive. Churchill's bellicose 
opposition to the post-Revolutionary regime was at odds 
with the general temper of the British nation and with the 
attitude of Lloyd George. In September 1919 the British 
Weekly criticised the uncertainty of the Government's 
policy asking how long Churchill was to be allowed to pour 
men and money into his campaign against the Bolshevists 
which could only succeed if Britain declared war on Russia. 
It believed that while Lenin and Trotsky had the peasantry 
behind them, "outside interference [was] doomed to 
failure".54 In January the following year the British 
Weekly carried the Leader "War No More" which argued that 
Churchill did not understand the mind of the nation: "They
53 British Weekly, 3rd July 1919 .
54 British Weekly, 25th September 1919, 20th November
1919.
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will not have war at any price. They are so wearied, so 
exhausted, so bereft, that hardly any cause would stir them 
to a renewal of the horrors that have been stamped
indelibly on the minds of all..." It called finally for 
the removal of Churchill from the Cabinet, or at least the 
War Office.55 The piece had an impact as Lloyd George told 
Riddell:
While we were in Paris, Winston was very excited 
about Russia. I had to handle him firmly. He 
was most insistent, and prepared to sacrifice 
both men and money. Now he is changing his views 
on Russia. I think the leader in this week's 
British Weekly, which is able and bitter, helped 
to modify his ideas.56
The British Weekly did not stop haranguing Churchill 
whom it appeared had not significantly altered his 
position. Although it was opposed in principle to the 
Council of Action the British Weekly admitted that the "one 
excuse for the threat of violence... is the intense distrust 
felt by the working classes for Mr. Winston Churchill" who 
increasingly became a source of weakness to the Government. 
Churchill's suggestion that Britain should ally with 
Germany' to fight Soviet Russia "was hateful to patriotic 
men of all parties".57 The British Weekly was prepared to 
follow Lloyd George's approach to Germany and Russia 
(although censuring Churchill) which has been described as
55 British Weekly, 22nd January 1920.
56 24th January 1920, Riddell, Peace Conference, pp.162­
3 .
57 British Weekly, 19th August 192 0.
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a preoccupation with appeasement.58
iv. Reprisals in Ireland:
The Government's policy in Ireland was not one of
conciliation and required increasing military resources but 
the British Weekly gave its full support to the Prime 
Minister. Sinn Fein had set up the Irish Bail after their 
overwhelming victory in the 1918 General Election. This 
was not declared illegal until September 1919 and by then 
certain structures of the new Irish State were already in 
place.59 This new political situation allowed the British 
Weekly to shift its support towards its Protestant brethren 
in the counties of the North East. In a signed piece 
Nicoll argued that the case for Protestant Ulster had to be 
restated: "It must now be admitted... that they [Ulster 
Protestants] are asked to do a much harder thing [than have 
an understanding with Redmond and the Nationalists]. They 
are asked to submit to the Sinn Feiners and to join in an 
independent Irish Republic. That they can never do".60 
The British Weekly accepted Lloyd George's refusal to 
constitute Ireland as a Republic and his argument that to 
do so would be to negate the whole purpose of the war by 
creating a country over whose harbours and inlets Britain 
had no control and which would jeopardise or ruin the
58 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p.133.
59 R.F.Foster, Modern Ireland 1600-1972, (paperback) 
London 1988, p.495.
60 British Weekly, 17th July 1919.
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Empire. Nevertheless it did not want to see the wholesale 
alienation of the Irish people by repeating the blunders 
that came after the 1916 Rebellion.61
Lloyd George was not sensitive to the lessons of the 
past in Ireland and while not conceding that the increasing 
violence constituted a "war" {and therefore having to rely 
on the police to enforce order) he did support a policy of 
unofficial reprisals by the Black and Tans and Auxiliaries 
sent in to help the police.62 This brought on him
condemnation from all sections including the I.L.P., the 
Northcliffe press and C.P.Scott who severed his friendship 
with Lloyd George as a consequence.63 In contrast the 
British Weekly had no criticism of Government policy and in 
June 1920 argued:
The gravity of the situation compels a truce to 
niggling criticism. If the voice of 
reconciliation is to be heard in Ireland we must 
abandon party bickerings among ourselves. It is 
almost incredible that in this fateful hour any 
writer of intelligence should blame the Prime 
Minister for the Irish troubles.64
In the summer an Irish Emergency Bill was placed on 
the Statute Book and the British Weekly dismissed criticism 
of its severity from Asquith: "Like Mr. Asquith we deeply 
deplore the necessity of exceptional measures of severity, 
and the overriding of the jury system, but we ask, would 
he, if in power, suffer a continuance of the hideous
61 British Weekly, 1st January 192 0.
62 Foster, Modern Ireland, pp.497-498.
63 Morgan, Consensus and Disunity, p.125.
64 British Weekly, 24th June 1920.
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atrocities now prevalent in Ireland?"65 In December the 
British Weekly put its support behind the introduction of 
Martial Law, declaring that the measure received the 
support of all moderates in Ireland and encouraged 
wholeheartedly every authority, organisation and individual 
who was prepared to work for peace.66 Conversely coercion 
was more likely to have the effect of pushing young 
moderates towards violent opposition.67
In November 1920 a "court" consisting of prominent 
Americans had been set up to hear testimonies on the 
situation in Ireland. The Manchester Guardian discussed 
its findings in a leader at the end of March the following
year:
in the main the facts, unhappily, are only too 
far past dispute...A few men like Sir Hamar 
Greenwood [Secretary of State for Ireland] have 
landed us in the dock, without a defence, before 
the consciences of mankind.68
Undeterred Nicoll continued his support for Government 
policy. At the end of May 1921 he received the news that 
he was to be appointed a Member of the Order of Companions 
of Honour in the King's Birthday Honours List.69 Hamar 
Greenwood wrote with congratulations and received a reply 
from Nicoll which he passed on to the Prime Minister.
65 British Weekly, 12th August 1920.
66 British Weekly. 16th December 1920.
67 Foster, Modern Ireland, p.498.
68 Manchester Guardian, 31st March 1921, T.P.Coogan, De 
Valera: lone fellow, lone shadow, London 1993, p.184.
69 Darlow, op.cit., p.302.
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Nicoll wrote:
Of all the kind messages I have received none has 
pleased me so much as yours. It was indeed 
wonderful that out of your kindness in midst of 
your overwhelming labours you found time to write 
me a letter of congratulation. I am most proud 
of the letter and most grateful to you. You do 
not need to be told that I am in full sympathy 
with you in your heavy task. You have shown 
yourself already to be both a brave and a wise 
man.70
In July 1921 a truce was declared in Ireland and Lloyd 
George offered a "Dominion Status" package which proved 
unacceptable to Dail Eireann and Sinn Fein. Before it had 
been rejected the British Weekly declared that no enemy of 
Britain would "ever again be able to accuse her of meanness 
or selfishness in her dealings with the sister island".71 
It remained optimistic even after the Bail's rejection.72 
The weight of public opinion and the prospect of having to 
rule 26 counties in Ireland indefinitely under Martial Law 
(6 counties in Ulster had already been conceded their own 
Parliament in a reworking of Carson's pre-War Provisional 
Government) forced Lloyd George to accept a Conference with 
the Irish leaders. For the British Weekly the Prime 
Minister had won the reward for his patient toil and 
invincible hopefulness.73 The outcome of the Treaty 
negotiations were greeted with "profound thankfulness" by
70 Greenwood to Lloyd George, 9th June 1921, Nicoll to 
Greenwood, 8th June 1921, (copy) Lloyd George Papers, 
H.L.R.O., F/19/5/1, F/19/51.
71 British Weekly,
72 British Weekly,
73 British Weekly,
18th August 1921. 
1st September 1921.
6th October 1921.
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the British Weekly which declared that the nation's 
thoughts went out with gratitude "to all who, under God, 
have had their share in the blessed work of
reconciliation" .74
The British Weekly was not uninterested in the future 
of Ireland and gave ample coverage to the main developments 
there. However it maintained its dispassionate approach to 
the politics of the island and colluded in Government 
oppression when other Liberal voices were raised in 
opposition. The Northcliffe press no doubt saw Ireland as 
another stick with which to beat Lloyd George but many 
Radicals were genuinely repelled by Government policy. The 
Treaty which Lloyd George negotiated in 1921 was resented 
by many Conservatives and would assist the Prime Minister's 
eventual passing. Therefore Nicoll's support was very 
important to Lloyd George and the editor undoubtedly felt 
the full weight of his responsibility. It was consistent 
with the British Weekly's position since its inception in 
which Ireland was not significant enough to dictate 
allegiance to the Liberal party. When Nicoll agreed with 
the party leadership on other major policy issues he 
accepted the official line on Ireland. This allowed him to 
accept Home Rule in 1886, the side-lining of Home Rule 
after 1894 and its re-introduction before and after the 
First World War. Ireland never impressed itself on 
Nicoll's conscience.
74 British Weekly, 8th December 1921.
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v. The Collapse of the Coalition:
Unionist rebellion over the Irish Treaty aggravated 
the problems of the Coalition which had been endemic since 
its inception. Lloyd George was an over-mighty member of 
the Cabinet with no official party organisation. There 
would inevitably be a tussle over what the electorate had 
mandated: Conservatism or Lloyd George. The crisis was 
reached in July 1922 when Lloyd George was forced into 
accepting a Royal Commission to examine the process of 
granting Honours. Nicoll noted that there was "not much 
enthusiasm about the Birthday Honours, but there is 
satisfaction, and the new publicists who have been rewarded 
are men who have served the State".75 There was very 
little coverage in the British Weekly concerning the 
dispute; however the Parliamentary correspondent did 
conclude that friends of the Government ridiculed "the idea 
of any person going, with the authority or knowledge of 
responsible Ministers, up and down the country selling 
honours for cash on delivery" .76
The obvious fragmentation of the Coalition led Lloyd 
George to renegotiate his relationship with his pre-War 
constituency. In February 1922 he invited Free Church 
leaders to breakfast in Downing Street and the Westminster 
Gazette warned that there was "the lingering air of 
suspicion that the Prime Minister is turning to 
Nonconformity again in the hope of securing some political
75 British Weekly, 8th June 1922.
76 British Weekly, 20th July 1922.
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backing".77 The British Weekly entertained no such
reservations. During the summer Lloyd George joined 
leading Free Churchmen at a dinner hosted by Sir Murray 
Hyslop. Ernest Hodder-Williams wrote a sympathetic leader 
on the Prime Minister's theme "The Business of the 
Churches" and the British Weekly had invited a response 
from the Ministers present. Rev. Thomas Yates, Chairman of 
the Congregational Union, pre-empted criticism of the 
political nature of the evening:
The attempt to represent it as a gathering of one 
political colour, or as an election move, became 
merely fatuous in view of the character both of 
the assembly and of the speeches. The host of 
the occasion is, I believe a whole-hearted 
supporter of the Coalition, though he said 
nothing even remotely suggesting it... It was as 
mixed a company politically as the Free Churches 
are mixed.
The British Weekly added its own view that Lloyd George had 
"cleverly disarmed all possible opposition or criticism by 
beginning his speech with the statement that he proposed to 
ignore politics and speak as a Free Churchman".78 If the 
Chairman of the Congregational Union was politically naive 
the British Weekly certainly was not and this provided a 
striking example of the disingenuousness of its reporting 
of the Prime Minister.
The inevitability of a General Election which was 
anticipated in the autumn of 1922 had the effect of pushing 
the British Weekly towards a less tolerant view of the
77 Westminster Gazette, 25th February 1922, in Koss, 
Nonconformity in Politics, pp.159-160.
78 British Weekly, 3rd August 1922.
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Labour party. Although claiming to accept that it should 
be fairly represented in the House of Commons, the British 
Weekly claimed that everyone should understand that 
Labour's unofficial programme was something approaching the 
nationalisation of all important industries.79 By October 
the British Weekly was arguing that the next Government 
must be a Coalition since no single party could command a 
decisive majority in the House of Commons and that the real 
enemy which must be fought was that extreme type of 
Revolutionary Socialism linked with Bolshevism in Russia.
It reminded its readership that it was less than two years 
since the country had been threatened with "direct action" 
in the form of industrial strikes which would have 
paralysed the life of the community.80 This was very much 
at odds with the British Weekly's former efforts to 
distinguish very clearly between the moderate Labour party 
and more extreme direct action. At the beginning of 
November in its Election leader "Into the Battle" the 
British Weekly suggested that there was very little 
difference in the proposals being put forward by rival 
groups, except for the Labour party with its militant 
Socialism which made it stand out from the other three 
principal groups.81
Lloyd George was forced from the Premiership by a vote 
at the Carlton Club in October 1922. The British Weekly
wrote a restrained leader on "The Two Prime Ministers"
79 British Weekly, 10th August 1922.
80 British Weekly, 19th October 1922.
81 British Weekly, 2nd November 1922.
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which listed Lloyd George's virtues and provided a tolerant 
profile of Bonar Law.82 The following month the 
Conservatives won a clear majority in the General Election 
winning 347 seats. The collapse of the Liberal vote 
prompted the British Weekly to turn again to the idea of 
Liberal reunion; it claimed to have received many letters 
from both wings of the Liberal party in support of this 
view: "It is pleasant to have these assurances of a better 
day,...For ourselves we are convinced that the Liberal 
principles are again to have their day".83 The temporary 
hostility towards the Labour party was abandoned and the 
British Weekly again attempted to explain that when Lloyd 
George talked about one "common foe" he was not talking 
about the party of Clynes and Henderson, but the dangerous 
section of the party which sought to overthrow the State.84
The theme which defined the politics of the first 
issues of the British Weekly had returned in the months 
before Nicoll's death: "The peril which threatens a divided 
Liberal Party is that of extinction". It still hoped for a 
Progressive alliance, accepting that there was "a growing 
alternative party which makes a strong appeal to bold 
reformers" but arguing that Lloyd George was as keen as any 
Labour leader for better housing or generous treatment of 
unemployed.85 The British Weekly supported the Liberal's 
last gasp at the end of 1923 and carried a message from
82 British Weekly,
83 British Weekly,
84 British Weekly,
85 British Weekly,
26th October 1922.
30th November 1922.
8th March 1923.
8th March 1923.
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Asquith to his countrymen of the Free Churches which 
asserted that Liberalism was still following the path of 
sanity and peace, and opposing any encroachment upon 
freedom of trade, enterprise and opinion.85 When the 
future of the Liberal party was sealed in January 1924 the 
British Weekly nevertheless heard in Ramsay McDonald's 
victory speech at the Albert Hall "scarcely a word with 
which any Liberal could disagree".86 7 Stephen Koss has 
argued that the British Weekly's assertion the following 
October that it was "willing to give the idea of Liberalism 
a broad and inclusive interpretation"88 was representative 
of the broader Liberal campaign in which "Liberalism had 
been elasticised to stretch in either direction".89 
Consequently, it had ceased to have an independent identity 
or the vibrancy necessary to survive the post-war political 
world.
vi. Conclusion:
The last years of Nicoll's life coincided with the 
palpable decline of political Nonconformity and the end of 
the power in journalism of nineteenth century "men of 
letters". These external forces had an effect on the
British Weekly and the weakened health of its editor meant
86 British Weekly, 22nd November 1923.
87 British Weekly, 10th January 1924.
88 British Weekly, 16th October 1924.
89 Koss, Political Press, p.879.
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that it lacked energy and focus in the immediate post-War 
years. Free Church issues such as Fisher's Education 
proposals in 1920 and the possible reintroduction of State 
Purchase in 1919 brought from the British Weekly warning 
shots but there was no attempt to revitalise political 
Nonconformity by developing agitation on these themes.90
The religious content of the British Weekly became 
increasingly removed from the political sphere. Jane 
Stoddart wrote a series of articles against Spiritualism 
which were eventually turned into a book.91 These were an 
attempt to counteract the tidal wave of Spiritualism which 
had gathered during the war and after, predominantly among 
the bereaved. The British Weekly, in its review of 
Stoddart's book, urged Churches to propagate a message 
"calling their people to trust and to wait for the reunion 
with the longed-for and the lost".92 The orthodox 
Christian Churches had to battle to sustain their position 
in a time when realism had replaced romanticism and belief 
systems had been severely tested by the War. Therefore 
many concentrated on defending their theological message 
and protected themselves from the further criticism of 
being too closely associated with political parties. The 
great Nonconformist battles were a thing of the past and 
Nicoll had never taken on a fight unless he was sure of his
90 At the end of 1919 Nicoll noted that there were 
rumours of the revival of State Purchase. He concluded that 
the danger was not imminent but the situation needed 
watching. British Weekly, 20th November 1919.
91 J.T.Stoddart, The Case Against Spiritualism, London
1919. ~
92 British Weekly, 20th November 1919.
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side.
Nicoll's relationship with Lloyd George was central to 
the the political nature of the British Weekly after the 
War. The Prime Minister was strong in the country but had 
lost much of the fabric of his organised support. The 
fragmentation of the Nonconformist political voice robbed 
him of his natural constituency and his collusion with the 
Conservatives had left him bereft of his former Radical 
supporters. The acquisition of the Daily Chronicle and the 
setting up of the Lloyd George Liberal Magazine also 
signalled the Prime Minister's declining relationship with
other members of the Press. In this environment the
continued support of the British Weekly had even greater 
significance and this intensified the relationship between 
the newspaper and Lloyd George.
The British Weekly understood the need to make room 
for Labour and the period of reconstruction saw Nicoll give 
unprecedented attention to the broader issue of social 
reform (although as always his newspaper was short on 
specific policy initiatives). It was on domestic affairs 
that the British Weekly was most critical of Lloyd George, 
aware of the danger should he be seen as a puppet of the 
Conservatives. It differed with the Prime Minister most 
strongly on the alienation of moderate Labour, the British 
Weekly having believed that the Coalition's task was truly 
to create a large Progressive Centre to stand against the 
extreme Left and Right. Nicoll saw the period very much as 
an extension of the War emergency and fought against the 
revival of party politics . This helped him to avoid
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recognising that he too had shifted from his former Radical 
base. However the War had polarised politics in Britain 
and Nicoll's hope of national unity did not survive beyond
1921.
Nicoll's death in May 1923 removed the final illusion 
of political strength from Nonconformists. His successor 
Rev. J. M. E. Ross lacked Nicoll1s political acumen and 
Jane Stoddart lacked his political contacts. The confusion 
within the Liberal party was reflected in the British 
Weekly and it disappeared from political significance under 
its new leadership.
CONCLUSION
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This thesis has been an examination of British 
Nonconformity as it was represented by Nicoll and the 
British Weekly from 1886 to 1923. It traces the 
development of Nicoll's political character - his 
relationship with the Liberal party and the expanding 
democracy during this period. It has also explored the way 
in which the weekly print medium through which he worked 
shaped Nicoll's responses. This thesis has been interested 
in the interplay between religion and politics in the 
finale of political Nonconformist strength.
This work set out to prove that the British Weekly was 
a journal with a very specific political and sectarian 
agenda. Despite Nicoll's protestations to the contrary the 
British Weekly was created to capture the Liberal Free 
Church readership lost to the Christian World when it 
turned Liberal Unionist. Nicoll wanted to invigorate the 
Radical Nonconformist presence within the Liberal party and 
strengthen the party's commitment to the campaign for 
religious equality. The British Weekly did not represent 
the special relationship between Gladstone and the Free 
Churches and within two years of the Home Rule split it was 
vilifying the Liberal leader for his lack of commitment to 
disestablishment. The Irish question did not constitute 
the pressing moral issue which kept Nicoll alongside the 
official Liberal party; this was religious equality.
The urgency with which the British Weekly pressed the 
campaign for disestablishment was a recognition of two 
factors: firstly that many Nonconformist grievances had
already been removed (such as compulsory Church rates and
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religious tests at Oxford and Cambridge), reducing the 
sense of alienation of the Free Churches and their 
politicisation which in turn reduced support for 
disestablishment. Secondly, that the extension of the 
franchise to a wider, less religious working class 
necessarily reduced the political influence of the Free 
Churches and altered the nature of political debate. The 
British Weekly attempted to link the new language of 
democracy to that of disestablishment but religious 
equality was not immediately relevant to the majority of 
working class voters.
The realization that electoral reform had transformed 
politics forced the British Weekly to partake of the social 
reform debate. This analysis shows that Nicoll's main 
motivation in this area was to present the Liberal party as 
having the ability and commitment to accommodate the Labour 
movement within its programme. The British Weekly carried 
many articles on Socialism which it attempted to prove 
could be encompassed within the broad progressive force 
already existing in the Liberal party. Rosebery appeared 
as a possible leader of this reforming church and the 
British Weekly supported the direction he was thought to 
give in Gladstone's wake.
This thesis shows, however, that Nicoll's association 
with the Liberal Imperialists was more the consequence of 
other factors. Rosebery represented a move away from the
dominance of Home Rule and his close association with 
Robert Perks suggested that he would incorporate the Free 
Church agenda within his progressive programme. The
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Roseberyites also appealed to Nicoll's imperialist
instincts which saw him support the British cause during 
the Boer war and later, high Naval Estimates.
When the Liberals achieved power in 1906 the British 
Weekly could support their reforming programme because much 
of it was prescriptive and because the burden of payment 
was not to fall on to the middle classes. However Nicoll
also supported Lloyd George because he had a reputation as 
a Free Church M.P. who campaigned against the 1902 
Education Act and fought for Welsh Disestablishment. Lloyd 
George's past as a "Pro-Boer" was not prohibitive to a 
working relationship with the British Weekly editor because 
sectarian concerns were more important to Nicoll than 
imperial issues. Nicoll was prepared to sacrifice some of 
his independence in order to move into Lloyd George's inner 
circle because he felt it was important that Free Church 
leaders should have the ear of a senior Minister. It had
been a source of anger that Gladstone never had a
Nonconformist as a close friend. The Free Churches finally 
had someone in a position of power who was truly responsive 
to their particular demands. Unlike Rosebery, Lloyd George 
understood very well the language and tradition of Dissent 
and this was an important conquest for Nicoll. His wrath 
during the First World War revealed the extent to which 
Nicoll expected Lloyd George to bow to his Free Church 
past. Records of Nicoll's contact with Lloyd George reveal 
that the editor was still pressing sectarian issues long 
after they had lost political immediacy. However this 
thesis also shows that Nicoll was rather dazzled by his
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association with Lloyd George and was consequently
compromised by this link.
As a newspaper the British Weekly was one of the main 
formulators of the idea of the "Nonconformist Conscience". 
Price Hughes first used the term in 1890 during the Parnell 
scandal. At this time and during resistance to the 1902 
Education Act the "Nonconformist Conscience" was used to 
describe the assertiveness of political Nonconformity; the 
term does not refer to individual conscience but to a 
collective voice. By the end of the nineteenth century, 
the Free Churches had begun to look to the State to 
legislate for morality. Therefore the shared conscience 
was necessarily political. It was used by journals like 
the British Weekly to raise the collective consciousness of 
Dissenters in an attempt to impress their moral value 
system on the national mind.
This work also demonstrates how the newspaper medium 
affected the way in which the British Weekly expressed this 
Free Church conscience. Nicoll dictated his contributions
to a secretary and they read like sermons which gathered 
emotion as they progressed. As a journalist he had to make 
his points clearly and concisely and this often simplified 
the debate. He was also hostage to these weekly diatribes. 
Equally Nicoll could not remain silent on important issues. 
He could omit certain pieces of news from his paper, and 
relegate information to the centre pages, but on major 
political and social issues the British Weekly had to put 
something on record. This certainly had a propulsive 
influence during the passive resistance movement and during
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the campaign against State Purchase during the First World
War.
The issues which dominated political debate changed 
from the moral crusades of the nineteenth century to the 
social and industrial campaigns of the twentieth century 
and the Free Churches could not find a united voice on 
modern issues. The implosion of the Liberal party also 
removed the only secure base of Nonconformist influence and 
exacerbated a trend in which Dissenters were drifting to 
the Left and Right. The position of some Free Church 
leaders during the First World war left them exposed to 
criticism when the war ended. The British Weekly had been 
instrumental in keeping the shared consciousness of the 
Free Churches alive and refreshing the cultural memory of 
its readers long after Nonconformity ceased to be a 
powerful political force. In the post-war reconstruction 
the link between religion and politics was further severed 
and the Liberal party was in irreversible decline. 
Furthermore the deaths of Nicoll and Clifford in 1923 dealt 
a severe blow to the collective strength of Nonconformity, 
representing the end of an era.
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